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COOPERATIVE COLONIZATION

The Japanese in America, in this era, and in the midst of world wide confusion, need friendship. They are a minority in America, but they despise to be petted, pitied, and to receive a sympathetic treatment. All they need is a fair understanding which will lead to the creation of friendship and the friendship itself will supersede all rational feeling. The word "friendship", according to the Webster's Dictionary, means:

"An attachment to a person, proceeding from intimate acquaintance, and a reciprocation of kind office, or form a favorable opinion of the amiable and respectable qualities of his mind."

"FRIENDSHIP IS OF MORE VALUE THAN BLOOD."
(From "The Robe" by Lloyd C. Douglas.)

This colonization plan is presented for consideration by a Citizen's Committee of three, now residing at Rohwer Relocation Center, Relocation, Arkansas.

Respectfully,

Sumida, C.
Takasugi, T.
Muraoka, S.

August 1, 1944

Copies being sent to:

Mr. Harold Ickes, Secretary, Dept. of Interior

Mr. Dillon S. Myer, Director, WRA

Mr. John Province, Community Management Division
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Malcolm Pitts, Asst. Director, WRA

Mr. Edwin G. Arnold, Chief, Relocation Division
Washington, D. C.

Mr. E. J. Utz, Chief, Operations Division
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Ray D. Johnston, Project Director
Rohwer Relocation Center

Mr. E. B. Moulton, Rohwer Relocation Center

Mr. Charles Wisdom, Rohwer Relocation Center

Miss Wilma Van Dusseldorp, Rohwer Relocation Center

All Directors of other Relocation Center

All Relocation Supervisors, and Field Relocation Officers.

COOPERATIVE COLONIZATION

The Spring of 1942, for the first time in the history of the United States, marked the wholesale evacuation from the Pacific Coast of approximately 110,000 people of Japanese origin embracing the older alien stock and the majority, those of American citizenry by virtue of birth within the United States and its territory.

Through a series of processing amid emotional confusion, these people were afforded temporary haven in the several WRA-sponsored War time Relocation Centers dispersed throughout the nation.

During the intervening two years, the population has decreased considerably in the course of relocation by some and the segregation of others and the latest population figure, with the exclusion of the Newell project, is approximated at 70,000 for the eight centers.

At the beginning of the current calendar year 1944, the WRA made known to the public its anticipation of relocating at least 40,000 evacuees in the near future.

With the announcement of this WRA objective, Fortune magazine for April, 1944, carried the following article in part:

"If the war lasts two more years, and if the WRA has succeeded in finding places for 25,000 more Japanese-Americans in the next twenty-four months (and WRA hopes to do better than that figure) it will be a job well done. That would leave some 45,000 in the relocation centers, as continuing public wards, not to mention over 20,000 at Tule Lake and the Department of Justice internment camps. Whatever the final residue, 25,000 or 45,000, it is certain that the "protective custody" of 1943 cannot end otherwise than in a kind of Indian reservation, to plague the conscience of America for many years to come."

Indeed! The post-war problems confronting these center residents should be ample food for thought. For posterity's sake as well as the immediate post-war future, the blueprint for constructive resettlement of these people must be drawn up now.

Regardless of how public opinion takes its course, it will not influence the dissatisfaction of dormant, enclosed living that circumstances have forced upon these heretofore active people.

It is a plain acceptable fact that no one is contented to remain placidly in this situation for any prolonged length of time. Then why, with all the facilities being opened to them, do they not relocate?

The restraining factor has been the reasoning and the somewhat final realization that the relocation centers are the only place where they can live at present; or live without fear of anticipating prejudice and bodily harm and insecurity adherent to possible financial difficulties.

Since the institution of the relocation program by the WRA, about 1,700 evacuees have relocated from the Rohwer Center, and only about 12% of the 1,700, or 200 (including their families) are those with previous experience in agriculture.

Years of experimentation and subsequent acquired experience had made the records of Japanese farmers in California an enviable one. But it would be virtually impossible for these farmers, we speak of the thousands of others still remaining within the centers, to relocate into a new and strange territory where weather, climate, crop, marketing and other conditions inherent to farming are entirely dissimilar and in most instances unknown to them.

A major concern is the lack of financial ability to begin any sort of a venture where material and equipment are basic necessities. It is needless to point out that complete uprooting due to the evacuation from California has meant total loss of the efforts of a generation.

In the daily life of any normal being, security is one of the most important elements which allows the continuation of that avocation.

