More on
McCloy

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1944

SECRET

Dear Jack:

Thank you very much for your letter of June 10 commenting on the proposal for the transfer of a million Jews for certain munitions and supplies. The comments in your letter will be very helpful to us.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Ed

Ed. Stettinius
State Dept.

Mr. John J. McCloy,

Assistant Secretary of War.

ASW 291.2 Jews

14 June 44

RG 107-47-16 ASW. 291.2 Jews

5998

General Marshall asked McCloy to assist in writing a report & then send it to Gen. Gerles, War Dept Bureau of Public Relations.

Sent to Col Sexton

ASW 320.2

September 3, 1943

GENERAL SURLES:

Errata:

1. p. 47. The first two lines in the last paragraph on the page should read as follows:

"The threat to the security of our Pacific coast region reached its peak in June 1942 when the large Japanese task force...."

Lorie — June 1942 - Midway. He could have stopped the JA exclusion program at this time.

ASW 380

2. p. 50. For the first two lines in the first full paragraph:

July 1 1943 finds the United States Army and Navy united against the Axis powers in purpose and in operation, a unity shared when the occasion demands..."

ASW 320
ASW 322
A - Public Relat. B (Surles)
x - Public Relations Bureau (Surles)
x- C of S

(SIGNED) JOHN J. McCLOY

John J. McCloy

NND 7/1/74

1 Sept 43

RG 107-47-17. ASW 320.2.

DASW
JJMcC. Errata suggested for Gen. Marshall's Biennial Report 1943

14144

Lowi

JOHN J. McCLOY
ONE CHASE MANHATTAN PLAZA
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10005

October 18, 1982

Dear Mr. Macbeth:

I have your letter of October 14th in which you enclose some contemporaneous documents relating to the Wartime Japanese relocation as to which I testified from time-to-time in the past including my latest appearance before your Commission. I have only seen the documents enclosed in your letter quite recently, as you noted, they were apparently delayed in reaching me due to insufficient postage.

First, let me say that I do not have any documents in my possession so far as I am aware which would cast any further light on the subject of the materials contained in your letter. Secondly, I was most interested in seeing a copy of my letter to General DeWitt of April 8, 1943. It is, to the best of my recollection, the views I held at the time regarding the desirability of some relaxation to the exclusive orders which were, in my judgment, made desirable by the chain of circumstances which the course of the War and the formation of the Japanese-American Combat Teams indicated were desirable. The views expressed in that letter remain my views today and they seem completely consistent with my testimony before the Commission which upheld the propriety and full justification of the action taken by the Government shortly following the Pearl Harbor attack. I do not recall that there was anything in the action taken after the raid which would preclude any moderation of the measures until the War had fully run its course, provided sufficient security reasons would justify them. The loyalty as displayed by the Japanese-American 442 Combat Team would, in my judgment, have been good and sufficient reasons in themselves for relaxations in respect of them and their relatives.

As for Colonel Bendetsen's contemporary memoranda, I can have no helpful comment. I feel certain that his comments accurately reflect his views as to what occurred at the time but I have no papers or recollection which would throw any light on them. I am not clear in reading

them as to whether any of his comments include any views of mine and I have not sought any clarification from him.

If I can be of any further assistance, I would be glad to attempt to do so.

Sincerely,

/tr

Mr. Angus Macbeth
Special Counsel
Commission on Wartime Relocation
and Internment of Civilians
726 Jackson Place, N.W.
Suite 2020
Washington, D.C. 20506

Lori

September 27, 1982

John J.McCloy, Esq.
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and
McCloy
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
46th Floor
New York, New York 10005

Dear Mr. McCloy:

A few weeks ago in reviewing papers in the National Archives relevant to the decisions on terminating the exclusion of the ethnic Japanese from the prohibited zones on the West Coast, the Commission staff came across the two documents which I enclose, a transcript of a telephone conversation of April 29, 1943 between General Barnett and Colonel Bendetsen, and a memorandum of May 3, 1943 from Bendetsen to General DeWitt.

