SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT

January 1 to June 30

1944

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington, D. C.

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AVERAGE RELOCATION CENTER POPULATION BY MONTHS
JANUARY - JUNE 1944

CENTER	JAN.	FEB.	MAR.	APR.	MAY	JUNE
TOTAL	92,516	91,430	89,982	88,545	85,923	82,536
Central Utah	7,243	7,182	7,074	6,897	6,622	6,315
Colorado River	13,642	13,460	13,109	12,887	12,563	12,022
Gila River	9,695	9,596	9,372	9,154	8,856	8,947
Granada	6,855	6,682	6,491	6,358	6,191	5,835
Heart Mountain	9,714	9,593	9,441	9,200	8,813	8,984
Jerome	6,599	6,504	6,406	6,390	5,845	2,753
Manzanar	8,461	7,993	6,442	6,335	5,927	5,567
Minidoka	8,912	8,784	8,549	8,333	7,799	7,250
Rohwer	6,521	6,390	6,214	6,070	5,469	6,204
Tule Lake	14,874	15,246	16,884	16,921	17,838	18,659

Source: Form WRA-176, Daily Evacuee Population Summary

War Relocation Authority
Statistics Section

AVERAGE EMIGRATION DURING POPULATION BY MONTHS
JANUARY - JUNE 1944

CENTER	JAN.	FEB.	MAR.	APR.	MAY	JUNE
TOTAL	82,316	81,450	85,982	88,546	86,023	83,556
Central Utah	1,243	1,182	1,074	1,097	1,022	1,316
Colorado River	13,622	13,460	13,105	12,897	12,062	12,028
Gila River	5,995	5,866	5,372	5,164	4,828	5,947
Granada	6,855	6,622	6,491	6,368	6,181	5,855
Heart Mountain	9,714	9,595	9,441	9,300	9,318	9,964
Jerome	6,002	6,204	6,405	6,320	5,948	4,158
Manzanar	5,421	7,995	6,442	6,316	5,927	5,927
Minidoka	8,312	8,764	8,862	8,332	7,759	7,260
Rohwer	6,231	6,350	6,214	6,070	5,865	5,204
Tule Lake	14,874	15,242	16,884	16,921	17,638	16,659

Source: Form WRA-176, Daily Evacuee Population Summary

War Relocation Authority
Statistical Section

SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT
January 1 - June 30, 1944

SUMMARY

The most significant single event in the program of the War Relocation Authority, during the first six months of 1944, was the transfer of the agency, on February 16, by an Executive Order of the President, from the status of an independent war agency to the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior. This transfer resulted in no changes either in the general program or in the personnel of the War Relocation Authority. Its principal effect was to make available to the agency the resources of a Cabinet Department in dealing with the major problems involved in relocating the evacuated people of Japanese descent.

Other events that high-lighted the period were (1) the transfer of the physical equipment and personnel of the Colorado River Relocation Center from the Office of Indian Affairs to the War Relocation Authority on January 1, (2) the release of Tule Lake from emergency Army control on January 14, (3) the announcement by the War Department, on January 20, that Selective Service inductions of Nisei into the Army were to be resumed, (4) the announcement by the President, on June 9, that the War Relocation Authority was to administer the Emergency Refugee Shelter at Oswego, New York, and (5) the closing of the Jerome Relocation Center on June 30.

The period was, in the main, a quiet one in comparison with the periods that preceded it. There were no major disturbances in any of the relocation centers, though the resumption of Selective Service for Nisei aroused some apprehension and resistance among the residents at a few of the centers. Attacks on the WRA program and on the evacuees, aimed especially at the Tule Lake population, continued to be made by various newspapers and organizations. In some sections of the West Coast, a campaign to inflame race prejudice against Japanese Americans, and to prevent them from returning to their former homes gained fresh impetus from the widespread publicization of the Tule Lake incident. But no new or particularly nettlesome charges were made.

The acceptance of the evacuees in the communities where they relocated was generally good. There were a few incidents, however, that attracted considerable attention. In New York City, resistance developed to the establishment of an evacuee hostel by a church organization in Brooklyn, but was overcome by the efforts and influence of individuals and organizations cooperating in the WRA program. Other incidents involving small groups of evacuee farm laborers occurred in New Jersey, Delaware, and North Carolina, and in two midwestern communities, one in Iowa and one in Nebraska. The general reaction of the country at large, however, was distinctly critical of these communities and favorable toward the evacuees.

In many ways, a noteworthy improvement in public sentiment toward the evacuees was becoming increasingly evident, owing largely to the outstanding record of Nisei troops in action on the Italian front. Even the bitterest enemies of the Japanese Americans, who had previously condemned them without exception, were compelled to admit that the members of the 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442nd Combat Team were amply proving themselves to be worthy of recognition as good Americans. The opposing tide of tolerance and fair play

was definitely rising against the torrent of racist propaganda and distortion regarding evacuees that had previously been spread across wide sections of the country.

THE RELOCATION PROGRAM

The period was a notable one in the relocation program not only for the volume of relocation accomplished but also because of the new resettlement policies and procedures which were introduced. During the half year approximately 10,000 evacuees left the centers on indefinite leave to resettle throughout the country. This was larger than the total for any previous semi-annual period and brought the grand total of relocation to slightly less than 27,000 on July 1.

Most important among the operational developments were the following:

1. A shift away from the practice of concentrating on specific job offers toward greater emphasis on "community invitations."

2. A greater reliance on cooperating committees and other agencies, public and private, to provide for the emergency needs of the resettlers, and to assist them in planning for long-term adjustment.

3. The institution of a family interviewing and counseling program at the centers.

4. The organization of systematic procedures for channeling information from the field to the relocation centers, and between the field offices and the Washington office.

At the start of the relocation program, emphasis had been placed on securing job offers for the evacuees while they were still residing in the centers. Many offers were obtained, but for several reasons the evacuees were reluctant to accept them. One reason was that many of the jobs were not the kind they wanted, or that they were trained and experienced to fill. Another reason was reluctance to accept employment without meeting the prospective employers in advance and learning, from first-hand observation, the character and conditions of the jobs that had been offered, as well as the housing possibilities and the type and attitude of the community. Too often, even when the evacuees accepted offers, they stayed on the jobs only a short time before switching to other employment and other locations. It became obvious that a new approach was needed to these relocation problems.

To meet the situation, the relocation officers in the field were instructed to cease sending to the centers long lists of job offers, which were often more confusing than helpful, and to prepare, instead, brief summaries of employment opportunities in the areas where they were assigned to duty, emphasizing information about the abundance or scarcity of certain kinds of opportunities, the attitudes of the communities, and the availability of housing. They were directed to give more attention to the development of community acceptance and to build local volunteer committees to the point where evacuees, arriving on the basis of community invitation, would be able, with

the assistance of these committees, to find their own jobs, housing, and other essentials of adjustment after their arrival in the new community. Advance planning was continued only when specific cases, such as health problems, demanded it, or when community acceptance was not well enough known.

The new relocation policy called for shifting as much responsibility as possible to voluntary cooperating committees and other agencies. In the area offices in Chicago, Cleveland, and New York City, relocation adjustment advisers were appointed to assist the district officers in organizing community support and making use of local resources. Especially helpful in the organization of cooperating committees were the churches, which have always supported the relocation program. By the end of the first six months in 1944, cooperating committees were functioning not only in every middle-western and eastern community where a relocation officer was stationed, but in a number of other communities as well, including Madison, Wisconsin; Peoria, and Rockford, Illinois; Grand Rapids and Ann Arbor, Michigan, and Dayton, Ohio.

The functions of the cooperating committees were to foster favorable community sentiment, and to assist the resettlers in adjusting themselves to normal community life. Insofar as possible, they were to help arrivals from the centers to find acceptable employment and housing, and to develop social and recreational opportunities for them. In addition, they were asked to cooperate in the development of plans to accelerate the relocation of families and older people.

Two devices were used to provide temporary residence for the resettlers while they were looking for employment. In various cities special hostels, operated by cooperating groups, were open to resettlers until they could find more permanent residence. Two new hostels--in Brooklyn (for New York City), and in Philadelphia--were opened during the first six months of 1944 to add to the five already functioning--in Chicago, Detroit, Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Des Moines. In other cities arrangements were made with YMCA's and YWCA's, settlement houses, and churches to make quarters available to the resettlers.

From the Washington office, arrangements were made with the Travelers Aid Society and the Family Welfare Association of America to provide the cooperation of their branch offices and affiliated agencies in virtually all large communities where relocation activities were in progress. Other relationships, previously established with public and private agencies, were reviewed and modified, where necessary, to tie them more closely into the relocation program. Among them were agreements with the Federal Security Agency and the National Housing Administration.

The financial and advisory services available to resettlers were broadened, including RFC and FSA loans. For those needing emergency financial or medical assistance, other arrangements were made, principally through the resettlement assistance program administered by local welfare agencies under the direction of the Social Security Board. In every instance where it was requested, the assistance was adequate to the need, even in several rather serious cases involving chronic illness.

At the relocation centers, welfare counsellors and relocation advisers were assigned to interview families for the purpose of analyzing individual

or family relocation problems and gathering information which would help the WRA to plan its future operations. By the end of the period, approximately 6,500 families had been interviewed, and the substance of the interviews had been reported to Washington for review and analysis. The program was proceeding systematically, and was aimed to reach all families in the centers by the end of the year.

Another development at the centers was the enlargement of evacuee participation in the relocation program. The need for more effective evacuee participation had been recognized before the outset of 1944, but not a great deal had been done about getting it organized. By June 30, however, relocation planning commissions, composed of evacuee representatives, had been organized at most of the centers, and were exercising an important influence not only in the day-to-day planning of relocation activities, but also in gaining acceptance for the program among the evacuee residents. These evacuee commissions were especially helpful in disseminating information about specific relocation opportunities and interpreting WRA policies. At several centers, they sponsored the interviewing program, and recommended several important changes in policy to stimulate wider interest in resettlement.

To encourage the relocation of families, several significant modifications were made in the leave assistance program:

1. The limitation was removed on the weight of personal property which relocating families could have shipped at Government expense.

2. Shipment at Government expense was authorized for the equipment, tools, and fixtures essential to an evacuee's trade, business, or profession (not to exceed 5,000 pounds), when replacing them in the area of relocation was unfeasible because of wartime shortages.

3. Pullman accommodations were made available for the sick and infirm going to relocate with their families.

4. Coach fares were authorized for the representatives of groups of evacuees selected for the purpose of making final investigations of relocation opportunities, when such trips were approved by the relocation officers concerned.

In the relocation field offices, as well as in the Washington office and at the centers, special efforts were made to get more families and older people to relocate. Evacuees already relocated were encouraged to plan with counsellors from social agencies and the WRA for the resettlement of their families and friends.

Another new measure to induce resettlement by persons hesitating to break their ties with the centers was introduced in March by the authorization of a new type of leave, designated as indefinite leave, trial period. Under its provisions, an evacuee eligible for relocation was permitted to accept outside employment for a trial period of four months, during which return to the center was prohibited. At the expiration of the period, however, he was given two additional months in which he might return to the center of his former residence if he failed to make a satisfactory adjustment in his new

environment. On the other hand, if he wished to convert his trial leave to a full indefinite status, he was given the privilege of applying for a leave assistance grant without returning to the center.

In February, the seasonal leave program, which had been instituted in the spring of 1942, was modified to provide for the issuance of seasonal leave only to persons recruited for agricultural work through the War Food Administration, and employment was authorized only in counties approved by WRA relocation officers. Previously, a good many evacuees--especially young men--had been showing a disposition to favor seasonal leave as more desirable than indefinite leave. Each season, after several weeks of outside employment at good wages, they would return to the centers with enough money to satisfy their incidental needs until another harvest season arrived; they were reluctant to apply for indefinite leave under terms that made more difficult a return to the centers and the resumption of living at Government expense.

The competition among agricultural employers for seasonal workers from the centers had also presented a troublesome problem. Even at the outset, the supply of available workers was never sufficient to meet the total demand, and, as the employable population of the centers dwindled through relocation, the inadequacy of the supply became more acute.

The new policy provided better controls over the seasonal leave program, and facilitated the systematic granting of leaves to meet critical manpower shortages. It was not possible, however, to supply enough workers to satisfy all the calls that were made for them.

During the first half of 1944, ten district offices were closed, and four new offices were opened. Two of the new offices were established in Savannah and New Orleans to pioneer the development of relocation opportunities in the South.

In April, a relocation conference was held in Chicago, with members of the Washington office, the area supervisors, and relocation program officers from the centers in attendance. The conference emphasized the necessity for family relocation and the need to plan for it both in the centers and in the field. It also showed that the evacuees needed a program of re-orientation for life outside the centers, both prior to leaving the center and after their arrival in a new community.

The rate of relocation rose fairly steadily from the first of the year to its highest point for the period, the week of June 18, when 657 persons left the centers, a higher proportion being Issei than had been true in the past. Appreciable gains were made in all the relocation areas. The greatest increase was made in the Middle Atlantic area, where more than 1,500 evacuees were living by June 30. Strong gains were also made in the Central, North Central, and Great Lakes areas. In the Intermountain and Great Plains areas, new relocation was discouraged but considerable population gains resulted from family members going to join other members who had already relocated.

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF TOTAL EVACUEES, BY MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION IN 1942
WHO WERE ON INDEFINITE LEAVE, JUNE 1, 1944, BY NATIVITY

Note: Occupational classification in both cases refers to U.S.E.S. Classification, fully qualified or entry, assigned in 1942.

MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION	ALL EVACUEES			RELOCATED EVACUEES					
				Number			Percent of Orig. Classif.		
	TOTAL	American Born	Foreign Born	TOTAL	American Born	Foreign Born	TOTAL	American Born	Foreign Born
TOTAL	110,442	73,353	37,089	1/24,146	20,447	3,699	21.9	27.9	10.0
Agricultural, Fishery, & Forestry	24,495	10,543	13,952	4,738	3,668	1,070	19.3	34.8	7.7
Clerical and Sales	10,836	9,013	1,823	4,204	3,960	244	38.8	43.9	13.4
Professional and Managerial	10,002	4,513	5,489	2,956	2,288	668	29.6	50.7	12.2
Service	8,827	4,631	4,196	2,340	1,844	496	26.5	39.8	11.8
Semi-Skilled Worker	6,278	4,024	2,254	1,568	1,365	203	25.0	33.9	9.0
Skilled Worker	3,259	1,754	1,505	943	773	170	28.9	44.1	11.3
Unskilled Worker	1,550	720	830	325	275	50	21.0	38.2	6.0
No Occupational Classification	45,195	38,155	7,040	6,485	5,801	684	14.3	15.2	9.7
Unknown Classification /2	0	0	0	587	473	114	-	-	-

1/ Difference from 24,415, total number of evacuees reported by centers as being on indefinite leave, June 1, 1944, due to omission of cases queried to centers because of discrepancies in records.

2/ Refers to relocated evacuees for whom WRA-26 Records were not received prior to April 1943 when records were coded and occupational classification assigned.

Source: Data for all evacuees: Estimated from approximately 25 percent sample (27,142) of Individual Records, Form WRA-26, for ten relocation centers.
Data for relocated evacuees: Forms WRA-177 and 178.

War Relocation Authority
Statistics Section

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MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION AS OF 1942
FOR TOTAL EVACUEES AND RELOCATED EVACUEES, JUNE 1, 1944, BY NATIVITY
Number and Percent/1

Note: Occupational Classification refers to U.S.E.S. Classifications, fully qualified or entry, assigned in 1942.

MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION	ALL EVACUEES 1942			RELOCATED EVACUEES 6-1-44		
	TOTAL	American Born	Foreign Born	TOTAL	American Born	Foreign Born
TOTAL	110,442	73,353	37,089	2/24,146	20,447	3,699
Agricultural, Fishery, and Forestry	24,495	10,543	13,952	4,738	3,668	1,070
Clerical and Sales	10,836	9,013	1,823	4,204	3,960	244
Professional and Managerial	10,002	4,513	5,489	2,956	2,288	668
Service	8,827	4,631	4,196	2,340	1,844	496
Semi-skilled Worker	6,278	4,024	2,254	1,568	1,365	203
Skilled Worker	3,259	1,754	1,505	943	773	170
Unskilled Worker	1,550	720	830	325	275	50
No Occupational Classification	45,195	38,155	7,040	6,485	5,801	684
Unknown Classification/3	0	0	0	587	473	114
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Agricultural, Fishery, and Forestry	22.2	14.4	37.6	20.1	18.4	29.9
Clerical and Sales	9.8	12.3	4.9	17.9	19.8	6.8
Professional and Managerial	9.1	6.1	14.8	12.5	11.5	18.6
Service	8.0	6.3	11.3	9.9	9.2	13.8
Semi-Skilled Worker	5.7	5.5	6.1	6.7	6.8	5.7
Skilled Worker	2.9	2.4	4.1	4.0	3.9	4.7
Unskilled Worker	1.4	1.0	2.2	1.4	1.4	1.4
No Occupational Classification	40.9	52.0	19.0	27.5	29.0	19.1
Unknown Classification/3	-	-	-	-	-	-

1/ Percent based on totals excluding "Unknown Classification."
2/ Difference from 24,415, total number of evacuees reported by centers as being on indefinite leave, June 1, 1944, due to omission of cases queried to centers because of discrepancies in records.
3/ Refers to relocated evacuees for whom WRA-26 Records were not received prior to April 1943 when Records were coded and occupational classification assigned.

Source: Data for All Evacuees: Estimated from approximately 25 percent sample (27,142) of Individual Records, Form WRA-26 for ten Relocation Centers.
Data for Relocated Evacuees: Forms WRA-177 and 178.

War Relocation Authority
Statistics Section

MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION AS OF 1942

FOR TOTAL EVACUEES AND RELOCATED EVACUEES, MAY 1, 1944, BY ACTIVITY

Number and Percent[1]

Note: Occupational Classification refers to U.S.E.S. Classification, fully qualified or worker, employed in 1942.

MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION	ALL EVACUEES 1942			RELOCATED EVACUEES 8-1-44		
	TOTAL	Americans Born	Foreign Born	TOTAL	Americans Born	Foreign Born
TOTAL	110,442	72,326	37,080	34,140	20,647	13,493
Agricultural, Fishery, and Forestry	25,625	10,363	15,262	6,736	3,888	2,872
Clerical and Sales	10,338	8,513	1,825	4,204	3,980	224
Professional and Managerial	10,002	8,232	1,770	3,298	2,890	408
Service	8,847	6,651	2,196	2,840	1,984	856
Semi-skilled Worker	8,270	6,664	1,606	1,986	1,586	400
Skilled Worker	3,259	1,756	1,503	942	772	170
Unskilled Worker	1,360	750	610	338	278	60
No Occupational Classification	43,142	33,797	7,040	2,496	2,099	396
Unknown Classification[2]	0	0	0	587	475	112
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Agricultural, Fishery, and Forestry	23.2	14.4	42.2	20.1	18.8	21.3
Clerical and Sales	9.4	11.8	4.9	12.3	19.3	1.6
Professional and Managerial	9.1	8.1	4.8	9.7	13.8	3.0
Service	8.0	9.2	5.9	8.3	9.6	6.3
Semi-skilled Worker	7.5	9.2	4.3	5.8	7.7	2.9
Skilled Worker	2.9	2.4	4.0	2.8	3.7	1.2
Unskilled Worker	1.2	1.0	1.6	1.0	1.3	0.4
No Occupational Classification	39.0	46.7	18.9	7.3	10.2	2.9
Unknown Classification[2]	-	-	-	1.7	2.3	.8

1/ Percent based on totals excluding "Unknown Classifications."

2/ Differences from 24,414, total number of evacuees reported by workers as being on indefinite leave, June 1, 1944, due to minimum of cases varied to centers because of misreporters in records.

3/ Refers to relocated evacuees for whom 8-1-44 records were not received prior to April 1945 when records were coded and occupational classification assigned.

Source: Data for All Evacuees: Estimated from approximately 25 percent sample of (8,7,192) of individual records, Form WRA-26 for ten Relocation Centers.

War Relocation Authority
Statistics & Plans

Data for Relocated Evacuees: Forms WRA-17 and 17A.



LEAVE CLEARANCE

By January 1, 1944, the routine processing of leave clearance for citizens of Japanese ancestry had been virtually completed. Thereafter, the emphasis was placed on an early completion of project hearings for a considerable number of evacuees whose cases required special hearings to determine their loyalty status before their eligibility for release from the relocation centers could be established. Although the beginning of the period saw this work well under way, a great volume of hearings remained to be held at the centers and to be reviewed in Washington before final action could be taken by the Director. As an administrative instrument of the office of the Director, the Leave Clearance Review Committee in Washington was charged with the responsibility of establishing criteria for evaluating the information contained in the individual dockets and of making the recommendations for final action.

The findings of the Review Committee had a direct bearing on two broad phases of the WRA program: (1) It directly assisted in the relocation of evacuees eligible for relocation by rapidly clearing worthy cases and thus allowing them to leave the centers. (2) It was a means by which evacuees ineligible for relocation could be screened and segregated. Those whom the Review Committee found ineligible and whose leave was denied by the Director were scheduled for transfer to Tule Lake. If they could not be immediately transferred to Tule Lake they were ineligible to leave the relocation center, pending such transfer.

It was necessary to accelerate the work of the Review Committee for a period previous to the final segregation movement in April and May. The aim was to review all cases that were pending so that action could be taken on them prior to this movement. This was particularly true of the cases from Jerome, as that center was scheduled to close in June and it was desirable to know the destination of all the residents.

Due to the large volume of cases which had accumulated and continued to come in it was deemed advisable to call in various key officials from the field offices and the centers to help the Washington staff in handling these dockets. This arrangement proved satisfactory, since it not only expedited the review of the cases but also permitted an exchange of viewpoints between the Washington office and the field personnel.

Although there was much work remaining to be done after June 30, the Section was in a position to evaluate the work that had been accomplished and to estimate what remained to be done before all work on leave clearance could be terminated.

Shown on next page, by centers, is the action taken by the Washington office on the cases which had had hearings at the projects. The figures are cumulative, up to and including June 30:

Project	Leave Clearance Authorized	Leave Clearance Denied	Total
Central Utah	865	13	878
Colorado River	805	191	996
Gila River	761	67	828
Granada	533	77	610
Ht. Mountain	894	142	1036
Jerome	756	282	1038
Manzanar	1032	253	1285
Minidoka	670	122	792
Rohwer	665	373	1038
Tule Lake	98	1	99
Total	7079	1521	8600

Summary of Cases Reviewed

Total final action cases.	8600
Total "deferred" action cases.	38
Total cases referred back for a re-hearing. . . .	435
Grand Total	9073

Early in the period the members of the Japanese American Joint Board (composed of representatives from the War Department, the Navy Department, and the War Relocation Authority) discussed the advisability of discontinuing its functions since its work was largely completed; on May 25, 1944, the Board was officially disestablished. Any remaining operational functions were taken over by the Provost Marshal General's Office.

Considerable assistance was given to the Coast Guard during this period in clearing Japanese Americans for service as seamen. Representatives from the Coast Guard consulted the leave clearance records almost daily and were enabled to compile a rather long list of seamen eligible for the merchant marine.

THE NISEI AND THE ARMED FORCES

The Secretary of War, on January 20, 1944, announced that American citizens of Japanese ancestry were again subject to involuntary induction through Selective Service procedures. Since the subject of the Nisei and the Army has been only briefly covered in previous reports, it might be well to give a summary of the events leading up to this announcement and the reasons for the change.

Army Service before January 20, 1944

Prior to December 7, 1941, several thousand American citizens of Japanese ancestry from both the Hawaiian Islands and the mainland of the United States had been inducted into the armed forces of the United States. After Pearl Harbor the War Department determined that no person of Japanese ancestry was acceptable for service, but made no formal statement to that effect. Such

War Relocation Authority
Statistics Section
Washington, D.C.

REPORTED ABSENCES ON LEAVE FROM RELOCATION CENTERS
BY TYPE OF LEAVE BY TWO WEEKS PERIODS
JANUARY 1 - JULY 1, 1944

DATE	TOTAL	SHORT-TERM	SEASONAL	INDEFINITE
January 1	20,188	433	2,825	16,930
January 15	20,644	517	2,707	17,420
January 29	21,159	567	2,606	17,986
February 12	21,753	667	2,532	18,554
February 26	22,532	739	2,627	19,166
March 11	23,285	841	2,548	19,896
March 25	23,950	898	2,410	20,642
April 8	24,720	953	2,359	21,408
April 22	25,603	1,007	2,477	22,119
May 6	26,777	1,079	2,864	22,834
May 20	28,422	1,202	3,581	23,639
June 3	30,322	1,236	4,320	24,766
June 17	32,442	1,451	4,947	26,044
July 1	33,797	1,362	5,446	26,989

Source: Weekly Telegraphic Reports.

LOCATION OF FORMER RESIDENTS OF RELOCATION CENTERS ON INDEFINITE LEAVE
BY REGIONS AND BY STATES FROM WHICH REPORTS RECEIVED
JANUARY 1 AND JULY 1, 1944

Note: Based on Change of Residence Cards received from evacuees. Excludes internees, institutionalized, repatriates, and Armed Forces. Departures to restricted areas of California, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona were under special permit issued by Western Defense Command.

REGION AND STATE	NUMBER REPORTED AS OF		INCREASE FROM 1-1-44 to 7-1-44	
	1-1-44	7-1-44	Number	Percent
TOTAL REPORTED	16,464	23,693	7,229	43.9
PACIFIC	731	1,227	496	67.9
California	34	35		
Oregon	253	430		
Washington	444	762		
MOUNTAIN	5,336	7,240	1,904	35.7
Arizona	57	67		
Colorado	2,118	2,967		
Idaho	862	1,332		
Montana	249	368		
Nevada	85	145		
New Mexico	37	51		
Utah	1,594	1,922		
Wyoming	334	388		
WEST NORTH CENTRAL	2,009	2,640	631	31.4
Iowa	272	373		
Kansas	79	112		
Minnesota	841	1,084		
Missouri	444	560		
Nebraska	327	456		
North Dakota	10	15		
South Dakota	36	40		
EAST NORTH CENTRAL	7,174	10,403	3,229	45.0
Illinois	4,146	6,064		
Indiana	136	164		
Michigan	1,213	1,748		
Ohio	1,436	2,067		
Wisconsin	243	360		
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL	178	207	29	16.3
Arkansas	30	26		
Louisiana	9	11		
Oklahoma	25	29		
Texas	114	141		
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL	97	115	18	18.6
Alabama		7		

LOCATION OF FORMER RESIDENTS OF RELOCATION CENTERS ON INDEFINITE LEAVE
BY REGIONS AND BY STATES FROM WHICH REPORTS RECEIVED
JANUARY 1 AND JULY 1, 1944

Note: Based on Change of Residence Cards received from evacuees. Excludes internees, institutionalized, repatriates, and Armed Forces. Departures to restricted areas of California, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona were under special permit issued by Western Defense Command.

REGION AND STATE	NUMBER REPORTED AS OF 1-1-44	NUMBER REPORTED AS OF 7-1-44	INCREASE FROM 1-1-44 TO 7-1-44 Number	INCREASE FROM 1-1-44 TO 7-1-44 Percent
Kentucky	19	25		
Mississippi	59	60		
Tennessee	18	23		
SOUTH ATLANTIC	144	271	127	88.2
Delaware	1	6		
District of Columbia	79	133		
Florida	2	9		
Georgia	4	7		
Maryland	33	74		
North Carolina	12	16		
Virginia	12	25		
West Virginia	1	1		
MIDDLE ATLANTIC	652	1,347	695	106.6
New Jersey	40	87		
New York	449	926		
Pennsylvania	163	334		
NEW ENGLAND	143	243	100	69.9
Connecticut	42	82		
Maine	4	3		
Massachusetts	91	146		
New Hampshire	3	3		
Rhode Island	1	7		
Vermont	2	2		

War Relocation Authority
Statistics Section

action was possible because, even though the Selective Service Act made citizens and aliens of certain ages liable for training and service in the armed forces of the United States, it provided at the same time that "no man shall be inducted for training and service . . . unless and until he is acceptable to the land or naval forces for such training and service and his physical and mental fitness for such training and service has been satisfactorily determined."

Since no formal statement had been made as to the acceptability of the Nisei (and Issei), the Selective Service boards continued to call them on the same basis as other registrants, but both Nisei and Issei were turned down at induction stations by the War Department. They were then classified as 4-F. Nevertheless, in some parts of the country, a few who were called or who volunteered at this time were accepted. Some local boards in California took it upon themselves to reclassify 1-A Nisei as 4-C.

Some of the Nisei who were already in the Army were simply given honorable discharges and sent home. Some were relieved of combat training and assigned to other duties. These two methods were followed mainly in the Pacific Coast area. In other regions Japanese American soldiers were assigned to their barracks for two or three days and then released to go about their duties as usual.

It was not until June 17, 1942, after all persons of Japanese ancestry had been evacuated from the West Coast and were either in relocation or assembly centers, that the War Department advised the Selective Service System that Japanese, or persons of Japanese extraction regardless of citizenship status, would not be accepted for service in the armed forces. Selective Service accordingly amended its regulations on September 12, 1942, to classify them in a deferred category. It was not deemed feasible to establish an entirely new class for them, since both Issei and Nisei together totalled only one-tenth of one per cent of the registrants in the United States. Moreover, to single them out in a class by themselves would have given the appearance of even greater discrimination. Accordingly all persons of Japanese descent were placed in class 4-C -- registrants not acceptable for training and service because of nationality or ancestry.

In the fall of 1942, however, it was decided to accept Nisei volunteers from relocation centers for special assignments. Many Nisei were anxious to fight for their country and resented the denial of that privilege, but the 160 who were taken at this time were recruited only for specific jobs as translators and Japanese language instructors. A larger number would have been taken had they proved themselves proficient in spoken and written Japanese. The Navy also recruited a number of Nisei for the same purposes but did not put them in uniform as did the Army.

Meanwhile, in June 1942, a unit of Nisei national guardsmen in Hawaii, many of whom had done creditable service during the attack on Pearl Harbor, were brought to the mainland and trained, as the 100th Battalion, at Camp McCoy in Wisconsin, and then at Camp Shelby in Mississippi. In August, 1943, they embarked for Africa and shortly thereafter joined in the invasion of Italy. Their story since then has become well known. They fought well and hard at

Salerno and in many of the fiercest battles of Italy and gained for themselves an enviable reputation as soldiers. As an outfit they have received a high percentage of Purple Hearts and many citations. The excellent morale, spirit, and fighting ability of this unit had very definite consequences.

On January 28, 1943, the Secretary of War announced that an all-Nisei combat team would be made up from volunteers from Hawaii and the mainland. Of this new policy President Roosevelt said:

> No loyal citizen of the United States should be denied the democratic right to exercise the responsibilities of his citizenship regardless of his ancestry. The principles on which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed is that Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry. . .
>
> (February 3, 1943)

In order to determine those who would be eligible for service in this combat team the "Army enlistment and leave clearance registration" was conducted during February and March of 1943 (See, Semi-Annual, Jan. 1 - June 30, 1943, pp.8-11). In April, 1943, the 442nd Combat Team, numbering about 4500, began training at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. The boys quickly won the respect of the officers who commanded them and they were invariably called "good soldiers." After a year of training they embarked, early in May, 1944, for Europe to join the 100th Battalion. They went into battle in Italy in June and again proved that Japanese Americans could fight as well for the country of their birth as any other American citizen.

WAC Enlistment

The WAC authorized enlistment of Nisei women on July 28, 1943, and shortly thereafter sent a recruting officer to visit the relocation centers. Actual induction of Nisei girls into the WAC began in November of that year.

The Announcement and its Implications

On December 18, 1943, the War Department, impressed by the "excellent showing" made by the 442nd Combat Team in training and by the "outstanding record" of the 100th Battalion on the Italian battle front, revised its policies to provide for the induction of Nisei through regular Selective Service procedures. This action was publicly announced by the Secretary of War on January 20, 1944. It had the effect of calling upon the Nisei to assume one of the highest obligations of American citizenship. Since that time, Japanese Americans at relocation centers and elsewhere, like other young Americans, have been subject to involuntary induction for Army service. Of this event Director Dillon Myer said:

> The announcement by the War Department that Nisei are to be inducted into the Army through the Selective Service System marks another significant step forward for American citizens of Japanese descent. It means that Japanese American soldiers now in the Army have performed their duties with high skill and courage, and that the valuable services rendered by such soldiers have been recognized.

The obligation to bear arms in defense of the nation is one of the essential elements of American citizenship. As increasing numbers of Nisei are called to assume that obligation, I feel confident that soldiers of Japanese ancestry in the Army will acquit themselves with distinction and that there will be widening public recognition of the status which all loyal and law-abiding residents of Japanese descent can and should enjoy in our national life.

It very soon became known, however, that there were certain specifications and restrictions which the War Department imposed upon the Nisei but which did not apply to other American young men: (1) The Nisei had to fill out Selective Service Form DSS 304A, a form made especially for them and very similar to that used for aliens(DSS Form 304). (2) The War Department reviewed the record of each individual Nisei and reserved the right to classify him as "acceptable" or "not acceptable." If he was considered "acceptable," his local board was directed to classify him in the same manner as any other American citizen. If adjusted "not acceptable" he was put in the 4-C classification. (3) It was understood that most of the Nisei inductees would be used as replacements in the Japanese American Combat Team, though some might be selected for other units and services, depending on their qualifications and the need. (4) It was understood that Nisei combat troops would not be sent to the Pacific theatre. These restrictions were considered discriminations by some of the evacuees.

Reaction of Evacuees

The announcement that Selective Service involuntary inductions had been resumed for the Nisei did not at first produce a strong reaction of any kind at the centers. It seems to have been taken largely as a statement of intent. Some young people welcomed the news as indicating the restoration of their citizenship status and all through the difficulties that followed in some centers, these young people continued to feel that it was only right and just for them to assume this obligation of citizenship. A large majority of the young men answered willingly when they were called. However, the general mood of the centers was one of wondering and questioning, of some discussion. The questioning took the form of asking why this sacrifice should be required of evacuees when many of the rights of citizenship had been denied them. Many of those most concerned, also, felt "let down" when they discovered that their classification and assignment would not be on the same basis as that of other citizens. The lack of any definite reaction in the beginning, and also the reactions that did come later, may be accredited in part to the comparative isolation of the centers; the center residents were out of contact with the normal currents of American thought; they realized only vaguely that young men from all communities were continually going off for training and to far battlefronts.

Several weeks after the announcement, when the notices began to come calling the Nisei boys for their preinduction physical examinations, the reactions became quite intense. The feeling was not against the Selective Service procedures themselves, for most considered it only right that American citizens of Japanese ancestry should be inducted the same as other citizens. Nor could the reaction be construed as draft evading in the usual sense, though there was a small number in the centers as elsewhere who could be classified simply as draft

evaders. The widespread evacuee reaction was against the induction of Japanese Americans when these Japanese Americans had been denied many of their constitutional rights and when, if inducted, certain discriminations would still be practiced against them. They thought that if the Nisei were to be asked to give their lives for their country, then all other rights pertaining to their citizenship should be restored, in addition to certain concessions being made to their parents. Specifically they asked that:

(1) The West Coast be opened to Nisei and loyal Issei.
(2) Financial losses incurred due to the evacuation be made good.
(3) The Issei not be discriminated against because they are Japanese, but be treated as are other enemy aliens, and be given the right to possess property.
(4) Jobs in war industries be open to Nisei on the same basis as to other citizens.
(5) Nisei not be placed in segregated units in the armed forces of the U. S. and that every branch of the service be open to Nisei on the same terms as to other citizens.
(6) There be no discrimination in Army assignments or promotions.

