

MINORITY REPORT OF THE HONORABLE HERMAN P. EBERHARTER

It is not possible for me to agree with the findings and conclusions of the other two members of our subcommittee, who constitute the majority.

After careful consideration, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the report of the majority is prejudiced, and that most of its statements are not proven.

The majority report has stressed a few shortcomings that they have found in the work of the War Relocation Authority without mentioning the many good points that our investigation has disclosed or the magnitude of the job with which the Authority is dealing.

Since the close of our hearings I have made some inquiries in order to clear up some points about which I was in doubt and on which the testimony did not seem to be sufficiently clear, the results of which inquiries have not been communicated to the other members of the subcommittee, because the subcommittee has never met to discuss the contents of a report.

There are a few basic matters that ought to be kept clearly in mind, which I wish to summarize here at the beginning before dealing with the body of the majority report of the subcommittee. It should be remembered that the relocation centers administered by the War Relocation Authority have been intended from the very beginning to be only temporary expedients. These relocation centers are not supposed to be internment camps. Dangerous aliens are placed in internment camps, but those camps are administered by the Department of Justice and should not be confused with the relocation centers. When the Japanese population was removed from the west coast they were at first free to go anywhere they wanted within the United States so long as they stayed out of the evacuated area. The first plan contemplated merely free movement and did not provide for any kind of relocation centers. For about a month thousands of evacuees were permitted to leave the west coast voluntarily for other parts of the country. Most of them have since continued to live anywhere they wanted to.

It was soon found not feasible to permit such voluntary movement to continue because trouble began to develop in places where people were not ready to receive these Japanese who had been ordered to move. It was then that the plan was changed to establish relocation centers in which the Japanese could live until it was feasible for them to get reestablished in normal life.

The dangerous aliens among the Japanese population on the west coast were picked up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies in the first few days after Pearl Harbor. Practically all the rest were presumed to be loyal and safe. It was necessary to evacuate the whole group, even after the dangerous aliens had been picked up and interned, because there was danger that the west coast would be invaded by the Japanese Army. But once removed from the west coast it was believed these people presented no further danger.

Dillon S. Myer, Director of the Authority, has told this subcommittee that about two-thirds of the people removed from the west coast are American citizens. Such a proposition as this, of moving approximately 70,000

American citizens away from their homes, has never been attempted before. Our Constitution does not distinguish between citizens of Japanese ancestry, or of German or Italian ancestry and citizens of English, Scotch, Russian, or Norwegian ancestry. Loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry have the same rights as any other loyal American citizens. I believe the Government was entirely right, therefore, in permitting free movement from the west coast so long as that was possible, and then in providing relocation centers when that proved necessary. The whole point of the program is to help the loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry, and the law-abiding aliens, to leave the relocation centers after investigation, and become established in normal life.

The rights of citizens to live as free men are part of the "four freedoms" for which we are fighting this war.

The testimony produced before this subcommittee shows that large numbers of the Japanese-American evacuees are working in war plants and in agriculture, and doing a good job. The Army has found that many of them are so trustworthy that they are being used in Military Intelligence and other secret work of high military importance. The evidence shows there were something like 5,000 loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the Army before the evacuation. Early this year the Army organized a special combat team of Japanese-Americans which is now in training at Camp Shelby, and which is made up entirely of volunteers.

Life in the relocation centers is not a bed of roses. The houses are of plain barrack style. The food is adequate but plain. The great majority of the relocation center residents are working at necessary jobs in connection with running the camps. They are raising much of their own food. For this work they get paid, in addition to their keep, only \$12, \$16, or \$19 a month. Even loyal American citizens in the relocation centers are working for these low wages.

Because of these facts I am disturbed about some of the ridiculous charges that were made early in our investigation. Stories about the Japanese people hiding food in the desert and storing contraband in holes under their houses, were shown to be ridiculous when a project was visited. However, the majority's report fails to withdraw these charges.

The report of the majority makes a big point about 23 persons who were released from the camps and who are found to be members of Butoku-kai, a Japanese fencing organization. This is 23 people out of 16,000 released. Even in the case of these 23 neither the majority report nor the hearings offer any evidence that any of the 23 were subversive.

I, for one, want to emphasize that just because a person is a member of an organization alleged to be subversive, I do not ipso facto conclude that the particular person is subversive. Certainly, mere proof of membership in an organization alleged to be subversive does not provide legal grounds for arresting or detaining such a person. Proper investigation may determine such a person to be intensely loyal to the United States.

