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JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTERNMENT IN WORLD WAR II--THE ISSUE OF REDRESS  
IP0158

The controversy over World War II internment of some 120,000 Japanese-Americans has simmered for 40 years despite several Government efforts to compensate internees with a small monetary settlement and Civil Service and Social Security credit for time interned.

Debate over the creation of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, and the testimony and calls for redress at its hearings have resulted in many inquiries about the internment itself, the Commission and its activities, and the issue of redress.

This Info Pack has been prepared to provide basic information on the World War II internment, the Commission, its findings, and pro/con material on the complex issue of redress.

We hope this information is useful.

Congressional Reference  
Division

Members of Congress desiring additional information on this topic should contact CRS at 287-5700.

# Public Law 96-317

Dated July 31, 1980

## Why a Commission?

Almost forty years have passed since the U.S. government ordered 120,000 civilians evacuated and detained in relocation camps, pursuant to Executive Order 9066 and Civilian Orders of the U.S. military forces.

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942, despite arguments by the Attorney General and FBI Director against the military necessity for mass evacuation. The Executive Order authorized military commanders designated by the Secretary of War to exclude persons from prescribed military zones or areas. Congress backed the Executive Order by passing Public Law 77-503, which authorized imprisonment and fines for civilians convicted of violating these orders. The Western Defense Command and Fourth Army subsequently issued over 100 orders which were applied exclusively to persons of Japanese ancestry living in the Western states.

All persons of Japanese ancestry in California and portions of Washington, Oregon, and Arizona were ordered to leave their homes, taking with them only what little they could pack and carry. Businesses, property, homes, farmlands, and personal goods were left behind. Assets were frozen by the U.S. government. In 1942, the United States government built 10 relocation centers in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Utah and Wyoming. Japanese American citizens and permanent resident aliens were moved to these camps. In March, 1946, the last detention camp closed.

The released Japanese had great difficulty in reconstructing their lives. Many faced poverty; others found themselves homeless. All faced uncertainty regarding their future.

The policy process which resulted in the evacuation and incarceration of 120,000 civilians has never been fully documented, nor has the economic, social and psychological impact of the years in relocation centers been comprehensively recorded or told.

The Aleut residents of both the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands were removed by the U.S. military authorities from their homes during June and July of 1942. The initial decision to evacuate was based on the Japanese bombing of Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian chain, and the Japanese invasions of Attu and Kiska islands. More than 850 Aleut citizens were taken to temporary camps in southeastern Alaska, some times without adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical supplies. Non-native residents of the Aleutian chain were allowed to remain in their communities.

In May 1944, the Aleuts were returned to their homes. Some had perished due to disease. They found their homes had often been vandalized and property stolen. The returning Aleuts faced the same uncertainty about their future as did the Japanese. "It seems funny if our government can drop so many people in a place like this and forget about them altogether," said Lee McMillin, agent and caretaker of the Punter Bay camp for the Aleuts.

SOURCE: THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND  
INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS

# Chronology

## Japanese

**1941 December 7** — Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. Presidential Proclamation No. 2525 gives blanket authority to Attorney General for a sweep of suspects.

**December** — U.S. declares war against Japan.

**1942 January 29** — U.S. Attorney General issues first of a series of orders establishing limited strategic areas along the Pacific Coast and requiring the removal of all enemy aliens from these areas.

**February 19** — Roosevelt signs Executive Order 9066 authorizing Secretary of War, or any military commander designated by Secretary, to establish "military areas" and exclude therefrom "any or all persons."

**March 2** — General DeWitt issues Public Proclamation No. 1, designating military areas in the states of Washington, Oregon, California and Arizona. Restrictions are placed on Japanese, German and Italian aliens and Japanese Americans. Period of voluntary evacuation begins.

**March 18** — President Roosevelt signs Executive Order No. 9102 creating the War Relocation Authority (WRA), a non-military agency with the authority to formulate and carry out a program for a planned and orderly relocation of persons evacuated under E.O. 9066.

**March 21** — President Roosevelt signs Public Law 77-503 making it a federal offense to violate any order issued by a designated military commander under authority of E.O. 9066.

**March 22** — First large contingent of Japanese and Japanese Americans moves from Los Angeles to the Manzanar Assembly Center operated by the Army.

**May 19** — Western Defense Command issues Civilian Restriction Order No. 1 establishing all assembly centers and relocation centers in the eight far western states as military areas and forbidding evacuee residents to leave these areas without expressed approval of the Western Defense Command.

**July 13** — Mitsuye Endo petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that she was a loyal and law-abiding U.S. citizen, that no charge had been made against her, that she was being unlawfully detained, and that she was confined in a relocation center under armed guard and held there against her will.

**August 7** — Western Defense Command announces the completion of evacuation of 110,000 from their homes in the military areas either to assembly centers or to WRA centers. The last of the residents of Japanese descent in eastern California are moved to relocation centers.

**1943 January 23** — Secretary of War Stimson announces plans for formation of a special combat team of Japanese American volunteers from both the Mainland and Hawaii.

**February 8** — Registration ("loyalty" questionnaire) of all persons over 17 years of age for Army recruitment, segregation and relocation begins at most of the relocation centers.

**June 21** — *Hirabayashi v. U.S.* and *Yasui v. U.S.* Supreme Court rules that a curfew may be imposed against one group of American citizens based solely on ancestry, and that Congress in enacting Public Law 77-503 authorized the implementation of E.O. 9066 and provided criminal penalties for violation of orders of the Military Commander.

**August, September and early October** — More than 15,000 people are moved in and out of the Tule Lake Center as a result of the segregation program. Those ordered out are redistributed to other centers.

**1944 June 6** — D-Day

**July 1** — President Roosevelt signed Public Law 78-405 permitting U.S. citizens to renounce their citizenship on American soil in time of war under procedures approved by the Attorney General.

**December 17** — Western Defense Command rescinds exclusion and detention orders, freeing Japanese Americans to return to their homes on the west coast, effective January 2, 1945.

**December 18** — *Korematsu v. U.S.* Supreme Court rules that one group of citizens may be singled out and expelled from their homes and imprisoned for several years without trial, based solely on their ancestry.

**December 18** — In *ex parte Endo*, Supreme Court rules that WRA has no authority to detain a "concededly loyal" American citizen.

**1945 August 15** — VJ Day

**September** — Western Defense Command issues Public Proclamation No. 24 revoking all individual exclusion orders and all further military restrictions against persons of Japanese descent.

**1946 June 30** — War Relocation Authority program officially terminates.

**1948 July 2** — Evacuation Claims Act passed, giving evacuees until January 3, 1950 to file claims against the government "for damages to or loss of real or personal property... that is a reasonable and natural consequence of the evacuation..." Total of \$38 million paid by the government, or less than 10¢ per dollar lost.

**1976** — President Gerald Ford formally rescinds Executive Order 9066.

## Aleut and Pribilof Islanders

**1942 June 3** — Japanese bomb Navy facilities in Dutch Harbor (Alaska) Aleutian Islands.

**June 6** — Japanese secure a beachhead on Kiska Island, Aleutian Islands. Japanese take all 10 Navy personnel prisoners.

**June 8** — Japanese army lands unopposed at Holtz Bay, Attu Island, Aleutian Islands, and takes 42 Aleuts and 2 U.S. government civilian employees prisoner, occupies Kiska Island.

**June 14** — Atka villagers are found by the U.S.S. Hulbert and evacuated.

**June 15** — Interior Department officials learn of the Aleutian evacuation. Initially, the Fish and Wildlife Service was given the responsibility for Pribilof Aleuts, with the office of Indian Affairs responsible for all other Aleuts.

**June 16** — U.S. military evacuates St. George, Pribilof Islands. Less than 24 hours are given for departure. Natives' cattle are killed and their houses booby-trapped but not destroyed. St. Paul Island, Pribilof Islands is evacuated.

**June 25** — Atka Aleuts are discharged at Killisnoo where the office of Indian Affairs has decided to locate them in a fish cannery. St. Paul and St. George villagers are discharged at Funter Bay.

**June 26** — All Aleuts have been evacuated.

**1943 Midsummer** — Japanese withdraw entirely from the Aleutian Island chain.

**December 13** — Secretary of War Henry Stimson gives final approval for all Aleuts to return home.

**1944 May 4** — U.S. Air Transport returns the Aleuts to the Pribilofs.

**August 7** — President Roosevelt authorizes the allocation of \$10,000 from his emergency fund for claims for damages.

## Commission Mandate

Public law 96-317, passed July 31, 1980, established a Commission to gather facts to determine whether any wrong was committed against those American citizens and permanent resident aliens affected by Executive Order 9066, and for other purposes.

## Duties of the Commission

- To review the facts and circumstances surrounding Executive Order 9066, issued February 19, 1942, and the impact of such Executive Order on American citizens and permanent resident aliens.
- To review directives of United States military forces requiring the relocation, and in some cases, detention in internment camps of American citizens, including Aleut civilians, and permanent resident aliens of the Aleutian and Pribilof islands.
- To recommend appropriate remedies.
- The Commission shall hold public hearings in such cities of the United States that it finds appropriate.
- The Commission shall submit a written report of its findings and recommendations not later than one year after the date of its first meeting.

## Commission Members

### Joan Zeldes Bernstein, Chair

Ms. Bernstein is a partner with Wald, Harkrader & Ross. She has served as General Counsel for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Environmental Protection Agency, and was named Vice Chair of the council of the Administrative Conference of the United States. Ms. Bernstein received her B.A. from the University of Wisconsin, and her LL.B. from Yale Law School.

### Daniel E. Lungren, Vice Chair

Congressman Lungren is a second term member from Long Beach, California, and serves on the House Judiciary Committee, the Select Committee on Aging, and the Republican Task Force on Congressional and Regulatory Reform. Mr. Lungren received his B.A. from Notre Dame University and J.D. from Georgetown University.

### Senator Edward W. Brooke

Mr. Brooke is partner with O'Connor & Hannan. He has served as attorney general for Massachusetts and United States Senator.

### Father Robert F. Drinan

Father Drinan is president of Americans for Democratic Action. He has been active in civic affairs and was a member of Congress from 1970-1980. He is an ordained Jesuit priest.

