

A BALANCE SHEET ON JAPANESE EVACUATION

Untruths About Japanese-Americans
Our Two Japanese-American Policies
Are the Evacuees being Coddled?
What Race-Baiting Costs America

by Galen M. Fisher

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The Writer

Mr. Fisher's competence to strike A Trial Balance on Japanese Evacuation derives from his long acquaintance with conditions on the Pacific Coast and in Japan, his experience in social investigation, and his knowledge of international affairs. Born in California, he graduated from the University of California, and studied for a year at Harvard. Following twenty-one years in Japan as secretary of the International Committee of the Y. M. C. A.'s, he spent two years in sociological studies at Columbia University, and then served for twelve years as executive of the (Rockefeller) Institute of Social and Religious Research. Among some fifty projects sponsored by this Institute were a number of racial studies, including the Survey of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast. In 1930-31, he directed the research staffs of the Layman's Foreign Missions Inquiry in India, China and Japan. He is a trustee of the Institute of Pacific Relations and Research Associate in Political Science in the University of California. As a founder and officer of the Committee on American Principles and Fair Play and of the Protestant Church Commission for Japanese Service, he has kept in touch with every phase of the evacuation.

Responsibility for the facts and opinions contained in these articles rests solely with the writer. Among the slight changes made in the original text is the substitution of October 1st figures for those of earlier dates.

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UNTRUTHS ABOUT JAPANESE-AMERICANS

A FULL year has passed since completion of the second large-scale racial evacuation in American history, that of the Japanese-Americans (that of the Indians was the first). As to the necessity of moving many of the Japanese from critical coastal areas, the government and public opinion agreed. As to removing all Japanese residents, and only Japanese, without hearings for any of them, except those interned as subversive, there was a strong body of dissenting opinion. Experience has shown that the dissenters were right. The evacuation may be termed a military success, a social failure, an international tactical blunder.

After what happened at Pearl Harbor, everybody on the exposed west coast, including Japanese residents, agreed that drastic defense methods were justified. But the record shows that for over a month after Pearl Harbor, no military or civilian spokesman suggested the complete and summary evacuation of all persons of Japanese race. During that period there was a marked absence of animus against the Japanese-American residents. The FBI, with the cooperation of the other intelligence services, arrested several thousand Japanese, Germans, and Italians, mostly aliens, and set up civilian hearing boards to ascertain whether or not they should be interned. All the military forces were placed at once on a war footing. It was generally assumed that these measures had forestalled any possible danger of fifth column activity and sabotage, and the public was comparatively calm and restrained.

Then, as if a hidden hand had given the signal, a barrage of verbal attacks on the resident Japanese was begun and demands for their total evacuation were made. What brought about this sudden barrage and won for it widespread popular support? Many forces were at work, some honorable, some utterly vicious. False rumors and fallacious arguments played an important part. Among them were the following untruths.

Untruth 1. That sabotage was committed by Japanese at Pearl Harbor. The readiness with which ordinary critical minds swallowed the fantastic rumors about how Japanese and Japanese-Americans aided the attacking forces on December 7 should suffice to humble many a professedly propaganda-proof American. Even the members of the Tolan congressional committee belong in that category, for during their hearings in California one of them silenced protests against wholesale condemnation of the Japanese by saying: "There are authenticated pictures during the attack (on

Pearl Harbor) showing hundreds of Japanese old automobiles cluttered in the streets of Honolulu so the army could not get to the ships." It is to the credit of the Tolan committee that in its printed report it made the amende honorable by presenting ten pages of official denials of such statements. Their falsity was early exposed in my article, "Our Japanese Refugees," in the April 1, 1942, issue of The Christian Century. J. Edgar Hoover told a House committee that the civilian population of Hawaii had committed neither sabotage nor espionage, and the attorney general of California told the Tolan committee that there had been no sabotage and no fifth column activity in the state since the war began. In face of all these denials, one would expect the rumors to die. To the contrary, they are still being repeated and believed by respectable people. Finally, in order to scotch them for good, I secured statements from the two men best qualified to know the truth. Here they are:

Colonel Kendall Fielder, chief of military intelligence for Hawaii since June, 1941, wrote on May 17, 1943: "There have been no known acts of sabotage, espionage or fifth column activity committed by the Japanese in Hawaii either on or subsequent to December 7, 1941."