With pending inclination of the theater of conflict to the Pacific area and inevitable increase of casualties, we cannot overlook the tide of antagonism that will surely rise against persons of Japanese descent.

It is regrettable that a racial minority has to entertain a complex of fear in this day and age. But the sense of isolation among strangers, helplessness in times of adversity and a fear of eventualities with possible physical attack, constitute the ingredients that must be analyzed before endorsing the "advantages" and "freedom" aspects of relocation. Blind encouragement for hasty relocation minus a sincere comprehension of these easily overlooked factors, may possibly be construed as coercive persuasion.

As yet this minority behind barbed wire fences today are definitely not formulating any intentions of remaining wards of the Government--a lost and forgotten people on another "Indian Reservation". Not if they can help it.

In the words of the pugilistic circle...down but not beaten...these almost forgotten evacuees are biding their time, waiting for an opportunity to present itself when they can make a comeback.

Opportunity knocks but once and it can be reiterated again and again that the time is now.

Here is a suggestion. We believe it is an intelligent one. And remember, we may seek opportunity but that opportunity must be created also.

We have come to the conclusion that the establishment of Colonies in fertile land suitable for agriculture, not only will solve the manpower shortage on the farm production front but will convert present Government expenditures for maintenance of the Relocation Centers into sound investments.

The greatest post-war problem that the United States Government and its people are going to come up against is the surplus man-power situation when hundreds of thousands of boys will return from the front; the process of conversion to peace time industry will mean the curtailment of labor.

What is the government planning to do with this flood of man-power?

Perhaps those entrusted with the welfare of our nation have already a clear-cut formula outlined to meet the situation. But, if colonization is to be repeated again as in the last World War (which proved a costly failure), establish one now with these willing evacuees who are confident of success and are now ready to be the guinea pigs in a very worthwhile experiment.

A Colony for a population of 10-13,000 can be established with an investment of \$15,000,000. Three similar projects make an aggregate investment of \$45,000,000 or approximately the annual expenditures for the maintenance of today's Relocation Centers.

It becomes an investment in the former and a surmounting expenditure in the latter.

The \$15,000,000 investment will be in the form of a loan with perhaps 2% interest...30 years repayment plan as an example. Assuming 4,000 farmers or settlers on one colony were to follow this system of repayment, it is quite possible to clear the debt on an annual installment of \$125.00 per farmer. Industrial enterprises together with every resident in the colony to have the share of this reimbursement, it would not be too difficult to clear the debt within ten to fifteen years at the most.

Building materials, farming equipment, and land and its improvement must be furnished by the Government. With the closing up of the Relocation Centers, dismantled equipment and supplies can be turned over for use in establishing the Colonies.

To mitigate against local political antipathy, it will be to the mutual interests of the Railroad Companies and the Colony to work together. In twenty-five years, fifty years, and a 100 years to come, the products and manufactured commodities rolling out of these Colonies will contribute a generous gratuity for transportation to the railroads.

If the local residents consider the Colony with its 10,000 or more people a menace, the Colonists will welcome the stationing of Military Police for protection of the Colonists themselves against uncivil actions by extremists; and, until much time as the local residents are able to understand the colonists with Christian thought, the "Public Menace will be under guard."

The Colony will function as a Co-operative Society. City taxes will be levied on individual incomes, as well as on all industrial enterprises within the colony and these will share in the requital of the Government loan.

OUTLINE FOR A COLONY OF 13,000 SETTLERS

A. THE PROPOSED COLONY WILL CONSIST OF 100,000 ACRES

1. A farmer will be allotted ten acres per member of his family. A family of five, for example, will be given fifty acres as their share.

2. Of the apportioned farm land, 25% may be used for crop production of the farmer's choosing, but 75% of the land must be cultivated conjunction with the Colony's program.
3. Husbandry of a cow, a pig, and 100 fowls shall also be maintained by a farmer.

B. MARKETING THROUGH A CENTRAL CHANNEL

1. All products will have a central outlet, marketed by the co-operative but credited to the farmer.
2. Marketing or handling fees will be charged on all transactions and such income will too, toward the varied expenses of the Colony.

C. INDUSTRY

1. Industrial enterprises will be maintained by the Colony and the non-farming residents will work here. Farmers may also work in these plants during their slack seasons.
2. Industry will be taxed to furnish income for the Colony.