These six requests, and various ramifications of them, were felt to be fully justifiable by almost all evacuees, Issei and Nisei alike, but there were two schools of thought as to how the requests should be made and how those called for service should behave in regard to them: (1) The large majority said that the Nisei should serve in the Army unconditionally, but should make these requests to the authorities in order to point out what they considered were the injustices in their treatment. (2) The minority said that the Nisei should refuse to report until and unless they were granted full citizenship rights, and that the points at issue should be presented as demands.

Which of these two groups exercised the strongest influence in the various centers depended upon the leadership which developed. In almost all of the centers that Community Councils were willing to take a fairly conservative stand and to present their points as requests rather than as demands. Where the councils had the support of the community, this approach tended to keep the residents relatively calm and relegated the more intemperate voices to the background. Such was the case at Central Utah where the Council sponsored the Topaz Citizens' Committee. Together the Council and the Committee issued a "Selective Service Bulletin" which contained all the information available which would apply to the residents of Topaz. It was an important factor in the smooth running of the program. Both organizations issued statements asking that the discriminations be removed, but recognizing "that the reinstitution of Selective Service procedures for Americans of Japanese ancestry on the same basis as all other Americans is a significant step forward in the restoration of our inalienable rights as American citizens. Accordingly, we accept the duty and privilege of service in the armed forces of our Country." ("Statement of Principles" of the Community Council.) Even the mothers at Topaz organized to send a petition to the President which asserted their sons' loyalty to the U. S., but deplored what they felt were the discriminations against them. The result of the strong stand of the Council at Topaz and its encouragement to the Citizens' Committee was that public opinion was eighty to ninety per cent

in favor of the Nisei responding to their notices to report, with only a small minority for mass resistance.

At Minidoka, too, the petitions which were circulated recommended nonresistance and expressed no defiance of Selective Service. At Granada, and some other centers, the initial reaction was intense but the pressure actually to resist induction never became well organized on a large scale and the turbulence finally subsided. The individual was left free to do as he thought best and he did not have to face an adverse and organized public opinion when he reported.

At two centers, however, pressure groups advocating mass resistance to induction arose and had a strong influence before the more conservative elements could gather their forces. These centers were Colorado River and Heart Mountain.

Heart Mountain and the Fair Play Committee:

Heart Mountain is the extreme example of this type of pressure. There, an organization called the "Fair Play Committee" gathered such strength for a time that those who tried to speak in favor of reporting for examination or induction were shouted to silence. This committee had existed for some time previously, but had had few followers, since the leaders were considered to be immoderate. However, as discussions progressed throughout the center, dissatisfaction with the draft became more stereotyped and opposition became stronger and more widespread. The leaders of the Fair Play Committee found that their stand had become a popular one and they soon had a large following. They held meetings almost every night and put out circulars and statements in the Sentinel (center newspaper) and sent releases to the Rocky Shimpo (bilingual paper published in Denver). They collected subscriptions and called in an attorney to discuss the restoration of their citizenship rights, the restitution of financial losses incurred in evacuation, and the right to enter and leave the center without passes; but their main idea, at least at first, was to get a test case and fight it through the courts for the purpose of establishing the illegality of evacuation. Later, however, the strategy changed and they came out openly against any Nisei reporting for physical examination or induction.

The Rocky Shimpo, a Japanese bilingual newspaper published in Denver, helped the cause of the Fair Play Committee. In it articles appeared favoring the activities of the Fair Play Committee and making the Committee seem more respectable and less dangerous than it had seemed earlier. These articles also encouraged the people of Granada to engage in similar activities.

The Community Council refused to recognize the Fair Play Committee or to have anything to do with it, but the council members were divided among themselves and some resigned. There was no strong group to oppose the Fair Play Committee. Its leadership began to wane only when twelve boys who had failed to report for their physical examinations were arrested by the U. S. Marshal and the report was published that nine Poston residents had been sentenced to three years in prison for draft evasion. At the same time, an issue of Rocky Shimpo arrived at the camp with the headline, "Camp Disturbance Pending, Internal Disorders Said to be Spreading at Heart Mountain,

Camp-Wide Strike is Feared." If a strike had been contemplated, it certainly had not come off and no one finished this rabble-rousing article much more excited than when he began it. A day or so later, two of the leaders of the Fair Play Committee were dispatched to Tule Lake. After these events the Committee began to lose its hold on the people. Attitudes in favor of accepting the draft became manifest, and the disturbance died down. Meanwhile the Rocky Shimpo was taken over temporarily by the Alien Property Custodian and finally placed under new management. The result of the campaign had been, however, that Heart Mountain had more refusals to report for physical examinations than had any other center -- 84 refusals out of 631 called. Of these 84, 76 had been arrested by August 26, 1944.

Another result of the activities of the Fair Play Committee at Heart Mountain was the interest which other centers took in what was going on, and the encouragement which it gave to them to try similar tactics. None was nearly so successful, however, and as time went on the intensity of feeling simmered down generally until most of the people came to accept the draft as more or less inevitable. By June a few boys were still refusing to report, but on an individual basis. Outside the centers, so far as is known, approximately 100 per cent of the Nisei answered their calls.

The Incident of the Spanish Consul

At Manzanar an event occurred which could have had serious repercussions had it not been promptly corrected. At the height of the discussion over the new ruling of the Selective Service there was circulated a letter, reputedly from the Spanish Consul in San Francisco, saying, "The American authorities have stressed the fact that if an American citizen (of Japanese descent) does not desire to serve this country (United States) he is not under any obligation to do so. He will then be considered disloyal to the United States and may ask for expatriation to Japan which will or will not be granted." This statement spread like wildfire throughout Manzanar and to other centers. The projects were immediately informed by the Washington office of WRA that the statement was factually incorrect and that requests for expatriation made after January 20, 1944, would be regarded as efforts to evade military service, and that anyone refusing to be inducted on the basis that he had made such a request would be subject to the penalties prescribed in the Selective Service Act. The Spanish Consul subsequently wrote a letter to correct his previous statement saying that the "Protecting Power" (Spain) had no authority to act in matters concerning American citizens and that American citizens should address their problems to the American authorities. Thus, what might have had serious consequences in the thinking of the Nisei in regard to reporting for the draft was avoided.

The Administration of Selective Service in the Centers

In the main, the WRA had little to do with the administration of the Selective Service in the relocation centers. It was handled according to the usual Selective Service procedure, with the WRA administrators supplying information to the evacuees when needed, sometimes furnishing transportation, and acting as liaison with the local draft boards.

All evacuee males who were between the ages of 17 and 65 had been registered with their local boards by the time of evacuation. After evacuation their

registrations remained with these local boards, though, with the reinstitution of Selective Service, a registrant was transferred for preinduction physical examination and induction to the board nearest his new residence, whether at the center or where he had relocated. The local board of those who turned 18 in a center was determined by the address which they chose to give as their residence, whether the center, their old home, or another.

On the basis of DSS Form 304A, the Provost Marshall General's Office of the War Department reviewed the cases of each of the registered Nisei and classified him as "acceptable" or "not acceptable", sending the decision to the registrant's local Board. The local board then classified him the same as any other U. S. citizen if he was acceptable, or in class 4-C if he was not acceptable. As a registrant's number came up with his local board he was sent a notice to report for his preinduction physical examination, which was held either at the nearest Army Induction Station, or as at Minidoka where the number to be examined was very large, by an Army team sent to the spot. If the registrant failed to pass the physical examination he was classified as 4-F.

When anyone failed to report for either the preinduction physical examination or for induction, it became the duty of the local board to notify the U. S. Attorney or the F. B. I., and a representative of one of these agencies arrested the offender. His case was then handled as would be that of any citizen charged with an infraction of the Selective Service law.

If a Nisei passed his physical examination he would be inducted any time after ten days. He might be inducted for active duty, or he might be placed in the Enlisted Reserve Corps. If the latter, he was then under Army orders and he might be called to active duty at any time from a few days to several months. This Enlisted Reserve Corps status was an administrative device whereby the War Department was able to accumulate enough Japanese Americans to form a new unit, since it was felt that to bring a few new men into a group that was already half trained would lower the efficiency.

Any Nisei with adequate knowledge of the Japanese language who was accepted for induction, was encouraged to volunteer for specialized training.

Boys between 17 and 22 had opportunity in most of the centers to take the examinations for the Army Specialized Training Program and for the Navy V-12. Many of the eligibles took advantage of the opportunity.

The following chart shows the number of Japanese American males called by Selective Service and those volunteering for service, both before and after January 20, 1944, and up to August 26, 1944. These are the first accurate figures compiled by the WRA from the records of the centers.

Public Reaction

Director Dillon S. Myer made a statement while he was visiting the Central Utah relocation center that the reinstitution of selective service for the Nisei had done more to improve public sentiment toward evacuees than any other single step. The truth of this assertion was increasingly apparent.

NUMBER CALLED AND VOLUNTEERING SINCE 1/20/44

CENTER	TOTAL	No Rpt. Received from Select. Service	Accepted by Selective Service Inducted				Re-jected	Refused to Report for Physical Exam.	Other 2/	Re-leased from Army	VOLUNTARY INDUCTION PRIOR TO 1/20/44
			E.R.C 1/	Active Duty	Refused to Report for Induction	Class 1-A					
TOTAL	4,295	179	465	853	91	804	1,167	164	554	18	813
Central Utah	280	0	21	65	0	124	66	4	0	0	80
Colorado River	955	0	43	155	55	50	17,272	14	452	14	116
Gila River	489	0	72	154	0	158	103	0	0	2	84
Granada	400	2	97	116	3	19	131	32	0	0	117
Heart Mountain 3/	631	0	35	74	0	152	226	84	59	1	46
Jerome 4/	103	0	0	15	0	0	87	1	0	0	37
Manzanar	192	0	51	5	0	66	60	0*	10	0	42
Minidoka	799	166	97	156	33	151	193	2	1	0	219
Rohwer	369	0	49	113	0	82	120	3	1	1	15
Tule Lake	77	11	0	0	0	2	9	24	31	0	57

1/ Enlisted Reserve Corps
2/ Includes number unable to report and number held over for further examination, etc.
3/ Figures subject to revision
4/ Center close June 30, 1944. Does not include 108 persons called but not inducted who transferred to other centers or relocated when center closed.

Source: Weekly Telegraphic Report on Selective Service
Weekly Report No. 1, September 2, 1944.
War Relocation Authority
Statistics Section
Washington, D. C.

Many western papers carried the story that the Nisei would be drafted and some editorialized on it. One of the first reactions was that this addition to the pool of manpower would delay the induction of fathers and agricultural workers in other communities. Others went so far as to say "the privilege to bear arms in defense of their nation is one that should never have been denied these young men." (Granada, Colorado, Journal, 1-27-44). The Salt Lake Tribune cited the record that the Nisei had already made in the fighting fronts, also the valuable services they had performed in intelligence work, ending, "This new order should go far to eliminate misunderstandings of other American citizens as to the status of these people and to assure them that the Nisei Japanese will carry their share of the war burden." (1-23-44).

THE CLOSING OF JEROME RELOCATION CENTER

In view of the progress of the relocation program and the steadily mounting number of evacuees leaving the relocation centers, the Director of the War Relocation Authority decided, in the last months of 1943, to eliminate one of the relocation centers and to transfer the remaining residents to available quarters in other centers. On February 22, 1944, it was announced that the Jerome Relocation Center in Desha County, Arkansas (the last center to be occupied) was the one selected to be closed and that center was offically closed as a place of residence for evacuees of Japanese ancestry on June 30, 1944.

There were three major considerations which influenced the choice of Jerome as the center to be closed: First, Jerome had always been a small center; its population had never exceeded 8500 and at the time the decision was made the residents numbered 6479. Secondly, Jerome was only 35 miles from the Rohwer Relocation Center and, since almost half of the Jerome residents could be transferred to available quarters there by truck and bus, much expense could be saved. Thirdly, the project administrative staff had been considerably depleted by transfers and resignations, and if the center remained in operation, personnel replacements would be necessary in the face of a critical shortage of qualified candidates for employment.

The reaction of the Jerome residents to the announcement was one of natural disappointment that Jerome had been selected for closing, and of some bitterness that their cooperation in making it a clean and livable center had gone for naught. Nevertheless, they accepted the decision with resignation. The closing brought into focus the problem of the future and intensified their feelings of insecurity. Relocation proceeded at the usual rate for a while after the announcement, but, as the actual time for departure approached, Nisei who were planning to go out slowed down the movement by staying to assist their families. The center residents to a large extent were given the privilege of choosing one of four other centers to which they might be moved. Rohwer and Granada were the most popular choices, and a system of priorities had to be set up to determine who would have the privilege of going to them.

Appreciated by the Jerome evacuees were the efforts made by the receiving centers to make arrangements for the reception of the new-comers before their arrival by sending representatives to Jerome to discuss housing needs to supply information the transferees desired to know concerning their future home. Community action of this sort bolstered the morale of the transferees who were

again anticipating partings from friends and familiar scenes, and on the whole the people were most cooperative. The movements were accomplished with a minimum of hardship and no disturbance.

Administratively, all went efficiently and according to plan. Careful planning and the previous experience in the movement of large numbers of people, gained through segregation, resulted in a very smooth operation. During the month of June, 5601 evacuees were physically transferred to other centers, 13 had been transferred in May, and 93 on temporary leave were assigned to their centers of responsibility. Aside from these, 650 had been transferred to Tule Lake early in May. This number included those designated for segregation after the earlier mass movement, together with their dependents.

As in previous mass movements of the evacuees, the Army, represented by the Eighth and Ninth Service Commands, cooperated with the Authority by taking charge of the train trips to the more distant centers (Granada, Gila River, and Heart Mountain). The Army's responsibility included arranging for the transportation, feeding and medical care enroute, and escort assistance. The cooperative efforts of the two service Commands resulted in an over-all efficient and yet sympathetic operation. Generally speaking, the railroads contributed to the effort by providing equipment that was cleaner than that supplied on previous transfer trips and by keeping to schedules over tracks heavily loaded with war traffic. Those evacuees who went to Rohwer were transported by truck and bus under arrangements made by the Authority. All persons on all six special train trips and twenty-four bus and truck trips reached their destinations without incident and the trips were accomplished more comfortably and closer to schedule than on any previous mass transfer.

Four centers received the bulk of the Jerome residents; a few went to two others:

Rohwer	2514
Gila River	2063
Granada	549
Heart Mountain	509
Central Utah	17
Minidoka	11
Temporary leaves to be assigned	44
	5707

The baggage and household goods, handled almost entirely by the evacuees themselves, had been shipped either previous to the evacuees' departure or went in the same trains with them. Forty-three freight car loads were shipped to the three distant centers; 557 truckloads, including most of the Jerome homemade furniture, went to Rohwer.

For about one hundred of the appointed personnel of the Jerome center arrangements were effected for transfers to other centers and offices of the Authority through the coordination of the Personnel Management Division of the Washington office. A few persons did not request such transfers. As before mentioned, many of the key administrative staff members had made arrangements for transfers or had resigned previous to the closing. Nearly all appointive

personnel transfers were effective between the 1st and 15th of July.

The pickup, accountability, transfer, and disposal of the large volume of government property at the Jerome Center represented a considerable problem, but one which was handled accurately and speedily. Approximately 45 per cent of the property at the center was transferred to other centers and offices of the Authority for further use by the Authority. The balance of the property, including the plant and other physical assets (except the land, which was leased), was disposed of through established channels to the Treasury Department. It was anticipated that the functions of the War Relocation Authority with regard to the Jerome center would be completed and all property would be turned over to the Treasury Department by August 15, 1944.

REPORT OF THE HOUSE SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE TULE LAKE INCIDENT

In late November and December of 1943 a second series of hearings were conducted by the Sub-Committee of the House of Representatives Special Committee on Un-American Activities, in connection with the November, 1943 Incident at Tule Lake. These hearings were briefly reviewed in the last semi-annual report. Early in 1944 the Committee's "Report on the Tule Lake Riot" and the "Minority Views on Tule Lake Segregation Center," presented by Representative Herman P. Eberharter, were printed.

The Committee's eight page report includes a summary of the events that occurred during the first day of the "riot," and appends 26 pages of verbatim transcript (official WRA) of two conferences of evacuees with the administration, one with Mr. Best, the project director, the other with Mr. Best and Mr. Myer, the National Director, on the day of the demonstration. The final recommendations of the Committee are prefaced by mention of the transfer of the WRA to the Department of Interior, calling the move "a belated recognition of the repeated demands of this committee, that a change be made in the administrative policy of the WRA." They continue, "However, because of the peculiar situation which exists at Tule Lake, where the disloyal evacuees are located, we make the following specific recommendations as a result of our investigation and hearings:

"1. That Dillon S. Myer and Ray R. Best be removed from their present positions as National Director and Tule Lake project director respectively, because of their evident inability to cope with the problem of the disloyal Japanese.

"2. That the Tule Lake center and the disloyal Japanese segregated there be placed under the jurisdiction and administrative control of the Department of Justice.

"3. That a report be submitted to the Congress at an early date listing the Japanese responsible for the attack on Dr. Reese M. Pedicord on November 1, 1943, and those Japanese guilty of inciting the riot which occurred the same day and also what disciplinary or legal action has been instituted against such persons.

"4. That the duty of policing all Japanese relocation and segregation centers be carried out by Caucasians and in sufficient

strength so as to guarantee protection to the lives and property of all persons residing therein."

Rep. Eberharter, in his minority report, stated that he was unable "to agree with the intimations, conclusions, and recommendations of the majority report. . . It deals only in the sketchiest summary with the mass of evidence presented to the subcommittee, and it systematically excludes all the evidence which indicates that the War Relocation Authority has a difficult assignment and that it is doing a capable job."

In commenting on the recommendations of the majority members, he expressed his conviction that "a careful reading of the transcript which is included with the majority report shows that both Mr. Myer and Mr. Best consistently displayed the qualities of judgment and emotional stability which this country has a right to expect of its Government administrators." He pointed out that the Attorney General of the United States "made it very clear and emphatic that it is not his desire to have administration of the Tule Lake center transferred to the Justice Department."