After all the wind and the fury of a long report that creates the impression that War Relocation Authority is doing a very bad job, the comments of the majority members are climaxed by three feeble, meaningless recommendations.

These recommendations hardly support the prejudiced tone of the report. I shall discuss them later. At this point I want to take up some of the specific matters discussed in the majority's report.

The Report of the Majority

Administration of relocation centers.

In the majority's report the following language appears:

This committee does not consider it necessary to discuss in detail the administrative errors and deficiencies of the War Relocation Authority which were indicated by voluminous evidence received in the course of the subcommittee hearings. The Director of the War Relocation Authority, Mr. Dillon S. Myer, was frank in admitting that many mistakes had been made. Only those administrative errors which bear directly or indirectly upon the subject of subversive and un-American activities come within the special interest of this committee.

The implication of this paragraph is that the administration of the War Relocation Authority program has been lacking in competency and efficiency, that many mistakes have been made, and that Director Myer acknowledged that this was true.

Actually, Director Myer expressed the judgment before the subcommittee that a good job is being done in administration of the relocation centers and of the program as a whole and that such mistakes as were made, particularly in the early months of operation, were largely such as would inevitably occur in the development of a new and unprecedented program. There was nothing in the evidence heard by the subcommittee that would bear out the implication that the program was being incompetently or inefficiently administered. All things considered the preponderance of evidence indicates that the War Relocation Authority is doing a good job in handling an extremely difficult problem.

Fitness of War Relocation Authority personnel.

The majority's report states that much of the personnel in the War Relocation Authority is manifestly unfit for the job. The only specific evidence which is referred to in the report or which was presented before the subcommittee to substantiate this conclusion was the assertion that few of the administrative personnel had a prior knowledge of Japanese culture, language, and habits. Director Myer, in his testimony, states that the War Relocation Authority staff included some persons who were especially chosen because of their acquaintance with Japanese culture and language and that these persons had served as advisers to other members of the staff. A considerable number of the staff were formerly residents of California and

other Western States who in the past had a great deal of contact with persons of Japanese ancestry living in this country.

The fact that apart from these two groups most of the War Relocation Authority staff had no previous close contact with Japanese or Japanese-Americans seems not particularly significant. For one thing, there are comparatively few people in the United States who understand the Japanese language or are well acquainted with Japanese culture. Apart from that, it would have been unfortunate had the War Relocation Authority sought to employ a large number of such persons when actually they would have been and are more usefully employed by other agencies of the Government engaged directly in the war against Japan. Furthermore, the War Relocation Authority would be subject to severe criticism were it dominated by people who have previously been intimate with the Japanese or Japanese-Americans and therefore subject to the accusation of being unduly sympathetic toward them.

Americanization.

Anyone genuinely interested in the problem of continuing the Americanization of the Japanese-American population of this country must acknowledge that the greatest force for Americanization is free, friendly, and continuous contact with non-Japanese-Americans in normal communities. The evacuation and isolation of the Japanese population in relocation centers away from normal contacts is an almost overwhelming obstacle to the assimilation of the Japanese-Americans, as it would be to any immigrant population. To say, as the majority's report does, that---

the War Relocation Authority had before it an almost unparalleled opportunity to inaugurate a vigorous educational program for positive Americanism---

is an almost complete inversion of the true situation. Americanization is best accomplished not by formal programs of education, but by the continuous day-to-day mingling of the immigrant group among the general American population. By way of illustration, the story is told of an educated, loyal Nisei during the very early days of evacuation when his family was still in an assembly center, who protested bitterly that his children, who had always spoken good English, were learning broken English from their less well Americanized companions.

Far from having an unparalleled opportunity in the relocation centers to effect Americanization, the War Relocation Authority is confronted with the very difficult problem, under such artificial circumstances, of preventing the development of a distinct relocation center culture which is mostly American but partly Japanese. Anyone sincerely interested in the Americanization of the loyal Japanese must see that the best Americanization program is found in the relocation of evacuees in normal American communities.

The majority's report bases a strong criticism of the Authority on the fact that the Authority has carried on the evacuee pay roll at each center certain recreational supervisors who were especially concerned with sports and recreational activities of Japanese origin. Particularly, criticism has been directed against the teaching of Judo. Reference is

made to the employment of 90 Judo instructors at one center. Director Myer explained that this overemphasis on Judo at that particular center had long since been corrected by the Authority. He also explained that such instruction in Judo as still continues at the centers is carried on under a program formulated after consultation with competent intelligence officers of the military service. It is a matter of common knowledge that Judo is taught to soldiers in the United States Army and that Japanese-Americans from the relocation centers are often used as instructors in Judo classes outside the centers.

