

more rapidly when they are fleeing downhill. It may be advisable that Sniper's  
Sentry's & Persed can handle this aspect of the situation.

The problem of preparing ambush along a dusty trail without leaving footprints or any  
other evidence of our intentions, deserves very careful considerations. Often it is  
advisable to approach the ambush position by cutting a path through some distance  
thru the undergrowth or heavily forested terrain. As an alternative, it sometimes is  
possible to approach on foot, or other methods may be improvised, but the danger of  
leaving footprints & its solution is something which always must be given first  
consideration. Neglect of this single factor may result in the entire ambush  
proving a costly failure, as well as the possibility of the ambush party being put  
into the same position as a victim by the enemy forces. Thus, if attacked by  
enemy forces in our supposed position, it is best to effect a breakthrough in the  
furnishing line as soon as possible, preferably during the initial attack by neutralizing  
his fire power. Even when we can take advantage of the heavy concentration of the  
supposedly heavily forested terrain feature, the enemy has the same advantages, so  
it is important for us to devise plans which will tempt the enemy to scatter and waste  
his fire. In this connection, it should be noted that jeeps are useful in confusing the enemy.

The enemy understands machinery & mechanical equipments and is adept at  
handling them. Speed characterise his actions and they are capable of altering  
his tactics quickly. Against these admitted military assets, we must not lose  
the decided superiority of the enemy. Being disciplined & regimented, the average  
enemy soldier depends too much on his superiors for orders, and is deficient  
in spiritual strength, since in Axis country "the state comes first". The average  
enemy soldier is very susceptible to concentrated firing, & become passive unless we strike  
him in his mind continuously. Enemy soldier who are regimented in their training  
have proved in past actions that their sense of personal responsibility is not necessarily  
high and they are prone to their security measures and arm. They are superior in  
mind overhauling they can crush their opposition by force of numbers, but they are  
individuals, fighting in small groups, they are more likely to surrender when the situation  
seems unworkable to hold their position. However, this cannot be considered as a  
true index of their fighting ability & reaction. When we depend on the enemy unit  
as a factor, we must be the terrain and tactical situation at hand.

#### ESTIMATING ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

To perceive the enemy's situation and plans may seem difficult, but good estimates  
of enemy plans and movements may be made as soon as the fighting begins by close  
study of its progress. Our estimates will be more accurate if we derive from past  
experience and known statistics, combined through observation and analysis, and  
not from a personal sense of mission with a definite aim in mind, and at the most appropriate  
time. However, we must be accurate in estimation, our own situation and planning  
should be our first consideration. To the difficulties which we face, we should  
before we can survive a supposed enemy. In other words we must attend to our  
own situation from our own point of view exclusively and to let external appearances  
deceive us. This can work in 2 different ways. If we underestimate ourselves, excessive  
self-confidence will lead to being caught off guard. On the other hand, if we have become  
overconfident, we will be more likely to fall for enemy's deception, leading to the  
enemy's own proper confidence in our own spirit will undoubtedly, further  
ourselves and less than his equally. We must be on our guard, we must be ready,  
we must have the best of both worlds. We must be able to use our own resources  
and we must be able to use the enemy's resources. We must be able to use  
the new ideas and be willing to try them out.



## A LESSON IN THE ENEMY DEFENSIVE TACTICS.

THE GERMAN SOLDIER WHO FOUGHT IN DEFENSE OF MASSIMO, A BROKEN SERIES OF HILLS, DELIVERED A LESSON IN GERMAN TACTICS HERETOFORE SELDOM ENCOUNTERED IN EUROPE. IN A SHORT PERIOD, THEY PROVED THAT THEY ARE WELL DISCIPLINED TROOPS CAPABLE OF FIGHTING AN ASTUTE DEFENSIVE BATTLE - A BATTLE BASED UPON SOUND TACTICAL PRINCIPLES, RATHER THAN UPON A DUMPER DETERMINATION TO DIE FOR "NAZI" CAUSE.

"ALL WHO CONTACTED THE ENEMY WERE IMPRESSED WITH HIS EXCELLENCE IN BATTLE." RIFLE WAS NOTED OF RECKLESS CHARGE, NEEDLESS SACRIFICES, OR FAILURE TO OBSERVE KNOWN TACTICAL PRINCIPLES. THIS A COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED FORCE GAVE A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT IS TO BE EXPECTED FROM ONE OF THE BETTER GERMAN INFANTRY UNITS OPERATING IN DEFENSE OF ROUGH, EASILY DEFENDED TERRAIN. THE OUTSTANDING ENEMY CHARACTERISTIC WAS HIS EXCELLENCE IN FIRE DISCIPLINE AND HIS CONTROL OF ALL FIRMS. WITHOUT EXCEPTION, ENEMY FIRE WAS WITH HELD UNTIL THE MOMENT WHEN ITS DELIVERY IN GREAT VOLUME WOULD GIVE GREATEST EFFECT.