As you will see, in both of these documents Bendetsen states your views as to the military necessity for the continued exclusion from the West Coast of at least those ethnic Japanese who had passed through a loyalty board review.

There is no obvious reason to be skeptical of Bendetsen's reports. They were made at a time when there was palpable tension between the Western Defense Command and the War Department over the language of General DeWitt's Final Report on the Japanese evacuation, and Bendetsen was the intermediary in those discussions with every reason to report views accurately. Nevertheless, it seems prudent to ask you whether you have any papers or clear recollections which are confirmatory or throw additional light on this aspect of the Commission's inquiry.

If you do have information which would be helpful, I would appreciate the kindness of a prompt reply simply because the Commission staff is now concluding its writing work.

Thank you very much for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Angus Macbeth
Special Counsel

Enclosures

JOHN J. McCLOY
ONE CHASE MANHATTAN PLAZA
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10005

November 25, 1981

Dear Senator:

After my recent appearance before the Commission dealing with the Japanese relocation program on the West Coast in 1941, I have some further reflections which I believe bear on the investigation by the Commission. I have tried, so far without success, to obtain a copy of a transcript of my testimony from the Commission so I cannot add any comments to it. I attempted, however, to dictate some notes which embody these reflections, and I take the liberty of enclosing them herein. In certain respects they may be repetitious of the thoughts I gave the Commission, but some may be new.

I suppose my main point is that the action taken after Pearl Harbor was indisputably and, as I believe, reasonably taken by the United States Government as it was then duly constituted.

First, and primarily, the President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces made the decision. In doing so, he was assisted by and consulted with The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, The Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Biddle, and, I believe, the Under Secretary of War, Mr. Patterson, who was particularly fearful of sabotage in the West Coast plants. Yet no responsible member of the government, as far as I can learn, was called by the Commission to defend the government's carefully considered wartime action. I believe this should have been almost the first order of business of the Commission. It was unjust to the then government not to do so. It was only at the very close of the Commission's testimony that Colonel Bendetsen and I, neither of whom made the decision, but each of whom had direct personal knowledge of how it was made and how it was carried out, were called.

Although it is the prerogative of the Commission to conduct the manner of its own investigation, I urge, that it, in fact, was most unfair to the wartime leaders of our government who acted in full accordance with their respon-

sibility for the security of the nation. I do not believe that even the government's brief in the Korematsu case was made a part of the record.

Sincerely yours,

Honorable Edward Brooke
O'Connor & Hannan
1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 1800
Washington, D. C. 20006

My reflections following my appearance before the Commission prompt me to repeat, even more emphatically than I did in the course of my testimony, what I consider to be the impropriety and serious injustice of making provision for any added compensation to that already given to those who were removed, in accordance with President Roosevelt's wartime Relocation Order, from certain military sensitive West Coast areas following the disastrous consequences of the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor.

To attempt, at any time, to equalize the damages or sufferings caused by war is, at best, a futile and impractical undertaking. By its very character, the damages of war are usually incalculable, and are never capable of even, or equitable, distribution among its victims.

To attempt such a thing now, forty years after the Japanese war was started by the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, would be not only out of place, but grossly unjust. This is so in view of the fact that:

1. None of the distress, now claimed as a base for added compensation to that already received, can ever be even remotely compared with the suffering of those who lost their lives as a direct result of the Pearl Harbor atrocity. We can readily assume that none of those of our Japanese-descended population, who were evacuated from the West Coast after Pearl Harbor, had anything whatever to do with the initiation of the surprise attack, but neither did any of the Americans who lost their lives as a direct result of it. Those American lives were never adequately compensated for, nor will they ever be; and *

2. A very substantial sum (beyond the costs incurred by the government to effect the Relocation) was appropriated and paid for the purpose of defraying, or at least greatly helping to defray, any damages caused by the Relocation to those involved in it. The sum, judged by its present worth is somewhere between 100 and 150 million dollars. It was set up when witnesses were available, and proofs were freshly at hand to support any claims which were made. The fund was created shortly after the Relocation process had been terminated, and I was chiefly instrumental in initiating the legislation to create it.

