

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

EXHIBIT

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From: 12:00 Noon, 24 January, 1942 GMT
To : 12:00 Noon, 31 January, 1942 GMT

Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army
Presidio of San Francisco, California
12:00 Noon 31 January, 1942 GMT

No. 5

MAPS: See sketch attached.


1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Troops of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army are not in contact with hostile ground forces. Based on radio direction finder bearings it is estimated that there is a standing hostile navy patrol, number of vessels unknown, operating along longitude 155° West. This patrol is believed to have mission of observation of Great Circle route approaches from the northwest Pacific coast toward Japan. This patrol was estimated to be about 900 miles south of KODIAK 29 January. Report of hostile submarine off SCOTCH CAP, UNIMAK 28 January has not been confirmed or denied. Reports of hostile submarines reported off the LOS ANGELES area 29 January have not been conclusively verified. No hostile ground forces are believed to be nearer than the enemy forces in the JALUIT-WOTJE area of the eastern MANDATED ISLANDS, 2000 miles west by south of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

b. Hostile naval forces which may operate in the waters of the PACIFIC off the west coast could be reinforced by special task forces, locations not definitely known, or by elements of the enemy FIRST and FOURTH FLEETS estimated to be in the MANDATED ISLANDS. It is possible for elements of these units, including carriers, to elude our naval defense and air patrols in the vast expanse of the PACIFIC especially to the northwest. Ground troops for raids or attack in force of the PACIFIC COAST or our island possessions in the eastern Pacific are available in JAPAN, FORMOSA, and possibly in the MANDATED ISLANDS.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

No hostile operations were conducted within this theatre of operations.



3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Enemy Casualties.

No contact with enemy was gained.

b. Morale.

The hostile morale undoubtedly remains high because of his successes so far. In a country where press, radio and public opinion are controlled entirely by the Government as in Japan, no hint of lowering of national morale is likely to reach the outside world. It is equally certain that reverses and losses will not be truthfully reported to the public.

c. Supply and equipment.

The supply and equipment of the enemy is believed to be adequate for the campaign he is waging outside of this theatre. It is probable that he will be equally well supplied and equipped in the event he operates in this theatre for sometime in the future, at least as far as quality of weapons and equipment is concerned.

d. Terrain not under our control.

The seas off the PACIFIC COAST, particularly those to the northwest, are so vast as to be considered "not completely under our control."

e. Weather and visibility, including meteorological conditions, in enemy territory.

Unknown.

f. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation.

The enemy's probable knowledge of our situation has not been gained by observation or reconnaissance but by information learned during peace [and the activities of fifth columnists]. Efforts to deny this information to the enemy include general surveillance of enemy aliens, internment of alien leaders and suspected spies and agents, seizure of contraband in possession of enemy aliens, adoption of stringent censorship measures, and transfer of many other Japanese, including second generation Japanese members of our military forces, from this theatre.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. Surprise raids or attacks against any portion of the PACIFIC COAST, including ALASKA and the PANAMA CANAL, or against HAWAII.

b. Harassing attacks by submarines or surface craft, including commerce raiders, against shipping in PACIFIC waters of this theatre.

- c. Intensification of the campaigns in MALAYA and the PHILIPPINES and the continuation of operations against the DUTCH EAST INDIES, in the NORTH AUSTRALIAN area and against our supply and ferry lines from SAMOA to AUSTRALIA.
- d. Attacks on the Maritime Provinces of eastern SIBERIA to eliminate menacing Russian air power, while continuing action elsewhere.
- e. Negative reports relative to a, b, and d and known activity relative to c leads to the assumption that the enemy will confine himself to this capability at present. Activity relative to b may be renewed at any time.
- f. The destruction of American and British naval, air and ground forces in the Far East and the reduction or seizure of the Singapore Naval Base are among the immediate objectives of the enemy in order to free his hands for action against the DUTCH EAST INDIES and possibly AUSTRALIA as the ultimate objectives. He probably plans to exploit the raw materials of this area for his own benefit in continuing war, to secure this region against attack by the Allies, to interfere with our plans to bring supplies, reinforcements and materiel to the SOUTH SEAS and AUSTRALIAN areas, and to protect the homeland and the sea and air routes to the SOUTH SEAS.

D. A. STROH,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2