### Dr. Arthur S. Flemming

Dr. Flemming is Chairman of the United States Civil Rights Commission. Dr. Flemming has been Secretary of HEW, Chairman of the White House Conference on Aging, Special Counsel to the President on Aging, and many other important positions in public service.

### Justice Arthur J. Goldberg

Justice Goldberg has been Secretary of Labor, Associate Justice in the United States Supreme Court, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, and Ambassador at-large for the United States. He is president of the American Jewish Committee.

### Father I. V. Gromoff

Father Gromoff is an ordained Russian Orthodox priest from Unalaska in the Aleutian Islands. He has been active in the Aleutian/Pribilof Island Association and was relocated to Funter Bay camp during World War II.

### Judge William M. Marutani

Judge Marutani presently serves on the bench for the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania.

### Senator Hugh B. Mitchell

Senator Mitchell was appointed to the U.S. Senate from Washington state, and served as a member of Congress from the 1st District of Washington for two terms.

## Commission Hearings

Washington, D.C. . . . . July 14 and 16, 1981  
Los Angeles, California . . . . August 4, 5, and 6, 1981  
San Francisco, California . . . August 11, 12, and 13, 1981  
Seattle, Washington . . . . . September 9, 10, and 11, 1981  
Anchorage, Alaska . . . . . September 15, 1981  
Aleutian Islands (Unalaska) . . September 17, 1981  
Pribilof Islands (St. Paul) . . . September 19, 1981  
Chicago, Illinois . . . . . September 22 and 23, 1981

## How to Participate

The Commission is interested in hearing from you. The members of the Commission would like to be informed of the views of concerned individuals and would like to encourage statements which will provide a framework for discovering the facts of the relocation and internment of civilians. The Commission welcomes your views and suggestions.

## The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians

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726 Jackson Place, NW  
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Washington, D.C. 20506  
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# The Burden of Shame

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*At last, amends for World War II internment camps?*

*"When I heard rumors that all Japanese would be interned, I couldn't believe it. I kept saying that I was a loyal American citizen and that it just couldn't happen in a democracy."*

—Testimony of Mabel Ota

It did happen. In the months after Pearl Harbor, more than 110,000 "persons of Japanese ancestry" (those with 1/16th Japanese blood or more) were forcibly relocated from the West Coast to inland internment camps in desolate areas of Wyoming, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Utah and Arizona. Most were

allowed to bring only what they could carry, they were herded into "assembly centers" at fairgrounds and race tracks stinking of manure and animals. Finally, they were transported to ten barely habitable camps for the duration of World War II. Mabel Ota, now 64, was sent to Poston, Ariz. She would, after the war, become the first Asian school principal in Los Angeles, but would spend her life believing that the camp's poor diet and worse medical care caused her father's death, and her daughter to be brain-damaged at birth.

Dr. Mary Oda, 61, now a San Fer-

during the war, some of them drafted right out of the camps.)


After the war, many of the detainees found they had lost everything. Clarence Nishizu left his farm in the care of a "neighbor friend"; the friend kept the profits and bought the land. "I had no place to go—I received nothing. Finally I found a house in San Fernando, where I went into gardening." Of the total property loss to the internees, estimated to be \$400 million in 1942 dollars, the U.S. Government eventually repaid \$38.5 million.

There are explanations, all of them ugly. Economic greed. Racism. War-time hysteria. Americans of German or Italian ancestry did not suffer mass incarceration, but the shock of Pearl Harbor inflamed the century-old hatred of Oriental immigrants—the "yellow peril." The public, President Franklin Roosevelt, even the Supreme Court, rushed to trample Japanese Americans' claim on the Bill of Rights.

But explanations are not excuses. One major question facing the nine-member commission is: What can be done to compensate the victims? Japanese-American groups are recommending financial restitution. Suggestions range from individual payments of \$25,000, to money for scholarships and communities. The idea of repayment is controversial, even to some Japanese Americans. Testifying last week, California Senator S.I. Hayakawa, who was born in Canada and spent the war years in Chicago, said demands for monetary reimbursement are "absolutely disgusting" and "not Japanese." But some commissioners clearly favor reparation. Judge William M. Marutani, a commission member from Philadelphia, put it bluntly to Hayakawa: "The Bill of Rights, as you will recall, provides that . . . citizens can petition the government for redress of grievances. . . We understand, sir, do we not, that we are in an American society where any redress of grievances is customarily by some monetary means?"

The commission's final report is due next year. Along with specific recommendations on how to make amends, the commission will address a larger, more important issue: making sure that due process is not stampeded again. Exclusion from the law causes deep and lasting personal harm. Many of the Japanese-American internees were able to speak of their pain and bitterness only at the prompting of their children, who were raised during the decades when the civil rights movements vastly enlarged our understanding of democracy. Poignantly, Dr. Oda explained why it had taken so long: "I did not want my children to feel the burden of shame and feelings of rejection by their fellow Americans. I wanted them to feel that in spite of what was done to us, this was still the best place in the world to live."

—By Jane O'Reilly.  
Reported by David S. Jackson/Washington and Jeff Melvoin/Los Angeles



January 1943: Internment camp at Heart Mountain, Wyo. Outside their bleak barracks, students pledge allegiance to the flag.

American citizens. One-third were resident aliens born in Japan and therefore, under the law of the time, ineligible for citizenship. No act of espionage or sabotage was attributed to a Japanese American during World War II. They were summarily imprisoned and their constitutional rights suspended solely because of their race. One thousand Aleut Indians were also interned, simply because of their "proximity to a war zone."

Now, nearly 40 years later, the process of understanding what happened and making reparations has begun. The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, created last year by Congress, is holding a summer-long series of public hearings. Last week in Los Angeles, the audience listened with hushed respect to stories almost too painful to remember, but too important to forget.

The spring of 1942. They had little notice, perhaps a week. Given numbers and

nando physician, was torn away from her first year at medical school. In the Manzanar, Calif., camp, dust whirled through gaps in the floor boards; nine people shared one cramped room, sleeping on bags filled with straw. Her family lost their farm, their equipment and one another. "We became separated during the evacuation and we never lived together as a family again."

Terrible ironies haunt the history. Fourth of July celebrations were bravely held behind barbed wire, in the shadow of sentry towers. Parents wasting away in tar-paper camp shacks proudly displayed starred banners indicating that their sons were American soldiers. Nisei (second generation Japanese Americans) members of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, which fought gloriously in Europe, were sometimes required to have Caucasian escorts when they visited their interned families. (About 33,000 Japanese Americans served in the U.S. military



EDITORIAL

WASHINGTON POST, 3/2/83, p. A22.

## *Japanese Americans and Injustice*

**R**EADERS WHO FOLLOWED Fred Barbash's series in this paper on Japanese internment camps during World War II may have thought they were prepared for the report issued by the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians issued last week. But the study, which was the result of two years' work involving thousands of documents and the testimony of 750 witnesses, is a powerful indictment of a shameful wartime policy. The history of civil liberties violations and the documentation of that episode presented in the report should jolt every American.

It is perhaps understandable that this country was gripped by war hysteria during the months following Pearl Harbor. It was not unreasonable to fear an invasion of the West Coast when Hawaii had been bombed so easily and some of the Aleutian Islands of Alaska were taken by the enemy. But under the guise of military necessity and national security a terrible decision was made and endorsed. Unfortunately, Japanese Americans—unlike their German and Italian counterparts—were easy scapegoats, for they were so readily physically identifiable. On the West Coast, all of them, whole families, aliens and third-generation American citizens, were rounded up and put into isolated camps with the enthusiastic support of their fellow citizens and the leaders of our government. No charges were brought. No hearings were held. No one was judged individu-

ally. They were interned for almost three years.

Perhaps the most stunning charge made in the report is that concerning President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Responsible government officials, including even J. Edgar Hoover, say the members of the commission, realized by mid-1943 that the internment was unjustified and unfair. Recommendations were made to return citizens of Japanese ancestry to their homes, but these proposals were rejected for political reasons, and their release was delayed until after the elections of November 1944. The list of important, liberal government leaders who supported or justified the internment policy is surprising and will be, for years to come, a matter of controversy.

What should be done to compensate Japanese American citizens who suffered during this time? Two, who were children in the camps, now sit in Congress. Others have recovered and thrived, but surely the scars of such unjust treatment by their own government remain. Some received money damages for property losses that could be proved. But what compensation can there be for loss of respect, education, opportunities and three years of one's life? The commission did not address the question of compensation in this report, but it will be the subject of a final document later this year. Formulating that recommendation will be a task even more difficult than the one accomplished with the publication of this powerful and moving history of a shameful time.

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EDITORIAL

NEW YORK TIMES, 3/1/83, p.A22.

## How to Atone for 'War Hysteria'

After Pearl Harbor, the United States rounded up 120,000 Japanese-Americans, most of them citizens, and shipped them to detention camps. The action, excused on grounds of military necessity, was rooted in "race prejudice, war hysteria and failure of political leadership," according to a report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians.

Congress created the commission to respond to decades of festering resentment and demands for reparations. On the moral question, the report's well-documented conclusion is not novel. Eugene Rostow wrote as early as 1945 that the internment program was motivated by "ignorant race prejudice, not facts." What is news, and important, is that an arm of Government has finally condemned this sad chapter of history.

The report points out that "not a single documented act of espionage, sabotage or fifth column activity was committed by an American citizen of Japanese ancestry or by a resident Japanese alien on the West Coast" before, during or after the internment. It also describes how no less a patriot than J. Edgar Hoover rebutted the military's assertion that it was impossible to separate the loyal from the disloyal. No such claim was ever made about Americans of German or Italian ancestry.

Initial overreaction might have been excusable, but the program lasted far too long. The Allied victory at Midway in 1942 removed any realistic fear of a Japanese landing on our shores. Behind the scenes, sobered officials questioned the relocation program throughout 1943, but President Roosevelt prolonged it past the 1944 election.

It seemed that national ideals of equality and justice had gone to war along with everything else. The Supreme Court deplored race prejudice but, over eloquent dissents, sustained the conviction of a loyal citizen, Fred Korematsu, for resisting internment. Justice Robert Jackson complained that the judicial blessing "lies around like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need."

