

Patrolling: From Static Positions.

"THE GERMANS BELIEVE THAT TROOPS SYSTEMICALLY TRAINED FOR PATROL ATTACK WORK, AND WHO ARE OBLIGED TO OCCUPY STATIC POSITIONS, CAN PROFITABLY BE EMPLOYED IN DIFFICULT ATTACK MISSIONS."

PATROLS SENT OUT BY A GERMAN BATTALION TO ITALY ACHIEVED RESULTS THAT THE ENEMY CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT, NOT ONLY AS FAR AS ACTUAL GAINS WERE CONCERNED, BUT AS POINTING UP THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMBAT PATROL METHODS THAT WERE EMPLOYED. BOTH PATROLS, RESULTED IN SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT OF THE MAIN LINE OF RESISTANCE, THE COURSE OF WHICH ORIGINALLY HAD BEEN INDICATED BY THE ALLIED FORCES. SUCH IMPROVEMENT WAS NECESSARY IF THE GERMANS WERE TO SECURE A DOMINATING TERRAIN FEATURES, AND THUS ENABLE THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH CO-SECURED POSITIONS AND POSITIONS IN DEPTH ON 3 TACTICALLY IMPORTANT HILLS IN THE VICINITY.

THE GERMAN REPORT OFFERS ITS READERS A NUMBER OF LESSONS BASED ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE 2 PATROLS. THIS IS WHAT THE ENEMY HAS TO SAY ABOUT HIS OWN RECONNOISSANCE.

"IN CLOSE COUNTRY IT IS ADVISABLE TO CARRY OUT RECONNOISSANCE WITH PRELIMINARY PATROLS, WHICH FOR HOURS OR END (BE HIDDEN) NEAR THE ALLIED POSITIONS AND MAKE DETAILED OBSERVATIONS AS TO THE ALLIES WEAPONS, POSITIONS, AND GENERAL ACTIVITY, AND LATER CONDUCT THE COMBAT PATROL AT NIGHT TO ITS STARTING POINT. IT IS ADVISABLE FOR THE LEADER OF THE COMBAT PATROL TO TAKE PART IN THIS RECONNOISSANCE HIMSELF."

PRELIMINARY RECONNOISSANCE BEFORE THE FIRST PATROL OPERATION REVEALED THAT THE ALLIED FORCES WAS NOT "ALERT" ON MOST OCCASIONS. IF NOT, THIS PROMISE SUCCESS FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK. THUS, THE GERMAN COMMAND FEELS ANY PREPARATORY ARTILLERY FIRE WOULD NATURALLY ALERT THE ALLIED FORCES TO BE ALERT FOR ANY POSSIBILITY, AS WELL AS THE FIRING OF THEIR OWN ARTILLERY BARRAGES. THEREFORE, WHEN ALLIED SECURITY IS BELIEVED TO BE BELOW NORMAL CONDITION, AND WHEN THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR APPROACH ARE GOOD, THE GERMAN PREFER TO ATTEMPT A SURPRISE ATTACK.

ADOPTIONS OF SUCH IS A TYPICAL GERMAN PROCEDURES. THUS, THE ALLIED FORCE MUST BE ALERT AT ALL TIMES, RIGGING THE AREA WITH SECURITY OUTPOST TO COUNTER NOT ONLY GERMAN ATTEMPT AT PENETRATION.

"THE GERMAN BELIEVES IF A SURPRISE ATTACK DOES NOT SUCCEED, THE OPERATIONAL MUST NOT BE BROKEN OFF, BUT MUST BE RESUMED AFTER SUITABLE FIRE PREPARATION. IN AN ASSAULT OF THIS TYPE, THE GERMANS USUALLY BRING INTO PLAY THE HEAVY INFANTRY WEAPONS AND ARTILLERY ON THE COLLECTIVE TO CONSPIRACIOUSLY IN ADVANCE, AND THUS BE ABLE TO CONCENTRATE FIRE ON FORWARD AGAINST LEAD CENTERS OF RESISTANCE."

THE EARLY HOURS OF THE EVENING MADE PLANNED SUITABLE FOR OPERATIONS SUCH AS THESE, SINCE, AS NIGHT COMES DARKER IT BECOMES DIFFICULT FOR TROOPS TO APPROACH THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THE FINAL ASSAULT.