D. CO-OPERATIVE ENTERPRISES.

1. Hospitals, General Stores, Theaters, Restaurants, Boarding houses, Barbers, Beauty shops, Garages, Dry cleaners etc., will be operated under the co-operative system.
2. The price of merchandise and all service fees will be reverted to the Colony's income.
3. Hospital patients and all cases under doctors' care, will pay a stablized rate of fee to the hospital and the doctors will draw their remuneration from the hospital, thus discouraging private enterprise.

E. OLD FOLKS HOME

1. A home for the aged will be provided to accomodate those under previous care in the WRA centers. However, operational expenses are to be borne by the Government.

F. PROPOSED BUDGET

Land 100,000 acres at \$5.00 per acre	\$ 500,000
Improvement on land at \$10.00 per acre	1,000,000
Housing for 4,000 families, school, hospital, fire department, water and sewer system, stores, and Administrating Building	\$10,000,000
Farming equipment	1,000,000
Farming-supplies for the first year	500,000
Cash allowances for all residents for the first year (\$125.00 per person for 13,500 persons.)	1,687,500
Miscellaneous	312,500
Total	<u>\$15,000,000</u>

F. PROPOSED BUDGET (continued)

Based on a thirty-year-installment plan, with annual interest of 2%, the annual payments would be \$510,000.00. The total debt is to be paid back by the farmers alone, and the yearly payment will be about \$125.00.

Distribution of Population	Workers	Family Members
Administrative and office workers	250	750
Farm workers	4,000	12,000
Industrial workers	250	750
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	4,000	13,500

G. QUALIFICATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP

We believe it necessary to establish some form of qualifications for becoming a resident of the Colony. As this Colony is a self-governing body, of the Japanese, by the Japanese, and for the Japanese, it will be difficult to expel those members who violate the Colony's rules and regulations. For this reason it is felt that all who are to be members accept this membership qualification. Therefore, two types of persons are to be eliminated from all membership in the beginning, namely those who have had a civil case against any Japanese prior to war and such persons whose character and personality will make it difficult if not impossible for them to live harmoniously with the rest of the Colony.

Today, there are many industrial organizations that will not employ anyone of Japanese lineage, due to Army censorship or employee relations, public sentiment or some less obvious reasons. Japanese-American Civil Service employees have been dismissed in some instances for unclarified reasons. There are countless instances on record, where the "indignant public" has taken matters into its own hands strictly on the face-value of the stranger among their midst.

Many colleges do not accept Japanese American students because of racial prejudice, despite the fact that several thousand of these Japanese are fighting side by side with other American boys in Italy and the South Pacific for the cause of Democracy.

Politicians of certain states continue to clamor for deportation of all Japanese, irregardless of citizenship, and Bills and Resolutions of so-called patriotic denominations maintain a steady stream into congressional chambers like an arterial blood transfusion.

There has been veiled threats and open threats of what will happen to the "Jap"..."If they are seen on our streets."

All this is breeding a combination of pessimism and fear, especially among those who do not have sufficient command and understanding of the English language.

At one time, the California press had sought to gain their ends by ridiculing and censoring the evacuees, after they were out of California, by deploring the living standards and conditions of the Japanese homes. Photographs of selected delapidated houses, weather beaten after a year's neglect, were splashed across the pages designed to deceptively impress upon the general gullible public that these houses so depicted were typical of the standard of living the Japanese maintained.

If such were true, after thirty and forty years of following the American pattern of living and rearing our children together with other American children in the same community and identical education facilities, we should be the most backward-unprogressive, most unassimilative people on the entire North American continent!

Standards of living are not a racial matter. How we live, regardless of our color, is determined entirely by the individual's ability and means. This indeed, is what Democracy is fighting for.

In view of this aspect of living conditions, advocating individual relocation into the somewhat primitive areas of the Middle West, where there are no electricity, adequate plumbing, fuel supply, lack of transportation due to priorities and soaring costs, and poor system of sanitation...is almost a futile effort though perhaps well meant.

These people, well advanced in years and tired, cannot be expected to have that dashing courage and undying pioneering spirit to open a new frontier alone. For them it must be security through unity.

And that security, simultaneously contributing to the nation's wartime and post-war efforts, will crystallize into a shining monument of what foresight did.....in a Democracy.

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April 25, 1945

Mr. S. Muraoka
Rohwer Relocation Center
Relocation Branch
McGehee, Arkansas

Dear Mr. Muraoka:

I have your letter of March 27 and was much interested in your discussion of the possibility of colonization in the vicinity of San Benito and Brownsville, Texas.

