# JAPANESE AMERICANS IN VARIOUS INTERNMENT CAMPS

DECEMBER 8, 1941 — OCTOBER 30, 1946

LOCATIONS AND PHYSICAL LAYOUTS OF THE WRA RELOCATION CENTERS

AND

**THE JAPANESE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AT TULE LAKE**

**PREPARED FOR THE TULE LAKE PILGRIMAGE**

**AUGUST 26 - 28, 1994**

BY

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## INTRODUCTION

They say that a plan is worth 10,000 words. These plans were prepared to record the historical sites and the physical layouts of the actual camps. If these plans are displayed in the classrooms as visual aids, the students will be able to comprehend the overall picture of the relocation period. Along with these plans are short narratives of various events and situations that took place during the tumultuous era.

The Tule Lake Center both during WRA Relocation and Segregation Center is explained in detail for the members of this pilgrimage. Keep in mind that not one person was guilty of any crime except for being born of Japanese ancestry.

## THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS

The shock of Sunday, December 7, 1941 came as a complete surprise to the Japanese American community. Suddenly they faced a new and challenging future. The first generation *(issei)* were paralyzed and the second generation *(nisei)* were outraged by the action of the Japanese government.

President Roosevelt immediately authorized Attorney General Francis Biddle to retain enemy aliens. The FBI quickly took into custody those persons who were considered highly suspect of sabotage. The community leaders were seized and there was a vacuum of leadership in the Japanese American community.

The assets of the Japanese American were frozen and the Japanese Americans were fired from their jobs.

Under these conditions, the bigots and race mongers quickly spread their emotional message and were eager for the military to begin the removal of Japanese Americans from the West Coast. It was a time of fear and irrationality expounded by the yellow journalist; the Hearst newspapers; and fanatic race baited, radio broadcasters such as Westbrook Pegler, Walter Lippman and H. V. Kalternborn and misguided organization and unscrupulous politicians.

Initially the Justice Department under Francis Biddle was against the evacuation; but on the West Coast, all the political leaders including California state Attorney General Earl Warren supported the removal of the Japanese Americans.

Executive Order No. 9066 signed on February 19, 1942 which gave the Army blank check authority to remove civilians out of the West Coast.

On March 11, 1942 the Wartime Civil Control Administrator (WCCA) was established with Colonel Karl Bendetsen as its director to supervise the evacuation.

On March 18, 1942 President Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9102, creating the War Relocation Authority 'to assist persons evacuated by the military under E.O. 9066'.

The legal authority for removal of the Japanese Americans from military zones was contained in Public Law 503 signed on March 21, 1942.

The following are the chronology, the executive orders, and the public law which authorized the mass expulsion of the Japanese Americans from the West Coast.

The section on Tule Lake Center was written for this Pilgrimage. It details the site selection and location, the construction and components of the camp; the movement of people to Tule Lake. The initial settlement period and during initial strikes and protest leading to the Army takeover of the Center.

The period of registration for the selective service and loyalty questionnaire leading to the segregation center are discussed in detail as it represents the irony of the entire relocation period.

The enactment of the Renunciation of American citizenship on American soil by Congress was the most disgusting display of bigotry and racial discrimination.

The pursuit , by the Department of Justice and running the program of Renunciation factory at the Tule Lake Center was immoral act perpetrated on defenseless group of internees .

The repatriation of loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry and their young children to Japan was a cruel and hateful judgment by the US Government.

What is most ironic (to the Japanese Americans), was that two individuals who were in favor of and instrumental in keeping imprisonment of the Japanese Americans, Earl Warren (then the Attorney General of California) and Abe Fortas (then at the Department of Interior), later became the Chief , and the Associate Justices of the US Supreme Court and were considered as liberal element of that Court.

Sadder yet was that the chief constructor of the Concentration Camps for the Japanese Americans was also the chief manager for construction of the Atomic bombs which fell onto Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan; a person by the name of Leslie R. Groves.

These maps and diagrams will be your reminder of this turbulent era in the Japanese American experience.

## CHRONOLOGY

### 1941

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| December 7 | Pearl Harbor was attacked by the Japanese. Presidential Proclamation No. 2525 gives blanket authority to Attorney General for a sweep of suspects. |
| December 8 | Treasury Department seizes all Japanese banks and business |
| December 9 | Many Japanese language schools closed. |
| December 11 | FBI warns against possession of camera or guns by aliens. |
| December 27 | Attorney General orders all enemy aliens in West to surrender short wave radios and cameras |
| December 30 | California revokes liquor license held by alien Japanese. |

### 1942

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| January 1 | Attorney General freezes travel by all enemy aliens, order surrender of weapons. |
| January 14 | President Roosevelt orders re-registration of enemy aliens in West. |
| January 27 | Los Angeles City and County discharges all Japanese on civil services list. |
| January 29 | US Attorney General Francis Biddle issued the first of a series of orders establishing limited strategic areas along the Pacific Coast and requiring the removal of all enemy aliens from these areas. |
| January 30 | Colonel Karl Bendetsen appointed as the War Department Representative. |
| January 30 | JACL passed a resolution to request the Federal Government to permit its members and their alien parents to evacuate West Coast areas voluntarily. |
| January 31 | Attorney General establishes 59 additional prohibited zones in California to be cleared by February 15. |
| February 4 | Attorney General establishes curfew zones in California to become effective February 4. |
| February 14 | Lt. General J. DeWitt Commanding General of the Western Defense Command sent a memorandum to the Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson recommending the evacuation of "Japanese and other subversive person' from the West Coast area". |
| February 19 | President Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9066, authorizing Secretary of War, or any military commander designated by Secretary to establish 'military areas' and exclude therefrom 'any or all persons'. |
| February 20 | Secretary Stimson designated General DeWitt as military commander empowered to carry out an evacuation within his command under the terms of the Executive Order 9066. |
| March 2 | General DeWitt issue Proclamation No. 1 designation the Western half of the three Pacific Coast states and the southern third of Arizona as a military areas and stipulating that all persons of Japanese descent would eventually be removed therefrom. |
| March 7 | Army acquire Owens Valley site for Manzanar Assembly Center. |
| March 11 | General DeWitt establish the Wartime Civil Control Administration (WCCA), with Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen as Director to carry out the evacuation plan. |
| March 16 | Wartime Civil Control Administration establishes military area in Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Nevada, designate 934 prohibited zone to be cleared. |
| March 18 | President Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9102 creating the War Relocation Authority to assist person evacuated by the military under Executive Order No. 9066. Milton S. Eisenhower was named Director. |
| March 20 | WCCA acquires Santa Anita as Assembly Center. |
| March 21 | President Roosevelt signed Public Law 503 (77th Congress) making it a federal offense to violate any order issued by a designated military commander under authority of Executive Order No. 9066. |
| March 22 | First large contingent of Japanese and Japanese Americans moved from Los Angeles to the Manzanar Assembly Center operated by the Army in the Owens Valley of California. |

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| March 23 | General DeWitt issues Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1 ordering the evacuation of all people of Japanese descent from Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound and their removal by March 30, to the Puyallup Army Assembly Center near Seattle. |
| March 24 | Curfew for all aliens and Japanese proclaimed for military area 1 and other strategic areas in west effective March 27. WCCA acquires sites for Assembly Centers at Merced, Tulare, Marysville, and Fresno. |
| March 27 | General DeWitt issued Proclamation No. 4 (effective March 29) forbidding further voluntary migration of Japanese and Japanese Americans from the West Coast military areas. |
| April 3 | First compulsory evacuation of Los Angeles Japanese to Santa Anita Assembly Center. |
| April 28 | Seattle evacuees are sent to temporary assembly center at Puyallup fairgrounds, called "Camp Harmony". |
| April 28 | Alaska evacuees (132) are sent to Puyallup Assembly Center; later to Mindoka WRA Center. |
| May 8 | The first contingent of evacuee arrive at the Colorado River Relocation Center (Poston) near Parker, Arizona. |
| May 19 | Western Defense Command issues Civilian Restriction Order No.1 establishing all assembly centers in the eight far western states as military areas and forbidding evacuees residents to leave these areas without expressed approval of the Western Defense Command. |
| May 27 | First contingent of evacuees arrives at the Tule Lake Relocation Center in Northern California; this group included 447 volunteers who came from Puyallup and Portland Assembly Centers. |
| June 1 | The Manzanar Army Assembly Center was transferred from WCCA to WRA and renamed Manzanar Relocation Center. |
| June 1-4 | Direct evacuee arrive from rural Oregon and Washington to the Tule Lake Center. |
| June 2 | General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 6 forbidding further voluntary migration of people of Japanese descent from the eastern half of California and simultaneously announce that all such people would eventually be removed from this area directly to WRA centers. |
| June 17 | President Roosevelt appointed Dillon S. Myer to succeed Milton S. Eisenhower as Director of WRA. |
| July 13 | *Misuye Endo* petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that she was loyal and law abiding U. S.. citizen, that no charge had been made against her, that she was being unlawfully detained, and she was confined in a relocation center under armed guard and held there against her will. |
| August 7 | Western Defense Command announced the completion of evacuation of 110,000 from their homes in the military area either to the Army Assembly Center or to the WRA Center. |
| August 10 | Minidoka Relocation Center near Twin Falls, Idaho receives the first contingent of evacuees from the Puyallup Army Assembly Center. |
| August 12 | Heart Mountain Relocation Center near Cody, Wyoming received its first group of evacuees from the Pomona Army Assembly Center. |
| August 15 | Farm Labor strike at Tule Lake. |
| August 27 | The Granada WRA Center near La Mar, Colorado was opened with the arrival of a group from Merced Assembly Center. |
| September 11 | The Central Utah WRA, near Delta, Utah received its first group from Tanforan Assembly Center. |
| September 18 | The Rohwer WRA near McGhee, Arkansas received its first group of evacuees from the Stockton Assembly Center. |
| October 6 | The Jerome WRA near Dermont, Arkansas the last of the 10 center ready for business received a group of evacuees from the Fresno Assembly Center. |
| November 3 | The transfer of evacuees from Assembly Centers was completed with the arrival of last group at Jerome WRA from Fresno Assembly Center. |
| November 19 | The National Japanese American Citizen League met at Japanese Church of Christ, 268 West First South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah and commended the WRA authorities for their efforts in behalf of the evacuee. The Assembly later adopted a resolution further commending the Washington authority. |