Honolulu Chief of Police Gabrielson wrote May 12, 1943:

The statement that Japanese trucks in Honolulu deliberately put out of commission several American airplanes is an absolute lie. No American machine gunners cleared Honolulu streets of any Japanese before, on or after December 7. The statement that all over Honolulu were signs which read, "Here a Japanese traitor was killed," is another absolute lie. . . . There was no dynamite planted by any Japanese or anyone else in or about Honolulu in December; and no civilian ever used a truck to pick up any dynamite.

Nelson Pringle, CBS broadcaster, after checking these rumors, made these comments on October 5, 1942:

Where were the Japanese on that Sunday (December 7), if they were not sabotaging? Hundreds of them were actively helping defend the territory, as members of the Oahu Citizens Defense Committee. Volunteer truck drivers, they rushed to their assembly points, stripped their delivery trucks of their contents, inserted frames prepared to hold four stretchers, and went tearing out to Pearl Harbor to take the wounded to hospitals. Some of these Japanese got there so promptly that their trucks were hit by flying shrapnel or machine-gun bullets from road-strafting Jap planes. The presence of the Japanese drivers and of their scarred and pock-marked trucks undoubtedly gave rise to the rumor that guns had to be employed to clear the highway of Japs who were blocking the road to Pearl Harbor.

An equally emphatic denial was broadcast over NBC on August 1, 1943, by Will Tyree, just returned from Hawaii and the south Pacific front.

I have dwelt on these rumors because their gullible acceptance on the west coast was a major link in an evil chain.

They made possible the change from popular calm and tolerance toward resident Japanese to hysterical distrust, the anti-Japanese crusade in the press and over the radio playing upon weak and excitable minds, the exaggerated reports of assaults upon and homicides of Japanese, the mutterings of mob violence against Japanese by gangs and even by respectable citizens. These all culminated in the decision of the military authorities to resort to total evacuation, partly for the protection of the Japanese residents themselves. This un-American principle of "protective custody" of an entire racial group may not have been the dominant factor leading to total evacuation, but careful observers agree that it was one of the weightiest.

Untruth 2. That the nisei gave no information to intelligence officers. It has been loosely charged, even by a staff officer of the Western Defense Command, that the nisei have not aided the authorities in discovering dangerous Japanese residents. The falsity of these allegations has been proved by intelligence officers both in Hawaii and on the mainland, as well as by informed civilians. It is true that the great majority of nisei did not give such aid, and the same could presumably be said of German-Americans. The chief reason is that most of them had no information to give, any more than most white citizens. Some who did have information feared dire consequences if they told it. Still others would not inform on relatives. But enough of them did give aid to disprove the sweeping charges to the contrary. Let some of the intelligence officers speak for themselves. On August 10, 1942, one wrote me:

I personally know at least fifteen intelligence officers who have received continual aid from the group of loyal and patriotic nisei attached to each, and have in consequence been of great service to the United States in obtaining information regarding disloyal and suspicious Japanese. There are innumerable cases I could give you.

An anonymous intelligence officer who "has more complete knowledge of the activities of loyal nisei than any other individual on the Pacific coast" wrote in *Harper's Magazine* for October, 1942:

Many of the nisei voluntarily contributed valuable anti-subversive information to this (the naval intelligence) and other governmental agencies. The Japanese consular staff, the Central Japanese Association, and others known to have been sympathetic to the Japanese cause did not themselves trust the nisei.

Joseph Driscoll, in the course of a series of articles on "The Japanese in America," wrote in the *New York Herald Tribune* of January 31, 1943:

These slant-eyed young Americans (of Japanese extraction) have thrown the fear of God and the Federal Bureau of Investigation

into their elders and made it plain that treason would not be tolerated and would be reported to the authorities. Common gossip out here was that not one Japanese had informed on another. On the highest authority I was assured the contrary was true, and that many patriotic Japanese have turned in suspects of their own race and even of their own families.