There are, of course, the objections to this large scale colonization which have been pointed out to you in past correspondence in connection with other similar proposals. In all of our deals, we have found that the best relocation has been where evacuees have gone out as individuals and become a part of America.

There was, however, one paragraph of your letter which particularly interested me. In this you mentioned that "Although a large group is desirable, even a small community comprised of 10 or 15 families will suffice to create contentment and materialization for their long felt desire nurtured since the trying days of evacuation."

I agree with you that assurance of this kind is desirable, particularly among the Issei and for this reason the Relocation Division has developed several offers for colonization on this small scale plan. Few of these offers have resulted in resettlement despite assurances from capable farmers that they are very worthwhile. I am wondering whether you have looked into a program of this kind and what your reactions are as to why it has not been successful.

Sincerely,

/s/ Malcolm E. Pitts

Acting Director

May 7, 1945

Mr. Dillon S. Myer
Director
War Relocation Authority
910 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, 25, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Ray D. Johnston
Project Director

Dear Mr. Myer:

In Re: Letter from Mr. Malcolm Pitts
Acting Director

I am in receipt of Mr. Pitts' letter dated April 27, 1945.

I am pleased to be able to take up this matter of mass migration again, as offered to the center residents.

During the past two years, if I remember clearly, three propositions have been received through the WRA; the Tri-County project in Nebraska; the Henry Ford plantation in Georgia; and, the Wilson plantation in Arkansas. There was one evacuee-sponsored offer called the Louisiana Deal. Unfortunately, none of these offers materialized from the standpoint of evacuee acceptance.

Why were these offers unsuccessful?

A. Tri-County Project of Nebraska (fall 1943)

This was the first offer of this nature introduced to the evacuees of this Center. Delegates were sent to study the situation and detailed reports have been made to the residents of the Center.

Interest towards the project sagged as the report disclosed that only farmhands for labor and share-cropping were wanted and excluded opportunity for independent farming.

Other reasons for non-acceptance can be summed up as follows:

1. At this stage, the evacuees were reluctant to live in a remote place away from communities. This was prompted by a sense of insecurity against physical violence. Reports indicated that houses were about a mile apart in most cases and would leave them helpless in emergencies.
2. The problem of sending children to schools was none too bright in that the nearest schools were two to three miles away and without adequate transportation facilities.
3. Many evacuees were still attached sentimentally to returning to California. Life in California was highly convenient with every benefit of modern facilities easily accessible. In comparison, the Tri-County Project lacked running water within the homes, no electricity, no natural gas or butane gas for cooking and left much to desire in order to induce evacuee resettlement there. Perhaps, the evacuees are creating an impression that they lack pioneering spirit, however everything about the offer did not appeal to them.
4. It meant farming in an unknown climatic region. The farming season was comparatively short and there was no prospect of sufficient alternative work during the slack seasons.

B. Ford Plantation at Georgia (spring 1944)

In this case the report of the delegates was encouraging.

1. Housing and school facilities were very good.
2. Climate, soil, and the other requisites for were favorable.
3. The Plantation offered year around work at nominal wage scales.

4. The possibility existed that land could be secured for independent farming in the future and evacuees opinion pointed toward acceptance.

However, this hope was nipped in the bud as community sentiments opposed the program and Mr. Ford himself, for some reason, took side with that sentiment. Thus, for obvious reasons, this deal was cancelled.

C. Wilson Plantation at Arkansas (since March 1945)

This offer was received about a month ago and when the investigating delegates made their report, it was considered a great chance for those evacuee farmers who lacked substantial financial resource. The delegates who were sent to the Wilson Plantation unfortunately had no knowledge of farming and presented an extremely rosy picture of the situation, deviating from actual conditions and details so essential to a report of this nature. (For further details, please refer to the report presented by Mr. C. B. Price, Relocation Officer of this Center.)

An illusion of Utopia was created by the reporting delegates and was immediately supported by about one hundred responses to the offer. Later, a group of thirty-three prospective resettlers made a preliminary tour of the plantation. But, their on-the-spot observations proved a disappointment. It was not as promising as the delegates had originally reported. They felt that they had been misled by the delegates. The delegates were accused of misrepresentation and an exaggerated counter-report of a negative nature was disseminated by this prospective group. Some of these disappointed people in this group even claimed that they felt the discrimination against evacuees. (I believe these claims are created because their disappointment was so great and it turned to wrath against the delegates, and in turn to the plantation.) The feeling was prompted this way without realizing fully conditions existing on the Plantation, because, of the 59,000 acres on the plantation, all the good tilled land is reserved for others; whereas, the evacuees would be placed on unlevel land of much heavier soil unsuited for vegetable raising and remote from the main community.