1943

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| January 4 | WRA field offices established in Chicago, Salt Lake City, Cleveland, Minneapolis, Des Moines, New York City, Denver, Kansas City, and Boston. |
| January 23 | Secretary of War Henry Stimson announced plans to form Japanese American Combat team to be made up of volunteers from both the mainland and Hawaii. |
| February 8 | Registration (loyalty questionnaire) of all persons over 17 years of age for Army recruitment, segregation and relocation begins at most of the relocation centers. |
| May 6 | The registration questionnaire took place at the Heart Mountain Center. |
| May 6 | Ms Eleanor Roosevelt spent a full day at the Gila River WRA Center. |
| June 21 | *Hirabayasi v U S and Yasui v US* Supreme Court rules that a curfew may be imposed against one group of Americans citizens based solely on ancestry and that Congress in enacting Public Law 77-503 authorized the implementation of E. O. 9066 and provided criminal penalties for violation of order of the Military Commander. |
| June 25 | Director Myer wrote to Assistant Secretary of War John L. McCloy regarding plans for a segregation program and the selection of Tule Lake as the segregation center. |
| September and early October, 1943 | More than 15,000 people were moved in and out of the Tule Lake Center. |
| October 11 | The last group of evacuees from the other centers arrive at Tule Lake Center. |
| November 10 | Final group of trains leave Tule Lake for Gila River, Minidoka , Heart Mountain, Granada and Jerome Relocation Centers. |
| December 8 | USS GRIPSHOLM an exchange ship return to USA; no further exchange of personnel occurred for the remaining of the war. |

1944

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| February 16 | President Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9423 transferring WRA to the Department of the Interior. |
| May | The all nisei 442 Regimental Combat Team (RCT) embarks for the Italian front. |
| June 6 | D-Day |
| June 30 | Jerome WRA Center closed; the remaining personnel transferred to Amache, Granada, Colorado and Rohwer, Arkansas. |
| July 1 | President Roosevelt signed Public Law 405 (78th Congress) permitting United States citizens to renounce their citizenship on American soil in time of war under procedures approved by the Attorney General. |
| December 17 | The War Department announced the revocation (effective on January 2, 1945) of the West Coast mass exclusion orders which had been in effect against people of Japanese descent since the spring of 1942 |
| December 18 | The WRA announced that all relocation Centers would be closed before the end of 1945 and the entire WRA program would be liquidated on June 30, 1946. |
| December 18 | *Korematsu v U S* Supreme Court rules that one group of citizens may be singled out and expelled from their homes and imprisoned for several years without trial, based solely on their ancestry. |
| December 18 | In *ex parte Endo,* Supreme Court rules that WRA has no authority to detain a "concededly loyal" American citizen. |

1945

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| April 29 | 442 RCT frees prisoners at Dachau Concentration Camps. |
| August 15 | VJ Day |
| September | Western Defense Command issues Public Proclamation No. 24 revoking all individual exclusion orders and all further military restrictions against persons of Japanese descent. |
| October 15 - December 15 | All WRA Relocation Centers are closed except for Tule Lake Center. |

1946

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| March 20 | Tule Lake Segregation Center closed. |

June 30 — War Relocation Authority program officially terminates.

October 30 — Crystal City Detention Center, Texas operated by the Justice Department releases last Japanese (North, Central and South ) Americans. The closing of the Japanese American Internment Program.

## 1948

July 2 — Evacuation Claims Act passed, giving evacuees until January 3, 1950 to file claims against the government for damages to or loss of real or personal property. . .that is a reasonable and natural consequence of the evacuation . . Total of $38 million paid by the government, or less than 10 cents per dollar lost.

## 1976

February 19 — President Gerald Ford formally rescinds Executive Order No. 9066.

## 1989

November 2 — President George Bush signed Public Law 101-162 which guarantees fund for reparation payments to the WW II internment survivors beginning in October of 1990. For the Japanese American community, it marks a victorious end to a long struggle for justice. For the nation, the President signature reaffirms the country's commitment to equal justice under the law.

**EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 9066**
FEBRUARY 19, 1942

Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe
Military Areas

Whereas, The successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national defense material, national defense premises and national defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533. as amended by the Act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220. and the Act of August 21, 1941. 55 Stat. 655 (U.S.C. , Title 50, Sec. 104):

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorized and direct the Secretary of War , and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deem such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restriction the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. The designation of military areas in any region or locality shall supersede designation of prohibited and restricted areas by the Attorney General under the Proclamation of December 7 and 8, 1941, and shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said Proclamation in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas.

I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said Military Commanders to take such other steps as he or the appropriate Military Commander may deem advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each Military area herein above authorized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal Agencies, with authority to accept assistance of state and local agencies.

I hereby further authorize and direct all Executive Department, independent establishments and other Federal Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said Military Commanders in carrying out this Executive Order, including the furnishing of medical aid, hospitalization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities and service.

This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority granted under Executive Order 8972, dated December 12, 1941, nor shall it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with response to the investigation of alleged acts of sabotage or duty and responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice under the Proclamation of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as such duty and responsibility is superseded by the designation of military areas thereunder.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House, February 19, 1942.

**EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 9102**
DATED MARCH 8, 1942
7 F. R. 2165

Authorizing the creation of the War Relocation Authority

By the virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statues of the United States, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to provide for the removal from designated areas of persons whose removal is necessary in the interest of national security, it is ordered as follows:

1. There is established in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President the War Relocation Authority, at the head of which shall be a Director appointed by and responsible to the President.

2. The Director of the War Relocation Authority is authorized and directed to formulated and effectuate a program for the removal, from areas designated from time to time by the Secretary of War or appropriate military commander under the authority of Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942, of the persons or classes of persons designated under such Executive Order, and for their relocation, maintenance, and supervision.

3. In effectuating such program the Director shall have authority to:

(a) Accomplish all necessary evacuation not undertaken by the Secretary of War or appropriate military commander, provide for the relocation of such persons in appropriate places, provide for their needs in such manner as may be appropriate , and supervise their activities.

(b) Provide, insofar as feasible and desirable, for the employment of such person at useful work in industry, commerce, agriculture, or public project, prescribed the terms and conditions of such public employment, and safeguard the public interest in the private employment of such persons.

(c) Secure the cooperation, assistance, or services of any governmental agency.

(d) Prescribe regulations necessary or desirable to promote effective execution of such programs, and, as a means of coordinating evacuation and relocation activities, consult with the Secretary of War with respect regulations issued and measures taken by him.

(e) Make such delegation of authority as he may deem necessary.

(f) Employ necessary personnel, and make such expenditures, including the making of loans, and grants and the purchase of real property, as may be necessary, within the limits of such funds as may be made available to the Authority.

4. The Director shall consult with United States Employment Services, and other agencies on employment and other problems incident to activities under this order.

5. The Director shall cooperate with the Alien Property Custodian appointed pursuant to Executive Order No. 9095 of March 11. 1942, in formulating policies to govern the custody, management, and disposal by the Alien Property Custodian of property belonging to foreign

nationals removed under this order or under Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942; and may assist all other persons removed under either of such Executive Orders in the management and disposal of their property.

6. Departments and agencies of the United States are directed to cooperate with and assist the Director in his activities hereunder. The Department of War and Justice, under the direction of the Secretary of War and the Attorney General, respectively, shall insofar as consistent with the national interest provide protection, police and investigation service as the Director shall find necessary in connection with activities under this order.

7. There is established within the War Relocation Authority the War Relocation Work Corps. The Director shall provide, by general regulations, for the enlistment in such Corps, for the duration of the present war, of persons removed under this order or under Executive Order 9066 of February 19, 1942, and shall prescribe the terms and conditions of the work to be performed by such Corps, and the compensation to be paid.

8. There is established within War Relocation Authority a Liaison Committee on War Relocation which shall consist of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Labor, the Federal Security Administrator, the Director of Civilian Defense, and the Alien Property Custodian, or their deputies, and such other persons or agencies as the Director may designate. The Liaison Committee shall meet at the call of the Director and shall assist him in his duties.

