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THE TEMPORARY DETENTION CAMPS IN CALIFORNIA

Registered State Historical Landmarks

By Raymond Okamura and Isami Arifuku Waugh

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Japanese Americans as part of the application for registration of the
Temporary Detention Camps for Japanese Americans as California State
Historical Landmarks. Application approved by the State of California
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PREFACE

The Temporary Detention Camps (a.k.a. "Assembly Centers")¹ represent the first phase of the mass incarceration of 92,785 Californians² of Japanese ancestry during World War II.

Pursuant to Executive Order 9066 signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on February 19, 1942, twelve makeshift detention facilities were constructed at various horse racetracks, fairgrounds, and labor camps in California.³ Three additional temporary camps were established in Arizona, Oregon, and Washington. These facilities were for the purpose of temporarily confining Japanese Americans until the more permanent concentration camps--such as Manzanar and Tule Lake in California--could be built in isolated areas of the United States.

Beginning on March 30, 1942,⁴ all native-born Americans and long-time legal residents of Japanese ancestry⁵ living in California were ordered to surrender themselves for detention. Individuals were imprisoned solely due to his or her ancestry. Citizenship, age, constitutional guarantees, or innocence of wrongdoing did not matter.

Japanese Americans were held behind barbed wire fences and guard towers at these Temporary Detention Camps for two to seven months until they were transferred to one of the permanent concentration camps. An entire population of loyal and productive Californians was eliminated from the public scene.

The incarceration of Japanese Americans had a profound effect on the military, political, and economic affairs of the state at the time; and the episode remains as a major blot in the history of American law.⁶ United States citizens and lawful permanent residents were imprisoned without charges, without evidence, without trial, and in violation of every basic constitutional right.⁷

The Temporary Detention Camps are a sobering reminder to all Americans of what can happen if constitutional principles are not vigorously defended against racism, political expediency, and economic opportunism.

HISTORY

Superficially, World War II might be seen as the impetus for the mass incarceration of Japanese Americans. The causes, however, were much more complex and deeply rooted in California history. Racial hate against Asian Americans emerged during the highly competitive and lawless Gold Rush days, inexorably grew in intensity during the next century, and finally reached its culmination in 1942. In the long historical context, the elimination of Japanese Americans from California was a logical extension of all that had transpired before; and the war itself was only a pretext to accomplish a "final solution" of sorts.⁸

During the peak gold mining years in California, there were over 9,000 Chinese miners, comprising 25% of the total number of miners. Viewed as unwanted competitors for the riches of California, the Chinese were driven from the mines through acts of violence and terrorism. By the early 1850's, racism against the Chinese became institutionalized in the law. Among other restrictions, Chinese Californians were denied the right to vote, to become naturalized citizens, to testify in court against a white person, or to engage in occupations of their choice. The California State Constitution had an entire article devoted to requiring discrimination against the Chinese and any "Mongolian."⁹ A series of Chinese Exclusion Acts between 1882 and 1904 effectively reduced economic competition by controlling and eventually barring Chinese immigration to the United States.¹⁰

By the time the first sizable number of Japanese immigrants arrived in California during the late 1890's and early 1900's, governmental discrimination against Asian minorities was firmly established. Japanese immigrants were initially recruited by the California agricultural industry to fill an acute need for laborers. But like all other immigrant groups, the Japanese Californians did not remain docile, underpaid

workers for long, and they soon set out to earn their share of the American dream.¹¹ Perceived as a new "yellow peril" threat, the white establishment applied much of the existing anti-Chinese laws to the Japanese as well, including denial of the right to naturalized citizenship.¹² Also, the California "Alien Land Laws" of 1913 and 1920 were specifically directed against the Japanese denying them the right to own or lease land--a right possessed by white aliens.¹³ Like the earlier Chinese exclusion movement, anti-Asian organizations in California lobbied the federal government to stop all immigration from Japan. In response to the pressures from California, Congress terminated Japanese immigration in 1924.¹⁴

In the years preceding World War II, racism against Asian Americans was a fact of life on the West Coast. Discrimination in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and social relations was pervasive. Moreover, the media constantly reinforced negative stereotypes: newspapers, radio, movies, comic strips, and pulp novels inundated the public with lurid tales of Japanese spies and saboteurs.¹⁵ This historical background is indispensable for an understanding of what happened to Japanese Americans during the war years.

