

What did the school teach these youngsters and these men? First egoism, personal interest and the cult of envy. After that, negation of every thing spiritual, of everything divine, of every ideal. Athism, if not proclaimed, was at least encouraged.

Could the military service improve or correct this education? certainly not at a time when the service of one year was practically reduced to four months and when, as¹⁵⁻²⁴ ascertained, certain men had not even learned the appellation of their officers.

To sum up - youth insufficient in quantity, insufficient in quality. That's what the twenty years following the victory gave us.

If from youth, which formed only a small part of army, we passed to the entire nation, what were its characteristics? at the base, lack of authority. One doesn't delegate authority; one asserts it. In France between 1919 and 1939 it merely exalted itself. In the government, under whatever label, we never saw anything but parties, we never saw France. The composition of every ministry - and they were many - was a scandal.

Our officers and noncommissioned officers of the reserve ate made up the enormous majority of our staff, did not dare to command, whether simplest piece of work or the ^最 ^大 ^十 ^一 greatest mission was in question.

It was the same from the top to the bottom of the industrial ladder. The result was a weakening of output, a lack of method, an increase in overhead, incompatible with any well-conducted business, whether it was a typist arriving a quarter hour late or putting on her typewriter a quarter hour early, a truck driver wasting five minutes or a fitter chatting with his neighbor instead of polishing off his piece, the result always came back in costs.

Hand
But the damage was even more moral than material getting used to disobeying his chiefs, getting used to no commanding, the Frenchman from his earliest youth became used to doing as he pleased.

And the reservist returning to his regiment no longer knew how to obey or how to make his ^中 ^隊 ^長 ^の ^部 ^下 ^を ^統 ^率 ^す squadron or section obey him. When colonels and generals must do the work of corporals, it is obvious the house is upside down.

The war of four years taught us how to die and
to suffer. It did not teach us how to work.
until 1914 the French labor and peasants
were hard workers. Our country was a
country of ^{ポツトウシ} petite bourgeoisie, citizen and
peasant, where the woolen stockings was a
fact, where economy - by certain people called
^{ミセリニシ} miserliness - guided the French citizen.
Not only the working hours, but the working conscience
diminished. The job was no longer the thing
that mattered. All that had gone to build up
the excellence of French production, its elegance
its finish, its attention to detail diminished or
disappeared all together. American methods
were adopted forgetting that France had neither
the spirit nor the potential of America.
It was easier to succeed by ^{イニシヨク} intrigue than work.
Politics became a career of compromise,
arrangement, betrayal. Many lawyer, profes-
sor and journalist certainly believed their
own statement, as soon as they had taken
their first degree - but above all, ^{at} soon as they
had managed to get into the office of some
under secretary of state, or into the reception
room of some woman of importance.

Ministry, Commissions, prefectures, colonial administration, etc, were in this way filled ^{with} young men who instead of using their brains for examinations, used their shoe razor or their father's gasoline to make useful and profitable contacts.

Shortage of equipment, unfilled orders, airplanes that never materialized, obsolete tanks, munition ^{that} never arrived - all this was the result of work ^{that} was inadequate in quantity and quality.

From 1918-1940, France luxuriated in every kind of regime that might be called republican - from horizon blue to the red ^{LE 77 78} Popular Front.

Ministries fall like houses of cards, scandals accumulated, riots caused the spilling of French blood, even on the paving stones of the capital; but always the same men ^{had, past} took the boards ⁷².

Dragoon They ruin what the Popular Front caused France immeasurable, but its greatest responsibility was to lynch the people of France laziness under the grandiose ^{one} name of "leisure". The King of all was a corner coffee. The forty hour week did not bring in anything more to the mother all of the family because the bread winner spent

statesman
政治家
策劃家

in two days, twice as much as in one.
The only result was that alcohol merchants
did well.
Let us hope that those who were cranked
the northern battle fields by the Luftwaffe,
that those who had neither anti-tank and
guns nor anti-aircraft guns nor munitions
will cry vengeance against ^{the} idlers who
neglected to make those things, and above all
against those whose criminal ^{4.8.9} idiocy
and lack of responsibility have created
this disorder and anarkie.

Diagram To produce under production at a time when
Germany should have had it was better to have
cannon than butter was not only treason
against the nation but crime against humanity.
They gave the greatest success to the totalitari-
an regime and the greatest assistance
that those regimes could have desired,
for sincere French men who have been in
Germany as prisoners of war can bear
witness to its prosperity and to its physical
and moral health, admittedly the Ger-
mans do not perhaps have liberty, but there is
certainly neither disorder nor anarkie.

everywhere is in work the only fortune for a
people which wishes to live and live happily.
May France remember it and prosper by it.
From 1915.