It was also brought out in Director Myer's testimony that the teaching of the Japanese language in the centers, originally prohibited, is now conducted largely for the benefit of persons who will become Japanese language teachers for the United States military and naval services.

As to Americanized recreational activities, the evidence indicates that baseball is the most popular sport among the evacuees at the relocation centers. Basketball and football are also very popular. Boy Scout work, Girl Scout work, and the like have a following multiplied many times over that accorded to similar activities of Japanese cultural origin. Among the evacuees there are many thousands of members of such organizations as the Young Men's Christian Association, Young Women's Christian Association, Girl Reserves, Hi-Y, Camp Fire Girls, and Future Farmers of America. A large proportion of the adult population belongs to parent-teacher associations, the American Red Cross, and similar organizations.

Evacuee food.

Among the complaints listed as reasons for this subcommittee's investigation is the charge that--

the Japanese evacuees were being supplied food through the Quartermaster Corps of the Army in greater variety and quantity than was available to the average American consumer.

This charge is repeated in the report of the majority members but it is not brought out that the evidence received before the subcommittee completely rebutted the charge. The facts which the subcommittee's investigators established and which were borne out by other testimony received by the subcommittee are these:

1. All rationing restrictions applicable to the general public are strictly applied in relocation centers.
2. Food costs have averaged about 40 cents per day per person and are subject to a top limit of 45 cents per day per person on an annual basis.
3. Director Myer testified, without contradiction, to the effect that the centers are instructed to refrain from purchasing commodities of which there are general or local shortages.
4. Within the limitations set by rationing and the 45-cent daily cash allowance, the authority has provided an adequate diet meeting reasonable wartime standards.

Discipline in relocation centers.

Another of the complaints listed as reasons for the subcommittee's investigation was the charge that--

the discipline in the various relocation centers was very lax and that considerable Government property had been destroyed by some of the Japanese.

No specific comment is made concerning this complaint in the majority's reports.

Actually, the evidence produced before the subcommittee indicated that there was much less crime of any kind in the relocation centers than in the average American community of the same size. By and large the evacuees have cooperated with the administration of the centers in maintaining order and discipline. Considering the emotional and social demoralization involved in evacuation, the conduct of the evacuees has been exemplary. The evidence indicates that ordinary crime at the centers has been negligible.

Manzanar gangs.

In the majority's report considerable space is given to certain activities attributed to the Blood Brothers Corps at Manzanar. Two statements are necessary in reference to this discussion. In the first place, it should be pointed out that the War Relocation Authority did, according to the evidence presented to the subcommittee, take rather effective action in handling these gangs. An isolation center was established and the gang leaders were transferred to that place. At present it appears that activities such as those of the Manzanar gangs have been eliminated. Secondly, the evidence concerning existence of the Blood Brothers Corps is very indefinite. No one has been discovered who belonged to the supposed organization and the only evidence of its existence consists of certain apparently anonymous letters purporting to be written by a member of the corps. The point is that very little worth-while evidence is actually available on the existence of a Blood Brothers Corps. The evidence indicates that Manzanar probably had more troubles than any of the other relocation centers but the evidence also indicates that the sources of trouble there have now been eliminated.

Segregation.

In the majority's report the War Relocation Authority is severely criticized for not having entered upon a program of segregating disloyal evacuees from the great majority who are loyal before public hearings before this subcommittee had revealed the urgent need for segregation. Actually the facts are that on May 14, 1943, at a press conference in Washington, Director Myer announced the program of segregation and the announcement was given newspaper publicity. This was before the hearings of this subcommittee were begun and long before the United States Senate adopted the resolution referred to in the majority's report. Furthermore, Director Myer had in April written a letter to Senator A. B. Chandler, chairman of the Subcommittee on Japanese War Relocation Centers of the Senate Committee

on Military Affairs, in which letter he stated that a program for such segregation was being worked out. Senator Chandler gave this letter to the press shortly afterward.

Had it been physically possible to make a fair determination immediately at the outset of the establishment of the relocation centers as to the loyalty or disloyalty of each evacuee, many of the difficulties of the War Relocation Authority would have been eliminated.

