


Japan Institute Harvard University

1737 Cambridge Street, Room 319
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Edwin O. Reischauer
Honorary Director
Donald H. Shively
Director



[Redacted]
1 June 1982

David
Dear ~~Friends~~,

After nearly eight years in graduate studies at Harvard, I am pleased to announce that I am finally entering the Real World. Before making a complete transition, however, I will spend the 1982-83 academic year as a Fulbright Fellow at the Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo finishing up my doctoral dissertation on Japanese antitrust policy.

Upon returning to the United States next year, I plan to work in Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. in a position that will allow me to draw on my graduate training in East Asian affairs, sociology, business administration, and law. Sakie also intends to pursue a career drawing on her five years of teaching at Harvard, her graduate studies here, and her recent experience working at a Boston-based international consulting firm.

We plan to stay in Cambridge through next month. By the fall of 1983 we should have a permanent address, but in the meantime we can be reached at the following:

August 1982

c/o Mr. Fred Fukushima
[Redacted]

September 1982-July 1983

c/o Professor Makoto Tachibana
[Redacted]

Please be sure to keep in touch and to let us know in particular if you have a chance to get together with us in Los Angeles, Washington, or Tokyo. We look forward to seeing you again.

With best regards,

Glen

Glen S. Fukushima

The Rearmament of Japan Could Backfire on America

By GLEN S. FUKUSHIMA

During the past decade, the American public has been preoccupied with U.S.-Japanese economic frictions at the expense of the political and social dimensions of the relationship. As a result, little attention has been focused on the Reagan Administration's attempts to put pressure on Japan to build up its military capability.

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger recently proposed that Japan increase its defense spending by 8% every year from now until 1989 in order to assume responsibility by the end of the decade for defending sea lanes up to 1,000 miles from its principal cities. Japan's 1982 budget contains only a 4.6% increase in military spending.

Many Americans see the military issue in purely economic terms. Thus, businessmen complain that Japan's postwar growth resulted from a "free ride" on U.S. military expenditures. Congressmen denounce Japan's unwillingness to spend more on defense and thus presumably ease the burden on American taxpayers. Even sophisticated observers such as MIT's Lester Thurow argue that U.S. economic productivity will continue to lag until Japan is forced to divert some of its technological resources to military use.

These economic arguments are not entirely groundless; Japan needs to do more to open its domestic market and to help rectify its trade imbalance with the United States. Overlooked, however, is the more fundamental question: What are the broader implications of a militarily powerful Japan?

Such a development would symbolize a profound transformation in the ethos of the average Japanese citizen. It would mean the nullification of Article 9 of Japan's constitution, with its renunciation of war and prohibition of armed forces—a document that has served for nearly 40 years as a constructive reminder of the horrors of World War II and as the cornerstone of the postwar commitment to national economic welfare.

True, some Japanese have long called for the repeal of Article 9 and for the establishment of a strong military—to replace what they perceive as U.S. unreliability in defending Japan and to counter what they see as a potential Soviet threat. Some have even advocated a Gaullist stance, including the deployment of nuclear weapons. Whether motivated by nationalistic fervor or economic greed, these advocates of a strong military no doubt welcome Weinberger's exhortation that Japan rearm. But these voices constitute a minority of the Japanese citizenry; most take enormous pride in the non-belligerency embodied in their peace constitution.

A militarily powerful Japan would signal a fundamental change in its relationship with the United States. Despite the criticism

heard in Japan of America's declining economy, most Japanese remain firmly convinced that politically, economically and militarily this country is Japan's best friend. Forcing Japan to remilitarize would only provoke anti-American resentment in some circles and bolster a "go-it-alone" attitude among neo-nationalists. The United States, which already has enough trouble coordinating policies among its allies, is apt to find that a militarily self-sufficient Japan is a less cooperative Japan.

In addition, a significant Japanese military buildup is certain to engender Soviet hostility and fuel the claim that Japan is merely a "puppet" of U.S. imperialism. Ever since their defeat by the Japanese navy in 1904-5, the Russian people have been extremely sensitive to any hint of Japanese militarism. Japan's aggression in the 1930s and '40s, coupled with its role in aiding the United States during the conflicts in Korea and Indochina, did little to allay these fears. Even if a remilitarized Japan did not adhere strictly to the American line, it would provide an easy excuse for the Soviet Union to increase its own military buildup.

Finally, rearmament would cause serious problems for Japan's relationship with its East Asian neighbors. Certain anti-Soviet governments may welcome a greater Japanese military presence in the region, but most Asian countries that suffered at the hands of Japanese colonialism less than four decades ago are not likely to forget so easily. For them, economic aid and technological cooperation are what Japan can best offer—not military personnel, hardware or adventurism.

The extent to which these possible consequences are realized will of course depend on the nature and degree of Japanese remilitarization. And, like it or not, Japan must make more concessions on the economic front to defuse the "free-rider" argument. But one thing remains clear: All Americans concerned with the future of international peace should seriously question the wisdom of forcing Japan to rearm.

Despite hard feelings about the inequities in "burden-sharing" between the two countries, we should not allow this Administration to take a heavy-handed approach toward Japan that underestimates the adverse consequences of such pressure. A Japan devoted primarily to economic prosperity is far more likely to contribute to world peace, stability and cooperation than a Japan bent on full-scale remilitarization.

Glen S. Fukushima, a Japanese American, is former director of the Japan Forum at Harvard University's Japan Institute. He will be graduated from Harvard Law School next month.