9. The Director shall keep the President informed with regards to the progress made in carry out this order, and perform such related duties as the President may time to time assign to him.

10. In order to avoid duplication of evacuation activities under this order and Executive Order 9066 of February 19, 1942, the Director shall not undertake any evacuation activities within Military areas designated under said Executive Order 9066, without prior approval of the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commanders.

11. This order does not limit the authority granted in Executive Order No. 8972 of December 12, 1941; Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942; Executive Order9095 of March 11, 1942; Executive Proclamation No. 2526 of December 8, 1941; Executive Proclamation 2527 of December 8, 1941; Executive Proclamation 2533 of December 29, 1941; or Executive Proclamation 2537 of January 14, 1942; nor does it limit the functions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House, March 8, 1942

**PUBLIC LAW No. 503 (77th CONGRESS)**
DATED MARCH 21, 1942

Authorizing the Military to Order Removal from Military Zones

To provide a penalty for violation of restriction or orders with respect to persons entering, remaining in leaving, or committing any act in military areas, or zones.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone prescribed, under the Authority of an Executive Order of the President , by the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed $5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both , for each offense.

## LOCATIONS AND PHYSICAL LAYOUTS OF THE INTERNMENT CAMPS

### TYPES OF INTERNMENT CENTERS

There were four different types of internment centers. Each type was differentiated by chronology, type of occupants., and administered by different government agencies. The types were:

1. *Isolation and Detention Centers* operated by the Justice Department.
   (first type of center to open December 8,1941-last to close October 30, 1946)
2. *Assembly Centers* operated by the Western Defense Command, US Army
   (second type of center to open March 22, 1942 - closed October 16, 1942)
3. *Relocation Centers* operated by the War Relocation Authority (WRA), a civilian agency, in the Executive Office of the US President
   (third type of center to open May 16, 1942 - closed May 30, 1946)
4. *Segregation Center* at Tule Lake operated by WRA and later after the riots by the US Army. (Opened July 1943 and closed on March 20, 1946.)

### ISOLATION AND DETENTION CENTERS

During the initial phases of the entrapment period from December 7, 1941 through December 31, 1941, the various governmental agencies had a list of personnel to pick up and detain. The personnel were picked up by the FBI, Naval Intelligence and the Immigration authorities and placed in four centers; Ft. Leupp, Winslow, Arizona, Santa Fe, New Mexico, Crystal City, Texas and Bismark, North Dakota.

The personnel considered for 'high risk' of espionage and sabotage were the following categories:

1. Religious leaders; especially the Shinto priests; Shinto religion has close affinity to the Emperor of Japan. Buddhist leaders were also taken into custody.

2. Prefecture leaders; a social and welfare organization; During the1930's there were not the 'safety nets' as presently and the prefecture leaders arranged for the seriously needed medical and unemployment needs by their group .The leader did not seek their positions but the group of elders prevailed on the person to serve, again and again. The principle here was to round up the community leaders to break the backs of the community.

3. Japanese language teachers; each moderate sized ethnic community had a Japanese language school. Many Japanese parents thought that they would return to Japan after making a bundle of money and wanted their children to learn the language.

   This situation turned ironic; the teachers (*issei*) were placed in the Federal detention centers, while their students (*nisei*) interned in the concentration camps were heavily recruited to serve in the Military Intelligence Service (MIS - Pacific).There were over 3,200 who served and 1,634 were from the internment camps (the remaining were from Hawaii).

   The MIS-Pacific served in all theaters of operation from the initial battle in the Aleutian, to the battle of Guadalcanal, the Burma campaign, the battle of Okinawa and finally on the General MacArthur's staff at the signing of the surrender on the battleship USS Missouri. This group was not publicized but accomplished more to end the war than the 442 RCT because they gathered intelligence and intercepted enemy messages.

The highlight of the intercept was the travel plans of Admiral Yamamoto to the Solomon Islands which led to the downing of his plane.

The capturing and translation of the battle plans for the defense of Midway Island led to the destruction of the major part of the Japanese navy and the tide of the Pacific War had changed forever in the Allies favor.

The military intelligence personnel were not ordinary recruits but many were university graduates. They were not given officers ranks even though other Caucasians classmates were given officers ranks.

4. Labor leaders; in urban areas these included longshoreman, and union leaders, but in the rural areas the farm labor leaders were migratory harvesters going from valley to valley to contract the harvest.

5. Veterans of the Japanese Imperial navy and the army and former government employees.

There were 2,700 personnel who were placed in these isolation and detention centers and usually remained in the center until the cessation of the war; some were allowed to join their families in the relocation centers. Some were deported to Japan during and after the war.

In hindsight the Americans in 1940 had no real knowledge of the Japanese American society, nor did many understand the Japanese culture or the language.

## ASSEMBLY CENTERS

While the permanent centers were being designed and constructed; a period from March 1942 through October 1942, the Japanese were rounded up and held in the detention which were called Assembly Centers (A. C.). The round up began in late February and completed late April 1942 by the Western Defense Command under Lt. General DeWitt.

Even through General De Witt said "you can't trust the Japs even though they were born in this country"; for unknown reasons; large groups of personnel did not go into the Assembly Centers but remained in their residences and were under curfew until sent to the WRA Internment Camps; starting on May 16, 1942. For example, in the Marysville,(CA) area . on one side of the highway the personnel were sent to Merced A.C. while on the eastside of the Highway 99 they were under curfew but allowed freedom during the daylight hours.

There were four different types of Assembly Centers. The most noted type were at the race tracks; Tanforan in the Bay Area and Santa Anita in the Los Angeles area.

The second type was those located at the county fair grounds. These included Fresno and Stockton. See enclosed site plans.

The third type, which very few people know about was located in the migratory farm labor camps. This type was the most primitive, with substandard sanitation facilities.

## HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

The fourth type was located in the Hawaiian Islands. The location was at Sand Island in the harbor of Honolulu .This could be classified more of a detention center as only certain classification of personnel were detained and later transferred to the WRA internment camps.

Nearly all Japanese Hawaiians were not interned even though they were closer to the war zone. The reasons given were that Hawaiian economy would collapse if the Japanese Americans were to be interned as they represented over 35% (159,905) of the Hawaiian population.

## ALASKA

The Japanese from Alaska were also interned; a total of 132 were sent to Puyallup Assembly Center and then to Minidoka WRA Relocation Center in Idaho.

**LIST OF ASSEMBLY CENTERS (AC)**

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| 1. | Fresno AC | 4,917 |
| 2. | Marysville AC | 2,431 |
| 3. | Mayer AC | 386 |
| 4. | Merced AC | 4,554 |
| 5. | Pinedale AC | 4,746 |
| 6. | Pomona AC | 5,260 |
| 7. | Portland AC | 3,630 |
| 8. | Puyallup AC | 7,399 |
| 9. | Sacramento AC | 4,655 |
| 10. | Salinas AC | 3,580 |
| 11. | Santa Anita AC | 18,491 |
| 12. | Stockton AC | 4,033 |
| 13. | Tanforan AC | 7,673 |
| 14. | Tulare AC | 4,942 |
| 15. | Turlock AC | 3,573 |
| | subtotal | 80,170 |
| 16. | Sand Island, HA AC | 1,700 |
| | Direct Evacuation | 27,695 |
| | TOTAL | 109,665 |

## TRANSITION FROM THE ASSEMBLY CENTERS TO THE WRA CENTERS

During this period an advance party of 40 -50 personnel were selected from each Assembly Center to proceed to the permanent relocation centers and to prepare for the arrival of the internees. As each ward or nine to ten blocks was constructed at the permanent centers, Assembly Centers were notified and each Assembly Centers contributed about 500 to the total of 2,000 peoples (in each phase) were moved to the permanent centers. The wards were completed every three weeks (a phase) and the entire camp construction took four month to complete. The last group to leave the Fresno Assembly Center was in November 1942.

## CORPS OF ENGINEER

The WRA Centers were constructed under the supervision of the Corps of Engineer. The project manager for the Engineers was Colonel Leslie R. Groves; (1896-1970) upon completion of the concentration camps, he was promoted to Brigadier General and was put in charge of the Manhattan Project. Ironically, in America he built the prisons for the Japanese Americans and later he was instrumental in nuclear destruction of the Japanese people at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

## DIRECT EVACUATION

During the initial period of confusion after Pearl Harbor, the Western Defense Command - Fourth Army set up two Military Zones. Military Zone 1 was the area adjacent to the Pacific Ocean and extended inland for one half of the states and Military Zone 2 were the remaining area of the States including Washington, Oregon, California and south west Arizona.