Japan had been waging a war in Asia since 1937, and United States-Japan relations had steadily worsened. A breaking point came in July 1941 when the United States imposed a total trade embargo and effectively cut off Japan's oil supply. With no domestic source of oil and only a few months of reserves, Japan faced military and economic collapse. The United States had broken Japan's top secret code and was aware of the crisis in Japan and the probability for armed conflict.¹⁶

With the expectation of war, the U. S. government undertook precautionary measures. In October 1941, the State Department ordered a covert investigation of the Japanese American communities on the West Coast and Hawaii; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the military intelligence services intensified secret surveillance programs which had been in existence for several years. All of these

intelligence reports certified that the Japanese American population as a whole posed no threat to national security.¹⁷ Curiously, on December 5, 1941--just two days before the outbreak of war--FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover instructed his agents to be ready for the "immediate apprehension" of Japanese nationals who had been targeted for "custodial detention."¹⁸

When the global war finally came to the United States on December 7, the government was well prepared to handle domestic security. Using previously prepared lists, the FBI summarily arrested over 2,000 Japanese nationals during the first few days of the war. No criminal charges were ever filed against these individuals; apparently, they were considered suspicious due to their leadership positions in the Japanese American community.¹⁹ Organization officers, Buddhist and Shinto priests, newspaper editors, language and martial arts instructors were all imprisoned at one of 26 Internment Camps operated by the Justice Department.²⁰ Dependents were left without a source of livelihood, and the Japanese American community was stripped of its established leadership.

Despite the shock of Pearl Harbor, there was very little public hysteria or panic. With the home front completely secure, public opinion was generally favorable toward Japanese Americans during the first month of the war. Newspapers published editorials and letters sympathetic to Japanese Americans; and even the California State Legislature passed a resolution urging federal officials "to prevent any and all racial discrimination in the national defense program."²¹

It took a little time before the long-standing anti-Japanese groups in California realized what a potent weapon they had in their hands, but when they did, they seized the opportunity to attain a goal they had been seeking for over 40 years, i.e. to get rid of the Japanese Americans once and for all. An organized hate campaign centered in California ensued; and as a result, public opinion started to turn against Japanese Americans in late-January 1942. Latent prejudices were aroused, but the

average citizen remained law-abiding and acts of violence or vandalism against Japanese Americans were rare.²²

Newspapers published unsubstantiated rumors about spies and saboteurs among the Japanese Americans. Because of the long history of prejudice and stereotypes, many white Americans believed the false stories. The truth was that there were absolutely no proven cases of espionage or sabotage committed by any person of Japanese ancestry living in the United States.²³ On the other hand, at least ten white persons were charged and convicted in courts of law as spies for Japan.²⁴

Like the previous immigration exclusion campaigns, California politicians and pressure groups lobbied the federal government to remove and/or lock up all Japanese Americans.²⁵ Even though Attorney General Francis Biddle and FBI Director Hoover advised against it, President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the mass expulsion and incarceration of Japanese Americans by signing Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942.²⁶ The order itself was carefully worded to avoid constitutional challenges: it did not single out a specific group, nor did it say people were to be locked up. But there was a common understanding that Executive Order 9066 was designed primarily for the purpose of removing and/or imprisoning the Japanese Americans. With no public demands for locking up German Americans and Italian Americans, the government chose to forgo the theoretical option of incarcerating descendants of the European enemy nations as well.

On February 20, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson designated Lt. General John L. DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command, to carry out the intent of Executive Order 9066. Just to make sure DeWitt correctly understood his assignment, both Stimson and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy directed him to include all persons of Japanese ancestry--irrespective of citizenship--in his plans, but that persons of German or Italian ancestry were to be left alone unless there was hard evidence to prove an individual was dangerous.²⁷

The first action under authority of Executive Order 9066 was the expulsion of

the entire Japanese American community from Terminal Island (San Pedro Bay, Los Angeles County) on February 25-27. Armed soldiers marched into the old fishing village and ordered every person of Japanese ancestry, including native-born Americans, to leave their homes within 48 hours. The majority of Terminal Island residents were United States citizens, but they were evicted without a hearing. The eviction was especially harsh because most of the men had been arrested earlier by the FBI and the move had to be made almost entirely by women and children. The government made no provisions for alternative housing, and some 2,000 Japanese Americans became displaced persons.²⁸

On March 2, DeWitt declared the Western halves of California, Oregon, and Washington, plus the Southern half of Arizona as "Military Area #1," and announced his intention to remove every person of Japanese ancestry therefrom. Japanese Americans were urged to "voluntarily" give up their homes and jobs before they were forcibly expelled by the army. A total of 10,312 Japanese Americans hurriedly left the proscribed areas, with 4,310 moving to the Eastern side of California, which was then a "free zone."²⁹

On March 11, DeWitt created the Wartime Civil Control Administration (WCCA) as a sub-unit of the Western Defense Command and appointed Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen as the military director responsible for implementation of the expulsion/detention program.³⁰ In the meantime, Congress passed Public Law 77-503 on March 21 which made it a federal offense for a civilian to disobey a military order issued under authority of Executive Order 9066.³¹

On March 24, all Japanese Americans on Bainbridge Island, Washington were ordered to report for imprisonment under "Civilian Exclusion Order #1."³² Subsequently, "Civilian Exclusion Order #2" issued on March 30 applied to the Long Beach-San Pedro area in California. Eventually, 108 separate "Civilian Exclusion Orders" were issued, each applying to a different locale in Arizona, California,

Oregon, and Washington. Japanese Americans were directed to bring only what they could carry in their hands and turn themselves in at a "Civil Control Station" near their homes. Upon reporting, they were registered, numbered, tagged with shipping labels, and placed aboard buses, trains, and trucks under armed guard for transportation to one of the 15 Temporary Detention Camps. From that point on, Japanese Americans became prisoners of their own country. On arrival at the camps, they were forced to submit to body and baggage searches, fingerprinting, and long interrogations about their background.³³

Japanese Americans were imprisoned on the basis of ancestry and ancestry alone. There was no evidence they had done anything illegal, or were dangerous in any way. Native-born Americans were locked up without charges or trial, and in complete disregard for their constitutional rights.