As for the recommendation calling upon the War Relocation Authority to provide the Congress with a report listing the individuals responsible for fomenting the incident of November 1, and indicating what disciplinary action had been taken against these individuals, he observed that submitting the report directly to the Congress would be a procedure without precedent. "I think it can be fairly stated," he said, "that the War Relocation Authority fully cooperated with the committee throughout the investigation and hearings insofar as the furnishing of information was concerned."

With regard to the use of evacuees to police center, he pointed out that they were assigned only "to handle minor infractions of the regulations," and that they were used not only for reasons of governmental economy but because knowledge of the Japanese language was frequently necessary in dealing with some of the older alien residents. "It is my understanding," he said that minor policing in prisoner-of-war camps, internment camps, concentration or detention camps, in all countries, including those of our enemies, is performed by residents of the camp. Were the recommendations of the majority of the subcommittee on this subject to be followed, it would mean a departure by the United States from the practice followed throughout the world."

Mr. Eberharter concluded his report by condemning the investigating techinques used by the subcommittee and the results obtained by the investigation. "The need for thoroughness, discretion, and balanced judgment in investigation is imperative; the possibilities for harm through biased or inadequate investigations are enormous. Yet the investigation has seemingly been conducted with a view to obtaining maximum publicity for the most irresponsible charges. On the basis of slim and unreliable evidence, the American people have been led to believe the WRA is pampering the residents of relocation centers and that it is deliberately or heedlessly turning potential spies and saboteurs loose upon the Nation. Groundless public fears and antagonisms have been stirred up at a time when national unity is more than ever needed, and widespread distrust has been engendered toward the operations of a hard-working and conscientious agency. Even more important, the investigation has encouraged the American public to confuse the people in relocation centers with our real enemies across the Pacific.

Thus it has fostered a type of racial thinking which is already producing ugly manifestations and which seems to be growing in intensity. Unless this trend is checked, it may eventually lead to all-advised actions that will constitute an ever-lastingly shameful blot on our national record.

"In view of these facts, it is my considered opinion that the 'investigation' of the WRA program has not only been a painful parody on fair-minded and constructive congressional inquiry but a serious disservice to the American people."

TULE LAKE

On January 1, 1944, the Army was still in charge of the administration of Tule Lake Segregation Center, after having taken over at WRA request on November 4. Two weeks later, on January 14, the administration of the center was turned back to the War Relocation Authority. Under the military authorities the center had almost ceased to operate as an organized community. The "Committee of 17", which had undertaken to negotiate with the administration during the incident of early November, had insisted that the residents were actually prisoners of war and should be treated as such. By this the committee meant that residents should not work except as they pleased for their own comfort and welfare.

The committee insisted that the production of food was not up to the residents of the center because food should be supplied by the government. All employment under the War Relocation Authority had stopped when the Army took control, and no wages were paid. The Army had imposed a curfew on the whole population, first for 7:00 p.m., later 9:00 p.m. All troublemakers, particularly those considered to be fomenters of the strike, were confined in what the Army termed the "stockade." This stockade was an enclosure surrounded by a double fence, with space between the fences for a jeep patrol. When the War Relocation Authority took over in January there were 352 men confined there. No assembly of any kind had been permitted in the center; if any group was found meeting it was immediately broken up. Nor had there been any schools in session; evacuees teachers were unemployed and the Caucasian teachers spent much of their time in staffing the administrative mess and performing other necessary tasks. All mimeograph machines had been removed from the evacuee area and no publications were permitted. That was the status of the center when WRA administration replaced the Army.

When the center changed hands, an agreement was reached with the Army that in the future the military could be called in to restore order without the Army taking control of the administration. This arrangement applied only to Tule Lake. There was also the understanding with the Army that the WRA would enlarge the staff of the appointed internal security section. This was complied with insofar as possible. Five patrol cars with two-way radios were acquired as equipment for the internal security officers, who thus were able to communicate promptly at any time with the military headquarters. The "stockade", however, was under the control of the Army until May 24.

After January 14, it was the job of the WRA to restore the camp to a functioning community insofar as the conditions permitted.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Statistics Section
Washington, D. C.

PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY SEGREGATED AT TULE LAKE
BY TYPE OF SEGREGEE, SEX AND NATIVITY
SEPTEMBER 1943 - MAY 1944

Note: Although reasons for segregation may be described by more than one "Type", at the time of segregation each segregee was classified into one of the "Types" with preference given to the categories in the order listed.

SEX AND TYPE OF SEGREGEE	NUMBER			PERCENT		
	TOTAL	American Born	Foreign Born	TOTAL	American Born	Foreign Born
TOTAL/1	18,355	12,489	5,866	100.0	100.0	100.0
Segregation Parolee	33	0	33	.2	0.0	.6
Leave Denial	514	348	166	2.8	2.8	2.8
Repatriation (Expatriation)	7,265	4,697	2,568	39.6	37.6	43.8
Registration	4,787	3,276	1,511	26.1	26.2	25.8
Voluntary Family Member	5,604	4,079	1,525	30.5	32.7	26.0
Other Authorized Segregee/3	118	75	43	.6	.6	.7
Unauthorized Segregee/4	34	14	20	.2	.1	.4
MALE	10,698	6,940	3,758	58.3	55.6	64.1
Segregation Parolee	33	0	33	.2	0.0	.6
Leave Denial	299	205	94	1.6	1.7	1.6
Repatriation (Expatriation)	4,407	2,655	1,752	24.0	21.3	29.9
Registration	3,118	2,117	1,001	17.0	16.9	17.1
Voluntary Family Member	2,763	1,922	841	15.1	15.4	14.3
Other Authorized Segregee/3	58	36	22	.3	.3	.4
Unauthorized Segregee/4	20	5	15	.1	2/	.2
FEMALE	7,657	5,549	2,108	41.7	44.4	35.9
Segregation Parolee	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Leave Denial	215	143	72	1.2	1.1	1.2
Repatriation (Expatriation)	2,858	2,042	816	15.6	16.3	13.9
Registration	1,669	1,159	510	9.1	9.3	8.7
Voluntary Family Member	2,841	2,157	684	15.4	17.3	11.7
Other Authorized Segregee/3	60	39	21	.3	.3	.3
Unauthorized Segregee/4	14	9	5	.1	.1	.1

1/Excludes a small number of persons segregated to Tule Lake who were not (1) original Tule Lake segregees or (2) on Route Lists of major moves from other centers to Tule Lake.

2/Less than 0.05 percent.

3/Includes internees' families, medical cases, etc., among original Tule Lake residents who were authorized to remain at Tule Lake Segregation Center.

4/Refers to original Tule Lake residents who remained at Tule Lake without authorization as segregees after Tule Lake became a Segregation Center.

Source: Route Lists, Form W.R.A.-274, for segregees from all centers except Tule Lake; Original Residents of Tule Lake Who Remained as Segregees After December 13, 1943; prepared by Tule Lake, December 16, 1944, for Tule Lake segregees.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Statistics Section
Washington, D. C.

PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY SEGREGATED AT TULE LAKE
BY AGE GROUPS, SEX AND NATIVITY
SEPTEMBER 1943 - MAY 1944

SEX AND AGE	NUMBER			PERCENT		
	TOTAL	American Born	Foreign Born	TOTAL	American Born	Foreign Born
TOTAL/1	18,355	12,489	5,866	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 17	5,212	5,181	31	28.4	41.5	.5
17 - 19	1,478	1,468	10	8.1	11.8	.2
20 - 24	2,845	2,811	34	15.5	22.5	.6
25- 29	1,849	1,819	30	10.1	14.6	.5
30 - 34	820	720	100	4.5	5.8	1.7
35 - 39	824	311	513	4.5	2.5	8.7
40 - 44	1,152	121	1,031	6.2	.9	17.6
45 - 49	994	25	969	5.4	.2	16.5
50 - 54	810	19	791	4.4	.1	13.5
55 - 59	937	8	929	5.1	.1	15.8
60 - 64	758	3	755	4.1	2/	12.9
65 - 69	478	2	476	2.6	2/	8.1
70 - 74	141	0	141	.8	0.0	2.4
75 and Over	57	1	56	.3	2/	1.0
MALE	10,698	6,940	3,758	58.3	55.6	64.1
Under 17	2,616	2,598	18	14.3	20.8	.3
17 - 19	804	799	5	4.4	6.4	.1
20 - 24	1,723	1,707	16	9.4	13.7	.3
25 - 29	1,055	1,041	14	5.7	8.4	.2
30 - 34	514	460	54	2.8	3.7	.9
35 - 39	464	202	262	2.5	1.6	4.5
40 - 44	613	92	521	3.3	.7	8.9
45 - 49	452	18	434	2.5	.1	7.4
50 - 54	457	15	442	2.5	.1	7.5
55 - 59	740	7	733	4.0	.1	12.5
60 - 64	669	0	669	3.6	0.0	11.4
65 - 69	418	0	418	2.3	0.0	7.1
70 - 74	122	0	122	.7	0.0	2.1
75 and Over	51	1	50	.3	2/	.9

PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY SEGREGATED AT TULE LAKE
BY AGE GROUPS, SEX AND NATIVITY
SEPTEMBER 1943 - MAY 1944
(Continued)

SEX AND AGE	NUMBER			PERCENT		
	TOTAL	American Born	Foreign Born	TOTAL	American Born	Foreign Born
FEMALE	7,657	5,549	2,108	41.7	44.4	35.9
Under 17	2,596	2,583	13	14.1	20.7	.2
17 - 19	674	669	5	3.7	5.4	.1
20 - 24	1,122	1,104	18	6.1	8.8	.3
25 - 29	794	778	16	4.4	6.2	.3
30 - 34	306	260	46	1.7	2.1	.8
35 - 39	360	109	251	2.0	.9	4.2
40 - 44	539	29	510	2.9	.2	8.7
45 - 49	542	7	535	2.9	.1	9.1
50 - 54	353	4	349	1.9	2/	6.0
55 - 59	197	1	196	1.1	2/	3.3
60 - 64	89	3	86	.5	2/	1.5
65 - 69	60	2	58	.3	2/	1.0
70 - 74	19	0	19	.1	0.0	.3
75 and Over	6	0	6	2/	0.0	.1

1/ Excludes a small number of persons segregated to Tule Lake who were not (1) original Tule Lake segregees or (2) on Route Lists of Major Moves from other centers to Tule Lake.
2/ Less than 0.05 percent.

Source: Route Lists, Form WRA-274, For Segregees from all centers except Tule Lake; Original Residents of Tule Lake Who Remained as Segregees After December 13, 1943, prepared by Tule Lake, December 16, 1944 for Tule Lake Segregees.

A week before the center was returned to the WRA a Coordinating Committee was set up to work with the administration. This Committee was composed of seven men who were selected from a group of 28 men called the "Divisional Responsible Men," from the Co-op and other groups. The members of the Coordinating Committee were put on the WRA payroll, given an office, and provided with the use of an official car. Their job was to channel the people back to work as soon as the WRA had useful work for them. The Committee cooperated satisfactorily with the administration and the employment went up gradually until most departments were adequately staffed. The Committee was even able to recruit members for the "Colonial Police" forces and had it functioning well enough so that the Army was willing to lift the curfew regulations by the middle of February. The workers were under the regular WRA evacuee wage scale. The number of those employed by April was about equal to that of the previous November before the incident, but the percentage employed was not as high because the population of the center had meanwhile increased due to the arrival of segregees from Manzanar and other centers. In late March it became evident that employment would have to be spread among families, and it was determined that no family should have more than two employed when there were other families with only one or none. An alternative was to "make work" which was not a desirable procedure. In spite of the statements of various newspapers to the contrary, there were no strikes at Tule Lake, though there were a few small work stoppages.

The Coordinating Committee functioned until April 29, when it resigned. Ostensibly it resigned because it was under considerable pressure from certain of the residents to force the release by WRA of all of those detained in the stockade. Actually, however, it had about outlived its usefulness in getting the people back to work. To this Committee should go considerable credit for bringing about a more cooperative attitude among the residents.

The population in the stockade had actually been considerably reduced before the Committee resigned. Many had been released after hearings before the Fact Finding Committee, a group consisting of the Assistant Project Director in charge of Community Management, the head of the Internal Security Section, and the Project Attorney. This committee, cooperating with the military, sought to collect all possible data on each individual who had been confined, to weigh the evidence, and to make recommendations for action by the Project Director. In April seven aliens were sent from the stockade to the internment camp in Santa Fe, nineteen more in June. Similar movements later were also planned. By the end of June only 20 (2 aliens, 18 citizens) remained in the stockade.

In May the WRA tried to encourage the people to institute some form of community representative committee. Two attempts were made to elect a representative advisory committee through democratic processes, but both times insufficient interest was shown and up until the end of the period the community had to operate without any community government. What needs the community had for overall organization were met through the Block Manager's group.

There was one group of evacuees who withstood various community pressures to discontinue their operations, and this was the Co-op or Community Enterprise group. All during the period of military control the "Tule Lake Cooperative Enterprises, Inc." continued to render service through the canteens and stores,

doing so under rather trying circumstances. The negotiating committee members demanded that the stores be closed because, they said, the government should supply the people with all their essential needs and the people should not have more than that. When the WRA took over, the Co-op reopened the canteen in the administrative area and began to expand its services to include a fish market and a shoyu factory. This caused a considerable furor among those opposed to cooperation and demands were made that the services be radically reduced, particularly the administrative canteen. The affair culminated with the general manager of the Co-op, Yaozo Hitomi, being stabbed to death one evening in June in front of an apartment adjoining his own. The Co-op board resigned immediately, but a new board was elected very soon and on it were included many of the old members. The new board still did not accede to the demands except in a few minor points.

Following this murder, serious threats were made against the lives of various of those who had cooperated with the WRA, including two members of the Coordinating Committee and the evacuee Chief of Police. The latter resigned and with him all his police officers. Those threatened, with their families, were quartered in the hospital for protection, and later removed to other centers. The police force was reorganized and the staff called "Peace Officers" instead of "Colonial Police." Despite intensive efforts, the Hitomi murder was not solved and no arrests were made.

The opposition to WRA policies had been clear somewhat earlier when a demand for resegregation was made on the part of some of the followers of the old negotiating committee. These people expected to return to Japan; they wanted to live according to Japanese customs, and have their children attend only Japanese schools; they did not wish to live among those who were Americanized or more loyal to the United States, or even "on the fence." Those who wished to be resegregated circulated a petition asking that the center be divided so that the two groups could live apart and behave as they saw fit. With 5000 signers, the petition was sent to the Spanish Consul and the Secretaries of State and Interior. The group also asked that they be granted the privilege of returning to Japan at the first possible opportunity. The WRA ruled that no enforced movement would be undertaken, though people could move by applying through the regular channels.

In May, an event occurred which somewhat reduced the opposition to WRA and made it stand, rather, in the light of protector. On May 4, an evacuee named James Okamoto and a helper were assigned to take a truck and cross the road to get some lumber. They had to go through a gate where a sentry was stationed; on passing the sentry, Okamoto got into some discussion with the sentry about showing his work badge. Ten minutes later, on the way back in, the sentry ordered Okamoto to get out of the truck and shot him. Okamoto was taken to the hospital and despite every effort to save his life, died that night.

Trouble was expected over this event, but none developed. The next day workers refused to go out of the camp because they had to pass sentries, but this was settled by having an internal security officer present with the sentry when any evacuees had to go by. It was also expected that there might be trouble at the funeral. Some 9000 people gathered at the outdoor stage and stood two and a half hours in a drizzle to attend the services. The project director made a

brief talk. No trouble developed.

On the basis of a preliminary investigation, the War Department ordered a court martial which was forthwith held under eight officers from the Presidio of San Francisco and military attorneys. Invited to be present were members of the project staff, the assistant solicitor from the San Francisco office of WRA, and eight representatives from among the evacuees. At the court martial, the sentry stated that he had felt that he was in danger of his life, that he was stationed alone and some distance from assistance. A statement was read to the court that a sentry's instructions read that he should protect himself. The sentry was exonerated.

Therefore, however, the Officer of the Day instructed all sentries at Tule Lake that they should shoot only as a warning and not to kill.

A very important change in policy took place at Tule Lake in February. This change was based on the knowledge that many had gone to Tule Lake originally because of family ties, or because of hasty decisions which were regretted after longer thought, and on the further knowledge that many of these people were not disloyal and had no desire to go back to Japan. This change was the institution of project leave clearance hearings, set up as at other centers, with a leave clearance hearing board of which the project attorney was the chairman. The administration let it be know that cases in which leave clearance had not already been denied would be heard before this board and a number of residents made application and were heard. Those cleared were sent to other centers and from there were permitted to relocate. A special appeals procedure was set up for Tule Lake residents who had been denied leave clearance, under which their cases would be heard by a Board of Appeals for leave clearance constituted of prominent and impartial civilians not otherwise connected with WRA.

The people in the center were rather surprised to learn that the young men there were subject to induction into the armed forces, as were the Nisei in other centers after January 20, 1944. All told 73 were called up for pre-induction physical examination, but when the Army examining team arrived on May 2 only 11 showed up for their examinations. Of the group 31 had been transferred to other centers or were out on indefinite leave, 7 were unidentifiable because of improper spelling, and 24 living at Tule Lake did not appear. Among these were some who had applied for expatriation and who did not feel that they should make any gesture to answer the call, even if they knew almost certainly that they might be classified as 4-F. The rest of them were those who apparently had come to Tule Lake to escape Army service and were simply evading the draft. They were investigated by the FBI for violation of the Selective Service Act.

During the period when the Army administered Tule Lake there had been no communication system for the evacuees except for the posting of official notices. Beginning on January 14, the official statements of the Coordinating Committee were mimeographed and distributed. During February, the administration got out two mimeographed issues which contained only official notices; the third issue, early in March, became the first issue of a new center newspaper, with news items and other matters of local interest. Its name was the "Newell Star" and it was staffed by people who had worked on the newspapers of other

centers. However, WRA (in contradistinction to its practice at other centers) imposed a complete censorship on all material that went into the Star and there were no editorials. The people of Tule Lake on the whole had considerable confidence in this paper and it had a large circulation.