THE GERMANS RECOGNIZES THAT AN ALLIED FORCE, AFTER LOSING PART OF A POSITION, CAN CONCENTRATE HEAVY ARTILLERY AND CONDUCT FIRE ON THE LAST POSITION AND THEN ATTEMPT A COUNTER ATTACK TO RECAPTURE IT. TO KEEP GERMAN LOSSES FROM SUCH FIRE AS LOW AS POSSIBLE, AND TO DEFEND A NEWLY WON POSITION SUCCESSFULLY, THE GERMANS USUALLY FOLLOW THESE TACTICAL MEASURES:

- (1) IN CHOOSING PERSONNELS FOR COMBAT PATROLS, TO SELECT MEN WHO WILL HOLD OUT THEIR POSITION DETERMINEDLY UNDER THE HEAVIEST OF FIRE.
- (2) TO HOLD RESERVE READY AND SEND THEM FORWARD AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO REINFORCE THE PATROL FOR THE DEFENSE OF NEWLY ACQUIRED POSITIONS.

- ③ TO SEND FORWARD ENGINEERS, IF AVAILABLE, TO IMPROVE POSITIONS
- ④ TO SEND FORWARD ENTRENCHING EQUIPMENT & AMMUNITION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
- ⑤ TO SEND FORWARD OBSERVERS FROM THE HEAVY INFANTRY WEAPONS AND ARTILLERY.

THESE MEASURES WHEN FAITHFULLY CARRIED OUT, AND WITH THE EFFECTIVE COOPERATION of Supporting Heavy Infantry Weapons and the ARTILLERY BATTERIES, ALL GROUND GAINED COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDED AGAINST ALLIED COUNTER ATTACKS OF BATTALION STRENGTH OR LESS.

THE GERMAN'S CONCEPTION OF THE OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, IN ORDER TO GAIN A SUCCESSFUL ADVANTAGE, THE FOLLOWING EFFECTIVE COOPERATION OF THE HEAVY WEAPONS AND ARTILLERY WILL NECESSITATE THE FOLLOWING PREPARATIONS:

- ① THE BATTALION COMMANDER WHO IS IN CHARGE OF THE PATROL OPERATION, WILL HAVE A LIAISON OFFICER FROM THE ARTILLERY BATTERY, WHO WILL BE ABLE TO INFORM WITHOUT DELAY TO HIS BATTERY, ABOUT THE PATROL'S REQUIREMENTS. THE COMMANDER OF THE MACHINE GUN COMPANY MUST ALSO BE AT THE HEADQUARTERS. CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, AND HEAVY INFANTRY WEAPONS WILL BE POSSIBLE FROM THE START OF ANY PROPOSED ACTIONS.
- ② THROUGHOUT THE NECESSARY OPERATIONS, GERMAN ARTILLERY & HEAVY WEAPONS WILL KEEP DELIVERING HEAVY HARASSING FIRE ON WHAT THEY SUSPECT TO BE POSITIONS OF ALLIED HEAVY WEAPONS AND THE APPROXIMATE ROUTE OF ALLIED RESERVES. THIS TYPE OF CONCENTRATED ACTION WILL NECESSITATE CONSIDERABLE DELAY IN THE ALLIED COUNTER MEASURE TO DEVELOP UNTIL LATE IN THE BATTLE.
- ③ USUALLY BEFORE ANY ACTIONS BEGINS, THE GERMAN ARTILLERY BATTERY FIRE "ZEROED IN" ALL POTENTIAL TARGET AREAS, JUST BEYOND THE POSITION THE GERMANS HOPE TO HOLD AND SECURE. THIS, FOR DEFENSIVE FIRE ON POSSIBLE ALLIED FORCE COUNTER ATTACKS, WITHIN 3 MINUTES, THE PREPARE "ZEROED IN" TARGET AREAS CAN BE SATURATED WITH HEAVY BARRAGES.
- ④ THE VALUE OF SUCH COORDINATED DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE HAS CAUSED A VERY HIGH PERCENTAGE OF LOSSES TO THE FORWARDING ALLIED TROOPS. WE MUST ALSO REALIZE THAT THE GERMAN MACHINE-GUNS USUALLY BACK UP THEIR FIRE WITH THAT OF THE ARTILLERY.
- ⑤ THE GERMAN COMMUNICATION SYSTEM IN THE CONTROLLING OF FIRE CONTROL WITH ITS ARTILLERY & HEAVY WEAPONS IS SUPERIOR AND WELL ORGANIZED, SO WE SHOULD BE ALWAYS PREPARED FOR ANY EVENTUALITY.