DeWitt gave the rationale of "military necessity" to protect the West Coast against sabotage in case of invasion, but such a claim was contrary to the actual U. S. Army "estimate of the situation" which correctly concluded that an invasion of the West Coast was extremely unlikely.³⁴ The claim was also inconsistent with the fact that Japanese Americans in Hawaii were not similarly incarcerated en masse. Hawaii was the site of the Pearl Harbor attack, was some 3,000 miles closer to the enemy, and was in far greater danger of any invasion. There were 159,534 Japanese Americans in Hawaii, comprising 34.2% of the population, but Lt. General Delos Emmons, the military commander in Hawaii, decided that "military necessity" there required the Japanese Americans to remain free and help in the war effort.³⁵

The "military necessity" excuse was further contradicted by the fact babies, children, blind or paralyzed persons, infirm or bedridden old people--those who could not possibly commit acts of sabotage or espionage--were also incarcerated. Even orphans in institutions and children adopted by white families were ordered imprisoned if they had any Japanese ancestry at all.³⁶

By March 24, all Japanese Americans were placed on a dusk to dawn curfew.

They were further required to have travel permits and were prohibited from possessing any camera, radio, or weapon. Although these regulations applied to all enemy nationals, Japanese Americans were the only United States citizens to be included in the restrictions.³⁷

On March 27, DeWitt abruptly prohibited any further "voluntary" movement of Japanese Americans away from "Military Area #1." Japanese Americans were "frozen" in their homes until arrangements could be made for their incarceration; they were trapped with no option aside from imprisonment.³⁸ DeWitt methodically issued detention orders almost daily, and an average of 3,750 persons a day were forced out of their homes and locked up in the Temporary Detention Camps.³⁹

In a corollary act, the California State Personnel Board summarily fired all state employees of Japanese ancestry on April 2. Blanket dismissal charges were filed against anyone with a Japanese surname. Those who had taken leaves to enter the Temporary Detention Camps were dismissed in absentia, while those who were still free were ordered to promptly vacate their jobs.⁴⁰

On June 2, DeWitt proclaimed the Eastern half of California as "Military Area #2" and prohibited Japanese Americans from leaving that area as well until they, too, could be ordered to report for detention.⁴¹ By this action, DeWitt betrayed an earlier promise to spare those who moved to the Eastern half of California during the "voluntary" period. Significantly, only the Eastern half of California was proscribed; the Eastern halves of Oregon and Washington were left alone. This discrepancy was due to the continued political pressures from California to eliminate Japanese Americans from the entire state.⁴²

About this time, an important turning point in the Pacific War occurred. The U. S. Navy annihilated the core of the Japanese Navy at the Battle of Midway on June 3-6; from that point on, Japan totally lacked the capability to attack the West Coast. The U. S. government and military knew that any danger of invasion had vanished. However, instead of canceling the detention program and saving millions

in funds, war materiel, and personnel, the government relentlessly continued to build new concentration camps and locked up more Japanese Americans.⁴³ Detention orders for the Eastern half of California started to appear on June 27.⁴⁴

The detention process progressed from district to district, county to county, over a five month period. By June 6, all Japanese Americans on the Western half of the West Coast states had been locked up; and by August 7, 1942, the entire process was completed. A total of 92,785 Californians, and an overall total of 120,313 Japanese Americans ended up in government custody.⁴⁵

While the Japanese Americans were confined in the Temporary Detention Camps, the War Department built ten large concentration camps--each designed to hold an average of 12,000 prisoners--in the interior desert and swamp regions of the United States. Two of these concentration camps were located in California (Manzanar and Tule Lake), while the other eight were in the states of Arizona (2), Arkansas (2), Colorado, Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming.⁴⁶

Beginning on May 26, and continuing through October 30, approximately 500 detainees per day were taken from the Temporary Detention Camps and placed aboard trains under armed guard for transfer to the permanent concentration camps. The movement required the use of 171 special trains--at a time when railroads were critically needed to transport military supplies. Each detainee had spent an average of 102.3 days in a Temporary Detention Camp before he or she was transferred; and a total of 9,485,202 detainee-days had been spent under the guns of the WCCA/Western Defense Command.⁴⁷

DESCRIPTION

Horse racetracks, fairgrounds, rodeo grounds, and labor camps were used as sites for the Temporary Detention Camps. The WCCA/Western Defense Command expropriated twelve such locations in California and hurriedly converted them into

transient detention facilities.⁴⁸ Existing horsestalls and grandstands were used for living quarters, and flimsy tarpaper barracks were hastily built for additional housing. The entire compound was surrounded by a high barbed wire fence and guard towers; sentries in the towers were armed with machine guns; soldiers with bayonet-tipped rifles patrolled the camp perimeter; and searchlights crisscrossed the camp interior at night.⁴⁹

Detainees made the following observations:

Estelle Ishigo (Pomona);⁵⁰

The first sight of the barbed wire enclosure with armed soldiers standing guard as our bus slowly turned in through the gate stunned us.... Here was a camp of sheds, enclosed within a high barbed wire fence, with guard towers and soldiers with machine guns.