*They have no lobby working overtime for them.

If all of the testimony given before this Commission, much of it patently stimulated, initiated and even incited by hopes held out for new and substantial so-called lump sum liquidated damages, to those who were evacuees, or to their relatives, were taken at face value, it could never, as a remote circumstance, be compared to the untold sufferings endured by Americans who were "uprooted" and lost their lives at Pearl Harbor, or later during the war which that attack commenced. The bodies of many of the sailors who died in the attack, still lie entombed in the battleships' hulks, resting on the bottom of Pearl Harbor. The same thing can be said of the suffering caused by the lives lost at Iwo Jima, Tarawa and Okinawa, as well as lives of the Japanese-American members of the 442nd Combat Team, who died in the European theatre.

None of the suffering caused by that loss of life has ever been adequately compensated for, nor will it be.

The fact is that the Relocation process was solicitously carried out by the Army and War Relocation Agency, so as to maintain, as far as war time conditions permitted, the health, well being and education of those caught up by the military necessity produced by the Pearl Harbor debacle. The Relocation was a rational response of President Roosevelt, acting also as the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, to the threats against the security of the sensitive military areas of the West Coast, which the almost total and sudden destruction of our main battleship fleet created. The Relocation process was a very difficult and even delicate operation to undertake, but it was made essential by the military necessities of the time, and was carried out fully in accordance with the Order of the President of the United States.

The operation was, in fact, carried out humanely, and with as great consideration as its difficulties and exigencies of the time permitted. That it was to be carried out in such a manner was embodied in the orders given to the Commander General of our Western Defenses, and it should be presumed that such orders were carefully obeyed.

In my testimony I recalled the names of some of the nation's leaders and statesmen, then responsible for the security of the country, who approved and participated in the steps taken to carry out the President's Order. I can add to these names by including Col. Frank Knox, the then Secretary of the Navy, and Robert Patterson, the then Under Secretary of War, who had formerly been a judge of the

Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in the Second District of New York. On at least two occasions the action of the President was tested, and upheld, by The Supreme Court of the United States.

I do not have the means now, as an individual, to attempt to assemble again the evidence which would show how humanely and with what consideration the camps were conducted.

In addition to my own inspection of a number of the camps, I recall that I had the advantage of the favorable reports of the inspections made by the Army of the camps. They were current and should be objective and unbiased, if the usual custom and discipline of the Army inspection system was followed. I have no idea whether they are now available, or whether an attempt was ever made to locate them. After forty years they may no longer exist, but if found they could shed contemporary light on the conditions and conduct of the camps.

In addition to the visits I made to the camps, I communicated with a number of Japanese-American leaders, both in the camps and elsewhere. I retain now a sense of their good will and cooperation. I have largely lost track of many of these individuals now, but I find among the few I have talked to, a reluctance to come forward with testimony favorable to the government's conduct of the Relocation, due to what appears to be the pressures exerted from the lobbying groups, who, to put it mildly, do not welcome such testimony. I cannot escape the conclusion that, if those groups were half as assiduous in gathering evidence in favor of the government's treatment of the wartime evacuees, as they have been in encouraging evidence derogatory of it, the record would be now far more objective than it appears to be.

I cannot forget myself the quite unrestrained hissing which took place during my examination whenever I spoke favorably of any government action.