Witnesses before the commission were split over the feasibility of individual reparations; it has deferred any proposals to a later report. In our view, symbolic atonement would be most appropriate — like a scholarship fund for Japanese-American students. An even more important way to make amends would be to set forth principles against a recurrence of the tragedy. These could hold the nation to an ideal for which many Americans thought they fought in World War II: that the rights of citizenship in no way depend on race or ancestry.

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WASHINGTON POST,  
2/25/83, pp. A1,  
A4.

## Report on Japanese-Americans Wartime Internment Decried

By Fred Barbash  
Washington Post Staff Writer

A government commission yesterday issued the most detailed accounting yet of the World War II internment of 120,000 West Coast Japanese-Americans, and concluded that it was a "grave injustice" caused by "race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership" from President Roosevelt on down.

The exhaustive 467-page report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians is the first phase of a process expected to lead to a recommendation by June that compensation be paid to those who were detained.

It is designed in part to prepare the public and Congress, which set up the commission, for reparations proposals that could cost \$3 million or \$4 million in payments of up to \$20,000 each for the personal suffering and property loss of those removed from the West Coast and confined in relocation camps after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

The commission also is considering payments to Aleuts evacuated after the Japanese attack on the Aleutians. While the commission did not challenge the need for that evacuation from a war zone, it criticized

See JAPANESE, A4, Col. 1

[correct figure  
should be \$3 billion  
or \$4 billion]

# Internment of Japanese-Americans A 'Grave Injustice,' Panel Reports

**JAPANESE, From A1**  
the "deplorable conditions" in abandoned mines and fish canneries where they were housed in southeastern Alaska. Ten percent of the evacuated Aleuts died during their two- or three-year stay.

After a review of thousands of documents kept secret during the war, the commission concluded that the claims of "military necessity" and disloyalty used to justify the internment had no basis in fact. "Not a single documented act of espionage, sabotage or Fifth Column activity was committed" by a Japanese-American, the study said.

The press and public officials at every level came in for criticism for fueling the hysteria. President Roosevelt, the commission said, approved the evacuation "without raising the question to the level of Cabinet discussion or requiring any careful or thorough review of the situation," despite having information that it was unnecessary.

Roosevelt then prolonged the detention of the Japanese-Americans in the relocation centers in 1944 because he feared negative political re-

action in that year's presidential election, the study said. "Whatever the military, legal or moral virtues of the evacuees' cause," it said, the president did not want to "do anything precipitous to upset the West Coast. There would be an election in November."

The average stay for detainees in the camps was 900 days.

"For every citizen and for American public life," the report said, the events of the period "pose haunting questions about our country and its past."

Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, the Army official in charge of West Coast security, was criticized particularly for helping the movement to evacuate the Japanese-Americans on the openly expressed theory that "ethnicity determined loyalty."

In a news conference yesterday, commission Chairman Joan Z. Bernstein called the roundup "particularly sobering because men of the greatest stature with careers of the most distinguished public service—Democrat and Republican, conservative and liberal, judges, legislators and Cabinet members, the president himself—were personally involved in

a course of action which today we can only find gravely unjust and deeply injurious."

Many of the individual documents and factual findings used by the commission have been previously uncovered by scholars since the war. The report brings them together for the first time and constitutes the first thorough official inquiry.

The report also includes a complete description of conditions in the camps, located in out-of-the-way and generally arid sections of California, Arizona, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah and Arkansas. They were short on medical and educational facilities, space and especially privacy, the report said, but amply supplied with armed guards and barbed wire.

Commission members are Rep. Daniel E. Lungren (R-Calif.), former senator Edward W. Brooke (R-Mass.), former representative Robert F. Drinan (D-Mass.), Arthur S. Flemming, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, the Rev. Ishmael Gromoff of Alaska, Judge William M. Marutani of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and Washington state Sen. Hugh B. Mitchell.



#### JAPANESE-AMERICANS

Mr. HAYAKAWA. Mr. President, I should like to remind my friends and colleagues that today is December 7, the 41st anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Forty-one years ago today forces of the Empire of Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor. Less than 3 months later President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Executive order that led to the relocation and detention of some 120,000 Japanese-American citizens and noncitizens in relocation centers.

In the four decades since that "day of infamy" we have destroyed our powerful adversary and built her up to be a powerful friend—so powerful that we now plead with her to restrict the export of her products.

In the four decades since the mutual hatreds of war, we have so healed ourselves that we now have a prosperous, thriving Japanese-American community which, despite its small population of about 600,000, includes not one, not two, but three U.S. Senators. The ancestors of these three men worshiped the Emperor. But these men stand in this Chamber, the heart of our democracy, and when the spirit moves them, freely criticize the President.

But one controversy has not subsided during the 41 years since Pearl Harbor. If anything, it has grown. That is the controversy over the relocation of Japanese-Americans.

In an effort to understand the issue, the Congress created a commission to investigate the events surrounding the relocation and to make any recommendations for redress. By law the commission must release its findings in a report by December 30, 1982. According to several newspaper reports, it will recommend compensation to those who were interned of up to \$25,000 per person.

Whether or how we shall compensate those interned is a matter for future Congresses, of which I shall not be a Member. But as a U.S. Senator, a Japanese-American, and especially as

an American, I must share my views on this most sensitive issue.

The wartime relocation of Japanese-Americans in 1942 can only be understood in the context of California history. As is well known, California has been the principal source of anti-Oriental propaganda in the United States for more than 100 years. During the Gold Rush days, by 1851, there were 25,000 Chinese in the State. It was a regular practice of miners, on a big Saturday night drunk, to raid the Chinese sections of mining towns to beat up or lynch a few Chinese just for the hell of it. Chinese were often the victims of mob violence. A mob of whites shot and hanged 20 Chinese one night in Los Angeles in 1871.

When the first transcontinental railroad, the Central Pacific, was completed, great ceremonies were held in connection with the hammering in of the Golden Spike to celebrate the occasion. Eloquent speeches were given praising the magnificent contributions of Englishmen, Irishmen, Germans, Frenchmen, and others who had contributed to the completion of the railroad. But no Chinese were invited to this event, although they above all—10,000 of them—had done the most dangerous and demanding labor to make the completion possible. The Chinese were dismissed when their work was done and set adrift without severance pay.

Anti-Chinese legislation and agitation were common throughout the latter half of the 19th century and well into the 20th. The workers discharged from the railroads drifted from town to town looking for work. In San Francisco they entered some of the skilled trades like hatmaking, cigarmaking, tailoring and so on. It is an interesting fact that the first union label was one placed on cigars to tell the customer that this cigar was made by white men and not by Chinese. That is what the union label means. That is the proud origin of the union label. In 1882 the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed after much agitation on the part of Californians, including the very influential and then-powerful Sons and Daughters of the Golden West.

The persecution of the Chinese continued into the 20th century. Chinese-American friends of mine who are now older professional men in San Francisco remember the days when, if they left the Chinese area, they were beaten up by Irish and other toughs, so they had to stay within the limits of Chinatown. Throughout this period, pamphlets and books were published attacking Orientals as a menace to white society.

The Hearst newspapers continued to lead a crusade against the "Yellow Peril." The Sacramento Bee, Fresno Bee, Modesto Bee—all of the McClatchy chain—were notorious for their anti-Oriental propaganda. I remember as a high school student in

Winnipeg in the early 1920's writing a term paper on anti-Oriental agitation in California, and it was then that I learned of the McClatchy newspapers, long before I knew where Sacramento, Modesto, and Fresno were. The Hearst newspapers were no better.

The attacks upon Orientals were not limited to the popular press or to labor unions and "patriotic" societies. It was highly endorsed by many of the leading intellectuals of the time. There were such books as Lothrop Stoddard's "The Rising Tide of Color, Against White World Supremacy" (1920). Other distinguished intellectuals who wrote warning books against the Orientals were people like Madison Grant, who wrote "Passing of the Great Race, or Racial Basis of European History" (1916). There was also the distinguished labor economist of the University of Wisconsin in the 1930's, Prof. E. A. Ross. When I was a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin in the 1930's, I used to see Professor Ross at the University Club. He never spoke to me nor did I ever speak to him. I did not know then what I learned much later, namely, that he was one of the leading intellectual advocates of exclusion of Orientals from the American labor force. He was regarded as a great liberal at the time.

There was also the widely accepted doctrine of what was later to be known as "Social Darwinism," to the effect that the white race was the highest point of human evolution, and that yellow, brown, and black people represented lower stages. Indeed, white people themselves were divided into the "higher" North European—"Nordic," "Aryan"—and the "lower" South Europeans—Slavs, Greeks, and Italians. The fact that these ideas were widely believed to be scientific is all too evident in the U.S. Immigration Act of 1924, which codified these ideas into law, and which gave high immigration quotas to British, Germans, and Scandinavians, lower quotas to Middle and South Europeans, and total exclusion to the Japanese. The Chinese had already been excluded in 1882.

Against this background of almost 100 years of successful anti-Oriental agitation throughout California, it is easy to understand that the attack on Pearl Harbor aroused in the people of California, as well as elsewhere, all the superstitious, racist fears that had been generated over the years, as well as the normal insanities of wartime. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was called "a stab in the back"—a typical Oriental form of behavior.

It is difficult for people who did not live through that dreadful time to reconstruct the terror and the anxiety felt by people along the entire west coast. Disaster followed upon disaster after the attack on Pearl Harbor. On that same day, December 7, 1941, Japanese forces landed on the Malay Peninsula and began their drive toward Singapore. Guam fell on December 10,

Wake on December 23. On December 8 Japanese planes destroyed half the aircraft on the airfields near Manila. As enemy troops closed in, General MacArthur withdrew his forces from the Philippines and retired to Australia. On Christmas Day the British surrendered Hong Kong.

The Western World was scared stiff. The west coast of the United States, rich with naval bases, shipyards, oil fields, and aircraft factories, seemed especially vulnerable to attack.

There was talk of evacuating not just the Japanese from the west coast but everybody. Who knew what was going to happen next?

How frightening were the nightly blackouts during that bleak winter of defeat. Would Japanese carriers come to bomb the cities—San Diego, San Francisco, Los Angeles? Would submarines sneak through the Golden Gate to shell San Francisco? Would they actually mount an invasion? Who could tell?