Charles Kikuchi (Tanforan);⁵¹

I saw a soldier in a tall guardhouse near the barbed wire fence and did not like it because it reminds me of a concentration camp.

Mine Okubo (Tanforan);⁵²

We were close to freedom and yet far from it. The San Bruno streetcar line bordered the camp on the east and the main state highway on the south. Streams of cars passed by all day. Guard towers and barbed wire surrounded the entire center. Guards were on duty night and day.

The fence and guards were not there to "protect" the Japanese Americans: the barbed wire tops were turned inward, and the guards had their weapons trained into the camp. DeWitt, himself, explained the purpose of the security measures;⁵³

The Assembly Centers in the combat area are generally located in grounds surrounded by fences clearly defining the limits for the evacuees. In such places the perimeter of the camp will be guarded to prevent unauthorized departure of evacuees.... Should an evacuee attempt to leave camp without permission he will be halted, arrested, and delivered to camp police.

In order to make it absolutely clear to the Japanese Americans that they were prisoners, DeWitt issued "Civilian Restrictive Order #1" on May 19 ordering the inmates to remain within the boundaries of the Temporary Detention Camps at all times. Anyone who attempted to leave without written authorization was

threatened with ominous, unspecified "penalties and liabilities."⁵⁴

The camp interiors were arranged like prisoner of war camps or overseas military camps, and were completely unsuited for family living. Barracks and horsestalls were divided into blocks and each block had a central mess hall, latrine, showers, wash basins, and laundry tubs. Toilets, showers, and bedrooms were unpartitioned; there was no water or plumbing in the living quarters; and anyone going to the lavatory at night was followed by a searchlight. Eight person families were placed in 20 x 20 ft. rooms, six person families in 12 x 20 ft. rooms, and four person families in 8 x 20 ft. rooms. Smaller families and single persons had to share unpartitioned units with strangers. Each detainee received a straw mattress, an army blanket, and not much else. Privacy was non-existent; everything had to be done communally; and endless queues formed for eating, washing, and personal needs. Sanitation and food quality were poor; outbreaks of diarrhea and communicable diseases were common; and the stench in the horsestall areas was overwhelming.⁵⁵

In spite of the stark reality of the prison facilities, the WCCA/Western Defense Command called these places "Assembly Centers." Army officials (particularly WCCA Director Bendetsen, who was a lawyer) were aware of the serious constitutional issues which could be raised if they admitted that Americans were being confined against their will without due process of law. In order to circumvent any legal difficulties, the army coined numerous euphemisms to camouflage the truth. One indication of the tortured lengths to which army thinkers went to cover-up what was actually happening was their use of the phrase "non-alien" to refer to native-born citizens of the United States of America.⁵⁶

The United States was not alone in the use of deceptive terminology during World War II. Canada expelled all Japanese Canadians from their homes in British Columbia and confined them in inland prison camps which were variously named "Clearing Stations," "Assembly Centres," "Interior Housing Centres," "Interior

Settlements," "Housing Projects," and Relocation Centres."⁵⁷ Interestingly, Japan also used the name "Assembly Centers" (Shukaisho) to refer to their internment camps in occupied China.⁵⁸

Germany's nomenclature for their concentration and extermination camps best illustrate the thesis that official government names are not necessarily accurate, nor desirable for continued use today. The Nazi operated camps were known at the time as "Work-study Camps" (Arbeitserziehungslager), "Protective Custody Camps" (Schutzhaftlager), "State Retirement Homes" (Reichsaltersheim), "Health Resorts" (Heilbad), "Jewish Self-administration Centers" (Judische Selbstverwaltung), and "Paradise Quarters" (Paradeisghetto).⁵⁹

APPENDIX A -- TEMPORARY DETENTION CAMPS IN CALIFORNIA, 1942

<u>Name</u>	<u>Location</u> ⁶⁰	<u>County</u> ⁶¹	<u>Previous use</u> ⁶²
1. Fresno	Fresno	Fresno	Fairgrounds
2. Marysville	Arboga	Yuba	Farmland
3. Merced	Merced	Merced	Fairgrounds
4. Pinedale	Pinedale	Fresno	Mill camp
5. Pomona	Pomona	Los Angeles	Fairgrounds
6. Sacramento	Walerga	Sacramento	Pastureland
7. Salinas	Salinas	Monterey	Rodeo grounds
8. Santa Anita	Arcadia	Los Angeles	Horse racetrack
9. Stockton	Stockton	San Joaquin	Fairgrounds
10. Tanforan	San Bruno	San Mateo	Horse racetrack
11. Tulare	Tulare	Tulare	Fairgrounds
12. Turlock	Turlock	Stanislaus	Fairgrounds
13. Manzanar ⁶³	Owens Valley	Inyo	Pastureland