OFFENSORS AND PANZER TANKS

THE USE OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED WEAPONS IN ATTACKS AGAINST STRONGPOINTS AND HEAVILY PREPARED FORTIFICATION IS USUALLY VERY EFFECTIVE. THE PENETRATING POWER OF SUCH PROJECTILES ON WALLS AND SANDBAGS IS SUCH THAT DEFENSE AGAINST IT COULD BE A PROBLEM. THE 88-CM RAKETENPOWERBUCHSE 43, COMMONLY CALLED OPEN ROAR IS FAIRLY SIMILAR TO A COPY OF OUR BAZOOKA. THE OPEN ROAR FIRES AN 88-MM HOLLOW-CHARGE PROJECTILE WEIGHING 9 POUNDS. THE MAXIMUM RANGE IS ABOUT 1050 YARDS. THE PUFFENBERG (DOL) A BRIDGE MOUNTED ROCKET LAUNCHER WITH BAZOOKA HEAD ALSO FIRES THE 88-MM ROCKET. ALTHOUGH THIS RANGE IS LIMITED ON CHECKS, IT CAN EASILY MOUNTED ON STEIGHS TO ACHIEVE A VERY LOW SILHOUETTE.

IT HAS A RANGE OF 770 YARDS, LIGHTLY BUILT FOR FRONT LINE ACTION.

WE SHOULD ALSO BE FAMILIAR WITH THE MANY GERMAN DEVICES WHEN IT COMES TO CLOSE COMBAT, WHERE FORTIFICATION, SUCH AS PILLBOX & STRONG POINTS ARE CONCERNED. THE GERMANS ARE KNOWN TO CONCENTRATE WHATEVER WEAPONS THAT'S AVAILABLE TO KICK OUT OUR STRONG POINTS IN THE MINIMUM OF TIME. FOR SUCH FRONT LINE MOBILIZATION WE SHOULD EXPECT ROCKET, ANTITANK, AND OTHER NON RECOIL TYPES OF FIRING FROM THE ENEMY AS THEY APPROACH OUR POSITION. AT CLOSE RANGE, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR ASSAULT SUCH AS COLOTON COCKTAIL, BOTTLES OF PHOSPHORUS, SLINGING AND HAND THROWN MINES, MAGNETIC HOLLOW CHARGES, STICKY BOMBS WHICH CLINGS TO THE THROWN AT TARGET, AS WELL AS THE COMMON GERMAN POTATO CRASHER GRENADE, ANTITANK HOLLOW CHARGE GRENADE WHICH CAN BE LAUNCHED FROM THE STANDARD RIFLE AND THE SIGNAL PISTOL FITTED TO FIRE HOLLOW CHARGE ARE ALSO USED. IN SUCH SITUATIONS, NEVER PANIC, BUT HOLD THE POSITION - HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF FIRING USUALLY WILL BEAT BACK THE GERMANS, AS THE ACTIONS SO FAR HAS PROVED FIGHTING THE ENEMY DURING THE PAST 12 MONTHS. THE GERMANS HAVE MET AND DEFEATED MANY GREEN AND INEXPERIENCED UNITS WITH SUCH TACTICS, BUT WHEN THEY CAME UP AGAINST OUR BATTLE TESTED VETERAN TROOPS, WE HAVE DEFEATED THE ENEMY.

THE GRENROHR



ARE CARRIED OUT. WHEN ALLIED FORCES ARE ALERT, BECAUSE OF ACTIONS ON THE PRECEDING NIGHTS, A DIFFERENT TIME FOR ATTACK SHOULD BE EXPECTED.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GERMAN POINT OUT, WHEN AN ASSAULT UNIT HAS THE MISSION OF PENETRATING ALLIED POSITIONS, AND DESTROYING THE POSITIONS AND THEIR COMPONENTS, THE COOPERATION OF HEAVY WEAPONS GENERALLY WILL BE NEEDED. AN UNDERSTANDING OF THIS SORT USUALLY TAKES PLACE DURING THE DAYTIME, AND THE LATE AFTERNOON HOURS, AND IS REGARDED AS THE MOST FAVORABLE. AS SOON AS THE OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN DECIDED UPON, DETAILED RECONNAISSANCE IS CARRIED OUT AND CONSTANT OBSERVATION IS MAINTAINED. THIS ASSIGNMENT IS PERFORMED BY MEMBERS OF THE RAISING PARTY THEMSELVES, SO THAT THEY CAN REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ABOUT THE OPPOSING ALLIED FORCES, ITS POSITIONS, AND THE TERRAIN. IN ALL DOCUMENTATIONS THE OPERATION IS IDENTIFIED BY A CODE NAME; THE DAY IS CALLED "X", AND THE HOUR "Y".