Untruth 3. That evacuees have been coddled in the centers. Congressmen, journalists and letter-writers to the papers have emitted a deluge of charges that the evacuees were living on the fat of the land, while the rest of us were being severely rationed. The facts as stated by the war department and the War Relocation Authority jointly on July 18, 1943, are that "all rationing restrictions applicable to the civilian population are strictly followed and two meatless days are observed each week. In general, the food is nourishing but definitely below army standards. The cost of feeding at the centers over the past several months has ranged from 34 to 42 cents per person per day. . . . Some perishable commodities are purchased locally, and practically all other food is bought through the quartermaster depots of the army."

Untruth 4. That dual citizenship is peculiar to the Japanese. In the *American Legion Magazine* for June, 1943, Frederick G. Murray writes what many other people have said before him: "All dual citizens — the Japanese are the only nation to establish a dual citizenship." This betrays inexcusable ignorance. France, Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands and many other European and Latin American nations claim far more jurisdiction over children born of their nationals in America than does Japan. In fact, Japan in 1924 enacted a law by which American-born children of Japanese subjects would have only American citizenship unless their parents registered them at a Japanese consulate before they were fourteen days old — a provision expressly intended to remove the issue from American-Japanese relations. In 1930, Professor E. K. Strong estimated that only 40 per cent of the Japanese-Americans in California over seven years of age had dual citizenship, and close estimates place the present number of such dual citizens in the United States at not more than 20 per cent. or about 16,000. A considerable number of these would renounce Japanese nationality if doing so were not often difficult and expensive.

Untruth 5. That Japanese-Americans and Japanese warlords are brothers at heart. It would be as logical to bracket all German-Americans with the nazis as to brand all Japanese-Americans with the same mark of Cain as Japan's military gangsters. Mr. Grew rebuked such careless libeling

of an honorable group of fellow citizens when he said in his address at Union College on April 26, 1943:

We Americans, of all races and creeds, fight the evils of despotic and selfish militarism. There can be no compromise between ourselves and the arrogant exclusiveness of self-styled men-gods of Japan — no more than between ourselves and the self-styled Aryans of Germany. In our war against caste and privilege, wherever they may exist or occur, the contribution of Americans who are of Japanese descent is of real value; first, because they are living proof of our non-racial free unity; second, because they make a valuable contribution to the sum total of our American civilization.

A few months ago two men at opposite ends of the country sang the same song of hatred of all persons of the Japanese race. The one was Senator Stewart of Tennessee, who proposed to the Senate that the execution of American flyers by the Japanese warlords be matched by stripping of citizenship and confining in concentration camps all Japanese-Americans. The other was the new president of the Native Sons of the Golden West, who sounded this keynote: "We're going to Washington to bar the Japs forever from again participating in the privileges and freedom of the country they so ruthlessly and treacherously attacked." Both of these gentlemen obviously identified a group of their fellow Americans with Tojo and his gang. They merited the stinging rebuke administered by the *Baltimore Sun* to the senator on April 26: "What Senator Stewart urges would . . . represent acceptance of the Axis technique of visiting vengeance upon the innocent for the deeds of others. It would be nothing less than an example of the Axis brand of racial bigotry."

Untruth 6. That confinement of evacuees is both lawful and necessary. The responsible federal authorities hold that the evacuation was legal, but that detention is legal only until resettlement of the evacuees in unrestricted areas can be effected. This distinction goes to the heart of American civil rights. Apparently this conclusion of the War Relocation Authority is unknown to the western congressmen and governors and county supervisors who have been telling the world that all evacuees should be strictly confined for the duration; or possibly they set themselves up as superior judges of law and policy.

The legal question hinges on the interpretation of two presidential executive orders. That of February 19, 1942 authorized the war department to "prescribe military areas . . . from which any or all persons may be excluded." That of March 18, 1943, created the WRA to provide for the needs of the evacuees, to supervise their activities and to provide for their relocation and their employment.