APPENDIX B -- TEMPORARY DETENTION CAMPS IN CALIFORNIA, 1942

<u>Name</u>	<u>Dates of operation</u> ⁶⁴	<u>Maximum detainees at any one time</u> ⁶⁵	<u>Total detainees</u> ⁶⁶
1. Fresno	May 6 to October 30	5,120	5,344
2. Marysville	May 8 to June 29	2,451	2,465
3. Merced	May 6 to September 15	4,508	4,669
4. Pinedale	May 7 to July 23	4,792	4,823
5. Pomona	May 7 to August 24	5,434	5,514
6. Sacramento	May 6 to June 26	4,739	4,770
7. Salinas	April 27 to July 4	3,594	3,608
8. Santa Anita	March 27 to October 27 ⁶⁷	18,719	19,348
9. Stockton	May 10 to October 17	4,271	4,390
10. Tanforan	April 28 to October 13	7,816	8,033
11. Tulare	April 20 to September 4	4,978	5,061
12. Turlock	April 30 to August 12	3,662	3,699
13. Manzanar ⁶³	March 21 to May 31 ⁶⁷	9,666	9,681

APPENDIX C -- TEMPORARY DETENTION CAMPS IN CALIFORNIA, 1942

<u>Name</u>	<u>Origins of detainees</u> ⁶⁸	<u>Concentration camp destinations</u> ⁶⁹
1. Fresno	Central San Joaquin Valley; Amador County	Gila, Jerome
2. Marysville	Placer and Sacramento Counties	Tule Lake
3. Merced	Northern California Coast; West Sacramento Valley; North San Joaquin Valley	Granada
4. Pinedale	Sacramento and El Dorado Counties; Oregon; Washington	Poston, Tule Lake
5. Pomona	Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Santa Clara Counties	Heart Mountain
6. Sacramento	Sacramento and San Joaquin Counties	Tule Lake
7. Salinas	Monterey Bay Area	Poston, Tule Lake
8. Santa Anita	Los Angeles, San Diego, and Santa Clara Counties	Gila, Granada, Heart Mountain, Jerome, Manzanar, Poston, Rohwer, Topaz
9. Stockton	San Joaquin County	Gila, Rohwer
10. Tanforan	San Francisco Bay Area	Topaz
11. Tulare	Southern California Coast; Los Angeles and Sacramento Counties	Gila
12. Turlock	Sacramento River Delta; Los Angeles	Gila
13. Manzanar ⁶³	Los Angeles, Amador, and San Joaquin Counties; Washington	--

NOTES

1. The name Temporary Detention Camp accurately describes the true nature of the sites being nominated for historical landmark registration. At the time, the U. S. Army used the euphemism "Assembly Center," but these sites were not merely places of assemblage. Instead, they were essentially and primarily detention camps to hold people against their will. "Assembly Center" is a misnomer and misrepresentation, and therefore is unacceptable for use as a landmark name. Justification for this position is given in the Description Section, pages 10-13.
2. Statistical data contained in this application are from U. S. War Department, Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 362 et passim. Two-thirds majority of the detainees were native-born Americans; while it is recognized that the minority were Japanese nationals, the terms Japanese Americans or Californians will be used to include all long-time residents of the United States (see note #5).
3. Manzanar was one of the original Temporary Detention Camps, which made a total of thirteen in California. But on June 1, 1942, Manzanar was redesignated as a permanent concentration camp, and the inmates stayed in place. Manzanar's primary significance rests on its permanent camp status (California State Historical Landmark #850); and the experience at Manzanar was slightly different from the purely temporary camps. Although Manzanar is listed in the tables as an early Temporary Detention Camp, it is not part of this application. For the sake of readability, the special circumstances of Manzanar is not included in the text discussions.
4. The first group of Californians locked up were covered under "Civilian Exclusion Order #2" dated March 30, 1942. An earlier group from Bainbridge Island (Puget Sound), Washington was imprisoned under "Civilian Exclusion Order #1" dated March 24. Although the residents of Terminal Island (San Pedro Bay), Los Angeles County were evicted from their homes in late February, they were not incarcerated.
5. "All Persons of Japanese Ancestry" was defined to mean anyone with 1/16 or more Japanese ancestry. Immigrants from Japan were prohibited by statute and court decision from becoming naturalized American citizens (see note #12). Since immigration from Japan was cut off in 1924, all Japanese immigrants had lived in the United States for a minimum of 18 years, and most had lived here for over 30 years (see note #14).
6. Nanette Dembitz, "Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgement," Columbia Law Review, 45 (March 1945), p. 175; Harrop Freeman, "Genesis, Exodus, and Leviticus," Cornell Law Quarterly, 28 (June 1943), p. 414; Eugene Rostow, "The Japanese American Cases--A Disaster," Yale Law Journal, 54 (June 1945), p. 489.
7. The following articles of the U. S. Constitution were abrogated or abridged: Amendment 1 (freedom of religion, speech, press, and assemblage); Amendment 2 (right to keep and bear arms); Amendment 4 (freedom from unreasonable search and seizure); Amendment 5 (right to life, liberty, and property, and due process