When I was pressed hard by Mr. Justice Goldberg, during my examination, to say whether, under all the circumstances, I believed that President Roosevelt's action was now justified, I had no hestiation whatever in saying that it was amply justified at the time. This, I submit, is when it must be judged. Neither Mr. Roosevelt, nor any of the others who participated in the decision, knew then that one of the most decisive battles of history was to be fought

later at a place called Midway in the Pacific, or that it was to be won by such a narrow margin. Suppose Midway had been lost with another one of our carriers sunk and most of our pilots dead. What would have been the consequences to our security, or the safety of our Japanese-descended population still concentrated around our sensitive installations on the West Coast? It was, of course, the duty of the President, to defend the country against all the hazards to its security he could reasonably foresee. But, one cannot fairly hold him, or his memory, now to a nice calculation shortly after the destruction of our fleet, of the prospects of a victory yet to take place.

I strongly maintain that the loss of the "Yorktown" and most of our pilots at Midway, together with the narrow margin of the victory, most weightily justifies the action which the President, with the concurrence of his advisors, took shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack.

I have heard the suggestion made that even though the exigencies of war may have reasonably justified the early evacuation of the Japanese population from the sensitive areas of the West Coast after the surprise attack, the termination of the Relocation process was unduly delayed after it became clear that the military necessity, on which it was based, disappeared, and that this, in itself, justifies some added redress to those evacuated.

In the first place the miracle victory of Midway, did not win the war. Many bloody battles had yet to be fought and many lives had yet to be lost before Japan surrendered. Midway did greatly relieve our anxiety, but emotions still ran very high along the coast, and, indeed, throughout the nation. How can this Commission, or an even much more militarily knowledgeable one, now determine, so long after Midway, just when the military considerations no longer justified the President's action.

In the second place, it would not have been a simple matter to have set the process in reverse. It was a large logistic problem, and objections to any returns of the evacuees or their relocations had to be overcome. The fact is, the process was duly terminated, and the record of this Commission indicates that the President was alerted by the War Department, while the war was still going on, to the need for the consideration of the termination of his earlier Order due to the lack of any further military necessity.

The general welfare of the Japanese-American population on the West Coast, and its relationship with the people of the United States throughout the nation is now very good. The fundamental loyalty of that population has been tested and is now fully accepted. I believe it was the record of the 442nd Combat Team,* as well as the considerate manner in which the difficult Relocation process was carried out following the Pearl Harbor attack, which contributed much to the healthy attitude now prevailing between the people of the United States, and its Japanese-descended citizens. There is no doubt in my mind that the manner in which the difficult operation, provoked directly by the Pearl Harbor attack, was carried out, can properly be considered a real credit to this country and to President Roosevelt and the statesmen and leaders who were associated with him in the protection of the security of the country at the time. There is, I submit, nothing whatever for which the country should atone.

I do not wish to reflect on the impartiality of this Commission. How it conducts its investigation is its prerogative. I wish only to be candid when I respectfully submit that a far more reliable perspective of the whole matter of our wartime Japanese Relocation process on the West Coast would have been obtained by the Commission, if someone, who had the personal knowledge of how the Relocation decision was taken by the President of the United States, and how it had been carried out, had first been called by the Commission to testify as to those conditions and circumstances, as a sort of government witness of the actual events. As it was, any such testimony seems largely to have been withheld until the very close of the hearings, and after a full head of steam had been generated by a persistent lobby acting over a number of years, and seeking a windfall of "liquidated" damages some forty years after the event. The sum of literally billions of dollars of U.S. taxpayers' money seems to have been contemplated, if press reports are reliable, for the added compensation sought. Yet, so far as I know, no one was called by the Commission to protect the interests of the American taxpayers, whose burdensome present taxes, the government of the United States is so fully committed to reduce. There were some, to be sure, severe inconveniences and even in some cases, what might be called hardships were endured by those taken up in the Relocation process. Those inconveniences and hardships were, however, in truth, of a really minor character when compared to the profound suffering brought about by the historical attack on Pearl Harbor and the commencement of the Japanese war which it signalled.

*The formation of which I initiated.

That suffering was brought about by the loss of many thousands of American lives for which no adequate compensation was ever made.