Nevertheless, I believe that the War Relocation Authority could and should have speeded up the plan for segregation more than it did. I feel that the actual movement of segregants should have been initiated more quickly. It is true that intelligent determinations on the loyalty of more than 100,000 people cannot be made in a week or a month and the War Relocation Authority's efforts to be fairly certain in its determinations are commendable. However, many of the evacuees who were known to be disloyal could have been moved out of the regular relocation centers sooner than was done. A certain amount of criticism on this point is therefore justified.

The legal aspects of the relocation program.

The constitutional difficulty of confining citizens not charged with any crime is not discussed in the majority's report. Legality of such detention becomes increasingly difficult to sustain when it involves citizens of the United States against whom no charges of disloyalty or subversiveness have been made, particularly, if the detention continues for a period longer than the minimum time necessary for ascertainment of the facts. The principal justification for detaining citizen evacuees in relocation centers is that such detention is merely a temporary and qualified detention. They are detained until they can be sifted with regard to their sympathies in the war and until jobs can be found for them in communities where they will be accepted.

Such action may be sustained as an incident to an orderly relocation program, but any unqualified detention for the duration of the war of loyal citizens would be so vulnerable to attack in court as to imperil the entire relocation and detention program. That the leave regulations are legally necessary is emphasized by a recent decision of the Federal court for the northern district of California which dismissed a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought by an evacuee, on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted her administrative remedies by applying to the War Relocation Authority for leave (In re Endo).

In Hirabayashi v. United States, decided on June 21, 1943, the United States Supreme Court heard an appeal by a citizen of Japanese descent who had been sentenced concurrently on two counts: First, for violation of curfew regulations, and secondly, for failure to report for evacuation. The Court sustained the conviction solely upon the basis of the curfew count and avoided consideration of the conviction on the evacuation count. The natural inference that the Court found it comparatively easy to uphold the curfew, while encountering comparative difficulty in determining the legality of the evacuation, is reenforced by passages in concurring opinions by Mr.

Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Douglas. Mr. Justice Murphy, in his concurring opinion, said of the curfew orders:

In my opinion this goes to the very brink of constitutional power.

Since the detention accompanying the evacuation is a more drastic restriction of liberty than the mere evacuation itself, there is even more reason for the opinion that such detention is to be justified under the Constitution only if it is carefully limited with all possible respect to the rights of citizens in the current emergency. The legal problems of detaining citizens cannot be disregarded by the governmental agency responsible for administering the leave program.

It is apparent that the leave program of the War Relocation Authority has been formulated with a thoughtful view toward assuring the legality of the Authority's program as a whole, and it is probable that without the leave program the whole detention plan might well be subjected to successful legal attack. That this protection against such attack has been set up and put into effective operation, thus giving greater assurance of the continued detention of those who under the program are not entitled to leave, is a fact for which the Authority is definitely to be commended.

Leave program for the War Relocation Authority.

A principal object of the War Relocation Authority's leave program, it seems, is the separation of evacuees believed to be loyal to Japan from those loyal to the United States. This is the same thing substantially as the segregation program. The best way to segregate the disloyal from the loyal is to relocate the loyal in normal life. That is what the leave program is designed to achieve. This takes time, however. It seems unfair to the loyal, in the meantime, to allow them to be confused in the public mind with the disloyal, therefore, segregation should be and is being undertaken as a separate program. As soon as segregation is completed it seems that the leave program itself for the loyal evacuees should be substantially speeded up.

Administration of leave program.

On October 1, 1942, the present basic leave regulations of the War Relocation Authority became effective, on publication in the Federal Register. They provide that any evacuee citizen or alien may request indefinite leave from a relocation center. To support the request, the evacuee must show that he has a job or can take care of himself, must agree to report changes of address to the War Relocation Authority, and must have a record indicating that he will not endanger the national security. In addition, the War Relocation Authority must satisfy itself that the community in which the evacuee proposes to relocate will accept him without difficulty.

Much of the substance of the majority's report is concerned with the problems of releasing evacuees from relocation centers. The essential question raised by the report is whether or not the War Relocation Authority

has exercised reasonable precautions and careful judgment in determining which evacuees shall be granted leave. The majority's report concludes that it has not. As evidence for its conclusion, it relies chiefly upon two arguments: (1) 23 evacuees who have been given leave from the centers may be dangerous because they had some connection with an allegedly subversive organization known as Butoku-kai; (2) the present procedures of the Authority do not provide sufficient checks on the record of individuals released.