of law); Amendment 6 (right to speedy and public trial by impartial jury, to be informed of charges, to be confronted with witnesses against, to call witnesses for, and to legal counsel); Amendment 7 (right to trial by jury); Amendment 8 (right to reasonable bail, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment); Amendment 13 (freedom from involuntary servitude); Amendment 14 (right to equal protection of the law); Amendment 15 (right to vote); Article 1, Section 9 (right to writ of habeas corpus).

8. Walton Bean, California: An Interpretive History (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), pp. 163-165, 233-236, 242, 332-335; Robert F. Heizer, The Other Californians (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 154-194; Paul Jacobs, To Serve the Devil: Colonials and Sojourners (New York: Random House, 1971), Vol. 2, pp. 71-84, 93-108, 169-185; Andrew F. Rolle, California: A History (New York: Crowell, 1963), pp. 373-385.
9. Article XIX of the California State Constitution adopted on May 7, 1879. This article was not repealed until November 4, 1952 (1953 Cal Stat cxxxii).
10. For a summary of the numerous anti-Chinese laws, see Thomas W. Chinn, A History of the Chinese in California (San Francisco: Chinese Historical Society, 1969), pp. 23-32; Stanford M. Lyman, Chinese Americans (New York: Random House, 1974), pp. 54-85; Cheng-Tsu Wu, "Chink!": A Documental History of Anti-Chinese Prejudice in America (New York: World Publishing Company, 1972), pp. 11-103.
11. Bean, op. cit., p. 294.
12. Takao Ozawa v. U. S. (260 US 178, 1922). See Consulate-General of Japan, Documental History of Law Cases Affecting Japanese in the United States, 1916-1924 (New York: Arno Press, 1978), Vol. 1, pp. 1-120; Yuji Ichioka, "The Early Japanese Immigrant Quest for Citizenship," Amerasia Journal, 4:2 (1977); pp. 1-22.
13. 1913 Cal Stat 206 (1913); 1921 Cal Stat lxxxvii (1920). See Frank F. Chuman, The Bamboo People (Del Mar, Calif.: Publisher's Inc., 1976), pp. 39-51, 73-89, 117-125; Yamato Ichihashi, Japanese in the United States (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932), pp. 261-281.
14. Immigration Act of 1924 (43 Stat 153). See Chuman, op. cit., pp. 91-103; Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 1-107; Ichihashi, op. cit., pp. 298-317.
15. Michio Kaku, "Media: Racism in the Comics," Bridge, 3:1 (February 1974), pp. 25-29; Dennis M. Ogawa, From Japs to Japanese (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1971), pp. 2-25; Irvin Paik, "That Oriental Feeling," Roots: An Asian American Reader (Los Angeles: University of California, 1971), pp. 30-36; Jacobus tenBroek, Prejudice, War and the Constitution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), pp. 22-67; Eugene F. Wong, On Visual Media Racism (New York: Arno Press, 1978), pp. 56-119.

16. Ronald Clark, The Man Who Broke Purple (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), pp. 138-178; John K. Fairbank, East Asia: The Modern Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 606-612; Anne R. Fisher, Exile of a Race (Seattle: F. & T. Publishers, 1970), pp. 1-30.
17. Bob Kumamoto, "The Search for Spies," Amerasia Journal, 6:2 (Fall 1979), pp. 45-75; Michi Weglyn, Years of Infamy (New York: William Morrow, 1976), pp. 33-53.
18. Kumamoto, op. cit., p. 69.
19. Chuman, op. cit., p. 154; Bill Hosokawa, Nisei: The Quiet Americans (New York: William Morrow, 1969), pp. 237-240; Betty E. Mitson, "Interviews of Herbert V. Nicholson," Valiant Odyssey (Upland, Calif.: Brunk's Printing, 1978), pp. 9-25; tenBroek, op. cit. pp. 100-102.
20. Internment Camp was the term used by the Justice Department. In this respect, the Justice Department was more honest about what they were doing. Justice Department prisoners at least had some measure of due process: each internee was accorded an administrative hearing, was allowed to appeal to a neutral consul (Spain), and was granted protections of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929. Detainees held by the Western Defense Command had none of these rights.
21. Morton Grodzins, Americans Betrayed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 377-399; tenBroek, op. cit., p. 76.
22. There were 36 cases of violence or vandalism against Japanese Americans in all of the West Coast states during the first four months of the war; and only seven of those attacks were known to have been committed by white persons. See Grodzins, op. cit., p. 140.
23. Stetson Conn, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, "The Decision to Evacuate the Japanese from the Pacific Coast," Command Decisions (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959), p. 100.
24. Most people failed to see an obvious point: real spies had to be inconspicuous, and only white people could fulfill such a role. Individuals convicted of espionage for Japan are named in Saburo Kido, Brief of the Japanese American Citizens League, Amicus Curiae, Fred Korematsu v. United States, In the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term 1944, No. 22, pp. 30-37.
25. Roger Daniels, The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1975), pp. 3-58; Grodzins, op. cit., pp. 19-225; tenBroek, op. cit., pp. 68-96.

