

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Bureau of Agricultural Economics

FARMERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE USE OF JAPANESE EVACUEES
AS FARM LABOR

Part II: Five Major Crop Regions

For Administrative Use Only

Study A-3
Report No. C-16

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SUMMARY

1. Unfamiliarity with the Japanese and other unusual types of labor is a major factor in farmers' rejection of the evacuees as agricultural labor. The greatest degree of acceptance of the evacuees was found in the sugar beet areas of the western mountain states, where evacuee labor was used during the past year. The greatest degree of rejection appeared in truck crop areas of the eastern seaboard, where farmers showed almost complete unfamiliarity with the evacuees as a potential labor supply.
2. In the areas where there had been no experience with the evacuees, they were commonly described in terms of racial and nationalistic stereotypes. This was in sharp contrast with attitudes expressed within the sugar beet region, where farmers had had sufficient experience with the evacuees to evaluate them for their work efficiency.
3. Although there is a somewhat greater tendency to consider the use of evacuees in areas where the pinch of labor-scarcity has been most severely felt, this tendency is by no means uniform (as was shown in Part I of the report). Prejudice and local considerations often override farmers' anxieties about their prospective labor supply.
4. Some farmers on the Pacific Coast feel that an economic loss was sustained when the Japanese were removed from that region, and they therefore desire to see the evacuees returned to the restricted areas. A majority, however, still apply racial stereotypes in opposing the return of the Japanese. The factor of economic competition often seems to underlie this attitude.

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INTRODUCTION

This report is an expansion of Part I of a study of "Farmers' Attitudes toward the Use of Japanese Evacuees as Farm Labor", issued by the Division of Program Surveys on January 30, 1943. The objective of the study, as set out in the first part of the report, is to discover what administrative steps may be taken: (1) to further the utilization of the agricultural manpower contained within the relocation centers of the War Relocation Authority; and (2) at the same time to assist the permanent integration into American community life of the people of Japanese extraction who have been displaced from their homes.

Part I of the report compared farmers' attitudes toward the use of evacuee labor in two crop regions, in one of which evacuee labor was employed last year, and in the other of which it was not. The effect of local influences on attitudes was considered in some detail. The conclusion was drawn that variations in receptivity toward the evacuees within the region where they had been used were largely explained by peculiar circumstances within local communities. Some implications of this finding for an effective placement policy were suggested.

This part of the report combines data presented in Part I with additional data obtained from several other major crop regions. It presents regional comparisons of receptivity toward the use of evacuee farm labor, and attempts to account for differences on the basis of a general theory regarding farmers' willingness to accept unusual types of labor. It also presents suggestive data regarding recent attitudes toward the evacuees on the Pacific Coast - at present closed to their re-entry, but comprising an area to which many evacuees will no doubt seek to return at the close of the war. The broader coverage of the material incorporated in this part of the report enables greater generalization of the conclusions drawn in Part I.

Source of the Data

Both parts of the report are based on data derived in a general survey of the farm labor situation in several major crop regions, which was conducted during the months of November and December, 1942.

The purpose of the general survey was to investigate a number of problems arising in connection with a decreasing farm labor supply at a time when expanded crop production was being undertaken. In the course of the survey an attempt was made to learn how farmers feel about using Japanese evacuee workers to offset part of the farm labor shortage. It is from this portion of the survey that the material for the present report is drawn.

For purposes of analysis, the 27 counties represented in the sample have been grouped into five geographical crop regions: Pacific Coast fruit and dairy; mountain sugar beet; southwestern long staple cotton; middle western dairy and livestock; and eastern truck crops. The counties surveyed were selected to represent these regions, but it should not be assumed that percentages cited are actually representative of regions as a whole, since no attempt was made to weight frequencies on the basis of relevant populations.

It was felt that such weighting would represent an artificial refinement of the data, which are offered as suggestive, rather than conclusive. Within each region there are significant local variations, and any regional combination of frequencies must therefore represent somewhat of a distortion of the respective situations in particular localities. For convenience in presenting the data, however, percentages are used which represent crude regional totals. Whenever these appear to be unrepresentative of particular counties within a given region, the exceptions will be pointed out in the text. On the whole, the percentages for individual counties within regions showed remarkable uniformity, with the significant exception of those for the sugar beet region. The reasons for differences within this region were discussed at length in Part I of the report.

FARMERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE USE OF
JAPANESE EVACUEES AS FARM LABOR
(Part II)

I. REGIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE USE OF EVACUEE LABOR

Farmers' readiness to accept Japanese and Japanese-Americans from the West Coast as farm workers showed a severe decline with geographical distance from the areas where the evacuees had previously lived and worked.