To go further with any such plan as seems now to be envisaged by some because the President of the United States, with the concurrence and advice of his leaders, sought to take steps reasonably designed to react to an imminent threat to the nations security, would be unjust to the American dead whose lives were lost in the Japanese war. It would also amount, in my sober judgment, to an incongruity.

I heard it said at the hearings that the world had changed and new concepts of civil rights and a sense of justice had overtaken us since the close of the Japanese war. It was said that a new generation of thinking had taken over, with much new emphasis on civil rights. I believe that present generations should also reflect, as I think many members of them do, on the fact that when democracy was set upon from the Atlantic to the Pacific by its enemies in the Second World War, it was successfully defended by this nation, at the cost of many lives and much treasure. By such defense, civil rights were preserved rather than impaired. It must be remembered that the statesmen and leaders of the U.S. at the time had their hands full, and if it looks now to new generations as if we were never really in danger, it is they who need new perspectives when it comes to appraising the relative inequities of wartime sacrifices and hardships, and the "bloody dilemmas" as Winston Churchill frequently put it, which war leaders had, from time to time, to face.

I urge the Commission to be most chary about making recommendations about how we should go about guarding our security or survival in the future. With all respect, this Commission cannot possibly know what may be ahead in terms of ensuring our security. Movements of people, determination of states of loyalty and other security measures must be left to future generations to formulate as new demands are presented. We cannot prescribe for such things in the future. Nuclear war and the threat of it could radically change many of our concepts with respect to security and survival. Such recommendations would probably be futile anyway, as future guardians would probably disregard them if they felt the fate of the nation was at stake.

The suggestion has also been made that the decisions taken at the time following the Pearl Harbor attack regarding the Relocation might have been motivated by "racist" considerations. I sense that there was, at some time, an attempt to suggest a certain verisimilitude of the Relocation centers to the conditions which surrounded the Nazi concentration camps. I am very glad to hear from counsel to the Commission that no such thinking is now remotely in the mind of the Commission. I believe that it ought also to be recognized that there was not a drop of racist blood in the bodies of President Roosevelt or of Secretary Stimson, or, I dare say, any of Mr. Roosevelt's advisors who participated in his decisions.

I cannot avoid feeling that there is another element which tends, I believe, to stimulate the thinking of some who now feel that we should atone in some degree for President Roosevelt's wartime order. I am sure that there are some wholly sincere people who take this attitude, but there are others like the medieval self-flagellants who seem to derive a real form of satisfaction by attempting to make this nation appear in a bad light on both the domestic and international scene. The attitude is unworthy of the spirit in which the Second World War was fought by this country, at a critical stage in history, and by the enlightened manner in which our former enemies and friends alike were treated during the reconstruction, e.g. the Marshall Plan and the opening of our markets, following the close of the war. Mr. Churchill, on several occasions testified to this spirit in a most eloquent fashion. I do not have the quotations at hand, but they can be readily found.

I suggest strongly to the Commission and to the Congress, as does Senator S. I. Hayakawa that the common interests of the country and our Japanese-descended population itself, would be far better served by dropping all thought of any further compensation to the relocatees who were moved after Pearl Harbor or the next of kin or for any recommendation (God forbid) of a national apology for President Roosevelt's war action.

November 23, 1981

COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS

726 JACKSON PLACE, N.W. □ SUITE 2020 □ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 □ 202/395-7390

October 2, 1981

Ambassador John McCloy
Milbank, Tweed, Handley & McCloy
1 Chase Manhatten
New York, NY 10005

Re: Amendment to the Request for Attendance

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

This letter will confirm my phone conversation with your secretary during which it was agreed to change the time and date on which you will appear before the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. You are scheduled to appear before the Commission on November 3, 1981 at 9:00 a.m. The hearing will be at the Russell Senate Office Building, Room 318, the Russell Senate Caucus Room, Washington, D.C.

Within the next few weeks, it is my intention to let you know the topics on which the Commission is particularly interested in hearing you testify. In order to conduct a hearing that will be as focused and productive as possible, I will try to arrange with you a discussion in advance of the testimony so that the presentation can be reasonably well prepared.