It is the basic contention of the federal authorities that

the evacuees must be treated not as prisoners of war or as criminals, but as persons innocent until proved guilty or dangerous to national security, and therefore entitled to honorable treatment while in detention, and to the earliest possible restoration to freedom within unrestricted areas. The alleged danger of subversive activity by the evacuees if they are released does not carry conviction in face of the statement of the director of the WRA that as of June 1, 1943, not a single act of sabotage or other subversive conduct had been charged against the 14,000 evacuees who had been released from the centers to resettle or to take short-term jobs. He properly added that all evacuees found, after proper procedure, to be disloyal or dangerous would continue to be confined.

Untruth 7. That the evacuees are unchanging, impersonal units. It is always hard to personalize people who are far away and markedly different from ourselves. It would therefore not be strange if Americans east of the Rockies thought of the evacuees as though they were robots. But it is decidedly strange that many Californians who knew individual Japanese before the evacuation now seem to think of all the evacuees as a static mass, as unaffected as a sleeping Buddha by the drastic changes in their lives or by the prevalent defamation and proposed disfranchisement or deportation of all "Japs."

In reality, the evacuees have been undergoing changes in attitudes and ideas equaled in intensity by few, if any, groups in our entire population. How could it be otherwise? Family life disrupted; business and professions gone; savings and security lost; a host of youth unable to realize plans for careers; life for the refined reduced to mediocrity; children contaminated by weakened parental control and abnormal social life; citizens registered for the draft and then denied service in the armed forces, except in a segregated racial unit; the future for most of them a dark enigma. Anyone with a modicum of imagination must see that the evacuees are an exceedingly dynamic as well as a tragic group. The practical import of this fact is that the tragedy is heightened by every added week of life in the centers. To advocate continued confinement of loyal and disloyal, citizen and alien, old and young alike, is to conspire to turn one of our most productive, orderly and ambitious groups into a host of shiftless, cynical problem cases.

OUR TWO JAPANESE-AMERICAN POLICIES

THE POLICY adopted toward the Japanese population on the west coast was a compromise between sound Americanism and compliance with hectic popular pressure. Now that the situation has cooled off, it is both possible and profitable to examine it critically and to contrast it with the course that was followed in Hawaii.

When the Pearl Harbor disaster left the west coast exposed, both the government and the public rightly demanded protection against invasion. This protection was held to be solely a military problem. But it is now clear that it was not exclusively a problem of physical military defense. If it had been, then the summary mass evacuation of residents of one race, the Japanese, might have been justifiable. But the situation was shot through with delicate social and international factors, almost as vital to winning the war and the peace beyond as the physical military factors. The war department is not supposed to be qualified to handle social and international factors. The national administration should therefore have conditioned the power given to the military so as to make sure that those factors were properly handled. If that had been done, the unfortunate repercussions of the evacuation among our allies in Asia would have been averted. More important, constitutional rights would have been more fully maintained, and the evacuees would have been honored, if not compensated, for the sacrifices they made in the national interest.

Where the President Failed

Whose duty was it to check the hysterical popular pressure for indiscriminate and precipitate evacuation of the Japanese? That duty rested on many persons, public and private, but in the national emergency only the administration could adequately cope with it. Sobered by danger, the people as a whole would have heeded a stern appeal to refrain from lawlessness and to honor the Bill of Rights, if it had been issued by the President and backed up by the secretaries of war and the navy and the Western Defense Command. Failure to make this appeal was a lamentable oversight. Attorney General Biddle and Governor Olson of California did issue such appeals, but they alone did not carry sufficient weight to check the anti-Japanese campaign that began suddenly five weeks after Pearl Harbor.

There is much to commend in the execution of the evacuation by the Western Defense Command, but much to condemn in its rejection of selective evacuation. That a selection could and should be made, where the Japanese lived, by hearings or other legal processes, was from the outset the

conviction of many representative citizens. But thistles were sown, and thistles have been and will long be reaped. It has proved impossible for the War Relocation Authority and all the voluntary religious and social agencies working for the evacuees to do more than reduce the number of thorns.