I moved to San Francisco in 1955. You could still see along the shores of Marin County the great big remains of submarine nets that went across the Golden Gate to catch Japanese submarines in case they started sneaking through the Golden Gate. That is how serious the fear was.

War of course breeds fear of enemies within—spies, saboteurs. There were rumors that Japanese farmers in Hawaii had cut arrows in their fields to direct Japanese fighter pilots to targets at Pearl Harbor, and that west coast Japanese were equally organized to help the enemy. Such rumors were later found to be totally without foundation, but in the anxieties of the moment they were believed.

It was a field day for inflammatory journalists and newscasters: Westbrook Pegler, John B. Hughes—even Damon Runyon—on the radio every night, screaming, these alarmist broadcasts about the dangers of Japanese attack.

The columnist Henry McLemore wrote:

Herd 'em up, pack 'em off and give 'em the inside room in the badlands . . . Let us have no patience with the enemy or with any whose veins carry his blood . . . Personally I hate the Japanese. That goes for all of them.

So both at the level of sensational journalism and at the level of the social sciences into the 1930's, the idea of white supremacy was challenged by remarkably few. In California, white supremacy took the form of anti-Orientalism. The notion that the Oriental was shifty, mysterious, and untrustworthy was built into the culture in such books as the Sax Rohmer "Dr. Fu Manchu" novels.

Most Americans have always had difficulty distinguishing between Chinese and Japanese I—must say the Chinese and Japanese have the same difficulty—although the latter were treated far more leniently than the former. The Chinese, except for diplo-

mats and merchants, were forbidden to bring women or wives to America, so that they were essentially a society of bachelors. You can still see many of these lonely old bachelors sunning themselves in Portsmouth Square in San Francisco.

If you want to see the evidence of history still alive, and that evidence in front of your eyes, you can see these old, elderly Chinese gentlemen in old, old clothes and old hats playing chess in Portsmouth Square, all of them 75, 80, and 90 years old. They are the old bachelors who came at a time when they did not let Chinese women into the country at all. But the Japanese could bring their wives or send for picture brides, that is, brides selected from photographs, so that they developed strong family ties and a place for themselves in American society, especially through their children who learned English in the public schools and helped to Americanize their parents.

Again the popular hue and cry was backed up by reputable intellectuals. Walter Lippmann, the dean of American social commentators then and for decades thereafter, joined in the demand for mass evacuation. The idea was also supported at the time by such liberal intellectual journals as the Nation, the New Republic, and the extra-liberal but short-lived New York newspaper, PM.

On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which set in motion the evacuation program. It applied to all Japanese, citizens and noncitizens alike, in the three Western States and a portion of Arizona. Altogether some 110,000 were relocated, of whom more than 70,000 were American citizens by birth; the remainder were not able to become citizens under the laws then prevailing.

Of course the relocation was unjust. But under the stress of wartime anxieties and hysteria and in the light of the long history of anti-Oriental agitation in California and the West, I find it difficult to imagine what else could have occurred that would not have been many times worse. If things had continued to go badly for American forces in the Pacific—and they did—what would Americans on the west coast have done to their Japanese and Japanese American neighbors as they learned of more American ships sunk, more American planes shot down, more American servicemen killed, including your husband, your boyfriend, your brothers? What would they have done? Would they have beaten their Japanese neighbors in the streets? Would they have ostracized and persecuted Japanese American children? Would mobs have descended on Little Tokyo in Los Angeles and Japan town in San Francisco to burn down shops and homes?

There was precedent for such behavior in California, especially directed

against the Chinese. The Chinese started wearing lapel pins saying, "I am Chinese."

I recall a friend of mine, a Japanese American now living in Marin County, who was 11 years old when the war broke out. She and her parents were vastly relieved when they learned of their evacuation from the west coast. Most of her generation and her parents generation welcomed the evacuation as a guarantee of their personal safety.

The question is often asked why Germans and Italians were not interned and why the Japanese in Hawaii were left alone. The answer is simple. Germans and Italians were persecuted during World War I, when they were fairly recent immigrants, but there were too many of them to intern. However, "patriots" dumped garbage on the lawns of German homes, and in some east coast cities, all the German books in the public libraries were burned and courses in the German language offered in colleges and high school stopped. By the time of World War II, both Germans and Italians were a well-established and familiar part of American life. The same was true of the Japanese in Hawaii, who were more than 20 percent of the population there and well known and trusted. Besides there were not enough ships to transport the huge Japanese populations out of the major islands.

On the west coast of the American mainland, the situation was different. The Japanese were a small fraction of the population of California, Washington, and Oregon. The immigration of Japanese was principally between the years 1900 to 1924; then it was stopped by law. Japanese males, who constituted the first immigrants, married late in life because they felt that they had to have a steady job before they could send for a bride from Japan. Hence the typical Japanese American family consisted of a father 20 years older than the mother, and the average age of the Nisei, as the American-born Japanese were called, at the time of Pearl Harbor was 16.

This last statistic is of great importance in accounting for the evacuation and internment.

If the average age of the American-born Japanese is 16, it means that the average white adult official in California knew little or nothing about the Japanese. He had not gone to school with Japanese children nor visited their homes. He had not had Japanese friends on baseball or debate teams. Furthermore, the Japanese parent generation spoke little English or none at all. So the ruling classes, the people in the city councils, the State assemblies, and so on, did not know who the Japanese were. They did not know anything about them. So whatever Westbrook Pegler said about them was likely to be true.

For most white Americans, especially those old enough to sit in positions

of authority, the Japanese were a strange and foreign element, so almost anything could be believed about them.

For example, it was widely believed—Japanese used to send their children, after public school, to Japanese language schools. It was widely believed that the Japanese children going to Japanese language school were being taught reverence for the Emperor of Japan, that they were being indoctrinated with Japanese patriotism.

This happened to be true. That is, many of the teachers who came over in the 1930's were products of the superheated patriotism in Japan that made it possible for Pearl Harbor to happen. However, it was not possible at that time to predict that this indoctrination in emperor worship would prove to be totally ineffective.

Incidentally, our distinguished colleague DANIEL INOUYE, as a pupil in a Japanese language school in Hawaii before World War II, kicked up a strenuous protest against the use of these schools to preach Japanese nationalism—and look what happened to him. He got elected to the U.S. Senate.

The relocation centers in desert areas to which the Japanese were assigned were, indeed, dreary places. However, the governing body of the centers, the War Relocation Authority, was headed by the wise and humane Dillon Myer, a midwesterner who, before his appointment, had known almost nothing about the Japanese.

Dillon Myer, by the way, died just about a month ago at quite an advanced age. I believe he was in his nineties.

Being a firm believer in democracy and justice and knowing the people in the camps has done nothing to deserve their internment. Mr. Myer did everything possible to make life tolerable for the internees. He encouraged camp self-government, hired teachers from outside to continue the education of the children, sent WRA staff around the East and Middle West to seek college admittance for Nisei who had graduated from the camp high schools. One result was that many Nisei students who, without enforced evacuation from the west coast, might have stopped with a high school education to work in their father's shops or farms, instead went on to college, including prestigious and private institutions such as Antioch, Oberlin, and Mount Holyoke, as well as to such great public institutions as Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Purdue.

A large number of young people—middle-aged people by this time—from very modest families got a college education which they otherwise would never have if they had not been sent to relocation camp.

The officials of the staff of the WRA with a few exceptions were deeply concerned about the injustice of the relocation program, eager to re-

store the Japanese Americans, especially Nisei, to normal American lives. They fanned out over the United States east of the Rockies to seek employment for them. You must understand that the Japanese Americans that were put into camps were only those who lived west of the Rockies. If you lived east of the Rockies—Salt Lake City, Denver, Chicago—they left you alone, because you were not considered to be a military danger. I was living in Chicago, thank goodness.

They fanned out over the United States east of the Rockies to seek employment for the internees. Everywhere the Japanese Americans went, they impressed their employers by their industry and loyalty, so that more were summoned from the camps—scientists, teachers, mechanics, food processors, agricultural workers. By the time the order excluding Japanese from the west coast was rescinded on January 2, 1945, half the internees had found new jobs and homes in mid-America and the East.

I emphasize this last point because the relocation centers were not "concentration camps." The younger generation of Japanese Americans love to call them concentration camps. Unlike the Nazis, who made the term "concentration camp" a symbol of the ultimate in man's inhumanity to man, the WRA officials worked hard to release their internees not to be sent to gas chambers but to freedom, to useful jobs on the outside world and to get their B.A. at Oberlin College.

By 1945, there were almost 2,500 Nisei and Issai in Chicago, a city that was most hospitable to Japanese, and I myself found relatives I did not know existed. Other Midwest and Eastern cities acquired Japanese populations they did not know before the war: Minneapolis, Cleveland, Cincinnati, New York, Madison, Wis., Des Moines, St. Louis, and so on. And those who remained in camp in most cases did so voluntarily. These were the older people, afraid of the outside world, with the Nation still at war with Japan.

I point out these facts to emphasize the point that to call relocation centers concentration camps, as is all too commonly done, is semantic inflation of the most dishonest kind, an attempt to equate the actions of the U.S. Government with the genocidal actions of the Nazis against the Jews during the Hitler regime. As an American I protest this calamity against the Nation I am proud to have served as an educator and even prouder to serve as a legislator.

Now, the relocation center at Tule Lake, Calif., was different from the others. It was there that those who resisted the evacuation and internment, including a Japanese veteran of the U.S. Army in World War I, a Nisei who renounced American citizenship in protest against the relocation, and other angry people were sent to isolate

them from those who patiently accepted their internment. There were frequent disturbances at Tule Lake.

The trouble-free lives at all the relocation centers other than Tule Lake can be contributed to a cultural trait of the Japanese, clearly seen in the Issai, that is, the older generation of immigrants, but almost unheard of in their American-born grandchildren, and that is the concept of gaman, which means endurance. Gaman is to endure with patience and dignity, especially dignity, hardships, misfortunes or injustices, especially those about which nothing can be done.

I am sure there are some Americans who will be enraged at the suggestion that anyone was happy in a relocation camp. But with the concept of gaman, you learn to make the best of a tough situation, endure with patience and dignity the situation you are in and make the best of it.