During the early stage of this action, a US INFANTRY REGIMENT MANAGED TO SEIZE THE HIGH GROUND OVERLOOKING THE VALLEY TOWARD MASSIMO WHERE THE GERMAN FORCES CONTROLLED THE AREA DEFENSE PERIMETER. THIS AREA WAS OCCUPIED BY THE REMAINS OF A CRACKED OUTFIT WITH LONG EXPERIENCE OF COMBAT METALS IN POLAND, HUNGARY, ETC. THE GERMAN ON THE FIRST OF A SERIES OF HILLS ON THE FORWARD SLOPES OF THIS FIRST RIDGE ALLOWED THEIR POSITIONS TO BE BYPASSED BY TWO REINFORCED COMPANIES OF US INFANTRY TROOPS. THE ENEMY IN APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF ONE BATTALION, REMAINED QUIETLY IN SUCH CONCENTRATION THAT THE TWO COMPANIES PASSED WITHOUT OPPOSITION. WHEN THE FORWARD UNITS WERE OUT OF CONTACT FROM THE RESERVE UNITS, THE ENEMY OPENED UP WITH A BURST OF FIRE, PRACTICALLY ANNIHILATING THE US FORCES. ON SUBSEQUENT DAYS THERE WERE NUMEROUS INSTANCES WHEN GERMAN TROOPS - OFFER IN STRENGTH OF A BATTALION IN BUNKERS AND STRONGPOINTS, SUPPORTED BY 6 TO 12 MACHINE GUNS AND MORTARS, WOULD PERMIT THE CAUTIOUSLY ADVANCING ELEMENTS OF ALLIED FORCES TO BYPASS THE EXCELLENTLY CONCEALED POSITIONS. THEN THE ENEMY WOULD OPEN FIRE ON RESERVE TROOPS (MOVING UP IN WARE CONTACT FORMATION).

AS THE ALLIED FORCE ATTACK DEVELOPED, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT ENEMY DEFENSE STAGE IN THE AREA WAS WELL DEFENDED. THE ENEMY USED PROPER USE OF FIRE THROUGH EFFECTIVELY, WITH EVERY FOOT OF THE TERRAIN USED PROPERLY FOR A DEFENSE PURPOSES AND ALL THEIR POSITIONS WERE MUTUALLY SUPPORTING.

THE ENEMY POSITIONS WERE CONSTRUCTED IN THE SHAPE OF AN INVERTED U. THE FIRE STEP AND FIRING POSITION TOWARD US WAS IN THE "TOE" AND THE "HEEL" WAS USED TO RETIRE INTO COVER. DURING OUR ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRE, EVERY AVAILABLE GUN WAS LOCATED TO WELL CONCEALED EMPLOYMENT WITH DEEP COVER BEHIND THE GUN FOR PROTECTION OF THE GUNNERS. MACHINE GUNS POSITIONED THE USUALLY SET UP NEAR DROPS AND WISE OF RIDGES AND ON THE FORWARD SLOPE. DURING ARTILLERY COVER OPERATIONS, THE MACHINE GUNS WOULD RETREAT BACK TO THE REVERSE SIDE OF THE SLOPE AND COVER UP TO AROUND THE BACK OF THE FIRING POS. THE MACHINE GUNS WERE KEPT IN PROTECTED BUNKERS AND STRONGPOINTS ON THE FORWARD SLOPE. CURRENTLY, THE AREA WAS BEING ENGAGED BY THE ALLIED GUN AND MORTAR FIRING PROTECTIVE FIRE ARTILLERY FIRE TO A PROTECTED REVERSE SIDE.



THE CORE FACT THAT A GERMAN POSITION WAS ENVELOPED OR ENCIRCLED DID NOT CAUSE THE ENEMY TO WITHDRAW. "Too GREAT AN EMPHASIS HAD BEEN PLACED ON TRAINING THAT ONE ENCIRCLEMENT MEANT A SUCCESSFUL ACTION". THE FACT IS: "TOTALITY OF THE ENCIRCLING FORCE, RANGE OF SUPPORT HAS TO BE MAINTAINED THROUGH THE STAGES OF OCCUPATION OF THE POSITION, CLOSE COMBAT WITHIN THE POSITION IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FRONTAL EFFORT, AND COMPLETE CHIPPING UP"

### COUNTER ATTACK:

IN ANOTHER SERIES OF BATTLE DURING THE CASSINO SIEGE, DURING THE ENTIRE 12 DAYS PERIOD DURING WHICH THE US FORCE WAS ATTACKING, THE ENEMY FOLLOWED A MODEST PLAN OF ACTIVE DEFENSE. DURING THE MORNING AND EARLY AFTERNOON HOURS, THE GERMAN RESISTANCE WAS GENERALLY LIGHT. HOWEVER, IT BEGAN TO INCREASE AT ABOUT 1530 HOURS, AND BY 1600 HOURS WAS EXTREMELY HEAVY. FROM THEN UNTIL DARK, COUNTER ATTACKS WERE LAUNCHED WHICH WERE LAUNCHED WITH INCREASING INTENSITY AGAINST THE FRONT AND FLANKS OF US UNITS, AND FROM BETWEEN UNITS THAT HAD NO FLANK CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER.

BY BUILDING UP RESISTANCE LATE IN THE AFTERNOON, AND BY COUNTER-ATTACKING TO SOME BEFORE DARK, THE ENEMY WAS ABLE TO BRING GREATEST FIRE UPON OUR ASSAULT TROOPS WITH DEMORALIZING AND DISORGANIZING EFFECT, AT A TIME WHEN OUR ENERGY & AMMUNITION WERE AS NEARLY EXHAUSTED AS IT WOULD BE AT ANY TIME DURING THE DAY. IT ALSO PREVENTED PROPER CONSOLIDATION OF FRONT POSITIONS BEFORE DARK.

ENEMY COUNTER ATTACKS WERE SUPPORTED BY FIRE FROM MORTARS & AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. NIGHT ATTACKS ON US PERIMETERS, ALTHOUGH FREQUENT, WERE NOT S.O.P. AS IS USUAL WITH GERMAN FORCES.



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