For some weeks it was taken for granted by nearly everyone of standing on the coast that the military would move only a fraction of the Japanese residents, since the FBI had promptly arrested all suspected and dangerous persons. What led to total evacuation? Many factors. Among them were the false rumors from Hawaii, the sinister campaign already referred to, the danger of invasion and fifth column aid and fear of mob violence to Japanese residents.

One Man's Prejudice

But one other factor, which was probably of considerable importance, has come to light; the apparent anti-Japanese bias of the then commander of the Western Defense Command. This bias was suspected at the time by some observers, but not until fourteen months later was the suspicion apparently confirmed. For on April 13, 1943, General DeWitt was quoted by the Associated Press as having said at a hearing of the House naval affairs sub-committee on housing: "It makes no difference whether the Japanese is theoretically a citizen. He is still a Japanese. Giving him a scrap of paper won't change him. I don't care what they do with the Japs so long as they don't send them back here. A Jap is a Jap." Although no denial of this statement has ever appeared, it still seems incredible that the highest representative of the army on the coast could have gratuitously insulted an unfortunate body of citizens and cast aspersions on citizenship in general.

What happened on the west coast might then be summarized as follows: Confusion as to policy but public restraint toward all enemy aliens and Japanese-Americans for weeks after Pearl Harbor; then sudden agitation for total evacuation of Japanese, countered by demands for selective evacuation; then threats of violence against resident Japanese; finally, the decision by the military to evacuate some 70,000 citizens and 40,000 aliens of Japanese race without hearings or evidence of misconduct. The evacuation was executed without harshness. Its hardships were tempered by the services of church and other groups and by kindly individuals. The evacuees were confined in assembly centers, then in relocation centers mostly located in desert areas where accommodations are primitive. Now efforts are being made by politicians and "patriotic" organizations to disfranchise, exclude from the coast, or deport evacuees. The WRA policy

in the centers has been and is democratic and human. The war department has authorized formation of a nisei combat unit, but registration for the unit has been bungled. Inland resettlement of approved evacuees is being pushed by WRA, with the aid of civic and religious groups. Resettlement is being slowed up by the reluctance of the evacuees, especially the aliens and couples with several minor children, to go out in face of uncertain prospects and public antipathy.

We turn now to Hawaii. There, martial law was declared soon after Pearl Harbor and General Emmons became military governor. About 37 per cent of the islands' population is of Japanese ancestry. One might therefore have expected a more drastic treatment of the Japanese than prevailed on the mainland. The contrary was the fact. General Emmons as well as civil officials and leaders of public opinion did all in their power to preserve the self-respect of the Japanese residents. Only 390 persons of Japanese extraction were interned, and half of those were consular and other officials of Japan. A few hundred others were evacuated to mainland relocation centers. The remaining 159,000 Japanese were treated like all other inhabitants, although the intelligence services and the large body of unquestionably loyal Japanese remained alert to discover signs of disloyalty anywhere. Lieutenant Commander Coggins, in the June, 1943, issue of *Harper's Magazine*, says: "By their actions an overwhelming majority of Japanese-Americans have shown hatred of the enemy and have made brilliant records in all of the war effort in which they have been allowed to participate." General Emmons and other officials have repeatedly acknowledged the indispensable part played by the Japanese population in rebuilding Pearl Harbor defenses, in donating blood, in buying bonds and producing food. To be accurate, there have been many instances of minor friction, especially between lower military officers or newcomer Caucasians and the Japanese, but these have not seriously marred the general harmony. An interracial committee in the morale section of the military government has been effective in averting trouble.

The Varsity Victory Volunteers

A dramatic illustration of the happy results of trusting and respecting the Japanese population is the story of the "Varsity Victory Volunteers." Soon after the Pearl Harbor attack, sections of the army and of the public felt uneasy over the fact that nisei members of the Territorial Guard or militia were protecting vital installations. Tactfully, the guard commander discussed the situation with the nisei members. They agreed, though not without deep chagrin,

that they should be inactivated. But 155 of them resolved to find a way to evidence their patriotism. So they wrote a petition to General Emmons which ended with these words: "Hawaii is our home; the United States our country. We know but one loyalty and that is to the Stars and Stripes. We wish to do our part as loyal Americans in every way possible and we hereby offer ourselves for whatever service you may see fit to use us." The general was pleased and made them a labor corps with the engineers. For more than a year these V.V.V.'s rendered most efficient service. The press filled columns with their pictures and accounts of their doings. President Gregg Sinclair of the University of Hawaii termed V.V.V. "the most honored initials in Hawaii." When the lists for the combat unit were opened in February of this year many of the V.'s rushed to volunteer.