During February, also, the WRA schools opened, with about a 75 per cent enrollment, first the grammar school, then the high school. An understanding was reached with the Coordinating Committee that these WRA schools would be on a half day schedule so that the pupils would be enabled to attend Japanese language schools the other half day. Many adults, feeling that the children should be prepared for returning to Japan, contributed money to pay the teachers, mimeograph texts, and buy supplies. No government money was expended for these schools. To represent and superintend the schools the residents elected the Japanese language School Board of Education. The Board was recognized by the WRA as an official body representing the schools. The Board, however, in setting up textbooks and a course of study, gave too little attention to Japanese culture and history to suit many of the residents. Illicit schools with a more strongly nationalistic tendency were started in some blocks. As soon as the administration heard of these illicit schools, orders were issued that there would be no space or facilities for classes not under the Japanese Board of Education, and that no classes could be held which conflicted with the WRA class schedules. The Japanese Board of Education resigned in May, but when the administration said that there would be no language schools without a board, it was re-elected, with many of the old members.

It was originally planned to produce a surplus of farm products at Tule Lake for shipment to other centers. After the incident the decision was reached to cut the acreage planted to just enough to fill the subsistence needs of Tule Lake. This had been one of the demands of the negotiating committee who, considering themselves as prisoners of war, did not want anything sent to the loyal people of other centers because they felt that would be contributing to the war effort of the United States. However, when the "League of Nations" tract of 2318 acres was turned over to the Reclamation Service, many people protested vigorously, showing that the whole of Tule Lake was not in agreement with the ideas of the negotiating committee. One of the objections to this return was that, with the reduction of farming area, not so many could be employed.

During the six months period a representative from the International Red Cross visited the center. He talked with a committee of Issei and arranged with this committee for the distribution of various articles provided by the Japanese government for the residents of the camp, including food and books. The medical supplies which were also sent were put in special storage at the hospital and issued on the prescription of evacuee doctors.

FURTHER SEGREGATION MOVEMENTS TO TULE LAKE

In September and October of 1943 WRA carried out the mass segregation movement wherein those Japanese aliens and American citizens of Japanese ancestry at relocation centers who had been denied leave clearance, asked for repatriation or expatriation, or had answered "no" to the loyalty question in the registration, were transferred along with their dependents to Tule Lake.

Simultaneously residents of Tule Lake who had not fallen in these categories were moved to the other centers. (See Semi-Annual Report, July 1 - Dec. 31, 1943). Some 8575 were moved to Tule Lake at this time and, with those remaining there, the available housing was filled to capacity. Therefore, it was not possible for all who wished to be transferred to go to Tule Lake until further construction could be undertaken. There was also a group of people at each center who were assigned to Tule Lake on the basis of denial of leave clearance after the previous movement had taken place. Housing for additional segregees was partially completed by the middle of February, 1944 and arrangements were immediately made to transfer the 1876 people from Manzanar who had not been able to go the previous fall. It should be noted that 42 per cent of this 1876 did not fall within any of the categories mentioned above but were accompaning members of their families. Arrangements for this transfer were very carefully made, following the same pattern as that which had been conceived for the previous movement, except that baggage inspection and housing and work assignments were made before departure from Manzanar instead of after arrival at Tule Lake. The Army and the WRA cooperated closely and four trainloads of people arrived and were housed smoothly and without incident. Not long afterwards, 74 more were transferred from Poston.

After a careful check on the housing situation at Tule Lake following this second segregation movement, a third transfer to Tule Lake was planned. This took place during May. The main part of it was formed of segregees from Jerome and Rohwer so that the closing of Jerome might be facilitated. There were also small numbers from several other centers. Altogether, this transfer involved 1653 people. When they were settled in Tule Lake that center was filled to absolute capacity. In fact it was necessary to convert some recreation halls and offices into living quarters.

SPANISH CONSULAR VISITS

During the year from July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1944, a representative of the Spanish Embassy, as Protecting Power for Japanese interests and nationals in this country, visited all the centers, including Tule Lake, at least twice, excepting Colorado River which was visited once. This representative was usually the Consul or Vice-Consul of the area in which the center is located; he was accompanied by a representative of the State Department. On the occasions of these visits, under international agreement, the representative of the Embassy inspected the camps and conferred with Japanese nationals and with project officials concerning camp affairs which relate to the aliens.

COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT

By January of 1944--after a year and a half of study and practical experience by both evacuees and appointive staff--it seemed that the community government in the relocation centers had at last reached a stage of maturity and stability. Eight of the nine centers had adopted a plan for center government and had elected community councils. The ninth, Manzanar, still kept the Block Managers Assembly which, though not elective, functioned in a way quite similar to the councils in the other centers. These governmental bodies have taken a lively interest in the general welfare of the community and in the specific events

which have confronted the residents. They have been the organization through which the communities have been able to present their views and needs to the administration, to discuss policy and problems, and to plan and coordinate for community betterment. They have contributed to community stability, given leadership for crystallizing opinion on critical issues, and provided many thousands with their first opportunity to learn and participate in the democratic process.

In the different centers the problems which the councils have considered have had their local aspects, but the general type of work was the same. In this semi-annual period there activities covered a wide range. They enacted law and order codes and established judicial commissions to apply penalties to violators of community regulations. The health, education, food, employment, production, and public relations problems of the community were handled through committees composed of council members. Many councils took care of the distribution of articles from the Japanese Red Cross. Those at Rohwer and Gila River planned welcoming functions for the new residents from Jerome. Several recommended that junior colleges be started at the centers. Many councils also established a number of commissions of a permanent nature, to which non-council members were appointed. Relocation Planning Commissions were established at most centers and have played on active and significant part in stimulating resettlement. Other groups established include health and school boards, manpower commissions, juvenile commissions, police commissions, and cemetary boards.

The responsible role of community governments was demonstrated at every center during the sometimes heated discussions over the reinstitution of Selective Service. Most councils either sponsored or transmitted petitions from citizen groups welcoming Selective Service but requesting clarification of citizenship rights for the Nisei. The councils at Heart Mountain, Minidoka, and Central Utah sponsored visits by Sgt. Ben Kuroki, the Nisei war hero. Departing inductees were honored by councils at all centers.

The councils also contributed to the internal stability of the centers by negotiating labor disputes, improving labor relations, and meeting critical shortages of workers. Manpower commissions were established in several centers to work with the administration in determining job priorities and allocating the available labor supply. Councils also resolved many intra-community disputes between individuals and groups.

The community government in Minidoka became operative in February with the election of a seven-man council and 34 block commissioners. Six committees were appointed, with a councilman for the chairman of each, the other members being drawn from the commissioners. The council was very soon confronted with several problems; one a strike of food warehouse workers in April, and another, the burning, reputedly by center residents, of a stretch of rip-rap along a neighboring irrigation ditch. The first problem was met by the council assuming responsibility for the operation of those services affected by the strike; the second by the council recruiting 75 volunteers to repair the damages.

A national meeting of council representatives was given additional study. It was finally decided that it was advisable to postpone planning for such a conference until later in the year.

Community government on the whole has had an important role in preparing the evacuees for a return to normal life, promoting good public relations, and maintaining a constructive attitude among center residence.

Tule Lake

The problem of establishing a responsible representative group among the residents of Tule Lake was not satisfactorily solved during this period, though some progress was made. The confusion and disorganization which resulted from the November incident continued to have its effect. After the community, by a bare majority, accepted the idea of ending the existing impass, the Coordinating Committee was appointed from the Division of Responsible Men and other groups. This Committee worked from January until April, tackling various problems, such as encouraging a back-to-work movement, lifting the curfew, modifying the Army control, recommending names for appointment as Police Commissioners -- of whom three were appointed, and recommending to the Administration appointment for key supervisory positions. It resigned after a policy for establishing a representative government had been received from Washington. Plans for an election were made, but further efforts to establish a representative committee were postponed until the residents should show a more definite interest. It became apparent that until additional understandings on various issues which concerned them were reached between the administration and the residents at Tule Lake no organized form of community representation would be possible.

BUSINESS ENTERPRISES

On June 30, 1944, there were business enterprises functioning in nine centers, including Tule Lake. The enterprises organization at Jerome was liquidated in the month of June when the center closed. Eight of the nine enterprises were incorporated; only that at Heart Mountain still operated as a trust, though it contained within its structure most of the attributes of a formal cooperative organization. The total number of employees in the business enterprises on June 30 was 1853, serving 81,430 center residents.

The Jerome Cooperative Enterprises, Inc., the first cooperative to be liquidated, distributed net earnings of $264,694.90 to its members. Other center cooperatives assisted the Jerome group in the disposal of stock and equipment. On the other hand, the Tule Lake business enterprises, with a greatly expanded population and anticipating a somewhat longer life than other centers, launched a program of active expansion.

The normal relocation process presented the enterprises with the common problem of personnel procurement. Definite steps were considered to alleviate a rather serious situation, such as instituting an apprentice system within the frame-work of the various organizations. The Vocational Training Section in Washington made plans to give the enterprises assistance in conducting formal training courses and apprentice programs.

Another problem which came up at the centers was that of working out the details of the evacuee domestic service, which functioned at centers primarily for the benefit of the appointed personnel. No uniform scale had previously

been set for wages; a new ruling provided that anyone hiring an evacuee domestic should pay the wage rate which prevailed in the nearest community, the employee should receive the current center rate, and the difference should be contributed to the cooperative fund.

In spite of the handicap of losing trained personnel, the business enterprises continued to become more independent. In June, at a meeting of the WRA Business Enterprises Section in New York, it was decided to terminate the services of all WRA project business enterprises supervisors as of June 30, except for one in Tule Lake in the restricted zone, and to have instead auditor-supervisors, each covering three projects.

The Federation of Center Business Enterprises, organized in September, 1943, continued to function, holding a meeting in Granada for three days in April. Plans were formulated for the Federation to bring about almost complete self-sufficiency for the cooperatives so that the WRA would need to provide only a bare minimum of supervision. More specifically the Federation planned to:

1. Assist in the liquidation of the Center Business Enterprises.
   a. Provide the machinery for disposing of the inventory to other centers and/or private parties at the least possible loss.

   b. Act as administrator or trustee (in conformity with legal requirements) for any center cooperative after its dissolution.

2. Provide a constant channel through which to move surplus goods accumulated in all centers, resulting in a stronger financial position for all center enterprises.

3. Carry on discussions with the center enterprises with a view to the perpetuation of the Federation into a permanent organization which would be able to assist the residents of relocation centers to establish themselves on a sound cooperative basis in the postwar period.

WELFARE

Special Counseling Unit and Family Summaries: In spite of the difficulty of securing the required personnel, the program of special counseling to aid families and individuals in planning for their relocation and long range future was instituted in most centers by March. The greatest difficulties arose, of course, with families which presented dependency problems or serious social maladjustments; in such cases careful planning with outside social agencies was indicated. It was necessary also to consider procedures for the relocation of children who would not be accompanied by or going to a parent or legal guardian, as well as the guidance of youths of 17 and 18 in their new communities by church groups, social agencies, or responsible relatives.

Reuniting of Families with Interned Members: The Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice took action on the bulk of the

STATUS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES

For Period From 1/1/1944 to 6/30/1944. — As of June 30, 1944

Project	Av. No. of Shops for Period	Gross Sales for Period	Total Net Earnings	Ratio of Current Assets to Current Liabilities	Number of Employees
Tule Lake	27	$ 822,508.10	$ 116,511.47	3.41	382
Manzanar	13	309,526.92	23,835.86	3.10	177
Heart Mt.	15	388,057.82	47,812.53	3.66	153
Poston	18	447,618.46	51,416.01	2.74	298
Minidoka	18	382,939.85	49,047.32	1.51	161
Gila River	15	355,111.19	47,987.47	6.86	264
Topaz	15	238,294.76	26,263.66	5.09	171
Granada	13	225,391.64	29,251.08	5.40	116
Rohwer	9	190,539.38	24,529.95	4.42	131
Jerome	17	166,863.65	10,969.07	Liquidated	-
	160	$3,526,851.77	$427,624.42	Av. 4.02	1853

applications from center residents who asked to be reunited with members of the family at the Family internment Camp at Crystal City, Texas. The internees were either paroled and went to a center, were granted a segregation parole and joined their family at Tule Lake, or the family joined the internee at Crystal City.

War Refugee Camp: When the announcement was made in June that one thousand refugees would be quartered at a new camp in Oswego, New York, the Welfare Section at once began to participate in the planning for it. It was anticipated that the refugees would be greatly in need of welfare services due to their recent experiences and that local welfare agencies could be utilized to a large extent.

Special Activities at the Centers: When Selective Service was extended to the Nisei, the inductees often requested from the Welfare Section at the centers information and assistance in taking care of their families. The necessity for making a more definite policy on readmissions to the centers became pressing, as it was often requested that wives be allowed to return for the duration. In two centers the head counselors were appointed representatives of the County draft boards, and in several other centers they assumed the responsibility for making medical and social investigations of center inductees for the boards.

Several centers were concerned with the problem of the aged, infirm, or chronically ill who needed special help and care but who did not need hospitalization. The problem was largely solved by the use of custodial barracks to which such persons were admitted and which were under the supervision of the Health Section, and by further use of the housekeeping aide service.

Statistical Summary. The following is a summary of public assistance grants authorized in the ten centers; it shows a slight rise in number and percent of those receiving the grants, due largely to the load accumulated at Tule Lake when no assistance was given for a time.

Month (1943-44	Center Population/1	No. of Family Units	No. of Persons in Family U.	Average Size of Fam.Unit	Amount of Grant	Average Grant per Fam.Unit	%of Popul. Receiving Grant
			NINE CENTER SUMMARY 2				
January	78099	3149	5930	1.88	$22989.14	$7.30	7.6
February	77211	2980	5601	1.88	22538.87	7.56	7.3
March	70481	2575	4792	1.86	18636.35	7.24	6.8
			TEN CENTER SUMMARY 2				
April	89346	3178	6192	1.95	25550.48	8.04	6.9
May	87716	5378	10995	2.04	38812.23	7.22	12.5
June	84675	6476	13709	2.12	48702.26	7.52	16.2

1/ Population reported by centers on Form WRA-176, Daily Evacuee Population Summary, as of beginning of day on first day of each month.

2/ No figures available for Tule Lake for first quarter. Second quarter includes Tule Lake.

EDUCATION

During this period improvements were made in various areas of the school program at centers. Building facilities were improved, pupil morale was raised, and a greater degree of program continuity was effected.

At the beginning of the period the elementary and secondary school enrollment in the nine relocation centers was 19,838. At the end of the term the enrollment was 20,532 -- 8,900 elementary and 11,632 secondary pupils. There were also enrolled at the end of the year 1,821 pupils in nursery school and 10,175 in the post high school program. Of the latter, 1,186 were in vocational courses, 2,779 in English, and 6,210 in other adult courses.

Due to the difficulties experienced at Tule Lake the schools there were not opened until January and February. At the end of the school year there, the enrollment was 2,488 -- 944 elementary and 1,544 secondary. It was estimated that about 1,500 children of school age had not enrolled in the WRA schools.

With the closing of the Jerome Center the school pupils were sent to other centers. However, the schools were held in session until the end of the term in order that pupils might complete their annual credits before transferring.

The shortage in qualified teachers continued throughout this period. Most of the better qualified evacuee certified and assistant teachers had relocated. The number of appointed teachers was about fifty below the number allocated and there was a considerable turnover. It was planned to meet some of this shortage by recruitment, but it was also anticipated that with the opening of the fall term there would of necessity, be some program curtailment because of this teacher shortage.

The nursery school-programs were revised to limit the enrollment to three-and four-year-olds and the attendance to half-day sessions for each group of pupils, thus permitting the evacuee nursery teachers to serve more pupils. The teachers continued to emphasize the learning of English as a preparation for entry into the elementary grades.

The school improvement program was revised to eliminate most of the new construction except barrack remodeling and the erection of special shop, library, and auditorium units. Most of this work was completed during the half year.

Closer integration of the school programs with community life and the state educational systems developed gradually throughout the half year. Parent-teachers organizations were active in promoting school activities. They cooperated with schools in developing pupil work programs, and in promoting better public relations. Project advisory school boards were selected on several centers. Student councils and other student organizations offered pupils opportunities for democratic participation in school community life. Relations with neighboring schools continued to improve as was indicated by the inter-school visits. State accreditation for the year was granted in each state.

The schools at all levels participated freely in the relocation program. The elementary and secondary schools had study units on American customs, community living, and community standards, and occupational opportunities were developed and used as a basis of classroom instruction. Adult and vocational programs were directed primarily to the relocation program.

In order to vitalize the adult education program the Adult Education Committee, appointed by the Director, recommended various changes. One of these was a reorganization of the program of adult English. Through project committees and supervisors an effort was made to secure project-wide interest in the program. Appointed teachers assisted in the program during the summer months and instructed the evacuee teachers in the use of the direct functional method of teaching. Some centers organized language centers where residents could be given assistance in letter writing and drills in English enunciation.

Continued emphasis was placed on the high school vocational program. In the adult vocational field learnership (apprentice) training continued. In addition, there were thirty-eight project and eight state supported courses in trade training courses for adults. These courses were designed to provide basic training for industrial, commercial, agricultural, and semi-professional occupations. An effort was made to coordinate training for project operations with preparation for outside occupations. Courses were changed frequently to adapt to labor demands. However, the interest in commercial or secretarial training for women and in auto mechanics for men remained consistent.

COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

The contribution of the community activities or recreation program at the centers to the total program of WRA falls in several general areas: (1) the use of group activities to facilitate the relocation program; (2) the provision of recreation services and community activities to sustain and improve the morale of center residents; (3) assistance in cooperation with the personnel office in developing recreation services for the appointed personnel.

The evacuee residents at the centers continued to assume increasing responsibility for the conduct of the community activities program. By the end of the period evacuee organizations to take care of certain aspects of the program had been established in seven of the nine centers. These organizations varied from center to center but their function, to become partners with the administration in the responsibility for the operations of the program, was the same in all cases. Special effort was made to develop this evacuee responsibility and to turn over to the residents phases of the program previously taken care of by the administration. This increase in evacuee participation meant less need for governmental subsidy and, with more interest shown by the community, a more vital program.