26. Executive Order 9066, February 19, 1942 (7 Fed Reg 1407).
27. U. S. War Dept., op. cit., pp. 25-29.
28. Mass eviction notices were posted in the streets on the afternoon of February 25; soldiers handed each household an individual notice on February 26; and all Japanese Americans had to be off Terminal Island by midnight February 27. Earlier, the Harbor Commission announced on February 14 that all leases held by Japanese Americans were subject to cancellation in 30 days--but that warning gave residents until March 14 to settle their affairs. See Paul Bailey, City in the Sun (Los Angeles: Westernlore Press, 1971), pp. 29-35; Audrie Girdner, The Great Betrayal (New York: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 110-114; Hosokawa, op. cit., pp. 309-311.
29. Public Proclamation #1, March 2, 1942 (7 Fed Reg 2320); U. S. War Dept., op. cit., p. 107. DeWitt issued hundreds of military orders applying exclusively to civilians of Japanese ancestry. For a chronology and discussion of the key orders, see Sue K. Embrey, The Lost Years, 1942-1946 (Los Angeles: Moonlight Publications, 1972), pp. 5-13; Dillon S. Myer, Uprooted Americans (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971), pp. xxiii-xxx; tenBroek, op. cit., pp. 116-134; Dorothy S. Thomas, The Spoilage (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946), pp. 9-13.
30. General Orders #35, March 11, 1942, Headquarters, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army; U. S. War Dept., op. cit., pp. 41, 66.
31. Public Law 77-503, March 21, 1942 (56 Stat 173).
32. Civilian Exclusion Order #1, March 24, 1942 (7 Fed Reg 2581).
33. Bailey, op. cit., p. 42; Girdner, op. cit., pp. 134-147; tenBroek, op. cit., p. 124; U. S. War Dept., op. cit., pp. 118-124.
34. Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps USA (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), p. 38.
35. Bean, op. cit., p. 435; Daniels, Decision to Relocate, op. cit., pp. 27-28; Hosokawa, op. cit., pp. 457-467; Girdner, op. cit., pp. 20-21; Carey McWilliams, Prejudice: Japanese Americans (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945), pp. 141-147.
36. WCCA Director Bendetsen stated: "I am determined that if they (the children) have one drop of Japanese blood in them, they must go to camp." See Weglyn, op. cit., p. 77.

37. Public Proclamation #3, March 24, 1942 (7 Fed Reg 2543).
38. Public Proclamation #4, March 27, 1942 (7 Fed Reg 2601).
39. tenBroek, op. cit., p. 126.
40. Dorothy S. Thomas, The Salvage (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952), pp. 564-569.
41. Public Proclamation #6, June 2, 1942 (7 Fed Reg 4436).
42. Thomas, Spoilage, op. cit., p. 12.
43. Bean, op. cit., p. 434; Allan R. Bosworth, America's Concentration Camps (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), p. 125.
44. tenBroek, op. cit., pp. 132-133; Thomas, Spoilage, op. cit. pp. 12-13.
45. U. S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, The Evacuated People: A Quantitative Description (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 8; U. S. War Dept., op. cit., p. 362.
46. U. S. War Dept., op. cit., pp. 248-273.
47. Ibid., pp. 227-233, 282-284, 288, 370.
48. Ibid., pp. 151-183.
49. Bailey, op. cit., p. 42; Bosworth, op. cit., p. 117; Girdner, op. cit., pp. 146-147; Anthony L. Lehman, Birthright of Barbed Wire (Los Angeles: Westernlore Press, 1970), p. 24; tenBroek, op. cit., p. 126; U. S. War Dept. op. cit., p. 444.
50. Estelle Ishigo, Lone Heart Mountain (Los Angeles: Anderson, Ritchie and Simon, 1972), p. 9.
51. Charles Kikuchi, The Kikuchi Diary (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), p. 54.