The litmus-test of the two policies — trust and respect in Hawaii, and mass evacuation and expressed or implied distrust and disrespect on the mainland — was the comparative response to the chance to volunteer for the combat unit. In the ten relocation centers, only 1,300-odd volunteered; in Hawaii, 9,500. The 50 per cent larger Japanese population of Hawaii does not alone account for the difference. The basic reason was the difference in government policy and public attitude there from what obtained on the coast. More specifically: (1) In the centers, there was confusion because a registration for release was held simultaneously with that for the combat unit. There was also general resentment because Question 28 of the registration questionnaire required the alien evacuees to renounce allegiance to Japan, thus leaving them men without a country, since America debars them from naturalization. Only after a week was this question withdrawn. In Hawaii there was no confusion or bad feeling, because the registration was solely for the combat unit. (2) On the mainland, the nisei had been depressed by public abuse and opposition to their settling inland and, later, to their return to the coast. (3) The nisei volunteers in Hawaii, unlike those in the centers, had no reason to worry about the future of their families.

Coastal Policy Costly

Economically, also, the contrast is marked. The policy pursued in Hawaii enabled the Japanese to continue producing 90 per cent of the food raised in the islands and to play a leading part in defense work and other occupations. On the mainland, confinement of the evacuees withdrew not less than 45,000 working adults from normal production, at a loss, for the first year, of approximately \$70,000,000. Another \$70,000,000 was sliced from the federal treasury

to maintain the centers. The loss would have been still greater had not some 14,000 evacuees been allowed to go out to work on farms, nearly 10,000 of them to help save the sugar beet crop, thereby supplying a year's ration of sugar for 10,000,000 people.

The cynic may hold that the Hawaiian policy was due not to liberality but to necessity. He may claim that it would have been impossible to get ships to evacuate 160,000 Japanese, and that the economy of the islands was utterly dependent on them. This is true. Yet the fact remains that the tradition of racial fair play and the social wisdom of the authorities lifted the policy from negative necessity to positive statesmanship. In support of this interpretation, note these words of the chief of military intelligence, Colonel Fielder, in an address given last March:

Does anyone believe for a moment that any of the Axis crowd would give one of enemy race a fair chance to prove himself? Yet that's what was done in Hawaii, and so far it has proved militarily sound. That the situation is working out well is a tribute not only to wise administration, but to tolerance on the part of the rest of our good Americans here. . . . It would take much too long to tell you of the many concrete ways in which many of these people who were put on the spot have proved their love for America and have helped solve an otherwise ticklish military problem here. For the information of all who might be misled, there is none among us who has been led into this policy out of mawkish sentimentality or gullibility. . . . Americans of Japanese blood . . . are Americans, and until they prove (or show themselves dangerously capable of proving) traitorous, they should be treated as Americans.

On the west coast, sincere defenders of the evacuation policy contend that it was inevitable because of the twin dangers of fifth column activity in aid of the expected Japanese naval invasion, and violence against residents of Japanese race by Filipinos and Americans enraged over Nipponese army atrocities. Both these dangers were felt by nearly everyone to be real. Yet the Hawaiian military command, confronted by the same dangers in greater degree, refused to apply the weak-kneed device of "protective custody" or to shut up any Japanese residents except the 390 known or suspected subversive persons. Constructively, the military government formed a morale section, expressly to forestall interracial disunity and mob violence. Then the military and civil authorities applied their full force and prestige to check hysteria and violence against the Japanese residents. This policy won the grateful and ardent cooperation of practically the entire Japanese population. There is abundant reason to ask whether a similar policy could not have been applied to advantage on the mainland.