The people in the relocation camps were shopkeepers, market gardeners, farmers, laborers, all in relatively humble occupations, finding themselves with 3 years of leisure on their hands.

As one elderly gentleman said recently, "That was the first time in my life that I didn't have to get up at 4 o'clock in the morning to milk the cows."

Finding themselves with some leisure in their lives, they went in for art. There was a tremendous artistic output. They turned out little masterpieces of sculpture, flower arrangements, and ceramics and painting, later memorialized in a scholarly volume entitled "Beauty Behind Barbed Wire" by Allen Hendershott Eaton, 1952.

How else can one account for the elderly Japanese farmers and grocers who gathered around a bridge table to go over the nagauta, a traditional, long narrative song, and the music from the kabuki, which is the Japanese equivalent of opera?

For many older Japanese, the relocation turned out to be a 3-year release from unremitting work on farms and vegetable markets and fishing boats, and they used this leisure to recover and relive the glories of their traditional culture.

Now I come to the most important part of the story. It is the story of the Nisei, the children of the older generation I have just been talking about.

It was a great humiliation for the Nisei of the 100th battalion of the Hawaii National Guard to be sent to Camp McCoy, Wis., where they were trained with wooden guns.

SPARK MATSUNAGA, now a U.S. Senator from Hawaii, was in that unit. He writes:

We wrote home of our great desire for combat duty to prove our loyalty to the United States. It was not known to us then that our letters were being censored by higher authority. We learned subsequently that because of the tenor of our letters, the War Department decided to give us our chance. Our guns were returned to us, and

we were told that we were going to be prepared for combat duty . . . Grown men leaped with joy.

On January 28, 1943, the War Department announced that Nisei would be accepted as a special combat unit. They volunteered in the thousands both from Hawaii and from the relocation camps. They were united with the 100th Battalion as the 442d Regimental Combat Team at Camp Shelby, Miss.

The 100th Battalion first saw action at Salerno, Italy, in September 1943, and took heavy casualties. The 442d landed in Italy in June 1944, at once gained a reputation as an assault force, and accomplished the famous rescue of the "lost battalion" of the 36th (Texas) Division at an enormous cost in blood. Fighting in seven major campaigns, the men of the 442d suffered 9,486 casualties and won more than 18,000 individual decorations for valor.

Another 3,700 Nisei served in combat areas in the Pacific as translators and interpreters. The Japanese military, believing their language to be too difficult for foreigners to master, were careless about security. They did not count on Nisei on every battlefield reading captured documents and passing information on to Allied commanders. Kibei, Nisei born in America but educated in Japan and originally the object of special distrust, turned out to be especially helpful in this respect.

They were born in America. They were American citizens, but they were educated in Japan. They could read Japanese very well, so they were very good for intelligence work.

In short, the Nisei covered themselves with honor and made life in America better for themselves, their parents, who a few years after the war won the right to be naturalized, and their children. I remember vividly the returning Nisei veterans I saw in Chicago soon after V-E Day. Short of stature as they were, they walked proudly, infantry combat citations on their chests, conscious that they were home—in their own country. Chicago, known throughout the war for its hospitality to servicemen, outdid itself when the Nisei returned. They had earned that welcome.

The relocation was a heart-breaking experience for Japanese Americans as well as a serious economic loss for those who had spent decades of labor on their farms and businesses. But most seriously it was an affront. America was saying to them, "You are not to be trusted. You are Japs. We doubt your loyalty."

The Nisei, although very much Americanized, are in some respects profoundly Japanese. An imputation of disloyalty, being an affront, was also a challenge. A powerful Japanese motivation is "giri to one's name"—the duty to keep one's reputation—and one's family's—unblemished. Giri is also duty to one's community, one's employers, to one's nation. The Nisei's

nation was the United States. One accused of disloyalty is dutybound to remove that disgrace by demonstrating himself to be loyal beyond all expectation.

This is a basic reason the Nisei volunteered in such numbers and fought so well. More than 33,000 Nisei served in the war—a remarkable number out of a total Japanese American population—Hawaii and mainland combined—of little more than 200,000. They had a fierce pride in their reputation as a group.

The Nisei were also motivated by "giri to one's name." Those who found jobs outside the camps were exemplary workers, as if to prove something not only about themselves but about their entire group. Japanese Americans, young and old alike, accepted the mass relocation with dignity and maturity, making the best of a humiliating situation. In so doing, they exhibited the finest resources of their ancient background culture.

The prewar theory of white supremacy was completely discredited by the crushing defeat of Hitler and Hitlerism. The prejudice against Japanese in America was all but wiped out by the courage and the sacrifice of Nisei service men in Italy and the Pacific. Then in the 1960's came the civil rights movement, which further discredited doctrines of racial superiority and inferiority. We live today in a totally different era, in which the prevailing racialist theories of the 1930's and earlier are seen as historical curiosities.

The Nisei, with their courage, and their parents, by their industry, have won for Japanese Americans the admiration and respect of all Americans. Japanese Americans have an average level of education higher than any other ethnic group, including whites. They have a higher representation in the learned professions—medicine, law, engineering, computer science—than other ethnic groups—and in this respect they are doing as well as another group famous for their respect for learning—namely, the Jews. The per capita income of Japanese-Americans is \$500 a year above the national average. And they have, with a population of less than half a million, three representatives in the U.S. Senate, while the blacks, with a population approaching 23 million, have none. What more can Japanese-Americans want? We are living today at a time when Japanese-Americans are almost a privileged class, with their notorious scholastic aptitude, their industriousness, and their team spirit in whatever occupation they find themselves.

Mr. President, I am proud to be a Japanese-American. But when a small but vocal group of Japanese-Americans calling themselves a redress committee demand a cash indemnity of \$25,000 for all those who went to relocation camps during World War II, including those who were infants at the time and those who are now dead, a

total of some two and three-quarters of a billion dollars—we have been seeing this in a series of articles being published in the Washington Post—my flesh crawls with shame and embarrassment.

Let me remind the Japanese American Redress Committee that we also live in a time when American industry is seriously threatened by Japanese competition—in automobiles, steel, cameras, television, and radio sets, tape recorders, and watches. I warn the Japanese Americans who demand about \$3 billion of financial redress for events of 41 years ago from which nobody is suffering today, that their efforts can only result in a backlash against both Japanese Americans and Japan. And to make such a demand at a time of the budget stringencies of the Reagan administration is unwise enough, but to make this demand against the background of their own record as America's most successful minority is simply to invite ridicule.

Let me remind the Japanese Americans that we are, as we say repeatedly in our Pledge of Allegiance, "one nation," striving to achieve "liberty and justice for all."

This means—and I say this to black Americans and Mexican Americans and all other ethnic political groups—let us stop playing ethnic politics to gain something for our own group at the expense of all others. Let us continue to think of America as "one nation, under God, indivisible" and let us act accordingly.

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## Wartime Crime Against 77,000 Americans Awaits Redress

By DAVID KISHIYAMA

Tule Lake. Minidoka. Manzanar. Topaz. Poston. Gila River. Granada. Heart Mountain. Rohwer. Jerome. For 39 years the names of those 10 concentration camps for innocent U.S. citizens have lived in infamy. Now, after far too many years, a commission appointed by Congress is investigating that blatant crime perpetrated under the guise of wartime national security.

The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians was created by Congress to determine, in the words of Chairman Joan Bernstein, "how it was that the nation's military and civilian leaders decided to evacuate and confine 120,000 (Japanese American) people for no reason other than their ancestry," and to "recommend appropriate remedies." This has been interpreted by most Japanese Americans as an avenue for Congress to grant redress and reparations.

What happened is not in dispute. Two months after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, enabling a military commander "to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he . . . may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded. . . ." Over the next few months, Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, the Western states defense commander, issued a series of Civilian Exclusion Orders that eventually put nearly all persons of Japanese ancestry, including women and children, behind barbed wire. They had one week's notice, and could take only what they could carry.

There were no charges filed, no hearings or trials. Rampant invasion rumors and war



JENNIFER JO SMITH / for The Times

hysteria were enough to establish the "guilt" of 77,000 American-born citizens and 43,000 resident aliens. Innocent people spent more than three years in concentration camps, even though the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway seven months after Pearl Harbor had virtually eliminated the threat of Japanese invasion.

"It is a sad and nationally humiliating story," said former Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas, testifying at a recent commission hearing in Washington. "I believe the mass evacuation of those of Japanese ancestry and their prolonged detention was a tragic error, and I cannot escape the conclusion that racial prejudice was a basic ingredient."

Victims of this crime, in which seven of the Bill of Rights' 10 provisions were selec-

tively suspended, will have an opportunity to testify before the commission. The Los Angeles hearings will be held today through Thursday in the State Office Building downtown. Other hearings will be held in San Francisco, Seattle, Alaska and Chicago.

Also testifying will be opponents of redress, many of whom can be expected to raise emotional, unrelated arguments. It was hysteria that created the concentration camps in World War II, and we will have learned nothing since then if hysteria influences the commission during the hearings and in preparing its final report to Congress.

The issue really is simple: Is the wartime jailing of citizens of a certain ethnic ancestry warranted only on the ground that they might create a threat to national security?

With the hindsight of history, it should be easy for the commission to find that Executive Order 9066 was not a military necessity (Japanese Americans in Hawaii, directly in a war zone, were not ordered into camps). The commission should investigate how Executive Order 9066, which did not specify a target group, was transformed by the military into Civilian Exclusion Orders aimed solely at persons of Japanese ancestry (and, in Alaska, at Aleuts).

The commission also should reexamine the situation of those in the camps—several thousand—who refused to take loyalty oaths or resisted the draft. (The oaths were imposed after they and their families had been interned for more than a year.) The same reexamination is needed for those who renounced their citizenship and expatriated to Japan.

The commission should also examine the 1948 Japanese American Evacuation Claims Act, which compensated more than \$400 million in claims at a rate of 8½ cents on the dollar.

What will not be easy for the commission is the task of recommending remedies for the unjust and harsh treatment given the Japanese Americans. The issue of how much redress and reparation the government should pay, and to whom, already has overshadowed the larger issue of usurped freedoms and how to prevent such an atrocity from recurring.