Voluntary evacuation were encouraged from military zone 1 into military zone 2 or further inland and many personnel left areas such as Terminal Island and San Pedro in southern California for the central valley and other states such Utah and Colorado. The governors of the receiving states especially the Governor of Colorado Ralph Carr initially welcomed the Japanese, however the bigot politicians and the

# STOCKTON ASSEMBLY CENTER
## (SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY FAIRGROUNDS)



# BIRD'S EYE VIEW




FRESNO ASSEMBLY CENTER

ADMINISTRATION

Bldg. 18--Works Division
Mess & Lodging
Council Room

Bldg. 19--Center Manager
Fire Department
Supply Division

Bldg. 20--Finance and Employment Division
Service Division

Bldg. 21--Police Headquarters
Reception Hall

Hearst Newspaper put pressure on the governors and led to objections to the voluntary relocation. There were potential for widespread disorder and risk of violence; therefore on March 29, 1942 all voluntary evacuation out of military zone 1 and 2 were prohibited. The Japanese were then trapped and curfew was imposed.

Direct evacuation was first tried at the Manzanar center. The people from Los Angeles area gathered at the Rose Bowl in Pasadena and proceed in their own vehicles led by military police and conveyed to the internment center . The trip took ten hours for the two hundred and thirty miles distance.

Other centers where direct evacuation were tried were at Tule Lake, Poston and Gila River centers. Generally at these centers Greyhound buses were used for transportation.

A total of 27,695 (25%) were directly evacuated.

## WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY (WRA) INTERNMENT CENTERS

The Army did not want to have anything to do with running the internment camps. This led to the creation of a civilian agency in the *Office of Emergency Management* of the *Executive Office of the President.* President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9102 creating War Relocation Authority (WRA) to assist persons evacuated by the military under Executive Order 9066.

### MILTON S. EISENHOWER

The first director on March 21, 1942 was Milton Stover Eisenhower (1899-), the younger brother of General Dwight Eisenhower. Milton Eisenhower stayed for three months, than his assistant Dillon S. Myer took over for the remaining duration and until closure of WRA on June 30, 1946

Eisenhower and Myer both came from the Department of Agriculture and named their colleagues as project directors of the internment camps. Each had worked or known the directors for a long time at the Agriculture Department.

Milton Eisenhower felt uncomfortable in the unprecedented problems of imprisonment of American citizens and left the director's position to take a job as deputy to Elmer Davis the Office of War Information. Years later (untainted) he became the president of a university.

### DILLON S. MYER

Dillon Seymour Myer (1891-) became director on June 17, 1942; BS in agriculture , Ohio State University, Master of Education, Columbia University. was Agriculture Conservator Adjustment Administer prior to his position as WRA director.

Dillon Myer accomplished the difficult tasks with compassion and was very enlightened to the needs of the internees. In general the occupants left the centers with no hard feelings for Mr. Myer.

### JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZENS LEAGUE

The Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) actually honored (with a testimonial dinner at the Roosevelt Hotel, New York City on May 22, 1946) Mr. Myer for the humane treatment and honest approach of his administration. JACL throughout this era was the main spokesperson for the Japanese community and they believed that cooperation with the administration was better than resistance and would lead to better acceptance of the nisei by the American people.

After leaving the WRA Myer rejoined the government bureaucracy and later was an adjunct professor at a university. He wrote, in 1971, *Uprooted Americans,* the history of his WRA administration.

## DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIORS

With so much pressure put on the WRA and its Director and no one representing this small organization the thought occurred that WRA should be part of either the Justice Department or the Department of the Interior. Project Director favored the Justice Department but others thought that Department of the Interior had more experience such as running the Bureau of Indians Affairs. Actually the Colorado River and Gila River projects initially were directed by the Interior Department.

On February 16, 1944 President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9423 transferring WRA to the Department of the Interior. Dillon Myer then worked under Harold Ickes the Secretary of the Interiors. Ickes felt that Myer was performing well and left Myer alone to run the WRA project.

## Ms ELEANOR ROOSEVELT

One person who took direct interest in the internment camps was Ms Eleanor Roosevelt, the President's wife. She tried her best in keeping the camps as humane as possible. Myer and Eleanor were on good terms and visited several centers together including Poston and Gila River. Several nisei had direct talks with her in resolving the question of serving in the military, especially her interest in having the nisei women serve in the Women Army Corps (WAC). Over 500 nisei women served in the WAC and the Army Nurse Corps. She was also instrumental in many young people leaving the camps for the colleges. Most nisei have fond affection and admiration for Ms Eleanor Roosevelt.

## LOCATION MAP

The maps and legends are self explanatory and would raise the student's curiosity.
The first question is where were the ten relocation projects located. The map shows the ten project sites; however there were some projects which had more than one camp site.

There were 13 separate camp sites. The two projects in Arizona had multiple camps; Poston had three camps and Gila River project had two camps. Each camp was self sufficient but governed under one administrator.

## INTERNMENT CAMP POPULATIONS

| | Camps | Bancroft* | Myer* | J/A His* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Amache, CO | 7,554 | 7,656 | 7,318 |
| 2. | Gila River, AZ | | 13,420 | 13,348 |
| | A. Butte Camp | 9,480 | | |
| | B. Canal Camp | 5,097 | | |
| 3. | Heart Mountain, WY | 10.954 | 11,062 | 10.767 |
| 4. | Jerome, AR | 7,674 | 7,932 | 8,497 |
| 5. | Manzanar, CA | 9,927 | 10,121 | 10,046 |
| 6. | Minidoka, ID | 9,467 | 9,861 | 9,397 |
| 7. | Poston,AZ | | 18,039 | 17,814 |
| | A. Poston I | 9,483 | | |
| | B. Poston II | 5,952 | | |
| | C. Poston III | 2,987 | | |
| 8. | Rohwer, AR | 8,232 | 8,548 | 8,475 |
| 9. | Topaz, UT | 8,223 | 8,232 | 8,130 |
| 10. | Tule Lake, CA | 14,984 | 15,369 | 18,789 |
| | TOTAL** | 110,014 | 110,310 | 112,581 |

## PERMANENT RESIDENCE OF THE ORIGINAL GROUP OF EVACUEES

| | |
|---|---|
| Arizona | 259 |
| California | 92,785 |
| Oregon | 3,714 |
| Washington | 12,892 |
| Alaska | 132 |
| Others (Montana, Idaho, (?) | 660 |




Map of Western United States showing Relocation and Assembly Centers

| | |
|---|---|
| TOTAL | 110,442 |
| 1943 From Hawaii A.C. | 1,700 |
| GRAND TOTAL** | 112,142 |

*Sources (1) Bancroft Library, (2) Dillon Myer; *Uprooted Americans*; (3) Japanese American Historical Society, *Americans of Japanese Ancestry and US Constitution*

** The population discrepancies were created by the following:

## POPULATION

The camp population was always in a continuous flux for several reasons. The census were not taken on a certain date so each camp reported their total on different dates. The variables factors were:

## OUTWARD-BOUND OR INTER-CAMP TRANSFERS

1. There were constant transfers between camps to accommodate:
   A. The family members who were separated.
   B. To balance the supply and demand of the technical personnel such as doctors, engineers, and agricultural specialists.

2. The seasonal farm laborer were allowed to go outside the camp and return after the harvest. Several thousands (up to 10,000)could be out when the census were taken.

3. The recruitment of the Japanese speaking personnel in the Military Intelligence Service (1,634), later the draft and volunteers (11,780) and WAC and Army Nurse Corps (537).

4. Immediately after the transfer from the Assembly Center, the project directors allowed application to colleges. There were 3,812 personnel who applied for schooling and most left the camps bound for technical schools and colleges.

5. After arrival at the WRA camps, progressive project directors encouraged families to relocate to the midwest or the eastern seaboard. Thousands (25 - 29,000) began to relocate; most were older nisei who were better educated or had industrial skills needed by the employers.

## INWARD-BOUND

1. Japanese people in extreme western Idaho, (near Ontario, Oregon), such communities as Payette, Nampa, Caldwell and Weiser were sent to the Minidoka, Idaho internment center even though State of Idaho was outside of the Military Zone 2 and did not have to evacuate.

2. In late 1942 and early 1943, there were 1,700 Japanese - Hawaiians transferred from Sand Island. A. C., Hawaii to the two WRA Internment Centers; Jerome and Poston.

3. There were numbers of migratory farm and railroad workers who followed their family into the internment center in late 1942. The typical pattern of these workers :in spring; March or April they would leave their home base which was located in the Japantown section usually a boarding houses or (flop)hotels and follow the harvest route or the railroad maintenance route in the High Sierra or the Rocky Mountains. They would return to the home base in the late fall and winter there. The home bases were located in larger Japanese communities such as Los Angeles, Fresno, Stockton, Sacramento, Portland, Seattle and Spokane. When the internment notice came and the boarding houses and hotels closed, these 2,249 migratory workers did not have a home base to return to and most (were bachelors) joined their relatives or friends at the internment centers.

Because the project centers were located in sparse rural states, the internment camps with population of 10,000 became second, third and fourth largest cities in that particular state., including Wyoming, Idaho, Utah and Arkansas. For example Heart Mountain Center was the third largest city in Wyoming.