As the chart* on the following page illustrates, respondents in the Rocky Mountain sugar beet region accepted the use of evacuee farm labor most frequently; those in the truck growing areas of the eastern seaboard, least. With the exception of the Pacific Coast region, from which the evacuees are excluded at present, the regions which were most familiar with the Japanese or other ethnic types of labor showed the most acceptance of the evacuees. Evacuees were employed last fall in the mountain areas surveyed, and were used to a limited extent in areas near the southwestern counties, but were not employed at all in the middle western and eastern seaboard areas. (Mexicans, the most nearly comparable ethnic group, have been used extensively in the southwestern and mountain regions, and in limited portions of the Middle West.)


Several factors appear to be responsible for the decline in acceptance of the evacuees from western to eastern areas of the country: a general distrust of unusual types of labor and unwillingness to change customary employment habits; patriotic nationalism and racial prejudice; relatively low anxiety about the coming year's labor supply; and particular local experiences of rural-urban conflict.

General Distrust of Strange Labor

The attitudes of eastern and middle western respondents, when contrasted with those expressed in other areas, reveal clearly a

* Taken from Table 1. All tables are in the Appendix.

Chart 1. Percentages of Respondents in Each Crop Region
 Indicating Acceptance of Evacuees as Farm Labor



Unqualified acceptance of evacuee labor

Qualified acceptance (e.g., if trained farm workers, or if housing demands not too great)

* Taken from Table I. All tables are in the Appendix.

lack of actual experience with Japanese labor. In addition to the lack of specific experience with the evacuees, however, farmers show a general reluctance to change their customary employment practices, particularly when the change involves the use of "outsiders" or "foreigners" of any sort. The ability of strange ethnic groups is uncertain. Farmers assume that they are lacking in desirable specialized skills, and that they are not likely to know or be willing to follow the customary ways of doing things which are peculiar to each farming community. Objections to the evacuees were often expressed in occupational stereotypes, such as, "They might work out all right in truck farming (or beet harvesting), but they wouldn't know how to do dairying (or general farming, or livestock raising.)" Such expressions were less frequent in localities where the evacuees had actually been tried out, even in types of farming previously unfamiliar to them, or where other ethnic groups, such as Mexicans, had formerly been used.


Racial and National Antipathy


Distrust of the evacuees because of their nationality background was frequently expressed, particularly in the East, Middle West, and Far West. The considerations underlying such expressions did not necessarily have a common basis. Wartime feeling unquestionably was responsible for the application of some of the racial labels, but it is probable that in some areas they frequently represented less "respectable" reasons, such as fear of economic competition, or a desire for cheaply exploited labor. Sometimes they no doubt grow out of simple unfamiliarity with the evacuees as individuals. In the mountain sugar beet region, where farmers had recently had experience with evacuee workers, the prevailing tendency was to think of them as efficient or inefficient workers, rather than as members of a racial or national group.


Anxiety about the Labor Supply

Considering the data region by region, there is some correlation between farmers' concern about the available labor supply for the coming year and their willingness to accept the evacuees. (Chart 2, taken from Tables 1 and 2.) In communities where there is

Chart 2. Relation of Serious Concern about Labor Supply to Acceptance of Evacuees



 Percentage of respondents indicating willingness (qualified or unqualified) to accept evacuees as farm labor

 Percentage of respondents rated as seriously concerned about prospective labor shortage

Considering the data region by region there is some correlation between farmers' concern about the available labor supply for the coming year and their willingness to accept the evacuees. (Chart 2) there is

general concern about a prospective labor shortage, farmers are probably conditioned to feel a stronger interest in the use of unusual types of labor. In the present case it is difficult to estimate the influence of this factor, since the regions showing relatively high acceptance of the evacuees happen to be those having most experience with them - and acceptance and experience are correlated.

Anxiety about a labor scarcity, moreover, is only one of the factors tending to shape attitudes toward the evacuees, and is often overridden by other, sometimes irrational considerations. Thus Part I of the report demonstrated that special local situations have in several instances outweighed farmers' desire for an assured labor supply.

The Influence of Local Situations

Since the effect of local circumstances upon attitudes in any given community was discussed at some length in Part I, it will be given little emphasis here. It is nevertheless an important aspect of any comprehensive consideration of the factors shaping attitudes. That community differences appeared to any striking degree only in the mountain sugar beet area is largely attributable to the fact that this was the region in which respondents had direct experience with the evacuees during the past year. Local factors doubtless would come into play with the introduction of evacuees into other areas.

Although an early return of the evacuees to the West Coast is unlikely, a knowledge of present attitudes in this region is useful in projecting trends in public feeling toward Japanese Americans. It is highly significant that one-third of the respondents on the Pacific Coast were willing to accept the use of Japanese labor, in view of the earlier public antipathy which was partly responsible for the evacuation.

II. HOW FARMERS EXPRESSED THEIR ATTITUDES

There was considerable variation not only in the reasons which farmers gave for their opinions of the evacuees, but in the frames of reference in which they spoke. These two aspects of the responses form regional patterns which will be described.