The housing conditions, too, were not satisfactory as they expected ones a little better, and drinking water was somewhat of a problem. And moreover, although the plantation promised various jobs for the evacuees during the slack seasons, the evacuees considered the wage scale too low in comparison to other districts. These things lead the group to hastily believe that the evacuees were to be treated on the same level with the negro labor and lower class of whites in this section of the country.

As with the Tri-County Project of Nebraska, climatic conditions and short farming seasons did not appeal to the group, despite the other better aspects of the offer.

In my personal opinion, however, the proposition is desirable to those of little, or no, financial resources but offers no inducement to evacuee farmers who have some amount of resources and are seeking independent farming in a better climate.

At present, about ten families are planning resettlement to this Plantation. I believe many more will follow after these ten families become established on the Plantation. This offer, too, does not permit purchase of land by the evacuee settlers, and farming must be done on a sharecrop or cash-rent bases, but after Mr. Crane of the plantation becomes convinced of the evacuees' ability, I feel certain that better and more encouraging propositions will be made by the Plantation.

D. Louisiana Deal

This offer was by far the best from the aspect of fulfilling the requirements of the evacuee farmers' needs. The mild climate offered possibility of year-around cultivation; and, land could be purchased to enable the evacuee to become self-supporting.

Here again, the results did not live up to expectations. Unfortunately, the reputation of the promoter was questionable and knowledge of his past history prior to evacuation squelched the initial enthusiasm and only a few considered the offer.

This was not sufficient to purchase all of the 6000 acres in one transaction as stipulated by the land owner and the proposition faded out.

I have endeavored to present a picture of why the above propositions did not enjoy the success they anticipated.

It is apparent that their failure resulted from lack of provisions to guarantee independence. True, the evacuees were told that after they have acquired experience as sharecroppers in the community, perhaps, in a year or two, they may be given an opportunity to start a farm of their own. However, there wasn't sufficient assurance to convince the evacuee prospects. They couldn't foresee the possibility of acquiring the tools and implements.

I feel confident that my two years experience as a member of the Committee of Studying Relocation Program and the Resettlement Planning Commission, enables me to have an insight into the unfulfilled desires of the evacuee farmers, acquired through handling details of this nature in conjunction with the duties of the Commission.

The requisites of the farmers are light soil, sandy loam preferred; a mild climate where vegetable farming can be conducted throughout the year; facilities for financial assistance and protection against bodily violence as witnessed on the West Coast.

The Rio Grande Valley Project covers most of the requirements desired by the evacuees. Only financial assistance for farm tools and implements and housing facilities are needed.

In my letter of March 27th, I advocated a small group of ten or fifteen families as I am well aware of the inadvisability of large colonization at this time. In respect to the Rio Grande Project, if ten or fifteen families can establish a foothold there, I am positive that in due time, others will gradually migrate to the area, providing community sentiment is favorable. Our job is not done after these small groups have been resettled. It only constitutes the first step towards a full scale colonization.

The combination of fair climate, good soil, and adequate irrigational system makes the Rio Grande Valley the ideal farm land. Under the influential wings of Mr. King, unwarranted attacks against the evacuee settlers by misguided vigilantists may be kept in check during the crucial first stages of resettlement.

After Mr. King is convinced of the evacuee ability, he may see fit to offer unlimited support to them, which may prove to be of mutual benefit. The Seabrook Farm is a good example of evacuee acceptance, and Mr. Seabrook's opinion of them has guided his placement of more than a thousand evacuee workers in his plant. Mr. Seabrook of New Jersey has increased his evacuee workers, because he knows what they can do for his business.

He is not a social welfare worker; he is a sane businessman, first and always.

Similarly, if Mr. King of the Rio Grande Valley can be made to realize the benefits to be accrued, he too will wish to utilize his vast land holdings for something else besides cattle farming. The effect will be threefold--he will be aiding the national war effort; benefiting himself; a saviour to the evacuee.

If Mr. King consents to this program, we must have the fullest support of the WRA and other Governmental agencies. Our past experiences, in respect to the responses we have had in our requests for aid, have been such that the evacuees are beginning to lose confidence in government promises for assistance.