## CENSUS DATA OF JAPANESE POPULATION IN USA

| YEAR | JAPANESE IN USA | JAPANESE IN HAWAII | TOTAL USA POP. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1870 | 55 | | 38,558,371 |
| 1880 | 148 | | 50,155,738 |
| 1890 | 2,039 | | 62,947,714 |
| 1900 | 29,326 | 61,111 | 75,994,575 |
| 1910 | 72,157 | 79,675 | 91,972,266 |
| 1920 | 111,010 | 109,274 | 105,710,620 |
| 1930 | 138,834 | 139,631 | 122,775,046 |
| 1940 | 126,947* | 157,905 | 131,669,275 |

*This drop of population has been puzzling; most reports mention the depression led to returning to Japan of the issei and the nisei (*kibei)*attending schools in Japan.

## CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WRA INTERNMENT CAMPS

All of the WRA internment camps had similar characteristics:

1. Each center was about the same size with a population between 8,000 to 10,000.
2. The project area was large tract of land of over 3,500 acres.
3. The inhabited area was one square mile or 640 acres.
4. The block arrangements were similar.
5. The barracks or apartment units were similar in size 20 feet by 100 feet.
   (Camp Heart Mountain was the only center with barracks of 20 feet by 120 feet.)
6. The occupants came from same geographic areas of the west coast. The blocks and the wards had people from the same Assembly Centers, but the entire camp often contained people from several states or regions of the state.
7. Each project consisted of a farm area and the residential area.

## FARM AREA

The farming operation was one of the easiest tasks to set up at each of the ten internment projects. During 1930's the Japanese in the United States were predominately in the agriculture and related industries; these activities included fruit and vegetable farming, horticultural and ornamental nurseries, and wholesale and retail floral trades. The Japanese dominated the wholesale floral and certain vegetables in the late 1930's.

Many of the American farmers on the west coast resented the resourcefulness and the work ethics of the Japanese farmers and the nurserymen. The Japanese nurserymen were continuously improving the variety of fruits and flowers in order to have earlier and later maturity to obtain maximum marketing prices. The American farmers and organization like the *Native Sons of the Golden West* were happy to see the Japanese farmers put in the concentration camps and later opposed their release from the camps.

Each center started vegetable farms, poultry and hog production for use by the mess halls.
The farm was in production within four month and varieties including Japanese types of vegetable were produced; onions, peas, carrots, rutabagas, cabbage, beets, turnips, parsnips, beans, cauliflower, spinach, lettuce, squash, pumpkin, Swiss chard, nappa, cucumber, daikon, gobo, and Chinese peas.

Beef and dairy production were not undertaken by the Japanese because of cultural aversion to this type of work. Some Caucasian were employed to direct this activity. Generally these products were purchased from nearby vendors. In Japan people in beef and slaughtering occupation were considered outcast or '*eta*' and even today they avoid people associated as *Burakumin* (modern term for *eta*). This caste system was carried to this country by the emigrants and certain attitudes about marriage to an '*eta*' was prolonged during the nisei generation.

The farm activities were a safety valve for people in the concentration camps. Most men (and boys in the summer) left the restrictions of the camp and worked all day in the open fields. In the fall, potato and onion harvest were undertaken by high school students and by some of their teachers. They were creative in their attempt to develop agriculture in the desert and swampy environment. The combination of greenhouse and transplanting techniques familiar to certain types of Japanese farmers and nurserymen extended the growing season in the harsh climate.

Lot of the men (up to 10,000 had seasonal passes) left the camps during the summer to harvest crops on the outside and returned after the harvest. They journeyed to the interior of the rural states including Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado and Arizona. They were paid generally 45 cents per hour. What they encountered was appalling, compared to the west coast farms; the farmers of the interior states were poverty stricken. Many of the farms had no running water and still used outdoor toilets, The return to the camps with warm bath and indoor plumbing was a luxury. The main harvest crops were sugar beets, potatoes, onions, cotton and flax.

## INHABITANT CORE AREA

The core area of most centers were one mile by one mile or 640 acres. Several sites were larger because of the unusual configuration of the camps (see site maps). Within this space were two functional areas; the project administrative area and the internee residential area.

## PROJECT ADMINISTRATIVE AREA

These areas include the military police company (MP), the Caucasian staff housing and the administrative office area.

## MILITARY POLICE

The guarding of the relocation centers from the inner perimeter of the center outward was the responsibility of the Army. Initially, there was stationed at each center for this purpose one Military Police Escort and Guard Company. These company usually contained a high percentage of limited service men and were officered by over-age officers which, raised the efficiency of the companies by contributing experience and possibly a higher grade of intelligence. In a country at war the nature of the duty was unpopular and the location of the center (station) were considered poor assignments.

The maintenance of order within the centers was entirely the responsibility of the Project Director. The military commander could not exercise no authority within the center except upon the written request of the Project Director in which case the military commander became entirely responsible for the administrator of the center. There were only two such cases; Manzanar and Tule Lake, where internal security failed and the project director requested such actions. In both cases, the center were returned to the WRA control at the earliest moment thought expedient to do so.

At Tule Lake, the guard company was increased by the addition of one Battalion and remained until the guarding of the center was assumed later by the Department of Justice. At all other center the guards were gradually reduced to token strength until finally removed.

In all cases except specific duties or in emergencies such as fire, the enlisted men of the guard companies were off limit within the centers.

The company (140-150 personnel) of military police were responsible for the security of the outside of the camp. The internees area had a perimeter fence of barbed wire and the MP patrolled the fenced area by a series of guard tower located in strategic points. The guard tower usually had search light for night patrols and machine guns for protection.

The interior of the camp were patrolled by the internal security force which consisted of the Japanese personnel.

## STAFF HOUSING

Many of the Caucasian staff lived in apartment units within this compound however some found housing in nearby towns. The apartments were rented for $20 - 25 per month for 1 -3 bedrooms. The meals if eaten at the mess hall were charged at the rate of 40 cents per day.

## ADMINISTRATIVE AREA

The administrative area included office function of the project manager and his staff. The staff included the project director , assistant director, and his department heads. The department included :agriculture, education, medical, engineering, maintenance, fire, internal security, transportation, supply and warehousing and recreation.

## PROJECT DIRECTORS

The project directors came from the Agriculture Department and his assistant from the engineering side such as the Bureau of Reclamation. Because they were previously involved in some form of large organization; the camp operations were efficient and humane.

| Project Directors | Centers | Dates |
|---|---|---|
| Roy Nash | Manzanar | June 1942-Sep 42 |
| Ralph Merritt | Manzanar | 1942-46 |
| Wade Head | Poston | 1942-43 |
| Duncan Mills | Poston | 1944-45 |
| Eastburn Smith | Gila River | 1942 |
| Roy Bennett | Gila River | 1943-45 |
| Douglas Todd | Gila River | 1946 |
| Elmer Shirrell | Tule Lake | 1942 |
| Harvey Coverly | Tule Lake | 1943 |
| Ray Best | Tule Lake | 1943-46 |
| Harry Stafford | Minidoka | 1942-45 |
| Christford Rachford | Heart Mtn | 1942 |
| Guy Robertson | Heart Mtn | 1943-45 |
| James C. Lindley | Granada | 1942-46 |
| Charles Ernt | Topaz | 1942-44 |
| Louis Hoffman | Topaz | 1945 |
| Raymond Johnson | Rohwer | 1942-45 |
| Paul Taylor | Jerome | 1943-44 |

## DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS

Like all organization the head of the department set the policy and overall leadership but the actual running of the camps fell on the Japanese American staff. By 1940 the Japanese American had developed a cadre of university graduates in all fields including engineering and health sciences and many were employed in the civil services; this nisei group essentially directed the day-to-day operation of the camps.

## THE INTERNEE RESIDENTIAL AREA

The internees lived in the block. This unit was managed by the block manager and 90% of all activities happened at the block level. The typical block was the same for all centers; it consisted of two rows of six or seven barracks or apartment units on both sides of a utility core. The utility core was grouped in the center for efficiency and economy of building materials and consisted of the men and women toilet facilities, shower, laundry, ironing facility, the boiler room, and sometimes the mess hall. The recreation hall was on the perimeter of the block.

## BARRACKS (APARTMENTS)

The barracks consisted of 20 feet by 100 feet, (except for Camp Heart Mountain) which were divided into room of several sizes, depending on the family size, the usual sizes were 16 feet, 20 feet, and 25 feet. The room partition was from the finished floor to the underside of the roof truss or 8 feet in height. The area



4 FAMILY BUILDING
3 UNITS 20'x 24'
1 UNIT 20'x 28'




TYPICAL BLOCK PLAN

above the partition was open and therefore noise could be heard from one apartment to the next. The major complaint was the lack of privacy and the smell from cooking or making of liquor from the adjoining units.

The barrack construction consisted of a foundation of concrete piers with a 2 x 6 floor joist and 1 x 10 subfloor and a tongue and groove finish flooring. The walls were 2 x 4 stud wall with no interior finish and on the exterior with 1 x 10 sheathing and building paper. The barracks did not have any insulation at any of the camps. The building materials were hard to obtain during this period.

Each apartment had two sets of windows and a single door. Some ingenious residents build a vestibule to protect the entry door from the severe weather.

The apartment was furnished with a single light bulb, a coal burning pot-belly stove for heating and cots for beds. The furniture was made by the tenants from scraps of lumber left by the construction.

The camp construction took about four month from start to the finish. The construction crew consisted of about 3,000 unskilled workers. The skilled crew consisted of 12 lead carpenters, 3 electricians and 3 plumbers and one engineer from the Corps of Engineers.