The Frames of Reference

Most respondents considered the evacuees in either of two frames of reference, as shown in Chart 3 (from Table 3) on the following page. The evacuees frequently were thought of as a racial or nationality group, and the most violently emotional responses occurred within this context. Many of the respondents who made their evaluations on racial or nationalistic grounds had never seen a person of Japanese extraction, and knew very little about the evacuees except that they could be identified as members of the "yellow race" and associated with the enemy. There were others, of course - primarily on the Pacific Coast - who had had more opportunity to come into contact with the Japanese and Japanese-Americans. The bases of their antipathy were no doubt more complex, often involving a fear of economic competition or other threat to their own status.





A remarkably large number of respondents, on the other hand, evaluated the evacuees according to their work efficiency. These farmers did not seem perturbed about employing workers linked by ancestry with an enemy nation. They rarely even distinguished between aliens and citizens in expressing their opinions, although most assumed that governmental or military authorities would not permit actually dangerous members of the group to leave custody. Respondents sharing this frame of reference figuratively asked themselves the single question, "Can they do the work?" Acceptance or rejection hinged on whether the answer was affirmative or negative.

Most of the respondents who thought of the evacuees in terms of labor-efficiency had had experience with Japanese or other ethnic groups, and often were greatly concerned about the supply of farm labor for the coming year. This was particularly true in heavy seasonal hand labor areas. Such areas have customarily depended upon various migratory ethnic groups, such as Mexicans, Filipinos,

Chart 3. Percentages of Respondents Regarding Evacuees in Terms of Labor-Efficiency or of Racial-National Background*



Frames of Reference

-  Labor-efficiency
-  Racial-national background
-  Other (sympathy for evacuees as mistreated citizens, or complete indifference)
-  Not ascertainable

* Each bar represents 100 percent of the respondents in the respective region

Indians, and Russians. Possibly the reason that farmers in these areas are ready to accept the evacuees on their merits as workers rather than as undesirable outsiders is that they have become accustomed to the idea of hiring what other farmers would regard as "strange" groups. Such acceptance does not necessarily involve the granting of advanced status to the evacuees. On the contrary, perhaps they are accepted because their status is clearly defined as below that of the employer, while on a middle western dairy farm a hired man is often admitted to the same social group as his employer.

A few farmers thought of the evacuees in other terms than those which have been described. Some were completely indifferent, since they had no labor problem themselves. Others had a rather broad outlook and expressed sympathy for evacuees who had been unfairly deprived of their freedom as citizens. Both groups were relatively small with reference to the total number of respondents.

The Specific Reasons for Acceptance or Rejection

The principal considerations which respondents mentioned in accepting or rejecting the use of evacuee labor are listed in Tables 4 and 5. As the discussion of frames of reference has suggested, the most important considerations to farmers were the nationality and racial background of the evacuees, and their relative efficiency as farm labor.

In one region unusual costs in connection with employment of the evacuees became a strong reason for rejecting them. Other factors which seemed to carry weight were certain undesirable personal characteristics of the evacuees described by respondents. In Part I it was shown that these represented a basic rural-urban culture conflict between farm employers and some of the evacuees, and figured only in areas where farmers had already had experience with evacuee labor.

Several other reasons were mentioned in accepting or rejecting the evacuees, but none with great frequency. Fear of economic competition, which was rarely expressed, was no doubt at times rationalized beneath the mask of racial dislike.

Regional Patterns

Common attitudinal patterns within each of the regions surveyed help to explain the regional differences in acceptance of the evacuees. These patterns will be described briefly by regions.

THE MIDDLE WEST

Dairy and livestock farmers in counties scattered throughout the Middle West expressed an almost uniformly high degree of hostility to the idea of using evacuee farm labor. The frame of reference in which farmers thought of the evacuees was predominantly nationalistic, and expressions of strong antagonism like the following ones were frequent.

A Carroll County, Missouri, livestock feeder:

"If you want some Japs killed, send them here. I would let my farm lie idle before I will take any Jap labor. I don't care if they are born in this country. I am just as patriotic as anybody, and I am doing anything I can to help, but I am not going to give a Jap a home and my boys over there fighting them."

A Cedar County, Iowa, feeder:

"What would I think of using a Jap? What for - a corpse? It would be all right if we were running a bombing school. I think those Japs should be kept just where they are. If they want to do something with them and don't want to feed them, why not take them any place handy and put them in the Pacific and let them swim back?"

Opposition to the use of the evacuees was part of a general pattern of resistance to "outsiders" and "foreigners", as the following quotations indicate.

A young Medina County, Ohio, livestock raiser:

"Nothing doing! I wouldn't want no part of anything like that. Personally I have nothing against people like that. But in a section like this it is made up of fellows who own their own places. They are honest, hard-working people who don't lock their doors when they go out. They don't want a bunch of foreigners running around that they can't trust."