A major responsibility of the Community Activities Sections at the centers is to work with national private agencies and to encourage participation in their programs. Such participation facilitates the relocation program by providing opportunities for indentification with activities which may be continued outside the centers. Under a policy statement issued in June, 1944, responsibility was placed on the centers for arranging membership transfers

of persons planning relocation and for including relevant material concerning the leisure-time interests and group affiliations of individuals in the Relocation Summary for that person.

During the period several of these national agencies took an active interest in the relocation centers. In nearly all the centers the national YMCA made a practice of paying the cash and clothing allowance of evacuees to operate the YMCA facilities where full-time service are needed. The "Y" also assigned a full time employee--a former evacuee--to the work of integrating the Nisei into "Y" programs in communities throughout the country. The YWCA representatives visited extensively all the centers and advised with Administration officials about broadening the YWCA program for women and girls and helped with the program in other ways. Although evacuees were not permitted to contribute articles of production to the Red Cross for use by the Armed Forces, they did participate in many Red Cross activities of benefit to the center residents. The director of inter-racial activities for the Boy Scouts of America visited the centers to assist in the organization of Scout work. Outstanding in this field was the Drum and Bugle corps at Heart Mountain, a group of 65 young people who made a distinct contribution to community life. Interesting also was the cooperation of the Boy Scouts of Parker and Poston in collecting a freight car load of scrap paper in a drive, then joining together for a swim and supper at the center. The returns for the sale of the paper were used for the center USO.

Increased emphasis was placed on USO programs in the centers and at adjacent military installations. The two Arkansas relocation centers, Jerome and Rohwer, had special opportunities due to the proximity to Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and Camp Robinson, Arkansas. During the month of January, 585 service men from these camps participated in organized recreation programs at Jerome. All centers organized USO services to take care of visiting servicemen. Volunteer hostess groups were appointed for entertaining. Parents of Nisei soldiers set up committees for providing furniture and decorations for USO halls, and residents contributed financially to the national USO, as well as to the Red Cross.

As well as these national organizations, local social clubs were formed or maintained by those living within the same block or having the same interests. Such experience in group participation helped prepare people for a more successful adjustment to community living, and also helped to control juvenile delinquency. Interest in American-type activities continued to far outweight those of Japanese style. For each judo participant there were dozens interested in baseball, basketball, volley ball, Scouting, and similar activities.

Throughout the period evacuee personnel in the Community Activities Section and leaders of group activities at the centers tended to relocate in large numbers. This indicated an effective contribution by the community activities program toward relocation. But it also created problems in the continued operation of the center programs because of the high turnover. Leadership training programs were conducted at practically all centers in an attempt to meet the need.

A conference of the Community Activities Supervisors from all projects was held in Denver in May for the purpose of reviewing the experience of the

last two years. It helped to crystallize those practices in community activities which had been most effective and reviewed ways in which the program could make a fuller contribution to relocation.

LEGAL

The Office of the Solicitor of the War Relocation Authority, during the period covered by this report, continued to function as a service division. It continued to give legal advice to the Director and his administrative staff, to assist in the preparation of procedural documents, and to provide legal advice on problems raised by project operations and relocation policies. It also continued its relations with the Department of Justice on the Authority's legal problems, including liaison with the Alien Enemy Control Unit and the Immigration and Naturalization Service on the internment of dangerous aliens, the prosecution of persons in the centers suspected of violations of Federal laws, and the handling of parolees and deportees in relocation centers. It cooperated with the Department of Justice in handling litigation affecting the relocation problem. It also worked closely with the Alien Property Custodian and the Foreign Funds Control Unit of the Treasury Department in handling numerous problems affecting the evacuees.

Transfer to the Department of the Interior

The issuance of Executive Order No. 9423 by the President transferred the War Relocation Authority, its functions, records, property, personnel and funds, to the Department of the Interior, and the functions of the Director of the WRA to the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary of the Interior then immediately transferred this authority back to the Director, subject to certain limitations. The Solicitor's office participated in drafting orders and in working out the procedures for the transfer of records, funds, and accounts from the Office of Emergency Management to the Department of the Interior, and prepared a compilation of statutory provisions applicable to the Department of the Interior which affected the administration of the Authority. It also rendered advice in making several changes required in the language of the National War Agencies Appropriation Bill for the fiscal year 1945.

Special Activities.

The Solicitor's Office, in cooperation with the Department of Justice, assisted in working out a significant change of procedures with respect to paroled aliens. It was determined that the Authority would no longer be responsible for the eligibility for leave clearance of aliens who had one been paroled and were released or paroled. The Department of Justice agreed to assume full responsibility for their supervision.

The Solicitors' Office continued to work with leave clearance in all other cases as in the past, examining dockets in cases where the reviewer recommended denial of leave clearance and in other difficult cases. From these examinations suggestions were made for the improvement of leave procedures.

The Board of Appeals for Leave Clearance, established to hear appeals at Tule Lake from denial of leave clearance, had not met before June 30, 1944.

However, a sufficient number of appeals had been made by the end of the period to warrant calling a meeting shortly after July 1, 1944. The Project Attorney at Tule Lake is Secretary of this Board.

Following the Tule Lake incident of November 1943, a careful and thorough re-study was made of the policies governing the administration of the Tule Lake Segregation Center. One of the chief problems was what to do with the 100 aliens and 275 citizens who had been placed inside the stockade after the Army took over the administration of the project. An arrangement was made with the Department of Justice for the transfer to internment camps of aliens who were considered dangerous to the national security. At the project there was established a Fact Finding Committee, which included the project attorney, to prepare dockets on each individuals,review them, make recommendations to the project director who then submitted the recommendations to Washington. The Solicitor's Office assisted in setting up this procedure and also reviewed all the dockets which were submitted to the Washington office by the project director and made recommendations to him in each case where he had recommended internment. The Fact Finding Committee, in addition, prepared dockets on all citizens placed in the stockade, and reviewed all available evidence to determine whether each of the citizens should be prosecuted for violations of law, should remain in the stockade in the interests of maintaining law and order in the center, or should be released for residence in the center.

During this period the center cooperatives agreed to continue the Federation of Center Business Enterprises and the buying office in New York City. At the suggestion of the Solicitor's Office, the New York Buying Office was organized with two buyers being designated as agents of the several cooperatives through an agreement signed by the buyers and the cooperatives. Separate and distinct from the buying office is the Federation of Center Business Enterprises, for which the Solicitor's Office prepared the articles of association and by-laws.

Litigation

In the fall of 1943, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of Fred T. Korematsu for violation of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command. This decision held valid the evacuation and exclusion program carried out by the Army. In December 1943, a petition for a writ of certiorari, addressed to the Supreme Court of the United States, was being prepared. During the first half of 1944 the petition was filed and the Supreme Court granted the writ. As the period closed the case was pending on the calendar of the Supreme Court and was expected to be considered in the fall of 1944.

The Endo case was also considered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals during this period, but the Court did not decide it. The Court certified to the Supreme Court four questions on which it asked instructions to assist it in determining the validity of Miss Endo's detention. The essential point of the case was that although Miss Endo had been granted leave clearance, she still had to apply for indefinite leave and meet the requirements of the leave regulations with respect to means of support, community acceptance at destination, and reporting changes of address, before she would be permitted to leave the center. Like the Korematsu case, it was expected to be considered during the fall term.

Several escheat proceedings were instituted in the West Coast states during the first half of 1944 with respect to property owned by various evacuees allegedly in violation of the alien land laws. The filing of these suits presented an important policy problem for the Authority, inasmuch as, although some of the evacuees may have violated the laws of the states from which they were removed, others may be innocent of such charges and be wrongly suspected, and inasmuch as the Authority has responsibility for assisting the evacuees in maintaining and disposing of their property. A policy statement was issued by the Director pointing out that the Authority will do nothing to interfere with the enforcement of the alien land laws of the several states but will inform the evacuees of their rights under those laws and assist them in employing private attorneys to advise them in connection with investigations and litizations where the evacuees request such assistance.

In California a proposed initiative amendment to the alien land law of the state was being circulated whereby citizens of Japanese or other ancestry ineligible for citizenship who owe allegiance to a foreign government would also be prohibited from owning real property or watercraft. An analysis of the proposed measure by WRA's legal staff indicated that it was probably unconstitutional in several respects.

The legislature of the State of Colorado, during this period, considered and refused to pass legislation adopting an alien land law in that state. Circulation among the voters of an initiative amendment to the State Constitution was than begun. The matter was still pending at the close of the period.

EVACUEE PROPERTY

Through the first half of 1944, the Evacuee Property Office continued to devote its energies to servicing the West Coast property of the evacuees. The amount of business handled was slightly less than that of the previous six months.

Early in 1944 some administrative changes were made in the organization. The Evacuee Property Office, which had previously been under the Administrative Management Division in Washington, was changed to become directly responsible to the Assistant Director in the West Coast Office; and its designation was changed to Evacuee Property Division.

On January 18-20 an Evacuee Property Conference was held in San Francisco. Attending were representatives from Washington, the Attorneys and Property Officers from the centers, the Transportation and Property Supervisors from the area offices, and the personnel of the San Francisco office. As a result of the conference several new programs were made effective during the period: (1) the exchange of visits of property and transportation officers between the West Coast offices and the projects; (2) the investigation, reporting, and documenting of cases of fraud, vandalism, pilferage, fire damage, and serious management lapses; (3) the amending of transportation procedures to permit the cost of packing and crating evacuee property at the projects, and the elimination of the 500 pound limitation on evacuee-owned personal property shipments.

During the period warehouse space leased by WRA in the West Coast area was increased from 297,165 sq. ft. of floor space to 392,698 sq. ft. This re-

sulted from doubling the space in the San Francisco warehouse and increasing materially the space in Fresno and Seattle. This increase was necessary due to the continuing requests for government storage, as shown in the following table. Requests for transportion were also shown as greatly increased over the last period:

	July-Dec. '43	Jan.-June '44
No. of requests for storage	1531	2028
No. of requests for transportation	3227	4028
No. of lots moved to government storage	4409	4067
No. of lots shipped	3120	2838
No. of carload shipments	71	49

During this semi-annual period the Economic Analysis Section continued classifying and cataloguing information concerning real estate owned by evacuees. They completed the mapping of evacuee owned farm properties in counties formerly surveyed in the three West Coast states. More than 5200 pieces of property have been indentified, described, classified, and mapped. The filing of master index cards, showing type of property, acreage of farm land, transfers of title, and assessed valuation was completed.

The following composite activity report tabulates all business activities of all evacuee property field offices for the semi-annual period by type and number of transactions, and shows the amount of money actually handled by the Property Supervisors. "Miscellaneous activities" involves a transaction in which no money is handled, and may include anything from answering a telephone inquiry to several days spent investigating property or arranging transactions. The transactions involving farm property show the least activity, 17 per cent, the same as for the previous period. Cases involving farm and automotive equipment fell off considerably, from 39 per cent to 23 per cent. However, the proportion of cases involving urban and commercial property became increasingly dominant in the work of the property supervisors, jumping from 48 per cent to 60 per cent.

HEALTH AND SANITATION

In spite of the marked drop in population at all centers, hospital statistics indicate only a small decrease in hospital usage for the first half of 1944. However, it is evident that the peak in hospital care was reached in the fall of 1943.

During this semi-annual period there were 6,158 hospital admissions, and 124,575 out-patients were treated, exclusive of optometry and dental services. It was found necessary in 656 instances to have medical care provided through other sources than center facilities. No epidemics occurred during the period, and the vital statistics continued to indicate a good overall health situation, with 892 births and 294 deaths.

Personnel for the center hospital staffs continued to be a pressing

Activity Report of All Evacuee Property Field Offices
January 1 to June 30, 1944

Type of Activity	Number	Dollars
Farm Property	15	
A. Sales	15	$ 67,626.34
B. Leases		
1. Cash	16	2,273.70
2. Share	4	463.14
C. Collections		
1. Rent	36	9,223.56
2. Other	22	3,184.52
D. Debet Adjustments		
1. Mortgages and Contracts	10	7,207.24
2. Miscellaneous Obligations	-	-
E. Total Number of Transactions Involved	103	89,983.50
Farm and Automotive Equipment		
A. Sales		
1. Farm Machinery	32	28,840.03
2. Trucks	21	6,804.37
3. Automobiles	41	18,392.54
4. Other	16	3,152.00
B. Collections	35	7,264.38
C. Total Number of Transactions Involved	145	64,453.32
Urban and Commercial Property		
A. Sales		
1. Hotels and Apartments	10	52,738.90
2. Stores and Industrial Property	5	7,992.00
3. Residential Property	15	29,175.27
4. Industrial Equipment and Fixtures	41	13,996.20
5. Merchandise	18	3,231.21
6. Other	69	26,501.08
B. Leases and Other Types of Management		
1. Hotels and Apartments	16	4,574.16
2. Stores and Industrial Property	1	50.00
3. Residential Property	4	1,352.62
4. Industrial Equipment and Fixtures	2	37.50
5. Other	10	7,301.94
C. Collections		
1. Rents	47	3,386.75
2. Other	92	14,491.73
D. Debt Adjustments		
1. Mortgages and Contracts	1	1,103.00
2. Miscellaneous Obligations	37	3,085.08
E. Total Number of Transactions Involved	368	169,017.44
Miscellaneous Activities		
A. Miscellaneous Inquiries Answered	3153	
B. Miscellaneous Services Performed	2995	
C. Contraband	258	
Total Number of All Types of Transactions Completed	7022	323,454.26

problem with the increased emphasis on relocation and the above-indicated low decrease in hospital usage. More and more appointed medical officers became necessary to supplement the relocation of evacuee doctors. This resulted in some centers existing on skeleton staffs for short periods, but by temporary assignments of doctors from other centers and gradual employment of a few new appointees, adequate service was consistently maintained.

As nurses are the largest group of appointed personnel in the health section, the increased shortage during this period made proper disposition of those remaining very difficult. About 35 terminations occurred, and four centers were without chief nurses for short periods. However, the chief nurse vacancies were filled by promotions, transfers and coverage by the Washington office personnel. Only one new appointment was obtained through Civil Service during the six months and every other source of nurses was tapped without much success. Nurses' aides dropped off so sharply that some centers threatened to curtail hospital patient care, but this was partly solved by inducing married aides to return and also by employment of high school girls in this capacity for the summer.

Appointed hospital administrators were present on all centers for the first time during this period, and this greatly aided the principal medical officers at each center, as they were able to devote more time to technical work. Administrators noticeably improved control of hospital equipment and supplies, and were exceptionally helpful in preparation of the budget.

Sanitation and Sanitary Engineering:

Effort was continued at all centers to improve sanitation at hog farms, slaughter houses, chicken farms and canneries. Considerable emphasis was placed on special training for water and sewage plant operators at the plants that require detailed attention. In April, the seasonal work on malaria control was again initiated at both Arkansas centers, and in May, Central Utah began a rodent control program for plague prevention with the aid of the Fish and Wild Life Service. General improvement in sanitation was noticeable at all centers, due to the fact that attention was paid to the program by both appointed personnel and evacuees.

FIRE PROTECTION

The loss by fire in the centers during the first half of 1944 was $38,417, or only 60 per cent of the loss experienced in the preceding six months. The largest fire was at the Gila River Center with a loss of $16,000; the second largest fire was at the Colorado River Center, where a loss of $9,800 was incurred. There were seven fires with a loss of $500 or more, compared to eleven during the preceding period. The per capita loss was $413, having dropped from a high of $.69. This figure for the first half of 1944, while a 40 per cent drop, still ranked second highest for any semi-annual period in WRA's history. It indicated the need for effective action to prevent the trend of continuing losses.

The increased age and flammability of the buildings were an important

factor in the high fire losses. Seriously affecting the fire fighting facilities, also, was a shortage of water in all but three centers and trouble with the mechanical delivery of water in several. There was a higher water consumption than was anticipated and the production of some of the wells fell off. At Central Utah breaks in the water mains left many of the fire hydrants without water. At Tule Lake, with its additional population, three new wells had to be drilled and new fire hydrants and a 250,000 gallon high storage tank installed.

The worst fire of the period occurred in a warehouse at the Gila River Center, with a loss of $16,000. When the firemen responded to the alarm at 6:35 A.M. there was no water in the reserve tanks or in the mains. This failure in the water supply was due to difficulties with the electrical system. Fuses had been blown out the night before and had been replaced, but they were found fused again just before the fire. Two other failures of the water supply occurred at Gila after this heavy loss but both times it was discovered before there were serious results.

During the closing of the Jerome center great piles of grass and rubbish were observed throughout the center, often close to buildings. These constituted series fire hazards. It was recommended that when other centers close, safe burning areas should be designated and the burning done regularly in order to avoid such large accumulations.

During the period provisions were made whereby reports of the project Boards of Survey will in the future accompany all reports of fire losses. These Survey Boards must, within five days after a fire, survey and report on fire losses. The reports will be reviewed by the Washington Board of Survey and an attempt made to fix the responsibility in case of gross negligence and to recommend any other steps that may be considered necessary to correct conditions. It is believed that this close scrutiny of reports and the recommendations made both at the centers and in Washington will aid in reducing fire losses.

INTERNAL SECURITY

No disturbance of any importance occurred at any of the relocation centers during the first half of 1944. There were protests when Selective Service was opened, particularly at Heart Mountain, but they did not reach the realm of a disturbance. The following table shows the number of cases involving law and order violations reported by the centers during the two periods:

Center	Number of Cases	
	July 1943-Dec. 1944	Jan. 1944-June 1944
Central Utah	37	50
Colorado River	24	37
Gila River	107	33
Granada	45	48
Heart Mountain	69	80
Jerome	30	3*
Manzanar	120	84

(Continued)

Center	Number of Cases	
	July 1943-Dec. 1944	Jan.1944-June 1944
Minidoka	92	199
Rohwer	29	26
Tule Lake	85**	342
	838	802

* Report up to and including May 31, 1944, only.

** The number of cases refers to the July 1 to November 4 period, not to the November 4 to December 31 interval when the Army was in charge of Tule Lake.