The general construction was crude and use of green lumber were prevalent, and later when the lumber dried the flooring had become a sieve. Some residents added a skirt around the barracks hoping to reduce the air and dust infiltration; however a bad design and poor construction could not be easily remedied.

## BACHELORS

In most of the centers there were one or two barracks at the end of the blocks which were reserved for the bachelors. During this period there were lot of single men who did not have an opportunity to find marriage partners in America and had missed an opportunity to send for a picture bride from Japan. Many bachelors did not like the close quarters and after the MP were withdrawn, these men built a lean-to shelters (a shantytown) outside the perimeter fence and lived a life of a hermit, except for taking their showers and the meals; some even cooked and bathed outdoors and didn't associate with the rest of the inhabitants.

## MESS HALL

The following policy was adopted to provide for the feeding of evacuees at the relocation centers:

In all centers administered by War Relocation Authority, the evacuee resident are served their meals in mess halls operated by the authority. It is the WRA policy to provide at these mess hall food in quantity and quality comparable to the general public. Foodstuff are procured through US Army Quartermaster Corps under specifications used by Army mess procurement unless they conflict with or exceed WRA policy.

**AVERAGE MEAL COST FOR EACH CENTER**

| CENTER | TIME CENTER WAS OCCUPIED | AVERAGE POP. | AVERAGE COST/ DAY/PERSON |
|---|---|---|---|
| TOPAZ | 3 YR - 2 MO. | 7,193 | 36 CENTS |
| POSTON I,II, III | 3 7 | 15,833 | 35 |
| GILA RIVER | 3 5 | 11,734 | 34 |
| GRANADA | 3 3 | 6,657 | 33 |
| HEART MOUNTAIN | 3 4 | 9,268 | 31 |
| JEROME | 1 9 | 6,645 | 39 |
| MANZANAR | 3 6 | 8,532 | 29 |
| MINIDOKA | 3 3 | 7,663 | 33 |
| ROHWER | 3 3 | 7,441 | 35 |
| TULE LAKE | 3 YR - 10MO. | 14,920 | 47 CENTS |

The mess hall was essentially double the barracks size or 40 feet by 100 feet. On one end was the kitchen and open dining area in the remaining space. The kitchen stoves and oven were fueled by coal. One of the Arizona center had a gas line through their camp.

All personnel took their meals at the dining hall. The kitchen staff were the residents of the block. The meals were bland and no matter how the chef prepared the meals after several month each meal tasted the same. The term SOS was often used. Many preferred eating peanut butter and jelly sandwiches.

The mess hours were:

Breakfast 7:15 AM  Lunch 12:15 PM  Dinner 5:00 - 6:00 PM

**MENUS**

A typical menus consisted of the following three samples during a week in 1943:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | **Breakfast** | |
| 1 bowl of corn meal mush | rice flakes | one orange |
| 1 cup coffee with cream and sugar | coffee -sugar | coffee - sugar |
| 1/2 cup serving of scrambled egg | canned slice peaches | 2 doughnuts |
| 1 slice of bread and butter | bread-butter | bread - butter |
| 5 stewed prune | | |
| | **Lunch** | |
| 2 pork sausages | chicken & liver stew | slice of SPAM* |
| 1/2 cup of mashed potato | beet & onion salad | napa / sliced daikon |
| 1/4 cup of peas | | |
| 1 slice of bread and butter | bread - butter | bread - butter |
| 1/4 cup of chocolate pudding | | |
| 1 cup of tea | tea | tea |
| | **Supper** | |
| 2 cup of fried rice | slice of fried fish | rice |
| 1 bowl of soup | rice | cabbage- carrot stew |
| 1/2 cup pickles | peas | bread - butter |
| 1 cup tea | tea | tea |
| | apple sauce | canned blackberries |

*SPAM was a canned pork, ham and gelatin and was used for many menus .

During the initial few weeks the family eat together, but soon the family unit broke down and different group would eat in their section, teenage boys were in one area and the adult men in another.

The mess hall was heated from all the kitchen activity throughout the day and night. The mess hall was useful for gathering when not in use as a dining hall. The ladies used the mess hall for the netting sessions and as a social hall. The mess hall also was the setting for group activities such as dances and during the holiday season they would decorate the hall with Christmas scenery. The Christmas decorations irked lot of the Buddhist.

BOILER ROOM

In the core area attached to the laundry room was the boiler room which heated the water for the toilets, showers, laundry and the mess hall. Because the unit could not produce enough hot water, the occupants were allocated time slots for the laundry and showering activities. The boiler units were undersized primarily because the designers did not understand (culturally) that Japanese people even under adverse conditions took a bath once (or twice) a day. During this period (1930's depression era) most other people y taking a bath occasionally.

The boiler room was one of two constantly heated rooms in the block and developed as an activity center for the older men (the *issei*). The room provided areas for the Japanese game of *go(h)* and *shogi* a form of chess and checkers.

In the collective group, there was always a bootleg production of liquor which the inhabitants engaged in. The raw materials were rice, potato and sweet potato. These ingredients produced a *sake* (a wine), a *shochu* (form of vodka) and *awamori* (a rum). The men enjoyed their drinks in the boiler room where after a few drinks a round of *karaoke* type songs were sung. The camp life was characterized as *monotonous* and *lackadaisical.*

## RECREATION HALL

Because of living in the close quarters and also monotony of living in the camps, the recreation section of the administration made an effort to provide organized activities.

Each block had a barrack which was used for recreation or social activities. The hall was used for various clubs activities and for meetings. There were almost any types of youth organization from scouting to flower arrangement.

At Tule Lake Center the recreation halls were converted into Japanese language schools during the Incident of November 4, 1943, when the Army took control of the administration of the project.

The sports were the largest activities including baseball and sumo wrestling. These sports were good for drawing lot of crowds and with nothing to do in the camps; the spectator sports were enjoyed by everyone. Sometimes the recreation director would arrange to have the camp all star team play nearby American Legions teams. The results were that the all stars would swamp the opposition teams.

For young adult, some ad hoc organization would throw a dance for the ward in some mess hall. Lot of romances started in the camps and one good results of the relocation movement were that nisei from different parts of the west coast got to know each other. After leaving the camps the relationships continued and many couples eventually married.

## BLOCK MANAGER

The key to running an orderly operation was the block manager. He controlled all the administrative functions and was the direct link with the administration. Some of his duties included ; mail operation, issuing passes, sick calls, issuance of supplies, and most of all mediating disputes.

The population of each block ranged from 250 to 300 depending on the family composition.

Most activities happened at the block level and the residents hardly socialized with other parts of the center. It was hard to find any one who had traveled from one end of the center to the other.

The block managers were chosen from the advance party and had experience in running a farm labor camps or boarding houses in the Japanese section of their city.

There were two types of mangers; the *nisei* and the *kibei.* The nisei were born in the USA and never had gone to Japan, while the kibei were born here but had gone to Japan for their education and returned to USA prior to the W.W.II.

The nisei seem to be more open and friendly toward the internees, while the kibei were more authoritative. The backgrounds of each type were decisively different and later created considerable difficulty for the internees.

The difficulty occurred during the loyalty questionnaire period and the beginning of the draft movement.

## LOYALTY QUESTIONNAIRE

To determine who was eligible to service in the military for the nisei and for the issei to determine who were loyal and who requested repatriation and segregation, a questionnaire was to be answered by everyone over 17 years of age. The following is the summary of question 27 and 28 which created the most controversy.

The loyalty question read as follows:

FOR MALE CITIZENS DSS FORM 304A
QUESTION #27

One section of the questionnaire # 27 asked: Are you willing to serve in the Armed Forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?

QUESTION # 28

"Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend United States form any or all attack by foreign and domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or other foreign government power or organization."

FOR FEMALE CITIZEN DSS FORM 304B
QUESTION (#27)

"If the opportunity presents itself and you are found qualified would you be willing to volunteer for the Army Nurse Corps or Women Army Air Corps "

QUESTION #28

"Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor or any other foreign government power or organization."

FOR ALIENS WRA FORM 126 (# 28) AFTER REVISION FOR CLARIFICATION

"Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United States."

Most of the 21,000 nisei men in the Army registration willing answered "yes - yes" to the two questions. But there were other who refused to reply. Some were afraid that "yes -yes" would mean immediate induction and perhaps their alien parents would not be granted the allowance and allotment which other soldiers families received. If the citizen sons were killed, their issei parents could not inherit their real property under West Coast alien land laws. If the nisei answered "no -no" then he had no choice but to request expatriation to Japan. With "defend' in the second question, they could not answer 'no' to the first.

In the WRA (for issei) questionnaire the second question was similar to the Army; and issei were in a turmoil. To 'forswear allegiance' would leave them men without countries. To say 'no' some felt that they must then ask for repatriation. For their sons to answer 'yes' might leave the alien parents alone and in many cases penniless.