A Carroll County, Missouri, livestock and dairy farmer:

"I don't want them. I would quit before I would use them. I wouldn't consider it in no way. I would a lot rather have nigger help than Japs. Mexicans ain't much better. They are all the same to me."

A Johnson County, Kansas, dairy farmer:

"I never saw a Jap in my life, but I am afraid of them and the Mexicans."

Unfamiliarity with strange ethnic groups and particularly with the Japanese led farmers to repeat all the traditional racial stereotypes which they had heard. The evacuees were charged with treachery, brutality, and sedition, and the most common single criticism was, "You can't trust them". The widely circulated "true" story about the Japanese servant who told his American employer, "After this war, the white man will be working for the Jap", was repeated by a Dodge County, Wisconsin, dairy farmer. (This story had been picked up by interviewers in Dallas and Los Angeles on previous surveys shortly after the outbreak of the war, and the incident was later reported in the newspapers as having actually occurred to a friend of a California congressman.)

Respondents frequently expressed fear of personal harm, either through violence or sabotage, if the evacuees were brought into their respective communities. The examples below are characteristic.

A Saginaw County, Michigan, dairyman:

"I wouldn't feel safe (with the Japanese around). Not as long as we are at war."

A Johnson County, Kansas, dairy and livestock farmer:

"I wouldn't want Japs around a dairy. They might poison the milk, and then where would you be?"

A Medina County, Ohio, hog feeder:

"I'd be afraid of a Jap. They are the ones that are awful brutal in this war."

A Macon County, Missouri, dairyman:

"I wouldn't want to be around them. I'm kinda afraid of those people. I'd rather do it myself than trust those fellows. I've never seen any, but I don't want to."

Occasionally there were expressions of sympathy and tolerance, but even these were usually smothered in a desire to conform to the prevailing opinion in the community. One farmer in Carroll County, Missouri, ventured,

"That wouldn't bother me as long as the community wouldn't care. I don't think I would want the foreign-born Japs, but their children born in this country would be all right. They should have a chance to work, too. I am a little leary about bringing in any foreigners to take the place of our boys. If they would boost them out when the emergency is over, it would be all right. But if you had a good man you might get attached to him and wouldn't want to give him up, or he might not want to go, either."

Some of the opposition to employment of the evacuees probably stemmed from resentment against the conscription of local farm workers, and fear that returning sons at the close of the war would find themselves displaced by imported help. As one Faribault County, Minnesota, dairyman said,

"Why not send them (the evacuees) to the Army, and leave us have our own who know how?"

Such expressions were directed in opposition not only to the evacuees, but to all outside labor in general. Respondents in a number of instances frankly declared that they would rather not have their own sons go to war if there were others who might serve in their places. Moreover, they regarded the importation of additional workers to replace those conscripted as merely an exchange of good labor for bad, since the new help would have to be trained.

Farmers in the Middle West appeared on the whole less anxious about the prospective labor supply than those in any other region except the eastern seaboard. This circumstance probably contributed to the lack of genuine interest in considering new sources of labor, although labor scarcity was often mentioned as a source of difficulty in maintaining farm production.

Farmers disclosed both their lack of real concern about a labor shortage and their unwillingness to consider using unusual types of labor by the frequency with which they suggested that evacuee

workers would probably be better suited to other types of farming than their own. Occupational stereotypes were applied which relegated the usefulness of the evacuees to crops requiring heavy hand labor, such as sugar beets and garden truck. It was assumed that they would not be sufficiently skilled in the operation of farm machinery and the care of livestock to make satisfactory help on middle western general and livestock farms. Few suggested that the evacuees be given a trial to demonstrate their abilities, and none seemed sufficiently pressed to be willing to train his own help. Some of the objections were without doubt genuine, but many appeared to be mere excuses for not seriously considering the use of the evacuees.

There were two counties in this region, however, where farmers showed exceptional interest in the possibility of using evacuee workers to replace former help. The counties were Faribault and Steel, both in Minnesota. This is one of the few areas in the Middle West where farmers (largely Scandinavians) have had extended experience with the employment of various ethnic groups. This circumstance has probably rendered them more receptive (at least temporarily) to the use of evacuee labor than farmers in other areas within the same region. Several comments similar to this one by a Faribault County farmer were recorded:

"If they must take the farm boys for the Army, I would be willing to have some Jap-Americans come here to work. I am doubtful about them as permanent residents though."

THE EASTERN SEABOARD

Truck and dairy farmers in two counties on the eastern seaboard exhibited much the same pattern of thought with regard to the use of evacuee labor as farmers in the Middle West. If anything, they were more hostile and more extreme in their expressions of anti-Japanese feeling. They revealed the same general resistance to the employment of strangers and foreigners that was found in the Middle West. Some of the respondents were themselves immigrants from southern European countries. The Italians in particular may have been afraid that they would be identified as pro-Axis if they consented to use evacuee labor.