If you have any questions, please feel free to phone me. Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Angus Macbeth

Angus Macbeth
Special Counsel

AM:tw

Sent 10/6

AHY
Lou
NC

JOHN J. McCLOY
ONE CHASE MANHATTAN PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10005

July 24, 1981

Mr. Paul T. Bannai, Executive Director
Commission On Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians
726 Jackson Place, N. W. - Suite 2020
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Mr. Bannai:

Thank you for your letter of June 22nd. Due to the shortness of notice following my return from abroad, it was difficult for me to alter my schedule so as to enable me to appear on the first dates set for Commission testimony. I would, of course, be pleased to accept your invitation at a later date if you felt my appearance would be desirable. I regret this as I think the initial testimony, from the press accounts I have read, lacked proper perspective and ignored many important facts surrounding the Japanese relocation program.

In the meantime, in accordance with your suggestion, I am sending you this letter both to notify you of my willingness to appear before the Commission and to give you some of my present thinking regarding the subject matter of the Commission's investigation.

As your investigation probably already has disclosed, I had much to do with the early aspects of the relocation program while I was The Assistant Secretary of War following the Pearl Harbor attack. Among other things it is important to keep in mind it was a relocation program and not an internment or punitive measure. In some respects it was one of the most challenging problems with which the War Department had to deal during my wartime service with the government.

However, the events surrounding this action occurred so long ago -- some forty years in fact -- that I greatly fear any investigation of them now cannot reproduce the atmosphere, conditions and considerations which obtained at the time and which induced the action taken by the government. Without this perspective I do not believe any objective investigation can be undertaken.



In the first place, the shock of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and its devastating results can now be described but I doubt they can really be felt as they were then. Our entire battle fleet had been obliterated at one blow, delivered in the form of this outrageous surprise attack. With it our defenses throughout the Pacific from Hawaii to our West Coast suddenly became seriously impaired. This was, of course, the object of the attack. To put it mildly, our sense of security was stunned and, coming at a time when we were greatly preoccupied by the aggressions of another great power on the Atlantic side of the world, the implications were far reaching. In fact, Hitler's Germany declared war on this country practically simultaneously with the Japanese attack.

Over a substantial period of years the West Coast and, indeed, the entire country, had been agitated over the steady expansion of Japanese power in the Pacific. The nature of the so-called "Yellow Peril" had long been the subject of press comment on the West Coast while clear evidence of active Japanese aggression prior to Pearl Harbor stirred more immediate and substantially sharpened concern.

By chance, I was the only senior official in the War Department that Sunday morning when the news of the attack arrived and I immediately began doing what I could to implement plans for the security of the nation's capital which this startling event demanded. Shortly thereafter, urgent reports of the concern of the West Coast for its safety began to come in. These reports were addressed to the White House, the Congress and other government agencies, including, of course, the War Department.

Governor Warren of the State of California wired and phoned his anxiety for the security of his state. The Commanding General of the Department of which the West Coast was a part, General DeWitt, shortly called attention to the threat presented by the concentrated Japanese-descended population on the West Coast. As I recall it, General DeWitt subsequently notified the War Department that he could not accept responsibility for the security of the area he commanded unless steps were promptly taken to control this population with its threat of subversive action. I think it was possibly this accident of my being present at the Pentagon that morning dealing with local security problems which caused my subsequent involvement in the security problems of the West Coast.

This is not the time to recount all the pressures and considerations which set in motion the government's relocation program, even if it were possible to do so. I do recall that among

other conditions which had to be taken into account was the need for the protection of the Japanese population from possible local disorders, demonstrations and reprisals. Reports came in of barn burnings and other disturbances in the agricultural areas where a large part of the Japanese population was concentrated. Pressures on the White House and the Department increased. The Department of Justice and the Attorney General, Mr. Francis Biddle, and members of his staff were called in by the White House to give thought and advice on the legal authority to take the security moves which were being urged as well as to give guidance to those who might be called upon to implement the relocation process after the President's decision had been made. President Roosevelt, Secretary Stimson and Attorney General Biddle were all very much involved in the problems the situation presented and all were, at the same time, keenly sensitive to their responsibilities for the security of the country in time of war.