When the question was altered four day later, much confusion cleared up. Now issei were asked only to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no actions which would interfere with the country's war effort. The final tally showed more than 90 per cent 'yes -yes' answers to the two questions

## THE WARD

The next level of organization was the ward. This unit consisted of nine or ten blocks separated by the fire breaks. At some centers the ward was called sections .There were three functions at the ward level:

1. Fire Control
2. Internal Security
3. Food and Fuel Supply

### FIRE CONTROL

The ward unit was in charge of fire control for each of the blocks within the ward. There were usually three or four fire stations scattered throughout the camp. Each fire station provided protection to two or three wards. There were no major fires reported in any of the centers, except at Poston II which reported several warehouse buildings had a major fires.. The major reason was that there were people in the barracks and around the blocks at all times.

### INTERNAL SECURITY

The internal security was performed at the ward level. The individual was older men in ill-fitting uniform with an arm band and usually walked around the blocks acting like someone with authority. This group did not want to be known as policeman so they used the designation as wardens. Later this group received a nick name as *'inu'* or spies for the administration. Even the block managers avoided calling on the wardens but relied on their own staff for any emergencies.

After about one and one half years the MPs were removed and the guard towers were vacant except for the Tule Lake Center. The internal security personnel became more noticeable.

### FOOD AND FUEL SUPPLIES

The third function of the ward was to provide daily supplies to the mess hall. A truck from the motor pool assigned to the ward would go to the warehouse area, pick up and deliver the daily rations to each of the mess halls. The meals at each center was the same except for the local variation in vegetables. The menus were prepared one month ahead of schedule .

The ward also had a dump truck which picked up the coal supply and delivered it to the blocks on a rotating basis so each block received the coal once a week. The coals were delivered to the mess hall, boiler room, and at the end of each block. Each family was responsible to pick up the coals for their pot-belly stove.

### US ARMY QUARTERMASTER CORPS

Because the WRA was a new organization and had no experience in purchasing, the Army Quartermaster Corps was retained to do all of the WRA food and supply purchasing. This system worked quite well for all concern.

## CAMP WIDE FUNCTIONS

### HOSPITAL

The hospital served the entire camp and was directed by the administration but operated by an internee staff of doctors and nurses. After the initial settlement, the Japanese American doctors were transferred between camps in order to equally balance the supply of medical personnel.

The supplies and equipment were insufficient and outdated but the staff did their best for the patients.

The major complaint by the Project Directors were that Caucasian medical staff reported to the

Washington headquarters and were more interested promoting their careers at the expense of the internees. The medical staff did not cooperate with the project directors or the other members of the staff.

There were roughly 300 births and 150 deaths at each of the centers. Each center had a room used for a mortuary.

There exists a small cemetery at each camp site which reminds us of the difficult years of internment.

## SCHOOLS

There was one combined junior and senior high school at each center staffed by Caucasian and Japanese personnel. There were usually two or three elementary schools at each center.

The salaries of the Caucasian teachers were :

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | Elementary | $1,640 per year |
| 2. | High School | 2,000 |
| 3. | Japanese American (nisei) | $ 16 per month -- $192 per year |

The educational curriculum was based on the California standards as 90% the internees came from California.

There were four types of Caucasian teachers:

1. First types were teachers who knew about the internment and knew about the Japanese Americans during the difficult years. This type always took up the cause of the internees and the principal thought them as not effective teachers.

2. Second type were missionary teachers who had returned from the Far East prior to the war. They were considered as ill prepared and outdated and did not know their subjects.

3. Third type were retired teachers who returned to help with the desperate situation. The administration thought this group were lacking in current teaching method and not energetic.

4. The fourth group were recruited from teachers colleges, although young and inexperienced, were considered by the principal as the most effective teachers because of their knowledge of teaching methods, current subjects and the enthusiasm about extra curricular activities.

The students and parents could not differentiate between the groups and were appreciative. The education and attendance were excellent as the Japanese had high respect for the teachers.. Even today fifty years later, many students remember their teachers as encouraging them on to colleges.

After the camp years many nisei continued their college education and many became prominent especially in the arts, architecture and landscape design. They were prominent in the professions as well as becoming deans or professors at leading universities; the nisei names; Minoru Yamasaki, Gyo Obata, Rai Okamoto, Sara Ishikawa, Donald Hisaka, George Matsumoto, Hideo Sasaki, Aza Hanamoto, Ruth Azawa, Isamu Noguchi, and George Nakashima were household names in the design fields.

## CHURCHES

There were rooms made for use as churches for the different denominations. The practicing religions were Buddhists, Shinto, and Christians. The churches provided an important functions as many internee had a hard time adjusting to the camp life and dependent on their religion to carry them through this difficult period.

The irony of the camp experience was that nearly all the Shinto and many Buddhist priests were detained (considered as *high risks*) in the separate detention centers. This vacuum of leadership led to the Christian religion as the pseudo sanctioned religion in the internment centers. With the backs of the Administration turned, the Christians zealots rallied to convert the Buddhist to the their religion. Many Buddhist parents converted to Christianity to please the nisei generation. However years after the camp and during their

death bed watch many issei asked for a Buddhist burial. This was a dilemma for the nisei and many chose the neutral setting of the funeral parlor for the services rather than choosing between the religions.

## POST OFFICE

Each relocation center had a postal address. There was a main post office and each block manager's office distributed the mail. The distribution of the mail was a big event as the residents of the camps had nothing to do but wait for some news from the outside of the camps. When some one received a package or a letter from the outside of the camp each neighbor immediately heard the news and the gossip grapevine went to work. The issei women were good at standing around and would *pecha -pecha* (gossip) all day but then there were nothing else to do in the internment centers.

## 100/442 REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM

When terrible news such as 'Killed in Action' (KIA) was reported, the block manager, the church leaders and the neighbors immediately consoled their fellow internees. This news announcement was the most painful for the block manager, as he invariably was instrumental in the drafting of the young man and saw him leave for the overseas assignment. The 100th Battalion / 442 Regimental Combat Team (RCT) was recognized as the most decorated unit of its size during the WW II. Much of the honor consisted of *purple heart* (casualty) decorations. The all nisei unit 100/442 Regimental Combat Team had the highest casualty rate of any unit during WW II. For example to rescue the entrapped Lost Texas Battalion, the 442 RCT suffered 857 casualties to save 223 Texans. For many families where the only son was killed in action, it was devastating.

While the parents were detained in America's concentration camps, the 442 RCT were freeing prisoners at Dachau Concentration Camps on April 29, 1945. These soldiers were fighting for a country where they had been excluded from the democratic process, mistrusted and treated as second class citizens.

## CANTEENS ( STORES )

There were stores similar to '7-11' stores located in several areas of the center. They were operated under the Co-oP system. The problem was that no one had any money to spend in the camps as the banking accounts of the internees were frozen by the government immediately after Pearl Harbor. During the evacuation each family was limited to bringing $300. The lifting of the banking restrictions did not take place until January 2, 1945.

Many wealthier people would order items from Sears or Wards catalogs. How they obtained the money was a bewilderment.

## CLOTHING ALLOWANCES

Each person was allowed between $1.25, $2.75 or $3.75 monthly depending on their age for the clothing allowances. Ninety percent of the evacuees were from the warm climate of California and the internment camps were located in cold and harsh climate. It was necessary to obtain warm clothing immediately to ward off the chill in the barracks and the outdoor.

During the first fall season (1942) as many residents were without any funds to buy warm clothing, the block managers arranged to purchase woolen yarns by the gross and started netting sessions for each family to provide woolen socks, mittens and sweaters for their family. At first the clothing design was simple pattern but as time went by more elaborate design became prevalent.

When their men, drafted into the US Army, went off to the war, these same women began to net khaki colored garments for the boys going to overseas theater. Even today, all the women from the camp era could net clothing for their younger relatives.

## UTILITIES

The electricity was obtained from the local utility and distributed to each blocks and barracks.

Each apartment unit was heated by a potbelly stove fueled by coals.

The domestic water was obtained from a series of deep well, (except at Heart Mountain center which obtain the water from Shoshone River), filtered through a plant, chlorinated and stored in elevated storage tanks. There was a domestic water and fire water main to each block. About one and one-half million gallons per day were used at each camp.

Each project center had its own sewage treatment system and a disposal field.

Major street were paved but most areas around the blocks were graveled and during the winter there was a field of mud. Most internees traversed the mud by wearing a home made elevated *geta* (wooden clogs). The occupants later built a board walk from their living unit to the core area to avoid this situation.

## EMPLOYMENT AND SALARY

The project management budgeted money to employ as many people as possible in order to keep every one busy. The wages were set at minimum level in order to create as many positions as possible.

The wage levels were:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | Professional, block managers | $19/month |
| 2. | Skilled, foreman, teachers | 16/month |
| 3. | Unskilled labor, farm, kitchen | 12/month |

The comparable salary of the Caucasian staff ranged from $100 to 200 per month. The inequalities created friction between the Caucasian and the Japanese American professional staffs and sometimes led to a minor disruption of services.

The Director Dillon S. Myer tried to increase the salaries, but the politicians and newspapers were against any raises. The rationale used was that the Army privates were paid $21 per month and were risking their lives while the Japs were sitting in the centers without risks and therefore should not be paid more then the Army personnel.