The great increase at Tule Lake is attributable to the fact that the WRA again took charge of the center early in the semi-annual period (January 14) and that thereafter a more intensified type of case reporting was being used for that center. No report is included for the period when the Army had charge.

A summary of the more serious type of offenses actually shows a decrease from one period to the next at the relocation centers, though Tule Lake shows an increase:

Offense	Nine Relocation Centers		Tule Lake	
	July-Dec. 1943	Jan.-June 1944	July-Dec.43	Jan.-June 44
Thefts	95	73	11	25
Burglaries and Robberies	30	21	11	15
Assaults	51	37	2	10
Disorderly Conduct	36	28	5	11
Violations of Liquor Laws	11	6	0	5
Gambling	23	13	-	-
	246	178	29	66

The total number of more serious offenses at the relocation centers is considerably less than the number of similar offenses in average American cities of approximately the same size. A comparison of the following offenses committed at the centers with a similar group, as reported in the latest issue of the F. B. I. Uniform Crime Reports, discloses the following:

Offenses Jan.-June, 1944	Relocation Center Rate Per 100,000	Uniform Crime Report (FBI) Rate Per 100,000
Thefts (Larceny & Auto Thefts)	116	288
Burglaries & Robberies	45	97
Murder	0	1

At the relocation centers in the first half of 1944 arrests for drunkenness

FIRE LOSSES AT WRA CENTERS FOR PERIOD ENDING JUNE 30, 1944
(As revised, Dec. 31, 1944)

CENTER	No. of Fires			FIRE LOSSES - DOLLARS											
				Government Losses			Private Losses			Total Losses		
	Half-year			Half-year			Half-year			Half-year		
	1st	2nd	Year	1st	2nd	Year	1st	2nd	Year	1st	2nd	Year
Central Utah	23	13	36	$ 47	$ 3,917	$ 3,964	$ 20	$ 0	$ 20	$ 67	$ 3,917	$ 3,984
Colorado River	18	11	29	22,190	9,870	32,060	29,649	3	29,651	51,839	9,873	61,712
Gila River	8	9	17	2,048	16,480	18,528	80	252	332	2,128	16,732	18,860
Granada	28	16	44	475	2,702	3,177	5	615	620	480	3,317	3,797
Heart Mountain	87	27	114	1,201	259	1,460	100	150	250	1,301	409	1,710
Jerome	17	3	20	395	4	399	151	55	206	546	59	605
Manzanar	11	14	25	590	11	601	308	1	309	897	11	908
Minidoka	26	9	35	1,549	513	2,062	28	950	978	1,577	1,463	3,040
Rohwer	19	15	34	3	14	17	0	0	0	3	14	17
Tule Lake	12	27	39	5,045	2,809	7,854	50	5	55	5,195	2,814	8,009
TOTALS	249	144	393	33,543	36,579	70,122	30,391	2,031	32,421	64,033	38,609	102,642

PER CAPITA FIRE LOSS AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES
FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1944

CENTER	Fire Loss Per Capita Loss 1/ Half-year 1st	2nd	Year	% Bldg. Value Half-year 1st	2nd	Year	Inspections (Thousands) Half-year 1st	2nd	Year	Hazards Removed (Hundreds) Half-year 1st	2nd	Year	Fires with Loss Over $500 Half-year 1st	2nd	Year	Population Jan.1,1944
	$	$	$	%	%	%										
Central Utah	.009	.536	.541	.002	.117	.104	10.5	18.2	28.7	.7	.8	1.5	0	2	2	7303
Colorado River	3.047	.759	4.50	.86	.178	1.028	37.6	24.2	61.9	5.4	18.6	24.0	7	2	9	13,732
Gila River	.156	1.781	1.94	.048	.377	.471	33.2	23.1	56.3	3.0	4.1	7.1	1	1	2	9,727
Granada	.013	.423	.55	.013	.081	.101	5.0	14.7	19.7	1.6	3.5	5.1	0	1	1	6,925
Heart Mountain	.139	.044	.17	.041	.014	.053	34.1	30.6	64.7	81.8	1.2	83.0	1	0	1	9,787
Jerome	.090	.013	.09	.018	.003	.015	21.8	27.3	49.1	.1	.0	.1	0	0	0	6,623
Manzanar	.103	.003	.11	.029	.002	.029	101.0	102.4	203.4	1.5	3.0	4.5	0	0	0	8,485
Minidoka	.206	.168	.34	.045	.033	.086	25.0	37.5	62.5	.0	.2	.2	1	1	0	8,964
Rohwer	.000	.000	.002	.000	.000	.000	4.3	3.3	7.7	1.0	.2	1.2	0	0	0	6,561
Tule Lake	.385	.160	.54	.089	.051	.136	10.9	50.3	61.2	.2	43.2	43.4	1	1	2	14,853
TOTALS:	.69	.413	1.10	.157	.094	.252	300.5	335.1	635.6	95.3	74.8	170.1	11	7	18	92,960

1/ First half of year, based on population as of June 30, 1943.
2nd half of year, based on population as of April 1, 1944.
Year, based on population as of January 1, 1944.

increased slightly, and the combined figure for traffic and motor vehicle violations plus accidents were almost double that of the preceding six months. At Tule Lake there was a slight drop in the number of traffic and motor violations.

Juvenile delinquency, though still far less of a problem than in other communitiies of comparable size, continued to require attention at most of the centers. There was a definite attempt to divert the energies of the younger groups into acceptable and productive channels through an intensification of activities programs and the employment wherever possible of Internal Security officers who had had experience and were interested in working with young people.

Training programs designed to strengthen the center evacuee forces were inaugurated in all centers, and generally speaking, the evacuee staffs proved diligent and effective in law and order enforcement.

Tule Lake has continued to present the most serious problems in Internal Security. To cope with it more adequately cars equipped with two-way radios were put into use by the Internal Security Section. The stockade, which had been established at the time of the incident in November, was turned over to the administration of the WRA by the Army on May 23.

MILITARY POLICE

By agreement of the War Department and the War Relocation Authority the military guards at relocation centers were further reduced in April, 1944, as follows:

	Former Strength		Present Strength	
RELOCATION CENTER	Officers	Men	Officers	Men
Jerome, Arkansas	2	65	1	13
Rohwer, Arkansas	2	65	1	13
Granada, Colorado	3	74	2	17
Heart Mountain, Wyo.	3	74	2	25
Minidoka, Idaho	2	60	1	15
Central Utah, Utah	2	80	1	15
Colorado River, Ariz.	5	132	4	64
Gila River, Arizona	5	135	3	64
Manzanar, California	3	134	2	64
Tule Lake, California	31	899	29	736

The reduction in no way altered the responsibilities of the Military Commanders and the Project Directors created by the original agreement between the Assistant Secretary of War and the War Relocation Authority dated April 17, 1942.

The buildings in the military areas at each center no longer required by the reduced military strength were made available for use, in place, by the War Relocation Authority.

AGRICULTURE

Gratifying progress was made in the agricultural program during the first half of 1944. As compared with the same time the previous year the program functioned more smoothly and more nearly in proportion to the needs of the War Relocation Authority than at any time before. In the first two years the conducting of an agricultural program presented many difficulties; in all but a few centers the land had to be cleared and prepared for crops; but by the spring of 1944 very little of the land was "raw" and this fact made the task a great deal easier, both in planning and in actual labor. For the first time, also, the supply of farm machinery was, in the main, adequate to the needs and since more efficient methods of maintenance and repair had been developed there were fewer breakdowns. The main problem was, as had been expected and as was the case in almost all other enterprises, the shortage of labor. Both farm foremen and laborers had relocated or been inducted into the Army in large numbers so that it became necessary to recruit high school boys and older women. The training of the young boys was sometimes difficult, but in spite of this boys of 14 to 16 were taught to operate tractors and to do other important jobs. In some of the centers it seemed impossible to recruit large numbers of women for the field work. They were desired for such handwork as setting the plants, hoeing, thinning, and harvesting. In spite of the difficulties, the agricultural work in some of the centers was largely accomplished with the aid of these high school boys and women over 60.

Because of the labor shortage, plans were made to reduce materially the agricultural program. For example, at Manzanar it was determined that the beef cattle herd should be eliminated as soon as the supply of feeder cattle on hand were fattened and slaughtered. The production of poultry for meat at Manzanar was also to be discontinued as soon as the existing meat birds were killed. At Granada, plans for producing beef for shipment to Heart Mountain were cancelled and the beef cattle production at that center in the future is to be confined to local needs.

January to June was the time for harvesting in the southern Arizona centers (Gila River and Poston), but the time for planting in the other eight. However, wet weather in March and April delayed the fitting of the land and the planting of crops, and thus the harvest. In all centers, 4,178 acres of vegetables were planted or under cultivation, with more to be planted in July for winter use. The acreage of vegetables planted at Tule Lake was greatly reduced from previous plantings, due to an agreement between the administration and the center residents following the November incident that the production there should be confined to the needs of the center rather than to growing a surplus to be shipped to other centers, as had been the case in the past two

years. The vegetable harvest at all centers was 7,874,789 pounds, with a value of $322,876. This harvest was mainly from Poston and Gila River; from that latter center 3,276,970 pounds were shipped to other centers. Tule Lake and Manzanar also shipped vegetables, but in much smaller quantity.

Field crops planted totaled 5749 acres, but the yield at some centers was expected to be low since the irrigation of field crops was not so highly developed as for the vegetable crops.

The livestock program conducted during the period was much larger than during the previous periods. This was due largely to the improvement in the physical facilities for livestock production. Hogs were produced at all centers, in most cases supplying 100% of the pork that was needed in feeding the evacuees. An eighth poultry enterprise, at Rohwer, was instituted during the period. At other centers physical improvements were made and the enterprises increased, but in general they were held at subsistence level and future plans are to keep them there. In the future there will be only three beef cattle enterprises--at Gila River, Central Utah, and Granada--since Manzanar is to be eliminated. Gila River is the only center which supplies another project with beef, namely, Poston. At Gila River, also, the only dairy herd, with an average of 86 fresh cows produced 158,788 quarts of milk with a value of $15,878.00. The higher milk production over the previous period is accounted for by improved management of the herd as well as a small increase in its number. At the end of June, nearly half the needs of the Gila population were being supplied by milch cows at the center.

INDUSTRIES

The industry or manufacturing program at the centers remained at approximately the same level as it had during the previous six months, though toward the end of the period several shops were closed. The industries which continued to function were those which furthered the maintenance of the project facilities and contributed to the production of project-used goods. Only one center provided surplus to ship out, namely Manzanar where the garment factory sold its products not needed at the project through the Cooperative Enterprises of other centers.

Rohwer had no industries at all; those at Heart Mountain were closed in January--the sawmill only for a temporary period because of deep snow in the forest. Jerome, which had been fairly active in supplying the mess halls with food products, closed out in May and June just before the project closed. Tule Lake and Granada each had one very active industry, namely furniture and silk screen work, respectively. The latter industry produced 67,457 posters for use at the center and by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Gila River also produced for the Navy, having made 65 small ship models, and two large models, one a seven foot model of the battleship South Dakota and the other a six and a half foot model of the heavy cruiser Cleveland. Because of lack of orders the ship model factory was closed in May, but plans were made to replace it with a furniture factory in June or July. Aside from these products, Gila River produced, for use in the community, tofu and bean sprouts, as also did Central Utah, and Minidoka. Colorado River and Manzanar had the greatest number of industries, most of which were devoted to food products such as Tofu,

AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM-JANUARY 1 to JUNE 30, 1944

Center	Vegetables				Field Crops	Livestock							
	Planted Acres	Harvested Pounds	Shipped Pounds	Sold Pounds	Planted Acres	Hogs No.	Killed Live Wt.	Poultry No.	Killed Live Wt.	Eggs Hens	Produced No. Doz.	Cattle No.	Killed Live Wt.
Central Utah	242	70,400	--------	------	990	887	202,478	62	186	1,285	9,750	377	308,880
Colorado River	361	1,770,892	--------	------	819	565	147,405	4,275	14,622	5,285	22,620	----	--------
Gila River	1,462	5,111,730	3,276,970	10,698	1,400	1,106	331,921	3,332	11,109	5,252	57,630	1,377	412,497
Granada	505	57,345	--------	------	2,185	1,017	231,960	4,712	22,170	2,210	9,468	456	360,494
Heart Mountain	427	58,400	--------	------	573	873	217,926	1,437	7,244	8,918	59,472	30	23,670
Jerome	123	308,370	4,600	------	-----	701	200,883	-----	-------	-----	------	-----	-------
Manzanar	242	145,598	35,250	------	126	469	114,036	3,869	15,476	4,669	32,040	87	84,042
Minidoka	312	159,527	--------	------	425	611	156,791	3,249	18,244	3,627	30,750	-----	------
Rohwer	202	192,527	--------	------	375	411	171,625	1,150	3,600	-----	------	-----	------
Tule Lake	305	-------	669,220	720,000	856	532	195,348	-----	-------	-----	------	-----	------
Total	4,178	7,874,789	3,976,040	730,698	5,749	7,172	1,946,373	22,135	92,651	31,246	221,730	2,327	1,889,583
Value		$322,876					$311,420		$23,016		$88,692		$170,062

Note: In addition, the dairy herd at Gila River consisting of an average of 86 cows in milk produced 158,788 quarts of milk (value $15,878). $934,266 Total

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miso, shoyu, pickles, bean sprouts, and noodles, but also including a number of arts and crafts and repair shops, and, at Manzanar, the rather large garment and mattress factories. In the garment factory were produced 25,430 garments by a staff of 52 employees, in the mattress factory 4,020 mattresses by a crew of 19.

MOTOR TRANSPORT AND MAINTENANCE

The difficulties of keeping up the motor transport in the centers were not lessened during the first six months of 1944. However, the transfer from the Army to the WRA of 542 vehicles helped in the problem. This transfer had been arranged in the previous period but was not accomplished until the first half of 1944. The directive authorizing the transfer incorporated a provision that no longer would major repair parts be furnished to the WRA from the various Army Command shops subsequent to March 1, 1944.

In all centers except Heart Mountain, shortages in personnel, in equipment, or in facilities made it most difficult to keep enough vehicles in working order to serve the centers. In several centers the time and energies of the available personnel were devoted mainly to work on the construction of garage buildings and motor pools, the lack of which had slowed down maintenance work in the past. While the construction was in progress, however, the maintenance work had to be neglected due to the shortage of personnel for both jobs.

In the last period a plan had been initiated in cooperation with the vocational Education Section to set up regular classes with Civil Service teachers for the instruction of mechanics at each of the centers. The students were to get practical training by working on tractors, trucks, and other equipment in the motor pool or at their own shops, in addition to classroom instruction. By June all centers but Manzanar and Rohwer had these classes underway. The program was in addition to in-service training and learnerships.

Mileage traveled on all centers, compared with the previous six months, showed an increase of 226,152 miles. This was not, in all probability, an increase in actual mileage traveled, but was due to more careful checking. Previously there had been some trips which had not been recorded and others which had been only estimated because the speedometers on the old cars were not in operating condition.

At the end of June the WRA was responsible for operating and maintaining 2358 cars, trucks, and other pieces of equipment. Beside the 1780 listed below, which were in operation at the centers, there were also 477 tractors and other types of heavy equipment, and 30 on loan from other agencies. In addition there were 71 passenger cars at the field offices.

Types	Number
Passenger Cars	307
Stake Trucks	567
Cargo Trucks	281
Dump Trucks	172
Pick-up Trucks	233

Tank Trucks	14
Panel Trucks	63
Semi-Trailers	26
Buses	10
Carryalls & Station Wagons	30
Van & Winch Trucks	1
Truck-Tractors	12
Express Trucks	6
Load Luggers	2
Ambulances	29
Refrigerator Truck	1
Fire Trucks	26
Total	1780

CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE

By the end of June, 1944 a great deal of the construction work which was planned during the early days of the War Relocation Authority had been completed, though, for reasons of changed WRA policy, manpower restrictions, and other difficulties, it was necessary to reduce the program very sharply in many particulars. In many centers the major part of the program which continued was the work on irrigation, land subjugation, and the construction of food processing and storage developments.

During this period the temporary nature of the construction of the relocation centers became more and more evident through the sharp increase in maintenance costs. It was found that more and more skilled and semi-skilled workers were required to keep the centers in operation and to conduct the minimum amount of necessary maintenance work. The increase in materials needed was more than expected. Roofing and tar paper covering had to be replaced on many of the buildings. Flooring foundations, wall board, and interiors have deteriorated to a point where replacement and repair had to be undertaken to make the apartments livable. The deterioration is due to the inferior grades of materials used in the first place and to the overcrowded living conditions.

During the period a resurvey was made of the construction needs of all the centers in order to reduce the program where possible and to make it more commensurate with the ability of the available staff to accomplish the work. A difficulty encountered in attempting to make these adjustments was that some building which was already underway might be cancelled. It was decided to adhere rigidly to the plan that construction projects should be carried on only if they contributed directly to the health and safety of the center residents and to the provision of food required by them.

EVACUEE EMPLOYMENT

Early in 1944 WRA policy with respect to evacuee labor management in the centers was formalized in a statement which recognized the right of workers to negotiate and bargain collectively with the center administration on any matter concerning their own welfare or the welfare of the community, including labor standards, classification, schedules of hours of work, and employment

STATUS OF W.P.B. APPROVED CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

CENTERS	Number of Projects Underway and Per Cent Complete as of June 30, 1944																							
	Farm Projects		Evacuee Barracks		Industrial Bldgs.		Community Bldgs.		Staff Housing		Admin. Bldgs. Project		Service Bldgs.		Utilities		Roads & Bridges		Hospital Unit		Misc. Projects		Totals	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Central Utah	7	83	2	100	2	100	3	96	1	95	4	100	3	87	2	90	-	-	3	72	-	-	27	91
Colorado River	6	78	-	-	-	-	3	74	1	100	3	77	3	56	-	-	3	80	1	60	1	30	21	69
Gila River	7	80	1	100	1	80	1	92	1	93	6	82	1	55	1	100	1	100	-	-	1	100	21	88
Granada	4	65	-	-	1	60	1	100	2	55	2	95	2	73	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	75
Heart Mountain	5	84	1	80	1	100	1	100	1	90	-	-	-	-	3	100	1	60	1	100	1	70	15	87
Jerome	3	97	2	95	1	100	2	78	1	100	5	100	4	100	-	-	2	38	2	100	2	38	24	85
Manzanar	7	99	1	100	2	100	2	90	2	100	1	100	1	100	2	75	-	-	1	100	-	-	19	96
Minidoka	6	76	2	49	-	-	4	71	1	90	1	100	1	40	-	-	-	-	1	75	1	75	17	72
Rohwer	2	33	-	-	1	100	2	93	1	100	2	75	1	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	85
Tule Lake	4	98	1	90	2	100	2	100	1	93	4	96	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	100	1	100	16	97
Totals	51	79	10	88	11	93	21	89	12	92	28	92	16	76	8	91	7	70	10	69	7	69	181	

conditions. A procedure was recommended for establishing a fair labor committee in each center.