THE GERMAN'S PLANNED ATTACK

DISREGARDING PAST ACTIONS, WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE GERMAN DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE IS BUILT QUITE UPON COUNTER-ATTACK. THIS PRINCIPLE OF ACTIVE DEFENSE AT TIMES HAS REACHED THE SCALE OF COUNTER OFFENSIVE; HOWEVER, IT IS BEST ILLUSTRATED IN THE PERSISTENT LOCAL COUNTERATTACKS STAGED SO OFTEN BY UNITS DEPLOYED ON A REGIMENTAL, BATTALION OR COMPANY FRONT. TWO EXAMPLES OF WHAT MIGHT BE EXPECTED FROM THE DEFENSIVE DEFENDER OCCURRED DURING AN ATTACK ON THE CASSINO PERIMETER. A U.S. DIVISION REMAINED IN BREAKING THROUGH FORTIFIED AREA, SUSTAINED A GERMAN COUNTERATTACK KNOWN BY TWO BATTALIONS OF INFANTRY, 7 TANKS, AND FROM 15 TO 20 ASSAULT GUNS. THE COUNTERATTACK FELL UPON THE DIVISION'S LEFT FLANK, AND WENT SWIFTLY AFTER THE ADVANCING LEG KIFFERS.

THERE WAS NO HEAVY ARTILLERY PREPARATION, AND THE GERMAN HIT THE MOST VULNERABLE SPOT AT THEIR MOST OPPORTUNE TIME. THE GERMAN INFANTRY WAS STOPPED BY 45 ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY ACTION BEFORE THE COUNTERATTACK OBJECTIVE, A VILLAGE IN THE REAR OF THE AMERICAN LINE WAS REACHED. HOWEVER, SOME TANKS AND ASSAULT GUNS DID GET INTO THE VILLAGE, THIS CAUSING WHICH DAMAGES BEFORE THEY WERE ELIMINATED.

THE COUNTERATTACK WAS ONE OF 17 SUCH ASSAULTS THE GERMAN LAUNCHED DURING AN 11 DAY PERIOD. THE UNIT STOPPING THESE ATTACKS VARIED IN STRENGTH FROM A COMPANY TO A BATTALION OR TWO. TANKS, CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH THE INFANTRY WERE USED IN 12 OF THE ACTIONS.

ON ANOTHER OCCASION A U.S. DIVISION WAS CONDUCTING A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK UNTIL IT WAS HIT HARD FROM 2 DIRECTIONS BY 2 COUNTERATTACKING FORCES, EACH COMPOSED OF TWO GERMAN INFANTRY BATTALIONS, SUPPORTED BY TANKS. THE COUNTERATTACK WAS CONDUCTED BY TROOP FROM A GERMAN DIVISION WHICH HAD BEEN BELIEVED TO BE FAR IN THE ENEMY REAR, AND WAS REACHED UNEXPECTEDLY WITHOUT WARNING AT FIRST LIGHT. THERE WERE NO FEINTS AND NO ARTILLERY PREPARATION, OTHER THAN WHAT SEEMED TO BE A NOCTURNAL SHELLING OF THE AMERICAN POSITIONS. HOWEVER, THE AMERICAN STAFF IN THAT AREA WAS COVERED WITH A HURDLE OF GERMAN ARTILLERY FIRE, WHICH MAINTAINED AN EFFECTIVE FIRE SCREEN WITH BEFORE AND DURING THE COUNTERATTACK.

AS THE RESULT OF THESE AGGRESSIVE DEFENSIVE MOVES ON THE PART OF THE ENEMY, THE ALLIED INTELLIGENCE IN THAT AREA REACHED THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS:

WITH THE FORTHCOMING NIGHTS, AND WITH LIMITED AIR OBSERVATION AND PHOTOGRAPHY DURING THE DAY, THE ENEMY HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT HE CAN CONCENTRATE A LARGE FORCE OF 2 DIVISIONS WITH AS MANY AS 50 TANKS IN AN ASSEMBLY AREA CLOSE TO AN AMERICAN FRONT LINE OF OUR FORCES, AND HOLDING CHANCE OF SUCH CONCENTRATION.

THEY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE DARKNESS OF NIGHT, HE USUALLY CONCENTRATES AND BE UPON US WITHIN A 30 MINUTE NOTICE.