I have heard it suggested, long after the event, that the President did not take into account the full implications of his wartime order. From what I saw and experienced from the conferences which took place during the consideration of the action, I would strongly differ from those who now take that view. I do not recall that I had any direct contact with the President in regard to the matter, although I do know that the Secretary of War maintained close contact with the President and the White House. I believe from my meetings with the Secretary that the President was fully informed and gave the situation careful thought. Moreover, I believe that conscientious and determined attempts were made to alleviate the indisputable distress and hardship which the relocation imposed on many.

As promptly as possible, control over the program was removed from the jurisdiction of the Army (which initially was the only agency equipped to deal effectively with the logistics of the problem) and was placed in the hands of civilian agencies set up for this purpose. These were, as I now recall it, presided over first by Mr. Milton Eisenhower and later by Mr. Dillon Myer, both men of established liberal and sympathetic instincts. A sustained and enlightened effort was made to introduce schooling and other facilities into the camps and to expedite the redistribution of relocatees into areas around the country where jobs could be obtained and where life could be taken up with less threat of discrimination and violence than had been present on the West Coast. Legislation was proposed to alleviate the losses engendered by the relocation and to conserve the property of those relocated at the time. Indeed, as I recall, I initiated, or at least helped to initiate, the

legislation, and appeared at least once or twice in support of it. Substantial testimony was taken regarding the relocation program, and some legislation was passed. It does not seem necessary to go over the same ground again now.

I hope the Commission will find, as I believe to be the case, that the whole operation was as benignly conducted as wartime conditions permitted. I gained the impression, after making considerable effort to follow the destinies of those who had been relocated, that on the whole the deconcentration of the Japanese population and its redistribution throughout the country resulted in their finding a healthier and more advantageous environment than they would have had on the West Coast following the Pearl Harbor attack and the reports of Japanese atrocities in the Philippines and the Southwest Pacific.

This country, as well as our Allies, was forced to confront a number of unpleasant wartime dilemmas and the Japanese situation was one of them. My belief and hope is the Commission will conclude, after an objective investigation, that under the circumstances prevailing at the time and with the exigencies of wartime security, the action of the President of the United States and the United States Government in regard to our then Japanese population was reasonably undertaken and thoughtfully and humanely conducted. There has been, in my judgment, at times a spate of quite irresponsible comment to the effect that this wartime move was callous, shameful and induced by racial or punitive motives. It was nothing of the sort.

One fact I would urge the Commission to refer to if any report is made in connection with its examination of the relocation program is the role which the 442nd Combat Team played in establishing once and for all the fundamental loyalty of our Japanese population. As a result of many appeals made to me by members of our Japanese-descended population after the attack on Pearl Harbor, I sought and obtained authority from the Army to permit these groups to form and serve in an integrated combat unit in our Armed Forces. This, at first, encountered some opposition and it was not easily overcome. However, such a unit was formed as the 442nd Combat Team, and the famous 100th Battalion from Hawaii was a part of this unit. Composed of Americans of Japanese descent, it became one of the most highly decorated combat organizations in the entire Army. It served with great distinction in a number of hotly contested European campaigns. Its record of courage and military achievements was spectacular. The reputation it earned did much to rid the country of the unjust discriminatory laws and prejudices to which, at one time, our Japanese population had been subjected.

Whether the then-existing government acted wisely in the light of present hindsight and perspectives long after the victory is, I suggest, quite beside the point. As one who was present and active in the War Department at the time, I believe the action was thoughtfully and carefully taken by authority of the President under what were then wartime conditions. The President was advised by civil and military statesmen of the highest stature, character and experience. Careful examination of the law was made by the Attorney General and later litigation in the highest courts supported the action taken.

I believe, therefore, in the interests of all concerned, the Commission would be well advised to conclude that President Roosevelt's wartime action in connection with the relocation of our Japanese-descended population at the outbreak of our war with Japan was taken and carried out in accordance with the best interests of the country considering the conditions, exigencies and considerations which then faced the nation.

Sincerely,



JOHN J. McCLOY
ONE CHASE MANHATTAN PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10005

January 6, 1975

Dear Mrs. Weglyn:

I have your letter of December 3rd but due to the press of matters the latter part of the year it was impossible for me to take the time to reply.

Even now I find some difficulty in thinking back to the time of the Japanese-American evacuation in a manner which would enable me to reply authoritatively to your questions. The best I can do, however, at this late date is to give you my impressions.

I am not aware that Tom Campbell was seeking to fill the position for which Milton Eisenhower was ultimately selected. Certainly he gave me no impression that this was his objective. I remember that Tom Campbell had a very provocative, energetic mind and I was disposed to take his ideas seriously. Perhaps some of his ideas were incorporated in the evacuation program but if so, I cannot identify them at this time.

Karl Bendetsen was the one chosen to carry out the operations of the program, but I do not think of him as having been the originator of the idea. Although he was subject to rather close supervision both from Washington and from San Francisco, he was the operating manager of the program as I recall it. The Provost Marshall, General Gullion, was involved in the program, but I would not consider his role a decisive one. The move was strongly urged by General deWitt who declared that he could not accept responsibility for the security of the West Coast unless such a move as this took place. In this respect he was strongly supported by General Wedemeyer who at that time I believe was a colonel and was acting as the Staff Officer for General deWitt. The pressure from the West Coast was very great; Governor Warren

urged the measure and President Roosevelt himself pressed it as a security measure. I do not recall that Mr. Stimson insisted on the evacuation although he was prepared to go on with it even though he had some qualms about its propriety. I remember talking to him and discussing the legalities of the situation before the orders were put out. I know that President Roosevelt spoke to Secretary Stimson about it and I think that Mr. Stimson told me that Governor Warren had urged the move on the President. The move, of course, involved many difficult problems. I went out to the West Coast on a number of occasions to gain a concept of the scope of the problem, the attitude of the people and the authorities. It was obvious the dislocations would result in hardships and the sheer logistics of the problem of moving so many people in all conditions of life from their homes to relocation centers was apparent. I was very much impressed with the spirit and the attitude of those who would be affected by the move. Although there were some radical and extremely hostile elements in the group, they were of a very small minority and generally those who were moved cooperated fully. Although we had to act on rather short notice and our funds were not unlimited, we did do as much as we could to humanize the conditions under which the evacuees were compelled to move. I visited a number of the camps, supervised provision for education and health and finally turned the whole problem over to Milton Eisenhower and then to a Mr. Meyer who was really entitled to great credit for ameliorating the conditions under which the evacuees lived. The evacuees turned out to be a well behaved and cooperative group. From them we recruited a number who later became members of the 442nd Combat Team which had such an extraordinary record during the war.

One of the chief concerns that I think Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Stimson had regarding the Japanese population on the West Coast was the fear that if they had been permitted to remain on their farms and in their shops, there would have been hostile demonstrations and acts against them with perhaps some bloodshed. Some barn burnings had already started before the evacuation was undertaken.

Personally I had then and still have doubts as to whether the situation on the West Coast really justified the concern which General deWitt and Governor Warren felt, but they were in a better position to judge than were many of us in Washington. However justified or unjustified the operation was, I believe it was carried out in as benign and humane a manner as was possible.

For what my judgment may be worth, I think the distribution of the Japanese American population throughout the country which resulted in a large part from the evacuation program tended to relieve a great deal of the tension which would have existed had that population remained centered in one geographical area.

I hope this may be of some interest to you.

Sincerely,

John J. McCloy

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