The National Coalition for Redress/Reparations has demanded \$25,000 for each of the 120,000 Japanese Americans and 1,000 Aleuts (or their heirs) detained in the camps. Two other groups, the National Council for Japanese American Redress and the Japanese American Citizens League's

National Committee for Redress, have asked for monetary compensation but have not specified an amount. Other groups are supporting compensation by means of class-action suits.

Not all Japanese Americans seek redress. Surveys by both the Japanese American Citizens League and the Rafu Shimpo newspaper indicate that approximately 5% do not favor redress.

Many of them, like my parents (both deceased), found the 1940s too painful to discuss openly. Only recently have the stories of prejudice and hatred become widely known. Some fear that redress will rekindle that animosity. The horrendous humiliation and loss of honor was such a blow that some Japanese Americans would like to forget that shameful episode in American history.

But that would be wrong. This nation must not forget that the precedent set by mass expulsion and incarceration of Americans of Japanese ancestry represents a danger for all Americans of every ethnic descent.

To deny just compensation for such a wrong would allow that precedent to be reaffirmed in future situations. Meaningful redress and reparation, whether directly to the victim (or heir) and/or to a community fund, would be the right way to acknowledge that wrong and help insure that a similar crime will not be committed in the future.

David Kishiyama, a third-generation Japanese American, was born in the Heart Mountain, Wyo., camp. He is a Times copy editor and a founding member of the Asian-American Journalists Assn.



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SOURCE: LOS ANGELES TIMES

June 29, 1980

## Redress Divides Japanese-Americans Some War Internees Want Losses Repaid, Others Want Nothing

By TERESA WATANABE

Times Staff Writer

When World War II came, Bob Goka was uprooted from his Los Angeles home and sent to a relocation camp along with 110,000 others of Japanese descent, two-thirds of them U.S. citizens.

He was forced to sell at an estimated loss of \$100,000 his Chinese restaurant, produce house and bingo operations in Los Angeles.

Now, he is a successful nurseryman in West Los Angeles who grosses \$2.5 million a year and travels around the world.

The 75-year-old Japanese-American agrees he has done well. Nonetheless, he supports the nationwide campaign to win government compensation for the financial losses and emotional suffering that he and other internees experienced nearly four decades ago.

It's not a matter of money, he says, but of principle.

"They took American citizens and put us in concentration camps," Goka said. "Why, in America they must prove you guilty first. But we were never proven guilty."

Arao Hasegawa, 64, also was sent to a relocation camp. But he sees the matter differently. To ask for redress is improper and not the Oriental way, he says.

Hasegawa, now an administrative assistant at the Japanese consulate in Los Angeles, explains his attitude in culture-laden language: *gaman*, *haji*

and *shiyō ga nai*.

Literally, the words mean endurance, shame and "it can't be helped." But collectively, they mean much more.

The words reflect an attitude shared by many Japanese that war is inevitable and must be endured and that to complain now and ask the government for "charity" is a disgrace.

The opposing views of Goka and Hasegawa illustrate the disagreement within the Japanese-American community over the redress campaign.

The campaign has resulted in two bills before Congress—one to award \$15,000-plus in cash payments to those who were relocated, the other to establish a presidential commission to determine whether the evacuation was just and whether compensation should be paid.

If some Japanese-Americans are uncertain about the issue, so are many non-Japanese who are not quite sure what happened in 1942 or why it is a matter of concern today.

After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, and brought the United States into World War II, the U.S. government feared a Pacific Coast invasion and fifth column activity by Japanese-Americans.

It ordered thousands to leave their homes in California, Washington state and Oregon and report to internment camps in remote areas of California (at Tule Lake and Manzanar) and six other states. Those sent to the camps

lost millions of dollars in property and other assets, according to reports on the episode.

Over the years, the relocation has been criticized as a gross violation of individual civil rights and defended as a necessary wartime measure.

In the Japanese-American community, feelings about the redress campaign seem to divide on generational lines.

The campaign is primarily being fueled by the *nisei* (second generation) and *sansai* (third generation), who generally are more willing to air their grievances in public than their elders. Many say, however, that they are pushing the campaign not for themselves but for the *issei* (first generation). An estimated 40,000 of them went to the camps but only 5,000 remain.

"They're the ones who suffered the most, yet they aren't going to be around in five or 10 years," says Frank Abe, a redress activist in Seattle. "We've got to do it now."

Not many *issei* have joined the campaign and few even talk about it.

Aio Hanafusa is a dainty woman who lives in Tokyo Towers with other elderly Japanese. She speaks freely of her experiences as an obstetrics nurse at an internment camp in Texas but acknowledges she is an exception. Among most *issei*, the topic remains taboo.

"It's the shame," she says, explaining that most *issei* still feel an overriding guilt that it was somehow their

fault that they were interned.

Even among those who agree on the concept of redress, there is disagreement on how to approach it.

Some want to establish a community trust fund to pay for educational and cultural activities, arguing that such a fund would make a more lasting contribution to Japanese-Americans than individual payments would. Others call for a legal defense fund to handle civil rights cases. Still others believe a national apology would suffice.

But most attention is focused on the relative merits of cash payments as opposed to establishment of a commission.

The Japanese American Citizens League, a national educational and civil rights organization, at first argued for payments of \$25,000 a person. But the league abandoned that stance after deciding it was not politically feasible. It now supports the establishment of a commission.

The league's switch has evoked angry accusations that its leadership

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caved in to political pressures and repeating the league's errors of the past, when it called for peaceful compliance with the wartime evacuation order.

The league's Seattle and Chicago chapters, in fact, are continuing to argue for individual payments. So are the National Council for Japanese-

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American Redress and the Little Tokyo People's Rights Organization, a Los Angeles group.

John Tateishi, national chairman of the league's redress committee, defends the commission approach as politically realistic and the first step toward compensation.

"You have to uncover the wrongs

done before you can convince Congress that the redress bill should be passed," he argues. "Then you go for the compensation."

Assemblyman Paul Bannai (R-Gardena), who is promoting a state legislative resolution supporting a commission bill, agrees.

"I was amazed to find that even members of the state Senate—people who have grown up in California while all this was going on—remain misinformed about the experience," he says.

Rep. Mike Lowry (D-Wash.) is the author of the redress bill. His measure would award \$15,000 to each in-

ternee, plus \$15 for each day spent in camp.

He said he has received hundreds of letters from non-Japanese opposing his legislation because "the Japanese didn't compensate us for Pearl Harbor; why should we compensate them for the camps?"

Or, "I was a prisoner of war in Japan and I'm not getting paid for being there."

Lately, however, letters of support—mostly from Japanese-Americans—are outnumbering the opposition, a Lowry aide said.



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**THE INTERNMENT OF GERMAN AND ITALIAN ALIENS COMPARED WITH THE INTERNMENT  
OF JAPANESE ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES DURING WORLD WAR II:  
A BRIEF HISTORY AND ANALYSIS**

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PREFACE

The internment in the United States during World War II of more than 100,000 Japanese Americans, aliens and native-born citizens alike, has been the subject of numerous articles and books. Less well known is the fact that a significantly smaller number of German and Italian aliens, and some citizens, were also interned, despite the fact that they comprised a greater population than the Japanese Americans, and were present in larger numbers in equally sensitive and strategic areas of the United States.

Recently, a Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians was established (P.L. 96-317, July 31, 1980) "to gather facts to determine whether any wrong was committed against those American citizens and permanent resident aliens affected by Executive Order No. 9066" which authorized the War Department in 1942 to exclude persons from designated military areas.

The reasons for this disparity in treatment form the basis for the attached report.

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In 1940 the military successes of the Axis powers (Germany, Italy, Japan), in Europe and elsewhere, caused a reappraisal of the traditional policy of the United States regarding immigration and naturalization. As a result, and as a precautionary measure, Congress in June of 1940 passed the Alien Registration Act. 1/ An Alien Registration Division was established in the Department of Justice and registration began in August 27, 1940. Registration involved not only fingerprinting but also required the alien to answer forty-two questions including occupation, geographical location, biographical data, organizational membership, and status of citizenship. When registration was completed, 4,921,452 aliens had reported in the United States, and the Director of the Alien Registration Division noted that we "know more about the strangers in our midst than about ourselves." 2/

Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Federal Bureau of Investigation began a roundup of aliens deemed potentially dangerous as a result of prior investigation by the Bureau. Within weeks, several thousand

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1/ 54 Stat. 670. Also known as the Smith Act.

2/ Perry, Donald R. Aliens in the United States. In *Minority Peoples in a Nation at War*. Philadelphia, American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1942. (Annals, v. 223, September 1942) p. 6. For detailed description of actual registration, filing of records, coding cards, fingerprinting, etc., see Amidon, Beulah. *Aliens in America*. Survey Graphic, v. 30, February 1943. p. 58-61.

aliens had been taken into custody, brought before an Alien Enemy Hearing Board and then released, paroled, or interned, for the duration of the war. Those interned, if not considered a threat, were allowed later to apply for parole. 3/

Early Japanese military and naval successes, and a belief that the American mainland would be attacked, convinced many Americans, especially those living on the West Coast, that this somewhat selective screening process was not satisfactory. It was not long before calls were heard for an evacuation of all aliens, but especially the Japanese, from designated military areas. In January 1942, for example, Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, commander of the Western Defense Command, stated that the only solution was "evacuation of all enemy aliens from the West Coast and resettlement or internment under positive control, military or otherwise." 4/

Certain steps had already been taken (via Presidential proclamations in December 1941 and January 1942) to regulate the conduct and movement of enemy aliens. However, none of these measures was as severe as some desired. In January and February of 1942, additional measures were announced by the

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3/ Hoover, J. Edgar. Alien Enemy Control. Iowa Law Review, v. 29, March 1944. p. 402-403. Paroled meant that the individual was released but was under the observation of a "sponsor" selected by the Hearing Board.

4/ Conn, Stetson, et al. Guarding the United States and Its Outposts. The Western Hemisphere. United States in World War II. Prepared for the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1964. p. 123.