Two Japanese-Americans

Thus far we have dealt so largely in generalities that the

reader may have failed to see between the lines the sensitive brown faces of the thousands whose lives in Hawaii or on the mainland are being blessed or cursed by these contrasting policies. Two stories may serve to make more vivid what happened to a vast number of individuals.

A Japanese-American pastor on the island of Kauai, T. H., rendered invaluable aid to the authorities during the trying year after Pearl Harbor. As soon as the formation of the nisei combat unit was announced, he made strenuous and finally successful efforts to be appointed a chaplain to the unit. He was much impressed by the anxiety of his young parishioners and friends as they awaited the outcome of the physical examination on which hinged their admission to or rejection from the unit. He wrote: "When a 'reject' was called, his facial expression changed, his eyes were ready for tears, and he said: 'Why am I rejected?' . . . The quota was filled and 20 who were able-bodied had to return home. Their feet were heavy. They shouted their protests. A white soldier in camp told me: 'My God! I never saw a crazy bunch like this before.' The white cook exclaimed: 'I would really like to cook for those fellows. They certainly cooperate.'" Some weeks later, the same pastor wrote: "My mother and I sat anxiously thinking about the prospect of my youngest brother's induction into the unit. The next day he was called. That evening I met my mother and she had happy tears in her eyes. She said: 'With six sons, one at least should be in the army besides you. As a mother who has received so much from America, I can now walk the streets with head erect. I am the mother of a son in active service.' She spoke as if God had whispered, 'Well done.'"

Contrast that with this and drawn your own conclusion: In southern California lived a nisei, a veteran of the United States army in World War I. He had been decorated for bravery and was head of an American Legion post. He was evacuated, but he kept his chin up and rallied all the nisei veterans in the relocation center to form a Legion post. They sent in their application for a charter and were heart-sick when it was denied. About the same time, the charters of several all-nisei posts were canceled by the Legion authorities. These incredible rebuffs, added to the dismal life in the center, the blind-alley prospects for the future and the widespread "hate-campaign" against all "Japs," ultimately soured his spirit. He still loathed militarist Japan as much as ever, but he began to lose faith in the America for which he had repeatedly risked his life. He became a leader in stirring up trouble in the center, a carrier of disaffection, one of the many frustrated and disillusioned spirits.

ARE THE EVACUEES BEING CODDLED ?

DOUBTS as to the legality of detaining the evacuated Japanese in the relocation centers constitute one of the cogent reasons why the War Relocation Authority is speeding the release of all approved evacuees. The fact that only a few of the evacuees themselves have filed suits to test the legality of restraints on their freedom is noteworthy evidence of their tolerance in the national emergency. Not one of the Germans or Italians evacuated from the west coast has been further detained except after due process of law. If they had been, doubtless a host of citizens would have raised a rumpus — and justifiably. The Constitution declares that no citizen may be deprived of his liberty or of his property without due process of law. But the Constitution makes no exception on account of race. Do the citizens who clamor for the continued confinement of the Japanese evacuees desire to amend the Constitution to legalize detention solely on the basis of race? How is that different from the nazi race laws? Or do they desire that citizens be detained without benefit of law? What happens then to government of laws, not of men?

Be the law what it may, the fact is that some 107,000 evacuees were placed in ten relocation centers last year, and the bulk of them are still there. Some day the job done by the WRA in creating these centers will be recognized as a marvel of social engineering. There was no close precedent to follow. The nearest was the dubious Indian reservation system. The staff responsible for solving the problem had been trained largely in various branches of the federal government. Until this situation was precipitated by forces which took advantage of the war, few Americans realized what a reservoir of social engineering talent has been developed in such departments as those of agriculture and the interior.

WRA Headed by Experts

It was to the department of agriculture that the President turned for the two able administrators who have successively served as directors of the WRA, Milton S. Eisenhower, brother of the general, and Dillon S. Myer. Around them was assembled a staff of 1,800 Caucasians. Critics who have sneered at this staff as “welfare workers,” “theorists” and “sob-sisters” may not have known that all the candidates were sifted by the Civil Service Commission, not picked at random by “reformers.”

Have the relocation centers been a success? Yes and no. The odds were stacked against success. The patient, so to