The following comments are indicative of the depth of feeling

against the Japanese, and by association, against the evacuees, in these areas.

A Hartford County, Connecticut, dairy farmer:

"Don't bring any Japs here! They wouldn't get out of here alive!"

A Cumberland County, New Jersey, truck farmer:

"Take the sons of bitches out and shoot 'em! The yellow bastards! They got the right color - yellow clear through!"

A Negro truck farmer in Cumberland County:

"We got too many of them kind. That is the big trouble with the U. S. today. They are real enemies. It was a big mistake to ever let them in."

Fear of harm through sabotage or violence on the part of the evacuees was also asserted as a reason for rejection. A Hartford County dairyman, who had just sold his farm to go into retirement, "because of the labor shortage", said,

"Japs! I don't believe we need them! For myself, I wouldn't want them. You wouldn't know what they might do. They might poison your milk or something. Like them eggs the other day. A hell of a lot of people died from frozen eggs!"

Farmers in this region were rated by interviewers as least concerned, on the whole, about a labor shortage. Unquestionably some individual operators have been hurt by lack of labor, but the situation has not become general enough to lead farmers as a group to begin casting about for unusual sources of help. Seasonal labor (both white and Negro) has customarily migrated to these areas from the South, and this source has probably not been so severely affected by wartime drains as have other migrant groups.

THE MOUNTAIN AND SOUTHWESTERN REGIONS

Patterns in the Rocky Mountain sugar beet and southwestern long staple cotton regions were discussed in detail in Part I of the report.

Farmers in these areas showed most concern about the prospective labor shortage, and displayed a much higher degree of acceptance of the evacuees than was found in the East or Middle West. The tendency to consider the evacuees according to their potentialities as farm workers, rather than to think of them as an undesirable ethnic group, was more common here than in other areas. This was most strikingly shown in the sugar beet region, where farmers had had experience with various ethnic types of labor, including the evacuees themselves. Acceptance of the evacuees was relatively high in these areas, with the exception of those where particular local circumstances had had an unfavorable influence. (See Part I.)

Acceptance of the evacuees was considerably lower in the Southwest, where farmers felt that their best - and cheapest - available source of seasonal labor was nearby Mexico.

THE PACIFIC COAST

Public feeling on the West Coast ran high against persons of Japanese descent shortly after the outbreak of the war, and no doubt partly influenced the Government's decision to remove them from the area.* It is therefore especially significant that 32 percent of the respondents on Pacific Coast farms were willing to accept the use of evacuee workers. These farmers were thinking in a labor-efficiency frame of reference, and most of them desired the return of the evacuees because they had suffered some economic loss through their removal.

A larger dairy and vineyard operator in Kings County, California, said,

"The Japs are the best. Of course we are fighting them now, but they are the best of all. My Japs took care of my grapes and so on for me and they are good workers and they really know how. I wish we could get them back. The Mexicans and the Oklahoma people, they just work for the money. After they get so much money they don't care to work any more. Like today, there - you see they all quit picking cotton at one o'clock. After they make five or six dollars in a day they will quit, even if it is noon."

* A report prepared by the Division of Program Surveys for the Office of Facts and Figures on March 6, 1942, indicated that 77 percent of the West Coast respondents in an urban survey disliked and distrusted residents of Japanese ancestry. Fifty-two percent advocated evacuation or more extreme measures to remove the menace of the domestic Japanese.

In Yakima County, Washington, a prune grower commented,

"I can tell you this frankly: I'd be all for bringing the Japs back here to take up where they left off, but I don't think the valley would stand for it. Lots of people still have a bad taste in their mouths where the Japs are concerned. It's too bad, too, because the Japs are good, hard workers. They mostly mind their own business, and I personally believe that most of them are just as loyal to this Government as a lot of the other people in the valley."

When asked, "Did removing the Japs have much effect on the labor situation?" this respondent continued,

"Only indirectly. You see, the Japs never were much for working the orchards. They worked truck gardens - vegetables and things. But here's how it worked: when they moved the Japs out, then somebody else had to work their truck gardens, and it takes at least three white men to do the work of one Jap in that kind of work -- and then it isn't done half as good. The way I figure it is that every one that worked in the place of the Japs this year was just so many less available for work in the orchards. In that way it had plenty of effect."

Others objected to the economic waste resulting from confinement of the evacuees to relocation centers.

A Ventura County, California, orange grower:

"The Japanese have never worked here. I think by now they have had time to ferret out the bad ones from the good ones and they could bring the good ones back under supervision to work. That way they could pay their own way, rather than just be an expenso to the Government. I had a Jap come three times a week and do garden work in my place in Hollywood. I know he was all right, and I would hire him here in a minute and be glad to get him, except that the people around here would probably think I was a fifth columnist or something."