## NEWSPAPERS

There was a high quality newspaper started at each center. Each newspaper was professionally produced as the core editorial staff came from the former Japanese vernacular. The newspapers were: *Heart Mountain Sentinel, Denson (Jerome)Tribune, Manzanar Free Press, Minidoka Irrigator, Rohwer Outpost, Tulean Dispatch, Topaz Times, Poston Chronicle, Gila News-Courier, and Granada Pioneer.*

The newspaper was published twice a week and was read by everyone, since this was the only source of information from the outside of the camps. Often articles about people who relocated to the midwest and east coast were written to encourage the residents to think about their turn to relocate. The Japanese had a propensity to read the news and even during the Assembly Center days, there was a newspaper published at each assembly centers. The assembly center papers were generally mimeographed on 8 1/2 by 11 inches paper.

In the 1930's, each major Japanese centers such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Sacramento, Seattle and Portland had several Japanese language newspaper. Several editors and writers after leaving the camp newspaper were employed at major news organization. Some became editors or writers and were quite famous; nisei like William Hosokawa, Yoshiko Uchida, James Omura and George Togasaki.

## UNIQUENESS OF SEVERAL CENTERS

The uniqueness of the Arizona centers were that both center; *Poston I, II, & III* and *Gila River (Canal & Butte)* were on the Indian Reservation lands and were administrated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs

during the first year of operation; this administration was very relaxed and the internees could travel throughout the reservation lands without restrictions, this laxity became a cause for complaints and then created a cause for the bigots. Because of the complaints; the administration was then switched over to the War Relocation Authority (WRA). Many nisei enjoyed the close relations with the Native Americans and later in their retirement volunteered their professional services to the Indian communities especially in the medical and design professions.

*Heart Mountain* center located in Wyoming had the only layout with a super block arrangement (see site layout). Ms Estella Ishigo, a Caucasian married to a Japanese actor, was an exceptional artist and a writer. She wrote and included art works in her book *Lone Heart Mountain.*

This center was known for the protest against the draft. Heart Mountain draft resister some 120 nisei who were interned and refused to report for induction into the US Army until their constitutional rights were restored. "To this day, I maintain I did what I learned in high school about the constitution" What he did was to refuse to be drafted until his, as well as his parents, civil rights were restored.

*Minidoka* center had the most creative site layout and probably the camp was designed by a landscape architect. This center prided itself as having the most volunteers (364) in the US. Army and 976 total enlistment. Even today the Minidokans pride themselves as the most All American of the internment camps. This camp later produced Lt. Comd. Takeshi Yoshihara the first nisei to attend the US Naval Academy (1949-53).

*Manzanar* center was almost entirely populated by direct evacuation. Included was a sixteen year old Ralph Lazo, a Mexican American, who joined his nisei friend into the internment camp voluntarily.

The centers in Arkansas, *Jerome* and *Rohwer* were only 30 miles apart It was unusual to have centers so close together. The records indicate that construction of two camps was a mistake. In the site selection process, Jerome site had more merits than Rohwer, but each site was under different Engineering District jurisdiction and each district wanted to build the center and proceeded to construct the center. Bureaucracy and architecture at its best.

## IRONIC SITUATIONS

While the internment centers were located in the interior of America and held Americans of Japanese ancestry from the west coast states, many Japanese Americans were living only few miles from the internment centers as free people because they resided outside the restricted zone. For example the Japanese people of Idaho (1,200), Wyoming (650), Montana (308), Utah (2,200), Colorado (2,750), Kansas (17) and Texas (458) lived within miles of the internment camps and could come and go as a free citizens while others were under guard and restricted in their movements. ***The U. S. Constitution explicitly guarantees equal protection of the laws to every American regardless of the race . . . . (?).***

Unknown to the camp residents but known to a select few administrator, a group of Japanese American social scientists, many were graduate students from the west coast universities, tracked and recorded the events happening in the centers in order to experiment and quantify the endurance level of personnel living under the stressful conditions. This group later published a series of reports of their research. Who needed enemies when you had relatives like these.

***Oddly***, each main player during the relocation years was well educated, each with several degrees from well known universities, including John J. McCloy ,(1895-) Harvard Law (the chief architect, among the civilian brass there is an Assistant Secretary of War, already a power in the Pentagon, who in his 'moral blindness' pressed for "relocation camps" for the west coast Japanese Americans), General DeWitt (1880-) Princeton, their military assistance; Colonel Karl Bendetsen (1907-) Stanford Law, the WRA directors Eisenhower and Myer, and the camp project managers. ***Each had taken an oath to support the constitution and defend the rights of the individual.*** One wonders what is the purpose of an oath!

## PROGRESSIVE PROJECT DIRECTORS

The project managers of Amache, Colorado, Rohwer, and Jerome, Arkansas were not sympathetic for keeping the internees locked up in the concentration camps. They quickly and aggressively found ways to relocate the families outside the camps . Usually they found sponsors with large agri-business to take the internees to areas where labor was in short supply. The residents relocated to Colorado, Minnesota, Michigan, Illinois and the eastern seaboard, especially to Seabrook, New Jersey.

The project manager of Jerome was so successful that the population declined from 8500 to less than 3,000 within a year and one half. This created a less efficient camp and led to the camp closure on June 30, 1944 about one and one half year prior to other camp closures.

When the Jerome center closed the remaining personnel who could not be relocated were distributed to camps Rohwer (2,482) and Amache (530). Because of the early closure the camp records are not as complete as the remaining centers.

The total personnel to relocate to the midwest and eastern seaboard is estimated at 29,000 including students, WRA field workers (each major cities had a WRA relocation field office to assist the evacuees) and the evacuees. At this late date, it is hard to obtain a precise figure as many students, and field workers could have returned to the WRA centers and the evacuees of draft age went into the service from their new homes and after their Army enlistment nearly all returned directly to the west coast.

### RELOCATION TO MIDWEST - EAST COAST

| STATES | 1940 CENSUS | 1946 WRA REPORT |
|---|---|---|
| ILLINOIS | 46 | 11,200 |
| COLORADO | 2,734 | 5,300 |
| UTAH | 2,210 | 5,000 |
| OHIO | 167 | 3,900 |
| IDAHO | 1,191 | 3,500 |
| MICHIGAN | 139 | 2,800 |
| NEW YORK | 2,538 | 2,300 |
| NEW JERSEY | 298 | 2,200 |
| MINNESOTA | 57 | 1,700 |
| | 9,380 | 37,900 |

### WRA FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING

One goal of the WRA administration was to keep the internment centers at minimum health and safety standards and not so comfortable that the internees would prolong their stay in these centers. They were well aware of the Native Americans in the Indian Reservations who became the ward of the United States government. The WRA administration did not want this situation to happen and set a goal of relocation to the midwest and eastern seaboard as soon as possible; therefore the expenditures for items such as recreation, books, other than food and heating were kept to a minimum.

The total expenditures for the internment was kept at a reasonable level. It came out to be $1,439.97 per person for the three and one half years of stay. The following is the appropriation and the actual expenditures. The construction costs for the thirteen centers are not included.

| YEAR | APPROPRIATION | NET EXPENDITURES |
|---|---|---|
| 1942 | 8,000,000 | 6,300,000 |
| 1943 | 70,000,000 | 54,727,853 |
| 1944 | 48,170,000 | 42,592,858 |
| 1945 | 39,000,000 | 34,711,704 |
| 1946 | 25,000,000 | 20,079,615 |
| | 190,170,000 | $158,412,030* |

** DOES NOT COVER THE INITIAL CONSTRUCTION COSTS.*

## CAMP CLOSING

The camp closing were systematic and project directors were to file a final report of his administration. The directors in turn asked his staff to write up the departments final reports before they were paid their final salary and left for other jobs. These reports are filed in the Bancroft Library , University of California, Berkeley, Ca. Most reports are short because of the time limitation but there are final reports for all the WRA centers.

All WRA camps closed within one and one half months time, between October 15, 1945 and December 1, 1945 , except for Tule Lake which closed in March 20, 1946.

During July , August, and September 1945 the internees who had residences , business, or farms quickly left as transportation were arranged. Upon return to their homes, many met initial resistance and discrimination from the public. To counter these incidents, several organization publicized the heroics of the 442 Regimental Combat Team and the concept of fair play.

The remaining personnel in camp could not move as they did not have a home to return to. A lot of the personnel were migratory railroad or farm workers and the fall season is a bad time to be left without a housing or employment.

What took place in October,1945 was not the happiest moment of the camp experience. The camp officials were told to close by the end of October and these personnel were paid a bonus to remain until the closure. They decided to dump the remaining occupants on a train with 25 dollars and a ticket to the last place of former residence.

The closure staff called the destination and told the Japanese in the area to take care of their own people. In order to house this new influx of people, the local Japanese people opened up the churches and hostels for temporary residences. The winter of 1945-46 was a period of hardship for lot of these families; however by spring as the weather turned delightful the families found both jobs and housing and slowly began the recovery from the long relocation experience. ***Because of these shared hardship experiences the nisei generation has retained a certain bonding to each other apart from the other generations.***

# TULE LAKE WRA RELOCATION AND SEGREGATION CAMP

## ORIGIN OF THE TULE LAKE PROJECT

The choice of Milton S. