

- ② Walls of adjoining houses are blasted, and troops move forward through the houses, chopping-up parties of infantry follow. (making such covered approaches facilitates evacuation of wounded and supply of ammunition and rations).
- ③ As soon as a building has been taken, it is consolidated: windows and other openings are turned into firing ports. Since underground passages and sewers provide the enemy with routes and means of communication, the entrances to cellars, stairs, etc, are to be given special attention. If subterranean passages cannot be chopped up immediately, the entrances must be barricaded, or blown in and guarded. Troops will not stand around idly.
- ④ Even the most completely ruined houses must be occupied or covered by fire. Reconnaissance patrols are detailed to deny access to them and to ferret out any hostile stragglers who may have occupied them.
- ⑤ As far as possible, random destruction of potential cover can be prevented by strict discipline. Only outbuildings affording the enemy covered approach to vital points should be destroyed.
- ⑥ The fire power of all armored vehicles must be conserved by all means. In street fighting they are very much exposed to close range anti-tank attacks. This makes them fundamentally unsuited for "bulldozer" tasks. The accompanying infantry therefore protects them against surprise attack of any kind. When attacking such obstacles and obstacles, the infantry approaches first and forces a passage through the obstacles. Usually divisions of such occupied areas are put to work clearing of debris.
- ⑦ Rifle and machine gun fire must be delivered promptly and steadily from all newly captured buildings. Rifle fire is concentrated on group targets to keep the enemy's heads down. The enemy is not given a moment's rest, but feels himself perpetually observed and engaged. Rapid opening of fire is especially important, to avoid giving the enemy time to withdraw to alternate positions.
- ⑧ All available sappers are employed to clear debris. The second army to face this point relentlessly, even though the work is performed under fire.
- ⑨ Trucks must be employed to drag fire and silence it. Our intentions must be changed constantly: jeeps & other trucks & imaginative tactics must be devised.
- ⑩ Assault detachments are instructed in matters of cooperation, use of fire, and movements. Cooperation will be improved, if the assault detachments face each other constantly in the picture and if they report regularly on their position & intentions.
- ⑪ When tanks are used in street fighting, it should be employed as a tank infantry team. That is, a small infantry unit will be detailed to cooperate directly with tanks. The heavier the fighting, the greater the casualties will be, if the following principles are not observed:—
 - ① No splitting of forces.
 - ② Thorough and purposeful concentration of fire.
 - ③ Progressive infantry exploitation of tank fire.
 - ④ The closest mutual support throughout each attack.

It may be only a footprint or the distant sparkle of a twig, but either should be sufficient to arouse the suspicions of well trained men & cause them to take additional precautions in that particular area. Regardless of the terrain features a clearing always is and may be the danger spot. Wet should be avoided if possible. However, if necessity forces such area to be negotiated, one must use practical use the elementary principle regarding the use of terrain and the need for covering fire.

However, one must take into consideration that no one ambush will be ever be exactly like another. A leader preparing an ambush first satisfies himself that the chance will be profitable. An important thing to remember is that all ambush relies for its success entirely upon surprise. Also, an ambush must have a reserve to take advantage of favorable opportunities and to deal with the unexpected.

Enemy reaction to ambush is remarkably predictable:

- 1) The leading elements will slow off the approach path and tries an out-flanking or pincer movement.
- 2) Within 5 minutes the enemy mortar is in action, saturating the potential approach route and the general area in which the ambush has been prepared. It follows that unless arrangements have been made to the contrary, the enemy will be left in possession of the battlefield and will be able to dispose of our wounded, capture the wounded, and thus prevent us from getting identifications.

Therefore, any plans for such ambush action may well prove for our own good to remain in at least temporary possession of the battlefield.

When an ambush takes place and a fire fight follows, there is bound to be a certain degree of confusion. For this reason, the rehearsal for the ambushing party is essential. It may take some hours before the fighting party can assemble at the rendezvous (concealment). There fore, if we are to take advantage of the advantage during the period of confusion, it is clear that the deserter should be brought into action and fully rehearsed.

The relative strengths of the ambushing party and its reserve depends largely on the mission. If the mission is intended to make confusion and then a limited effort to undertake the main fighting, the ambushing party may be very small indeed, possibly just a leader and a few men. On the other hand, if it is intended that large enemy patrol could be ambushed, the ambushing party should be significantly stronger and be sub-divided into two, three, or more groups. The enemy element which has been standard operating procedures should be taken into consideration during ambush action.

When ambushed, the enemy soldier have been known to drop down and remain dead, lying still for long periods. It has been found advisable to ensure that they are really dead is by firing at the wounded enemy. If there is no reaction as the firing ceases or as close to the wounded as possible, search one enemy. Usually the majority of the enemy will scatter on both side of the approach route and to take cover and disengagement. This, when preparing such ambush tactic - its essential that the ambushing party placed on both sides of the enemy approach route are not permitted to the danger of the sub-divided elements with firing into each other. Scattering the elements on both side of the route minimizes the loss potential. However, as a rule, the terrain will dictate the answer to this problem.

When an ambush is prepared on a hillside, there may be a question as to whether the enemy should be stopped on the slope or higher ground than the ambusher. The ambushing party, in ambushing the enemy should do both. If possible, the ambushing party should be positioned on the hillside and the ambushing party should be positioned on the hillside.