A Yakima County apple grower:

"Everybody should work during wartime - even the Japs and Mexicans. It does seem a waste to keep the Japs locked up. They used to have such nice kept-up vegetable farms around here, and now everything has gone to seed. And it's very expensive to buy vegetables in town."

The heavy labor drain to defense centers caused an acute labor shortage in the harvest season for larger growers. One Yakima County apple grower said,

"I sure don't think it's right to keep 100,000 Japs idle in these concentration camps while the crops rot on the ground. It just doesn't make sense - especially when they keep yelling about how important it is to raise food."

Two-thirds of the West Coast respondents, however, rejected the use of the evacuees, and nearly all of these spoke in racial or nationalistic terms. Within this group were several farmers who had taken over land formerly operated by the evacuees and who consequently had an economic interest in opposing their return. Some of them complained that the Japanese were clannish and would not divulge "trade secrets" about their successful truck-farming methods, even to those who had formerly worked for them. One such farmer, a Los Angeles County Mexican, declared,

"The Japanese knew how to truck-farm pretty good, but I don't want them back here, oh no! I used to work for them. They would never tell you what kind of medicine they used to spray with or anything like that. I know, though, and I can farm as well or better than they can."

Comments like this one by a Yakima County hops raiser were common:

"As for the Japs - if I can't get my work done without the help of those slant-eyes, I just won't get it done."

Several mentioned fear of riots and sabotage. A Tulare County, California, fruit grower said,

"I don't think the people would stand for bringing the Japanese back. No, sir, I would be dead against that. I think we are too close to the coast here. There would be too much sabotage. Anyway, they would have to have more men watching them than there was working. No, sir, that wouldn't work. I think they are going to have to bring the Mexicans in, but how they are going to get rid of them after that is what I am worrying about."

A peach grower in Yakima County:

"I don't think I'd want any Japs, myself. Apt to be too much trouble. Don't want any riots on my hands."

Most of the dairymen in Kings and Los Angeles Counties rejected the use of the evacuees on the ground that they had had no experience in dairying. Some of the replies carried the implication, however, that the real concern was to prevent the Japanese from gaining a competitive position in a new farming enterprise. This undertone was likewise present in interviews with other types of farmers. Thus, while fear of economic competition was never specifically mentioned as a reason for rejection of the evacuees, it was without doubt operative in the minds of many West Coast respondents.

III. CONCLUSIONS

In order to secure satisfactory agricultural employment for the evacuees, and at the same time utilize fully their manpower, it is necessary to observe the primary considerations influencing farmers to accept or reject their services.

The Conditions of Acceptance

Acceptance was facilitated when farmers had had former contact with the evacuees or similar ethnic groups. Interest in the use of the evacuees was also stimulated (but to a smaller degree) when farmers were so pressed for help that they were forced to consider unusual sources of labor.

Acceptance was impeded when there were other labor sources more readily available, or when customary sources had not yet been fully exploited. It was often blocked by anti-Japanese prejudice, particularly if this was reinforced by feelings of threat to the economic and social status of prospective employers. Also hindering acceptance of the evacuees were the rural-urban conflicts which sometimes arose with their introduction; in certain areas where evacuees had been used, farmers opposed their return for this reason.

The Implications for Placement Policy

In Part I of the report some specific recommendations for evacuee placement policy were made on the basis of data from two of the five crop regions surveyed. It is now possible, through the inclusion of additional data, to make general application of the earlier recommendations.

These suggestions were made in Part I:

1. The selection of evacuees to be placed in agricultural employment should take into account both their farming skills and their rural cultural background, in order to minimize frictions with the rural community.

2. Voluntary employment should be encouraged, but so directed as to make maximum application of the agricultural skills contained in the group.
3. In placing evacuees in permanent situations, they should be introduced as individuals or in small groups, rather than in large numbers.
4. Before evacuees are sent into seasonal labor areas for mass employment, advance surveys should be conducted to discover particular local attitudes which might affect the success of the program.
5. The findings of such surveys should be used in planning local public relations policies and in making concrete arrangements for housing, transportation, and similar requirements.

It appears that these suggestions need not be modified in light of the general findings. On the contrary, succeeding evidence seems to establish the desirability of a placement policy which will take into account the individual capacities of the evacuees and the receptiveness of the communities into which they are to be placed.

Additional Recommendations

A further technique to facilitate a more general acceptance of the evacuees can be suggested. It is an adaptation of the "demonstration" technique which has been successful in introducing other innovations in farming practice into rural communities.

As has been pointed out, farmers in many areas have not yet reached the stage at which they need help badly enough to reconsider their established preconceptions about the suitability of strange labor. It may be expected, however, that as the war continues and food production demands increase, farmers will be impelled to consider unusual labor sources. This situation should create new opportunities for the employment of the evacuees, and possibly at the same time afford them a chance to become accommodated within numerous American communities.

It is, therefore, suggested that arrangements might be made to place a few experienced evacuee farm workers into each of

several communities most likely to be subject to continuing labor shortages. They would serve as demonstration groups, and farmers would have a chance to observe their work at close hand and under local conditions. Under such circumstances farm employers may tend to lose their habitual distrust of strange labor and begin to welcome the help of the evacuees.

In inaugurating such a plan in the Middle West, for example, it would probably be best to begin with communities which have had previous contact with unusual ethnic groups, and those which have had the greatest labor drain. Intensive farming areas surrounding defense centers would seem to offer the most feasible possibilities.

Evacuees for the demonstration units should be selected for their experience in the kind of work into which they will be placed, and for their capacity for accommodation into the community. Minimum requirements would probably include an agricultural background, a knowledge of English, and a personal ability to make necessary social adjustments. The vanguard groups will certainly be more likely to succeed if they are themselves conscious of their important office as demonstrators that Japanese-Americans can become useful, recognized participants in American community life.

A P P E N D I X

THE INTERVIEWING PROCEDURE OF THE DIVISION OF PROGRAM SURVEYS

The Division of Program Surveys conducts studies of social and administrative problems in which public attitudes play an important part. Generalizations about larger populations from relatively small numbers of interviews are made possible by the use of a carefully developed method of selecting respondents.

Interviewing is done by a full-time professional field staff who follow a narrative procedure in which the interview schedule becomes the stimulation for a controlled, respondent-centered discussion, rather than a series of questions for specific reply. A professionally trained analysis staff summarizes and interprets the interview write-ups submitted by the field staff.

The present report is based upon 333 intensive interviews representing

dairy and livestock farmers in Jersey County, Illinois; Macon and Carroll Counties, Missouri; Cedar and Butler Counties, Iowa; Washington County, Nebraska; Faribault and Steele Counties, Minnesota; Traill County, North Dakota; Dodge County, Wisconsin; Medina County, Ohio; Saginaw County, Michigan; Johnson County, Kansas; and Kings and Los Angeles Counties, California;

sugar beet growers in Weld County, Colorado; Big Horn County, Wyoming; Broadwater and Yellowstone Counties, Montana;

long staple cotton growers in Maricopa County, Arizona; Dona Ana County, New Mexico; and El Paso County, Texas;

fruit growers in Yakima County, Washington; and Tulare and Ventura Counties, California;

truck growers in Cumberland County, New Jersey; and Hartford County, Connecticut.

Supplementary information was obtained in interviews with agricultural officials and other special informants in the sampled counties.

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE*

1. Did you have any difficulty in operating your farm in 1942? (If yes) What was it due to?
 2. What crops or livestock enterprises were affected?
 3. (If difficulties were caused in whole or part by labor shortage) What sort of labor shortages caused these difficulties?
 4. Will your 1942 experience or the farm help situation for next year cause you to make changes in acreages, in crops or methods of care, harvesting and marketing next year? If so, what?
 5. Do you expect to change the 1943 livestock operations on your farm? Why?
 6. What could be done that would help you to maintain your present production in (the livestock and critical crops he is planning to decrease)?
- Rating: Interviewee's frame of reference in answering this question:
1. Personal or individual
 2. Group plans or identification
 3. Government action
 4. Other
7. If you had had more labor available what changes would you have made in crops or livestock this year?
 8. What difference is there in your family labor this year (1942) compared with last year (1941)?
 9. What labor will you have available for 1943?
 10. (If applicable) Is the draft or defense work having the greater effect in taking labor off your farm?
 11. Which is having the greater effect on the farms in your immediate neighborhood? (draft or defense)

* The interview schedule is that known as Study A-3. Material for the present report was drawn mainly from the responses to questions 1, 3, 4, 20, 21, and 22.

12. What are some of the changes your neighbors are making to meet the labor situation?
13. Do you know of any office where you can go to get farm labor?
14. To what extent can farm girls and women replace usual farm labor?
15. To what extent can city girls and women replace usual farm labor?
16. How do you feel about using non-farm boys 14-17 years old that have had short training?
17. Who do you think should train inexperienced farm workers?
18. How do you feel about using older men with previous farm experience - but past the age of greatest usefulness - on your farm?
19. How do you feel about using men from nearby cities or towns?
20. How do you feel about using labor from other farming areas, for example, (whatever labor has been recently imported into his community, as Kentuckians, Mexicans, Japanese evacuees, out-over area people, or other)?
21. (If favorable) Should they be used as migrant labor or be encouraged to become permanent residents?
22. How do you feel about using special groups, such as Spanish-Americans or Japanese-Americans? (Use "Mexicans" instead of Spanish-Americans if that seems best.)
23. Did farmers exchange labor more in 1942 than in recent years? What operations?
24. Could they go further in exchanging work? How far will this go in solving the problem?
25. Could you and your neighbors make better utilization of the most efficient machinery available in the community?
26. Would you be willing to loan or rent your machinery to neighbors?
27. Would you be willing to do more custom work?
28. Have you and your neighbors had more difficulty hiring custom work done in 1942 than in previous years? (If yes) Why? What operations?