52. Mine Okubo, Citizen 13660 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 81.
53. U. S. War Dept., op. cit., p. 216.
54. Civilian Restrictive Order #1, May 19, 1942 (8 Fed Reg 982).
55. Bailey, op. cit., pp. 43-53; Maisie Conrat, Executive Order 9066 (San Francisco: California Historical Society, 1972), pp. 76, 81, 86, 87, 94; Daniels, Concentration Camps, op. cit., pp. 89-90; Girdner, op. cit., pp. 148-167; Ishigo, op. cit., pp. 9-10; Lehman, op. cit., pp. 21-27; Okubo, op. cit., pp. 34-86; U. S. War Dept., op. cit., pp. 183, 186; Weglyn, op. cit., pp. 80-82.
56. See samples of "Civilian Exclusion Order" and "Instructions to All Persons of Japanese Ancestry" in U. S. War Dept., op. cit., pp. 97-100. Other commonly used euphemisms were: "evacuation" instead of expulsion, "relocation" instead of incarceration, "reception center" instead of concentration camp, "evacuee" instead of prisoner.
57. Ken Adachi, The Enemy That Never Was (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), pp. 218, 251-252.
58. Weglyn, op. cit., p. 202 (Japanese edition, p. 229).
59. Gerald Green, The Artists of Terezin (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1969), p. 20; Julius Schatzle, Stationen zur Holle (Frankfurt am Main: Roderberg-Verlag GmbH, 1974), p. 80; John Tolan, Adolph Hitler (Garden City: Doubleday, 1976), Vol. 2, p. 861.
60. U. S. War Dept., op. cit., pp. 155-165.
61. Ibid.
62. Wartime Civil Control Administration/Western Defense Command press releases dated March 28, April 1, April 4, 1942.
63. Manzanar is not part of this application. See note #3.
64. U. S. War Dept., op. cit., p. 227.
65. Ibid.

66. U. S. War Dept., op. cit., p. 373.

67. The first detention order applicable in California was issued on March 30. But some "volunteers" entered these installations earlier to help prepare the camp for the main body of detainees.

68. U. S. War Dept., op. cit., pp. 363-366, map insert II.

69. Ibid., p. 381.

-- Submitted on September 9, 1981

ETHNIC MINORITY CULTURAL RESOURCES SURVEY
JAPANESE AMERICANS

P. O. Box 799, El Cerrito, California 94530
Information: Isami Waugh 527-4629, Ray Okamura 540-2195

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE (5/2/80)

SANTA CRUZ -- The sites of the 1942 Temporary Detention Camps for Japanese Americans have been designated as California State Historical Landmarks. Some 93,000 Californians of Japanese ancestry were confined at these locations while the more permanent concentration camps were being built.

At a meeting here on Friday, May 2, the California State Historical Resources Commission unanimously approved an application submitted by the Ethnic Minority Cultural Resources Survey--Japanese Americans. Commissioners present and voting for the proposal were: Julia Costello, Ernestine Elster, Robert Ferris, Amanda Frost, and Nadine Hata.

Nearly three months after the United States entered World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 authorizing the mass detention of Japanese Americans. This action resulted from the long history of prejudice and legal discrimination against Japanese Americans, and the organized hate campaign of anti-Japanese groups in California.

The U. S. Army expropriated various fairgrounds, horse racetracks, rodeo grounds, and labor camps and rapidly converted them into detention facilities. Existing horsestalls, livestock exhibition halls, and grandstands were used for living quarters, and flimsy tarpaper barracks were built for additional housing.

Euphemistically called "Assembly Centers" at the time, the compounds were surrounded by high barbed wire fences, guardtowers, searchlights, and sentries armed with machine guns. The inmates were forbidden from going beyond the camp boundaries by order of General John L. DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command.

MORE

DETENTION
2-2-2

Twelve Temporary Detention Camps existed in California between March 27 and October 30, 1942. Each detainee spent an average of 102 days in a temporary camp before being transferred to one of the more permanent camps built in the interior desert and swamp regions of the United States.

The newly registered landmark areas are: The Big Fresno Fair/Fresno County Fairgrounds, Fresno; farmlands North of the Marysville Municipal Golf Course, Arboga; Merced County Fairgrounds, Merced; housing tract West of the old Air Force Depot, Pinedale; Los Angeles County Fairgrounds, Pomona; Palmgate tract (Camp Kohler/Walerga), Foothill Farms; California Rodeo grounds, Salinas; Santa Anita Park, Arcadia; Central Valley Exposition/San Joaquin County Fairgrounds, Stockton; Tanforan Park Shopping Center, San Bruno; Tulare County Fairgrounds, Tulare; Stanislaus County Fairgrounds, Turlock.


Local groups who wish to have a memorial placed at the site of the former detention camp in their community may now apply for a plaque under the general landmark registration. The state does not automatically install a plaque at every registered landmark, so a separate plaque application, with proposed wording, must be submitted.

Each plaque may be worded differently, reflecting the perceptions and sentiments of the local community. The Ethnic Minority Cultural Resources Survey has not proposed any plaque wording and does not intend to apply for any plaque. Plaque applications and plaque wordings are left completely within the jurisdiction of local committees.

Information on plaque applications may be obtained from the Office of Historic Preservation, P. O. Box 2390, Sacramento, California 95811, (916) 445-8006.

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State
Historical Landmark
No. 934



"Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible, but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary."

— Reinhold Niebuhr