As to the first of these arguments, the majority's report does not allege that these 23 members of the Butoku-kai are subversive or dangerous, but does state that--

The release of these 23 Japanese is evidence of the incompetence of the War Relocation Authority to exercise proper safeguards both for the national security and for the thousands of loyal Japanese as well.

In a letter dated July 16, 1943, to this subcommittee, Director Myer gave specific information concerning the circumstances under which leave was granted to these 23 persons. It was brought out that, as to 16 of the 23, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had records which disclosed no report or derogatory information. As to 5 of them, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had no records whatever. One was released for school work under an agreement with military intelligence. One, an alien, was paroled, under the regular sponsor parolee agreement prescribed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice. That accounts for all 23 of them. Director Myer states that no evidence was given to the Authority either from the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other agency that any one of these 23 persons was dangerous or subversive.

Leave clearance procedure.

The second major argument advanced in the majority's report in support of its strong condemnation of the leave clearance procedures followed by the War Relocation Authority is that procedures have recently been so liberalized as to remove certain essential safeguards. It is stated that while originally the Authority made what is called a home check and a name check and all leave clearance was granted by the Director in Washington, since April 1943 project directors have been authorized to "make their own determination (with certain limitations)" as to the release for indefinite leave of an evacuee and that the home check and the name check have been eliminated. ("Name check" is the term used by the subcommittee to describe the process of securing such information as is available in the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation before granting leave to an individual.)

This statement is misleading in three respects. In the first place, "the certain limitations" are extremely important in that they withhold the right of the project director to grant leave to the following categories of people:

1. Evacuees who answered no or gave a qualified answer to the loyalty question during the Army registration.
2. Repatriates and expatriates.
3. Paroled aliens.
4. Shinto priests.
5. Those whose leave clearance has been suspended by the Director.

These categories include all evacuees about whom there is generally reason to have doubt. That these "certain limitations" are in force is established both by the provisions of the Administrative Instruction (No. 22) given in evidence, and by the direct testimony of Director Myer before the subcommittee.

In the second place, in discussing checks made on loyalty of evacuees applying for indefinite leave, the majority's report mentions a home check and a name check, but does not mention the check-up made at the project. Director Myer testified that such a check-up is regularly made. The project staff is in a position to know a good deal about the evacuees.

In the third place, the statement is made in the majority's report that on April 2, the War Relocation Authority further liberalized its release program by eliminating the Federal Bureau of Investigation name check. The evidence indicates that the Federal Bureau of Investigation name check has not been eliminated, but rather that all names of evacuee adults are being submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has almost completed its check on all the evacuees. As soon as a derogatory report is received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation on one of the individuals, the project director is notified and is instructed not to grant leave to the individual in question.

Japanese-Americans in the civil service.

The majority's report intimates that the War Relocation Authority has set up a plan to place hundreds of Nisei in civil service employment of the Federal Government and it describes, under the heading "An Indefensible Release Procedure," one case in which an attempt was made to secure civil service rating for a Nisei. In response to my inquiry, the following letter was received:

War Relocation Authority,
Office of the Director,
Washington, August 18, 1943.

Hon. Herman P. Eberharter,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Eberharter: I am glad to respond to your telephone request for information concerning the investigation made by the War Relocation Authority before issuing indefinite leave to the person named in a letter sent by Mr. Elmer L. Shirrell, a relocation supervisor of the Authority, to the director of the seventh region of the United States Civil Service Commission on

May 26, 1943. The person referred to in the letter is Mary Nakasuji.

Mary Nakasuji applied to the War Relocation Authority for leave clearance in November 1942. A check of the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was made on December 12, 1942, which indicated that the records contained no information on the applicant. Reports were secured by the project internal security officer and by the evacuee's immediate employment supervisor at the center. Both reports were strongly favorable.

A letter received from a Mr. George M. Osborne, 4693 Alice Street, San Diego, Calif., dated December 31, 1942, states:

"I have known Mary and members of her family for several years. I sincerely believe her to be a very good American citizen. We know she is of Christian faith and has demonstrated to the utmost her democratic views regarding American ideals and our American standard of living. I highly recommend her as to character."