United States Attorney General by which aliens were excluded from various areas on the West Coast. 5/

Continued agitation against aliens on the West Coast resulted in the issuance of Executive Order No. 9066 on February 19, 1942. This order gave the Secretary of War, or his military commanders, the authority "to exclude American citizens as well as alien enemies, from such areas as the Secretary should designate." 6/ Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt was designated as the military commander to carry out the provisions of the executive order in the Western Defense Command. Successive proclamations by DeWitt restricted the movement of aliens. Finally, on March 24, 1942, DeWitt issued the first formal evacuation order in Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1 by which all Japanese, aliens and nonaliens, were excluded from military areas in the State of Washington. Later orders extended exclusion to California and Oregon. 7/

Six days later, General DeWitt announced that certain classes of aliens might be exempted from the exclusion orders. Eligible for exemption were the following:

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5/ U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, National Defense Migration; Findings and Recommendations on Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others From Prohibited Military Zones, Fourth Interim Report pursuant to H. Res. 113. House Report no. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d sess., May 1942. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print Off., 1942. p. 160-162. Hereafter cited as Tolan Committee, Findings and Recommendations.

6/ Ibid., p. 163. It should be noted that authority to deal with aliens was now removed from the Justice Department. P.L. 77-503 (March 21, 1942) enforced exclusion from military areas.

7/ Tolan Committee; Findings and Recommendations, p. 164-165.



1. German and Italian aliens 70 or more years of age.
2. German and Italian aliens, parents, wives, husbands, children of (or other person residing in a household whose support is dependent upon) any officer, enlisted man, or commissioned nurse on active duty in the Army of the United States (or any component thereof), United States Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard.
3. German or Italian aliens, parents, wives, husbands, children of (or other person residing in a household whose support is wholly dependent upon) any officer, enlisted man, or commissioned nurse who on or since December 7, 1941, has died in line of duty with the armed forces of the United States indicated in the preceding paragraph.
4. German and Italian aliens awaiting naturalization who had filed a petition for naturalization and who had paid the filing fee therefor on or before December 7, 1941.
5. Patients in hospitals, or confined elsewhere, and too ill or incapacitated to be removed therefrom without danger to life.
6. Immates of orphanages and the totally deaf, dumb, or blind.

However, Japanese were declared ineligible for all except categories 5 and 6. Thus, for all practical purposes, evacuation from the West Coast was limited to the Japanese. 8/

There was some opposition to the evacuation of the Japanese, but this was stilled by the Japanese victories in the Pacific in early 1942. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, for example, acquiesced because he had come to the conclusion that the "racial characteristics" of the Japanese were "such that we cannot understand or trust even the citizen Japanese." 9/ Attorney General Francis Biddle's efforts to prevent evacuation were derided on the West Coast as "Biddling along," and he yielded; but he did resist successfully

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8/ Tolson Committee; Findings and Recommendations, p. 165.

9/ Burns, James MacGregor. Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970. p. 215.

similar measures on the East Coast and was instrumental in setting up one or more hearing boards in each judicial district. 10/

Opposition to the evacuation of German and Italian aliens met with more success because the presence of large numbers of these people was not perceived as a threat to national security, nor did they provoke the sort of hysteria and panic engendered on the West Coast by the Japanese population. Moreover, the problems posed in moving such large numbers deterred any major effort for evacuation. Nevertheless, General DeWitt expressed a determination to proceed against the German and Italian aliens as soon as the evacuation of the Japanese was completed. Several of his staff members opposed such plans and they were aided by similar resistance in the War Department.

In February 1942, Secretary of War Stimson directed General DeWitt to "not disturb, for the time being at least, Italian aliens and persons of Italian lineage" unless they constituted a definite danger. In support of this order, Stimson stated that the Italians were "potentially less dangerous, as a whole, than those of other enemy nationalities" and that because "of the size of the Italian population and the number of troops and facilities which would have to be employed to deal with them, their inclusion in the general plan would greatly overtax our strength." 11/

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10/ Galkins, C. Wartime Attorney General. Survey Graphic, v. 31, October 1942. p. 423.

11/ tenBroek, Jacobus, et al. Prejudice, War and the Constitution: Census and Consequences of the Evacuation of the Japanese Americans in World War II. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975. p. 302. A similar conclusion was reached by a congressional committee investigating evacuation. In March 1942, the committee called mass evacuation of German and Italian aliens an "unmanageable proposal," and internment for the duration of the war was considered "unthinkable." U.S. Congress, House. Select Committee Investigating  
(continued)

By March 1942, the War Department had decided that any evacuation of German and Italian aliens would "produce repercussions throughout the nation," and Attorney General Biddle was contending that any evacuation of these groups would "have the gravest consequences to the nation's economic structure and war morale since it would be bound to produce confusion and disaffection among persons of those nationalities." 12/

Consequently, Lt. General Hugh A. Drum, commanding general of the Eastern Defense Command, was informed that there was to be no evacuation within his command. General Drum's statement on April 27, 1942, regarding the establishment of military zones and approved conduct therein contained the announcement that "Mass evacuation is not contemplated. Instead thereof, such evacuations as may be considered necessary will be by selective processes applicable to enemy aliens, or to other persons deemed dangerous to remain at large within the area or within its zones."13/

However, General DeWitt still recommended mass evacuation of German and Italian aliens on the grounds of military necessity. If his recommendations

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(continued) National Defense Migration. National Defense Migration; Preliminary Report and Recommendations on Problems of Evacuation of Citizens and Aliens from Military Areas. House Report No. 1911, 77th Cong., 2d sess., March 19, 1942. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1942. p. 25. See Ibid., p. 21-16 for reasoning of committee regarding a "flexible policy" for German and Italian aliens. The same committee reported that there were, according to the 1940 census, 126,947 Japanese, foreign-born and citizen, in the United States. Most of the Japanese were concentrated on the West Coast with 88.5 percent residing in the States of California, Oregon, and Washington. In contrast, German aliens amounted to 314,105, and Italian aliens, 690,551. When the number of German and Italian foreign-born naturalized citizens is included, the figure approximates four million. See Ibid., 91-92, 230.

12/ Conn, Stetson, Guarding the United States, p. 145.

13/ Tolan Committee; Findings and Recommendations, p. 36.

were not to be adopted, DeWitt requested "definite instructions to the contrary that would exempt him from all responsibility for the consequences." 14/

In the meantime, the House Select Committee investigating the evacuation of enemy aliens issued its fourth report in which various recommendations were made for the treatment of aliens. The committee also reiterated a statement made in a previous report regarding the evacuation of German and Italian aliens:

If the Japanese evacuation creates serious questions, it is because an entire group out of our population is being bodily removed, family by family. This is in the nature of an exodus of a people. The numbers involved are large, but they are by no means as large, for the whole country, as those who will be involved if we generalize the current treatment of the Japanese to apply to all Axis aliens and their immediate families. Indeed, this committee is prepared to say that any such proposal is out of the question if we intend to win this war. 15/

On May 15, 1942, General DeWitt was informed that there was to be no "collective evacuation of German and Italian aliens from the West coast or from anywhere else in the United States." The War Department would, however, authorize individual exclusion orders "against both aliens and citizens under the authority of Executive Order 9066." 16/ In a letter to DeWitt from Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy on May 20, McCloy told DeWitt that in approving evacuation under Executive Order 9066, "both the President and

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14/ Conn, Stetson, Guarding the United States, p. 146. On May 5, 1942, President Roosevelt wrote to Secretary of War Stimson that on the subject of evacuation of German and Italian aliens, he was "inclined to think this may have a bad effect on morale." See Polenber, Richard. War and Society: The United States 1941-1945. New York, J.B. Lippincott Co., 1972. p. 61.

15/ Tolan Committee; Findings and Recommendations, p. 31.

16/ Conn, Stetson, Guarding the United States, p. 146.

the Secretary of War did so with the expectation that the exclusions would not reach such numbers . . . . We want, if at all possible, to avoid the necessity of establishing additional relocation settlements." 17/

Thus there was no mass evacuation of German and Italian aliens in the United States during World War II, despite the fact that the Italians were more numerous than the Japanese on the West Coast and the Germans more so on the East Coast. For example, New York State alone contained more German aliens than the number of Japanese, both aliens and citizens, on the whole Pacific Coast. 18/ Part of the reason for this lack of action was the sizeable logistical problem it would have imposed at a critical period of the war. More important was the inability of the American people in World War II (in contrast to World War I) to fear "that people of German or Italian descent, unlike the Japanese-Americans, owed a divided allegiance." 19/ Indeed, as early as November 1942, Attorney General Biddle announced that Italian aliens were no longer considered "aliens of enemy nationality." 20/ As one

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17/ Weglyn, Michi. *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps*. New York, William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1976. p. 291. In June 1942, President Roosevelt assured Herbert Lehman, then Governor of New York, "that he was 'keenly aware of the anxiety that German and Italian aliens living in the United States must feel as the result of the Japanese evacuation of the West Coast.' Would Lehman assure them 'that no collective evacuation of German or Italian aliens is contemplated at this time?'" See Burns, Roosevelt: *The Soldier of Freedom*, p. 268. It was the opinion of Attorney General Biddle in 1943 that Executive Order 9066 "was never intended to apply to Italians and Germans." See Michi, *Years of Infamy*, p. 73.

18/ Grodzins, Morton. *Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1949. p. 173.

19/ Polenberg, *War and Society*, p. 41.

20/ *Ibid.*, p. 42. Earlier in the year, Roosevelt rejected the idea that the Italians in the United States constituted a threat and dismissed them as "a lot of opera singers." See Burns, Roosevelt: *The Soldier of Freedom*, p. 214.

historian of wartime America concluded, "Since Germans and Italians were numerous, politically influential, well assimilated and widely dispersed, Roosevelt and Biddle believed that it would be unwise to take action against them." 21/

Nevertheless, selective individual exclusions were carried out, based on information from the FBI and the results of individual hearings by a board of army officers. Anyone judged "potentially dangerous" was ordered to leave the area. Grounds for exclusion included pre-Pearl-Harbor ties with German or Italian organizations and expressions of "admiration, sympathy, or loyalty to Hitler, Mussolini, the Nazi Party, Fascism, or the Fatherland." 22/ For example, in the Western Defense Command, from August 1942 to July 1943, 174 individuals, including native-born citizens and enemy aliens, were given exclusion orders. Many of those excluded were German-born or Italian-born American citizens. Similar action was taken in the same period by the Eastern and Southern Defense Commands. In these instances, 59 and 21 persons, respectively, were excluded from the coastal area. 23/

Detention of enemy aliens was originally under the control of the Army. However, in early 1943, operation of the camps was transferred to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. By the end of the year, there were

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21/ Polenberg, War and Society, p. 61.

