

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 12:00 Noon 9 May 1942 GMT
To : 12:00 Noon 16 May 1942 GMT

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Presidio of San Francisco, California
12 Noon 16 May 1942 GMT

NO. 20

EXHIBIT

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Maps: See sketch

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy Front Line:

Troops of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army are not in contact with hostile ground forces.

- (1) Indications that hostile submarines may be operating in the INLAND PASSAGE waters of CANADA and ALASKA are decreasing. A submarine reported sighted by RCAF patrol west of PRINCE RUPERT on 4 May was subsequently identified as a whale by air and surface searchers. Investigation of another submarine reported sighted by RCAF west of KETCHIKAN 13 May disclosed that object was probably whale with large dorsal fin.
- (2) Four reports of unidentified submarines off Pacific Coast of the United States received during period but two were definitely identified as surface craft and remaining two were followed by negative reports and given poor credibility rating.
- (3) According to Northwest Sea Frontier, submarine activities as indicated by radio bearings continue to remain west of 180 degrees as of 8 May, largely in the general region of the MARSHALL ISLANDS, and to the south of that area. Bearings have been received on numerous unidentified call signs in the same region and to westward toward TRUK, indicating a considerable amount of enemy activity in this general area. No radio bearings or fixes obtained have indicated the probable presence of any enemy mobile craft east of 180 degrees.
- (4) United States - Pacific Coast


Radio silence ordered at 11:10 PM and blackout at 11:15 PM PWT 11 March in SAN DIEGO because of contact with unidentified plane later identified as friendly. Call sign at 11:22 PM.

WEST REPORT

T.O. 12008, Sec. 3-402

DOD dir. 52.00.30 6/18/79

By W. Lewis, NRES, Date 2/1/82



b. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention:

Hostile naval forces which may operate in the PACIFIC OCEAN off the west coast can be reinforced by special task forces, organized from elements of the Japanese Navy now in the vicinity of JAPAN, the BONIN (OGASAWARA) ISLANDS, or the MANDATED ISLANDS where Japanese naval units are reported to be gathering in the TRUK area. It is possible for a hostile naval force, including carriers, to evade our naval defense and air patrols in the vast expanse of the Pacific, particularly from the northwest. Ground troops for raids or an attack in force on the PACIFIC COAST, including ALASKA, or our island possessions in the eastern Pacific, are available in JAPAN, FORMOSA and possibly the MANDATED ISLANDS.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

No hostile ground operations were conducted within this theater of operations.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Enemy Casualties

No known casualties were inflicted by any forces in this theater.

b. Morale

The hostile morale remains high because of his successes to date. In a country where press, radio and public opinion are controlled entirely by the Government as in JAPAN, the gauging of national morale by the outside world is difficult. The recent air attacks on the large cities of JAPAN undoubtedly have shaken to some degree the Japanese feeling of security against attacks by the United States. The effect of food and other shortages upon civilian morale is unknown but probably not serious. The probable future effects of constant bombing is unknown.

c. Supply and Equipment

The supply and equipment of the enemy is believed adequate for the campaign he is waging outside of this theater. It is probable that in the event he operates in this theater, he will be equally well supplied and equipped, during the early stages of the campaign at least. Shortages of equipment and material will probably result as the war progresses unless the enemy has been very successful in replenishing his supply of raw materials in the SOUTH SEAS and in re-adjusting and expanding production.

d. Terrain Not Under Our Control

Nothing to report.

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e. Enemy's Probable Knowledge of Our Situation

The enemy's probable knowledge of our situation has not been gained by observation or reconnaissance but by information learned during peace by activities of accredited diplomatic, military and naval attaches and their agents. Efforts to deny this information to the enemy includes general surveillance of enemy aliens, internment of alien leaders and suspected spies and agents, seizure of contraband in possession of enemy aliens, adoption of stringent censorship measures, and mass evacuation of all Japanese, including second generation Japanese members of our military forces, from this theater.

f. Weather and Visibility Including Meteorological Conditions

See Annex No. 5.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. Lines of action open to the Enemy.

- (1) Surprise raids or attacks of the PACIFIC COAST, the PANAMA CANAL, HAWAII, and ALASKA.
- (2) Harassing attacks by submarine or surface craft, including commerce raiders, against shipping in the PACIFIC waters of this theater.
- (3) Extension of occupation to the other islands of the PHILIPPINES; extension of the BURMA campaign into the southern Chinese provinces along the BURMA road and/or the west preparatory to attack of INDIA; intensification of operations against NEW GUINEA, SOLOMON ISLANDS, and other islands to the southeast with a view to their use as sea and air bases for operations against AUSTRALIA and our supply and ferry line to AUSTRALIA; and invasion of AUSTRALIA.
- (4) Attack of EASTERN SIBERIA and/or the ALEUTIAN ISLANDS.

b. Discussion

- (1) The enemy will probably confine himself to capability (3) for the present. Activity relative to (1), (2) and (4) can be resorted to at any time by the enemy.
- (2) The possibility of activity relative to capabilities (1) and (2) but particularly the former, is enhanced by the enemy's desire to retaliate for air raids of his homeland suffered by him recently. It is possible that aircraft carriers plus supporting

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units could be employed in such an attack against our aircraft and other installations at any time after 10 May. An enemy may attempt or effect seizure of air fields or bases in LOWER CALIFORNIA. If such a seizure is made, a bombing attack against SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, LOWER CALIFORNIA or SONORA is a distinct possibility.

- (3) The apparent withdrawal of the naval and air task force formerly operating in the BAY OF BENGAL against CEYLON and the east coast of INDIA and the pattern of current operations indicate that the Japanese propose to conclude the campaign in BURMA before extending their invasion to INDIA proper.
- (4) The conquest of the south coast of NEW GUINEA and neutralization or invasion of allied bases on the north coast of AUSTRALIA would secure for the enemy the comparatively free use of the TORRES STRAITS and would deny the use of northern AUSTRALIA as a base for future United Nations offensive. Slow but steady extension of control of the islands to the east and southeast of New Britain is underway to assist in the protection of the east flank for operations against NEW GUINEA and AUSTRALIA. These operations, if successful, may become a serious threat to our supply and ferry routes to AUSTRALIA.
- (5) An attack against EASTERN SIBERIA in furtherance of a joint Axis plan or for the elimination of the Russian air threat, might be accompanied by an attack on the ALEUTIAN ISLANDS to prevent United States reinforcements, particularly aircraft, from reaching SIBERIA, and to protect the northern flank. A study of weather records over a period of years indicates that the month of May is one of the most favorable times of the year for air and surface operations in the vicinity of the ALEUTIANS. Weather research reports indicated that there are three relatively favorable periods for military operations along the MANCHURIAN-SIBERIAN border; (1) late winter, (2) late spring, (3) autumn.

8 Inclosures:

- Incl #1 - Map Sketch.
- Incl #2 - 4th Air Force Intell. Report.
- Incl #3 - Annex #1 (Economic).
- Incl #4 - Annex #2 (Political).
- Incl #5 - Annex #3 (Psychological).
- Incl #6 - Annex #4 (Espionage and Subversive Activities).
- Incl #7 - Annex #5 (Geographical and Meteorological Data).
- Incl #8 - Annex #6 (Air Information).

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