After considering the results of the name check, results of the check of the Federal Bureau of Investigation record, project report, and this letter of endorsement, this applicant was granted leave clearance on January 20, 1943. She left the Granada relocation center on March 13, worked as a secretary and bookkeeper in the Young Men's Christian Association at 19 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, and on June 6 went to work with the Roberts Manufacturing Co. at an increased salary. She is still employed there. Reports on her work are favorable. She has not yet taken a civil-service examination, but has filled out Standard Form 57 in order that her eligibility for civil service may be determined.

On July 2, 1943, the Japanese-American Joint Board concurred in the granting of indefinite leave to Miss Nakasuji.

If you would like any further information concerning this case, or any other aspect of our work, please do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely,

D. S. Myer, Director.

In view of the facts, I believe the letter written by the relocation supervisor seems fully justified in this case.

It is unfortunate that the majority's report should have relied so heavily upon a mistaken interpretation of the facts in this case when the true facts would have been readily available.

Conduct of evacuees who have been granted leave.

It is worthy of note that of all the evacuees who have been released on both seasonal and indefinite leave by the War Relocation Authority, numbering more than 16,000, no report of disloyal or subversive activity has been made to the Authority or to this subcommittee.

Moreover, among the Japanese-American population numbering 290,000 in the continental United States and Hawaii, only 32 percent of whom are in relocation centers, there have been no established cases of sabotage while there are thousands of cases of loyal workers in industry, agriculture, and in the armed forces of the United States.

When proper weight is given to the importance of preserving democratic and constitutional principles in the treatment of the Japanese-American population with, at the same time, proper regard for national security, it is evident that the relocation centers and the outside relocation program are being administered efficiently and well.

The recommendations of the majority report.

I have already commented on how mild the recommendations of the majority report seem after the severe language of its findings.

I agree fully with the first recommendation, that segregation of the disloyal should be put into effect at once. As I have said, I believe the War Relocation Authority should have moved faster on this than they did, although it is not an easy thing to distinguish the loyal from the disloyal among 100,000 persons.

The subcommittee's second recommendation is that a new board be established, made up of representatives of the War Relocation Authority and the various Intelligence agencies of the Federal Government to investigate evacuees who apply for release from the centers and to pass finally upon their applications. The subcommittee's investigations have made clear that there has always been close cooperation between Army Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, and the War Relocation Authority. The War Relocation Authority has always had access to the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I do not see any necessity for establishing still another board. I do not see that the results would be any different than they are now since the records of all these Intelligence agencies are now available to the War Relocation Authority. Such a board would simply divide responsibility among a number of agencies, and then no one person or agency could be held responsible for results.

There is nothing in the record of leave clearance granted by the War Relocation Authority that justifies the setting up of a board to take over this function. Moreover, it seems pretty clear that the agency of the Government charged with the detention of citizens, particularly those to whom leave is denied, should be the agency which makes the actual determination to grant or deny leave in individual cases. In short, the granting of leave is an essential part of the legal basis for detention and should not be separated from the administration of relocation centers.

No recommendation for the establishment of such a board as is recommended by the subcommittee majority was made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, or the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.

The third and last recommendation of the majority's report is in favor of a thoroughgoing program of Americanization for Japanese who remain in centers. Of course I am in favor of that; everybody is in favor of Americanization just as everybody is against sin. Of course I am sure the majority members of the subcommittee would not want to push this idea so far that they will turn these camps into a "social experiment."

Mr. Myer testified that there is a great deal of Americanization work going on in the centers. The schools are active in this work, and many of the younger people are members of Future Farmers of America, The Red Cross, the Boy and Girl Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, and similar agencies. Adult English classes are provided for hundreds of aliens.

Certainly, we would need an extraordinarily intensive Americanization program for loyal American citizens who are detained in seeming contradiction of American principles and the "four freedoms." Certainly, also, the best way to push Americanization of this group is for the War Relocation Authority to go ahead with its program of restoring full freedom of movement to the loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry and the law-abiding aliens who are now in relocation centers.

I believe the War Relocation Authority should complete its segregation program, should continue its Americanization program, and should, by all means, go ahead with its resettlement program.

Summation.

It is my conclusion that, considering the magnitude of its job, the difficulty of the legal issues involved, and the complexity and delicacy of the problem of resettling a large group of people in the midst of a war, the War Relocation Authority has acted, by and large, efficiently and capably, and has carried out the spirit and intent of the President's Executive order under which it was established. I think it is better to let the War Relocation Authority carry on unhampered by unfair criticism.

Respectfully submitted.

Herman P. Eberharter