22/ Barnhart, Edward N. The Individual Exclusion of Japanese-Americans in World War II. Pacific Historical Review, v. 29, May 1960. p. 113.

23/ Ibid., p. 113-114. In at least one case in 1943, that of a German-born American citizen in Philadelphia who had close ties with two German organizations, an order to leave the area was refused. This position was ultimately upheld later in the year by a Federal judge who ruled that the "Army lacked the right to exclude persons arbitrarily from coastal defense areas under present circumstances." New York Times, May 8, 1943, p. L 17, and August 21, 1943, p. 13.



sixteen internment camps scattered throughout the United States, most of them located in Texas, New Mexico, California, Montana, and North Dakota. One camp, Crystal City, Texas, was used solely for the internment of families. 24/

By July 1942, some 7,469 aliens had been taken into custody. However, many were released or paroled after investigation so that only 1,692 were actually interned. 25/ The peak number of inhabitants of the camps appears to have been reached at the beginning of 1944 when 9,341 aliens were being held. By the end of the year, only 6,238 remained in custody. 26/ Exact numbers are difficult to ascertain since in many cases they did not include German and Italian seamen interned when their ships were caught in American waters after the declaration of war, several thousand enemy aliens from Latin American, and a similar number awaiting deportation.

Within a few years after the war, all internment camps were phased out. Some "detention" facilities were still maintained, however, for aliens awaiting disposition of various legal actions. The last internment camp, the family facility at Crystal City, Texas, closed on February 27, 1948. 27/

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24/ U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Annual Report. 1943. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1943. p. 14-15.

25/ Ibid., Annual Report. 1941, p. 26-27.

26/ Ibid., Annual Report. 1942, p. 21. For descriptions of various camps see Harrison, Earl G. Civilian Internment--American Way. Survey Graphic, v. 33, May 1944. p. 229-233, 270. Some members of the German American Bund were denaturalized and spent time in the camps. See Diamond, Sander A. The Nazi Movement in the United States, 1924-1941. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1974. p. 345-346; and Bell, Leland V. The Failure of Nazism in America: The German American Bund, 1936-1941. Political Science Quarterly, v. 85, December 1970. p. 585-599.

27/ U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Annual Report. 1948. p. 19-21. Several camps closed during the war. For example, the Kenedy Internment Camp, Kenedy, Texas, closed in September 1944, the Kooskia Internment Camp, Kooskia, Idaho, closed in May 1945, and the Seagoville Internment Camp, Seagoville, Texas, closed in June 1945. See Ibid., Annual Report. 1945. p. 27.

## APPENDIX A: EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 9066

## EXECUTIVE ORDER—No. 9066

## AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY AREAS

WHEREAS the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national defense material, national defense premises, and national defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the Act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (U. S. C., Title 50, Sec. 104):

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders who he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. The designation of military areas in any region or locality shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the Attorney General under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas.

I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said Military Commanders to take such other steps as he or the appropriate Military Commander may deem advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each Military area hereinabove authorized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal Agencies, with authority to accept assistance of state and local agencies.

I hereby further authorize and direct all Executive Departments, independent establishments and other Federal Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said Military Commanders in carrying out this Executive Order, including the furnishing of medical aid, hospitalization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities, and services.

This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority heretofore granted under Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12, 1941, nor shall it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with respect to the investigation of alleged acts of sabotage or the duty and responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as such duty and responsibility is superseded by the designation of military areas hereunder.

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
February 19, 1942.

SOURCE: Tolan Committee, Findings and Recommendations, p. 314-315.

APPENDIX B: PUBLIC LAW 503, MARCH 21, 1942

AN ACT

To provide a penalty for violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons entering, remaining in, leaving, or committing any act in military areas or zones.

March 21, 1942  
[H. R. 6728]  
[Public Law 503]

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed \$5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, for each offense.

Violation of military restrictions.

Penalty.

Approved, March 21, 1942.

SOURCE: 56 Stat. 173.

## APPENDIX C: CIVILIAN EXCLUSION ORDER NO. ]

## CIVILIAN EXCLUSION ORDER No. 1

HEADQUARTERS, WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY,  
Presidio of San Francisco, California, March 24, 1942.

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Public Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2, this headquarters, dated March 2, 1942, and March 16, 1942, respectively, it is hereby ordered that all persons of Japanese ancestry, including aliens and nonaliens, be excluded from that portion of Military Area No. 1 described as "Bainbridge Island," in the State of Washington, on or before 12 o'clock noon, P. W. T., of the 30th day of March 1942.

2. Such exclusion will be accomplished in the following manner:

(a) Such persons may, with permission, on or prior to March 29, 1942, proceed to any approved place of their choosing beyond the limits of Military Area No. 1 and the prohibited zones established by said proclamations or hereafter similarly established, subject only to such regulations as to travel and change of residence as are now or may hereafter be prescribed by this headquarters and by the United States Attorney General. Persons affected hereby will not be permitted to take up residence or remain within the region designated as Military Area No. 1 or the prohibited zones heretofore or hereafter established. Persons affected hereby are required on leaving or entering Bainbridge Island to register and obtain a permit at the Civil Control Office to be established on said Island at or near the ferryboat landing.

(b) On March 30, 1942, all such persons who have not removed themselves from Bainbridge Island in accordance with Paragraph 1 hereof shall, in accordance with instructions of the Commanding General, Northwestern Sector, report to the Civil Control Office referred to above on Bainbridge Island for evacuation in such manner and to such place or places as shall then be prescribed.

(c) A responsible member of each family affected by this order and each individual living alone so affected will report to the Civil Control Office described above between 8 a. m. and 5 p. m. Wednesday, March 25, 1942.

3. Any person affected by this order who fails to comply with any of its provisions or who is found on Bainbridge Island after 12 o'clock noon, P. W. T., of March 30, 1942, will be subject to the criminal penalties provided by Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress, approved March 21, 1942, entitled "An Act to Provide a Penalty for Violation of Restrictions or Orders with Respect to Persons Entering, Remaining in, Leaving, or Committing Any Act in Military Areas or Zones", and alien Japanese will be subject to immediate apprehension and internment.

J. L. DE WITT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

SOURCE: Tolan Committee, Findings and Recommendations, p. 332-333.

## APPENDIX D: STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HUGH A. DRUM

## TEXT OF GENERAL DRUM'S STATEMENT

The text of the statement by Lt. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, commanding general of the Eastern Defense Command and First Army, with headquarters at Governors Island, announcing preliminary plans for the establishment, at an early date, of an Eastern Military Area along the Atlantic coast follows:

The President in Executive Order 9066, dated February 19, 1942, authorized and directed military commanders whom the Secretary of War designates, whenever the designated commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as the appropriate military commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which the right of any person to enter, remain in or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander may impose in his discretion. All Federal departments and agencies are directed to assist the Secretary of War and military commanders in the execution of said Executive order and authority is granted to accept the assistance of State and local agencies.

The Secretary of War has designated Lt. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, commanding the Eastern Defense Command and First Army, who is charged with the defense of the eastern seaboard, to designate military areas. General Drum will designate the entire Eastern Defense Command as a military area, called the Eastern Military Area. The Eastern Military Area includes the New England States and the Middle and South Atlantic States and Florida west of the Apalachicola River, and the District of Columbia. The object of prescribing a military area is to facilitate control so as to prevent subversive activities and aid being given the enemy, such as by lighting along our coasts. The military area system is an important and necessary adjunct to the defense of our eastern seaboard.

The functional subdivisions for control will be the four existing corps areas in the military area—namely, the First Corps Area, with headquarters at Boston, Mass.; the Second Corps Area, with headquarters at Governors Island, N. Y.; the Third Corps Area with headquarters at Baltimore, Md.; and the Fourth Corps Area, with headquarters at Atlanta, Ga.

Control throughout the area will be decentralized in most particulars to the corps areas and will be maintained primarily by means of a system of definitely described zones. The Department of Justice together with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Federal agencies will assist in the execution and enforcement of the regulations prescribed. State and local officials will be requested to assist. A zone embraces generally a public utility; a military, naval, or civil installation; a commercial or defense facility; a territorial region, or a strip of coast line or water front, or other place, whose individual importance to the national defense and security will vary in accordance with local or other conditions.

The plan embodied in the administration of the Eastern Military Area contemplates the control of conduct within the area on the part of enemy aliens, as well as of all other persons, so as to safeguard the national security, and will be effected by means of general restrictions and orders issued from the headquarters of the Eastern Defense Command.

The fundamental policy embodied in the plan is not to interfere in any manner whatever with the lives of the great mass of loyal Americans in the States included in the military areas, or with the economic life of the area, but it does express the determination of the military authorities to prevent any enemy sympathizer, whether alien enemy, alien of other nationality, or disloyal American, if any exist, from committing any act detrimental to the national security. Those persons whose conduct reflects their patriotic motives will not be affected by this administration.

Enforcement of restrictions, and consequently control of the area, will be accomplished by the application of penalties provided by law for violations of the restrictions and orders of the commanding general. These include exclusion from the area, internment of aliens, prosecutions under Public Law No. 503 of March 21, 1942, and evacuations. However, regulation or control of conduct is the keynote of the plan, rather than evacuations.

Mass evacuation is not contemplated. Instead thereof, such evacuations as may be considered necessary will be by selective processes applicable to enemy aliens, or to other persons deemed dangerous to remain at large within the area or within its zones.

As an initial step in the enforcement of the restrictions to be prescribed for the military area, the Fourth Corps Area commanders indicated above have been directed forthwith to assume control over all lighting on the seaboard so as to prevent the silhouetting of ships and their consequent destruction by enemy submarines.

In accordance with the provisions of the President's Executive order the governors of all the States and civil officials have been requested to assist the corps area commanders in the enforcement of the necessary restrictions.

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