In order to give evacuee workers rights and privileges more nearly comparable to other workers throughout the nation, sick leave and vacation leave were authorized according to length of service.

The most significant development in evacuee employment was the increasing labor shortage, largely caused by relocation and the induction of young men into the armed forces. Both relocation and induction took the most employable evacuees, leaving the centers with a population increasingly composed of the very old, the very young and the less skilled. As a result of the decline in employable residents, a number of activities operated below an efficient level. Farm and construction and maintenance operations were particularly hampered.

Adjustment was made particularly difficult because the previous surplus of labor had not encouraged efficient utilization of personnel.

From February through May, 1944, the total population of eight relocation centers (Jerome is excluded because the closing of the center June 30 made the decline in population artificial) declined approximately 7,600 while the number of unemployable persons declined only about 2,000. Thus the percentage of unemployables increased about 3 per cent in four months. At the same time, while the actual number of persons employed decreased about 2,300, the percentage of workers to the total population increased slightly over 1 per cent. Many new workers came from the 17 and 18 year old group, the people over 60, and women who had never been employed previously.

It became increasingly evident that the number and distribution of workers could not be efficiently determined in Washington and that the best utilization of manpower was a problem which would have to be worked out at each center through the cooperative efforts of the administration and the residents. Accordingly, on June 29 the Director, in a letter to all Project Directors, recommended the establishment at each center of a manpower commission made up of representatives of both the administration and the residents. It was suggested that the commission, after making an analysis of the labor supply and labor needs, assign a labor priority to each activity and plan a program for improved utilization of personnel and performance.

EVACUEE EMPLOYMENT AT THE CENTERS
June 30, 1944

Center	Population	Number Employed and paid by WRA	Percent of Total Population Employed
Central Utah	6,075	2515	41.39
Colorado River	11,705	5225	44.63
Gila River	10,179	3525	34.63
Granada	6,093	2437	39.99
Heart Mountain	8,993	3096	34.42

Continued

Center	Population	Number Employed and paid by WRA	Percent of Total Population Employed
Jerome	0	0	
Manzanar	5,475	2581	47.14
Minidoka	7,083	3044	42.97
Rohwer	7,170	2345	32.70
Tule Lake	18,657	5703	30.56
TOTALS	81,430	30,471	38.71

FINANCE

During the first half of 1944 the staff of the Administrative Management Division continued to apply the procedures and work toward the goals which had already been established and were reported in the previous semi-annual period. Two developments affected the work of this division particularly: (1) The transfer of the Colorado River Relocation Center from operation by the Office of Indian Affairs to operation by the WRA. This made it possible to make the systems of financial reporting uniform at all centers, and to apply to Colorado River the procedures followed by other centers in the fields of accounting, personnel, and supply. (2) The transfer of the WRA from the Office of Emergency Management to the Department of the Interior on February 16. Central Administrative Services Division of OEM continued to render certain personnel, accounting and supply services to the field offices and Washington office of WRA up through June 30, at which time all such services were terminated. (The centers had been performing these functions for themselves since July 1, 1943.) The Washington office made plans to take over all financial responsibilities on July 1, 1944, and to provide services in accounting, procurement, payrolling, maintenance of leave and retirement records for the Washington office and field offices outside the West Coast. At the same time an Administrative Division was set up in the Western Field Office of WRA to give the same service to WRA offices in the West Coast area.

SUPPLY

A further stage in the development of the WRA supply program was reached on June 20, 1944, with the issuance of a Supply Handbook, outlining a well-rounded program based on advance requisitioning, property utilization, and salvage. This was supplemented by the issuance of a Property Control Handbook to go into effect July 1. It was designed to improve the system of showing property availability, which is basic to avoiding the accumulation of surpluses in an agency which is only temporary.

MESS OPERATIONS

By the end of June the centers had accumulated substantial savings in food ration points. These points were issued to the WRA by the OPA according to the formula applied to institutions, with deductions to allow for food grown or slaughtered on the centers. The point savings were:

Processed foods	- - 19,676,000 points
Sugar	- - 1,706,000 points
Meat	- - 40,350,000 points

These surpluses are equal, approximately, to WRA point allotments for two months in processed food, 3½ months in sugar, and 4½ months for meat. The savings in points were accomplished by good management and also by the purchase and use of unrationed foods as substitutes for processed foods and meats, without curtailing the diet nor denying the residents an adequate supply of fresh meats.

EXAMINATIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS

In order to assure conformance with the policies and procedures of the Authority in the widely scattered field offices and centers and to uncover any irregularities or cases of malpractice, the Examinations and Investigations Section was created on January 17, 1944. Representatives of this section travel to the field offices and centers and examine their records, practices, and activities. The institution of this regular examination has helped to make the procedures of the various centers uniform and more efficient.

COMMUNITY ANALYSIS

The job of community analysis is to interpret to the administrators the human beings whom the WRA program is designed to rehabilitate and to advise in the formation of policy and procedure. This function was carried out during the semi-annual period both in Washington and at the projects. During the first quarter of the period analysts were established at all the projects.

An increased effort was made to provide information on evacuee background and on center conditions for the use of the whole WRA staff and for outside groups and persons interested in the WRA program. These reports covered three major lines: (1) Analysis of evacuee attitudes towards resettlement and of the social adjustment of resettlers for the purpose of furthering the relocation program; (2) analysis of current human relations problems in the relocation centers; and (3) systematic description and reporting of backgrounds, viewpoints, and customs of the various segments of the evacuee population. During the period twelve mimeographed reports were prepared for distribution by the section.

In the general series, Community Analysis Reports, two issues were made. "Japanese Americans Educated in Japan -- the Kibei" appeared in January as a descriptive analysis of this little understood segment of the evacuee population. A general report on "Buddhism in the United States" was issued in May.

Five analyses of specially significant events or attitudes on the projects were selected for issue in the Project Analysis Series. "Studies of Segregants at Manzanar" was designed to give a picture of the kinds of people segregated to the Tule Lake Center. "A Preliminary Survey of the Boilermen's Dispute at Minidoka" was a detailed analysis of the behavior of staff and evacuees during a serious labor dispute. "The Tule Lake Incident" analyzed the factors which caused the November incident at the segregation center.

"The Reaction of Heart Mountain to the Opening of Selective Service to the Nisei" gave in detail both the positive and the negative reactions of Heart Mountain evacuees to the new Army policy. "The Significant Factors in Requests for Repatriation and Expatriation" described the nature of the motives of evacuees in requesting repatriation to Japan. This study was utilized by the Attorney General's office in connection with the legal problems of renunciation of U. S. citizenship.

A new series of mimeographed reports called Community Analysis Notes was instituted in February. This series was designed to give staff and interested outsiders a more intimate picture of evacuee life. There were four issues of this series during the period. "From a Nisei Who Said 'No' "went behind the formal interview of a young boy who answered "No" in the registration and gave in his own words the nature of the experiences which led him to his decision. "Engagement and Marriage Customs at Minidoka" and "Traditional Japanese Thereapeutics Practiced at Minidoka" gave some details of unfamiliar customs at one center. "Social and Political Organization of the Block at Manzanar" gave an evacuee analysis of the fundamental social unit in a relocation center.

A second new series consisted of reports on the growing communities of relocated people outside the centers. The Community Analysis Section cooperated with the University of California Study of Evacuation and Resettlement in the production of a report on the relocated population in Chicago. The Washington staff carried out a study of relocated persons and their problems in the Washington area. The report on this study, issued as "Relocation to Washington", was released in April, 1944.

These studies, which were distributed within and outside of the Authority, were for the purpose of providing information on some of the less generally understood aspects of Japanese Americans background.

INFORMATION SERVICES

The information services of the WRA continued to be active in the three major fields: (1) the dissemination of information at the centers, (2) the maintenance of public relations, and (3) the reporting of center and field activities to the Washington office. Considerable thought was also directed toward furthering the relocation program. For this purpose pamphlets were issued, both for the evacuees, to inform them about particular areas in which they might wish to settle, and to acquaint the general public with the problems of the evacuees. Since the residents who remain at the centers are already Issei, many of the pamphlets were translated into Japanese. Pictures and movies were also distributed to the centers, and relocation libraries continued to be built up.

When the WRA came under the Department of the Interior it was necessary to integrate the Reports Division with Interior's Division of Information. A minimum of change was called for, however, in this transfer.

Towards the end of the period, in view of the increasing needs of the agency, plans were made for expanding the Washington staff of the Reports Division and for some reorganization of its functions.

Considerable use was made during the period of visual material. No new movies were made, but a 16 mm. Kodachrome film called "A Challenge to Democracy," which tells the story of the evacuation, was completed. Both this and "Go for Broke" were shown to various groups outside the centers and had good receptions. "Go for Broke", "The Way Ahead," and films depicting various parts of the country were shown at the centers for use in relocation work. Numerous still pictures were also taken at the centers, of relocated evacuees, and of Nisei soldiers, and added to the files in the centers and in Washington; a file was also started in the San Francisco office. From these files pictures were supplied for various uses, one of which was illustrations for publications. Several pamphlets were gotten out or started, including six more of the "Facts About America" series. Considerable progress was made, also, in work on one of the most ambitious WRA pamphlets yet to be attempted, "Nisei in Uniform," for which photographs were collected from many sources. Photographs were supplied on request to numerous non-WRA publications, newspapers, and picture services. A considerable display of visual material of various types was furnished the Relocation Team which visited most of the centers during this period. This material included the two movies, "Go for Broke" and "The Way Ahead", exhibits of photographs of relocated evacuees and of various areas, selections of clippings, maps, pamphlets, and folders. An interesting documentary record was made of the closing of the Jerome center, where two photographers were detailed to cover this event. Following is a summary of negatives taken and reprints made during this period:

New Negatives by Denver Photo Unit and Photo Editor	307
New negatives from centers	95
New negatives from area offices	172
5 by 7 prints	3673
8 by 10 prints	2955
11 by 14 prints	753

Aside from the pamphlets mentioned above for which pictures were used, other informational material was put out from the Washington office for use at the centers and by the public. For the evacuees it was largely in the form of relocation information; for the public it was information about the evacuees, including such titles as, "These Are Our Parents", "Democracy is for the Unafraid", and "Making Democracy Work". Various speeches of wide interest were also mimeographed. Released to the press were a number of news items, many of which were carried widely throughout the nation.

During the period, the historian, working with the Department of the Interior and the Committee on Records of War Administration of the Bureau of the Budget, continued to keep a record of the Authority and prepared sections of what will eventually be a full history of the WRA.

In the library use was made of the bookbinding class at Gila River to

bind several volumes of project newspapers, as this was judged to be a valuable method of preserving these documents. The library continued as before to serve the Washington office in gathering reference material, answering reference questions, and collecting the documentation of the program.

The Reports Officers at the projects and the relocation field offices were able to keep in contact with editors and wire services in their areas and to keep them informed of the happenings in the centers and newsworthy events among the evacuees, and also to check stories which the newspapers might have picked up indirectly. In this way more accurate reporting in the newspapers was made possible. Members of the press and writing professions were also encouraged to visit the projects and to gain a first hand knowledge of the program and center conditions.

Since the WRA has always felt that a documentation of its unique program was an important part of its work, when the closing of the first center was imminent complete instructions were issued as to the methods to be followed in recording this landmark, and also for recording the complete history of the whole relocation project. For this purpose, all divisions on the project wrote histories of their work and all were incorporated into a complete history of the Jerome Relocation Center, written and edited by the project reports officer. The actual closing was also preserved for future administrative, historical, and scientific use by a complete coverage of reports and photographs.

In spite of the continuing loss of trained and efficient evacuee personnel to staff the project newspapers, all of them continued with their publications. In several centers a good deal of the responsibility was placed upon Issei members of the staff, both because they were far more capable than the high school youngsters who were the only other helpers available, and because of the increasing proportion of Issei population. The situation was somewhat different at Tule Lake. There, after the center was returned to the control of the WRA, an information bulletin was put out in English and Japanese by the appointed personnel. In March this bulletin became the project newspaper, and was called the "Newell Star." Members of the newspaper staffs from other centers were available to work on this paper.

STATISTICAL WORK

The Relocation Planning Division served all the Authority's main programs by maintaining statistical records which provided quantitative information essential for effective policy determination and program planning. Through close contact with the Statistics Sections at each of the centers the Division afforded them technical assistance and supervision in collecting complete, accurate, and comparable date for utilization at the centers and at Washington.

From the reports received from the centers and summarized in Washington, the Division maintained a daily count of resident population at each center and of evacuees temporarily and permanently away from the center. Various special reports were prepared on specific subjects on the basis of this material. Data on births, deaths, marriages, and divorces occurring in the centers were also received and summarized.

Locator File

During the year the Division continued to accumulate indentifying information about all evacuees under the jurisdiction of the WRA. Data in subsidiary files were in process of consolidation into one Master Locator File. These records, when supplemented by material from WCCA records of voluntary evacuees and other Japanese-Americans never under WRA authority, will contain in an excess of 150,000 cards, including cross-reference cards by both Japanese and non-Japanese given names. In addition, current address files were kept from some 3,000 change of residence cards sent in by relocatees each month. These files were used to obtain information on individuals for numerous government agencies and many of the sections and divisions of the WRA.

The statistical laboratory at Central Utah, a field extension of the Relocation Planning Division employing from 25 to 50 evacuees, assisted materially in completing the work necessary for the preparation of the Master Locator File.

Analysis Services

In addition to the regular statistical analyses for the various divisions of WRA, the Relocation Planning Division undertook several special studies. One of these was a study of evacuees with special occupational skills. A study was also made of all relocated evacuees with respect to previous occupational skills, age, citizenship, and sex. (see appended table) Another project was a demographic study of all the evacuees. This study, when completed, will make known information about this minority group not previously available from any source. Other analyses are continually being made of special groups, such as segregees, those requesting repatriation or expatriation, and those having Leave Clearance Hearings.

Census, March 31, 1944

To insure the reliability of daily population reports and to provide a "city" directory for all centers, a head count of resident evacuees was taken as of midnight March 31, 1944. A census was also taken as of June 30 but a roster was not required.

EMERGENCY REFUGEE SHELTER

On June 8, 1944, the War Relocation Authority was given a new responsibility when President Roosevelt announced that 1000 refugees would be brought to this country from southern Italy and housed for the duration of the war at the unused Army post of Fort Ontario at Oswego, New York. The project was designated the "Emergency Refugee Shelter." "In choosing the refugees to be brought to the United States," said President Roosevelt in his cablegram to Ambassador Robert Murphy in Algiers, "please bear in mind that to the extent possible those refugees should be selected for whom other havens of refuge are not immediately available. I should however like the group to include a reasonable proportion of various categories of persecuted peoples who have fled to Italy."

Under the plan announced the refugees were to be brought into this

country outside of the regular immigration procedure. The over-all responsibility for refugee policy was placed in the hands of the War Refugee Board. The refugees were to be transported by the War and Navy Departments; the shelter was to be prepared and furnished by the War Department; the administration of the shelter was to be in hands of the War Relocation Authority. *

By the end of June, Mr. Joseph H. Smart had been appointed Director of the shelter. Plans were also under way to send representatives of the War Refugee Board and the War Relocation Authority to meet the refugees in Italy and to make the trip back with them. The purpose of the trip was to collect and relay to the Authority information concerning the refugees that would help in making adequate preparation for receiving and caring for them in the United States. *

* Since no Executive Order was issued for this program, the following authorizations are cited:

Memorandum sent by the President on June 8 to the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, the Director of the Budget, and Executive Director of the War Refugee Board.

Cablegram sent by the President to Ambassador Robert Murphy in Algiers, June 9, 1944.

Message of President Roosevelt to Congress, June 12, 1944. (H. Doc. 636, 78th Congress.)

CHRONOLOGY

January 1 ---- Colorado River Relocation Center transferred from the Indian Service to the War Relocation Authority.

January 14 --- Return of the Tule Lake Segregation Center to the WRA by the Army announced in an official War Department release.

January 20 --- Announcement of the reinstitution of Selective Service procedures for the Nisei.

February 16 -- War Relocation Authority transferred from Office of Emergency Management to the Department of the Interior by Executive Order 9423.

February 22 -- Announcement that Jerome Relocation Center in Arkansas, first WRA center to be liquidated, would be closed on June 30.

February 21-26 Second transfer movement of evacuees from Manzanar to Tule Lake Segregation Center accomplished. 1876 were transferred in four trains.

April 3-5 ---- Meeting of the Federation of Center Business Enterprises held at Granada.

May 4-25 ---- Third transfer movement of evacuees from Jerome, Rohwer, Granada,

Heart Mountain, Minidoka, and Gila River. 1654 were transferred in four special trains and two special cars on regular trains.

May 25 ------- Japanese American Joint Board disbanded, with functions transferred to the office of the Provost Marshall General.

June 8 ------- Memorandum sent by the President to the Secretaries of War, Navy, and Interior, the Director of the Budget, and the Executive Director of the War Refugee Board informing them of the arrangements to bring 1000 refugees to the Emergency Refugee Shelter at Oswego, New York. Shelter to be administered by War Relocation Authority.

June 30 ------ Jerome Relocation Center officially closed to residents of Japanese ancestry.