The evacuees have been told time after time that various agencies will aid them if they face difficulties after resettlement. Yet, when these evacuees actually applied for such aid, many of the local agents turned down applications without any satisfactory explanations, or else so much red tape was put into it that the effort would hardly have been worthwhile and would not have served the purpose of "a stitch in time saves nine."

I am not criticizing the WRA. We appreciate everything that the WRA is trying to do for the evacuees. You have accomplished much. We desire not to seek preferential privileges just because we are evacuees, but the same level of cooperation as accorded other citizens by all governmental agencies and welfare and social organizations of any community. Some agencies are so totally lacking in sincerity and cooperation that the evacuees don't receive any benefit, but are being disillusioned.

In presenting an example for the realization of the Rio Grande Valley Project, if the local agencies in Brownsville representing the F.S.A.; the Reconstruction Finance Corp.; National Housing Agents; the Social Security Board; and the G.P.A., are made to realize that evacuee resettlement on Mr. King's ranch contributes to the national cause as well as to the community of Brownsville and the State of Texas, I am certain that their decisions will take on a broader aspect and a favorable one. If all of these agencies combined their efforts and each directed its effort in its peculiar responsibilities, I believe it would be very simple to resettle ten or fifteen families.

In summarizing, we can come to the conclusion that the evacuees were not given concrete assurances of housing, farm tools, and other aids in the past.

Please accept my apologies for my frankness throughout this letter, but my best intentions will always be for the realization of a colony so

that they can shake off the shackles of Center life forever and utilize their ability for farming, for the sake of the American public as well as for their own good.

Respectfully yours,

S. Muraoka

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington

Sept. 12, 1944

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Mr. Ray D. Johnston
Project Director
Rohwer Relocation Center
McGehee, Arkansas

In re: Cooperative Colonization Plan

Dear Mr. Johnston:

I have carefully studied the plan submitted by Messrs. C. Sumida, T. Takasugi and S. Muraoka and ask that you convey to them my pleasure in receiving such detailed suggestions for helping the evacuees.

I do not feel that large-scale colonization will solve the problems of the Japanese-Americans in this country. The public has generally been against any group that has tried to set itself apart from the rest of the population. I think that dispersal throughout the country, especially in rural areas, would be more desirable and that it would be better for the evacuees to become integrated with the general American population.

The WRA does not have the funds nor the staff to make agricultural loans. This is the responsibility of other federal agencies. Any colonization plan, such as the one suggested, would have to be presented directly to the agency which handles such loans.

It is very doubtful if 100,000 acres of good farm land could be secured in one piece. Even if available, our experience indicates that public sentiment would oppose such a large purchase of land.

As to the details of the plan:

- (1) The cost of the land and buildings would vary considerably, depending upon the location, fertility and climatic conditions. The proposed cost of \$5.00 per acre is very low. If intensive vegetable farming is to be practiced, land in a good state of fertility would be most economical. It is believed that such land probably cannot be obtained in most localities for less than \$80 to \$100 per acre and in many locations the cost would greatly exceed that amount. Timbered land such as at Rohwer would now cost about \$10 to \$15 per acre, but drainage

and clearing required to fit the land for intensive cultivation would cost ₱70 to ₱85 per acre. The estimate for land cost would be ₱8,000,000 to ₱10,000,000 instead of the ₱500,000 set in the budget.

- (2) The 4000 farms, with the total acreage of 100,000 acres, would average 25 acres per farm. Since a cow, a sow and 100 hens are to be kept, a barn and poultry house and some fencing would be required. These improvements would cost a minimum of ₱800, instead of the ₱10 per acre or ₱250 per farm as estimated, bringing the total expenditure to ₱3,200,000 instead of the ₱1,000,000 set in the budget.
- (3) The other estimates included in your proposed budget for housing facilities, farming equipment and farm supplies seem reasonable. However, due to the higher cost of land and improvements that you had estimated, the total budget would more nearly approximate ₱24,700,000 than the given figure of ₱15,000,000.

Our experience in relocation has shown that it would be impossible to secure the necessary positive community sentiment, especially in rural areas, for such a large farming venture. Furthermore, those farm credit organizations who would be responsible for reviewing such a plan will usually consider loans only when the farmer has worked in the the area for some time and has established his reputation as a good farmer.

Although I think the authors of this plan should be complimented for the work they have put into it, it does not seem feasible to me.

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Sincerely

/s/ D. S. Myer
Director