29. To what extent would greater use of increased custom work and borrowing and loaning of machinery solve the problems of the labor shortage?
30. What do you think of the suggestion that older children be taken from schools for the emergency or that the school year be shortened?
31. How much further can you or your neighbors, their wives, and other family help go in doing the work of the farm themselves?
32. Do you know of any labor plan worked out for the community for supplying necessary labor, especially of short-period type? What do you think of it?
33. How do you feel about "freezing" farm labor on farms?
- a. hired
 - b. family
 - c. operators
34. What do you think of the suggestion that the Government subsidize farm labor so farmers can more nearly compete with war industry for labor?
35. What do you think of the suggestion that the Government give incentive payments to encourage farmers to keep up production of critical food products, such as milk?
36. What do you think the Government should do (that it is not already working at) to make it possible for farmers to maintain production?
37. Are there many farm auctions in your community? More than usual? Why are these farm operators selling out?

Table 1. Extent of Acceptance of Evacuees as Farm Labor*

Degree of acceptance	Pacific Coast		Mountain		Southwestern		Mid-western		Eastern	
	dairy and fruit	dairy and fruit	sugar beet	sugar beet	long staple cotton	cotton	dairy and livestock	dairy and livestock	trunk	trunk
Acceptance, unqualified	13%	14%	3%	3%	2%	6%				
Acceptance, qualified	19	35	16	16	7	0				
Rejection	68	48	61	61	63	88				
Not necessary - labor not a problem	0	3	0	0	0	0				
Not ascertainable	0	0	0	0	8	6				
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%				
N=	32	72	37	37	174	18				

* Questions 1, 3, 4, 20, 21, 22

Table 2. Extent of Farmers' Concern about Prospective Labor Shortage*

Degree of Concern	Pacific Coast		Mountain		Southwestern		Mid-western		Eastern	
	dairy and fruit	dairy and fruit	sugar beet	sugar beet	long staple cotton	cotton	dairy and livestock	dairy and livestock	truck	truck
Serious concern	37%		46%		46%		23%		17%	
Some concern	47		43		46		46		61	
No concern	16		11		8		31		22	
	100%		100%		100%		100%		100%	
N=	32		72		37		174		18	

*Based on ratings made by interviewers on each interview as a whole.

Table 3. Predominant Frames of Reference in Which Farmers Think of Evacuees*

Frame of Reference	Pacific Coast dairy and fruit	Mountain sugar beet	Southwestern long staple cotton	Mid-western dairy and livestock	Eastern truck
Labor efficiency	34%	82%	46%	19%	6%
Racial - National background	60	15	54	72	82
Other (complete in- difference, or sympathy for evacuees as mistreated citizens)	3	3	0	1	6
Not ascertainable	3 100%	0 100%	0 100%	8 100%	6 100%
N=	32	72	37	174	18

*Analysis staff ratings on responses given to questions 20, 21, 22.

Table 4. Percentage of Respondents Mentioning Considerations Favorable to the Use of Evacuee Labor*

Favorable Considerations	Pacific Coast dairy and fruit	Mountain sugar beet	Southwestern long staple cotton	Mid-western dairy and livestock	Eastern truck
Efficiency of evacuee labor	19%	47%	22%	4%	0%
Community benefit from presence of evacuees	9	3	0	0	6
Desirable characteristics of evacuees	3	11	0	0	0
Inability to get other help	3	8	14	2	0
	N= 32	72	37	174	18

*Questions 1, 3, 4, 20, 21, and 22. Percentage totals are more than 100, since more than one answer per person was possible. (Respondents represented in this table may also be represented in Table 5. Some respondents who rejected the evacuees nevertheless credited them with favorable attributes. Still others accepted the evacuees as efficient on the whole, but pointed out that some were inefficient and therefore would not be satisfactory.)

Table 5. Percentage of Respondents Mentioning Considerations Unfavorable to the Use of Evacuee Labor*

Unfavorable Considerations	Pacific Coast		Mountain		Southwestern		Mid-western		Eastern	
	dairy and fruit	13%	sugar beet	58%	long staple cotton	38%	dairy and livestock	15%	truck	0%
Inefficiency of evacuee labor	0		24		0		0		0	
Excessive cost of evacuee labor	56		26		57		70		66	
National - racial dislike	0		4		5		1		0	
Fear of economic competition	0		39		19		0		0	
Undesirable characteristics, other than racial	32		72		37		174		18	
	N ^a									

*Questions 1, 3, 4, 20, 21, 22

More than one answer per person was possible. See footnote to Table 4.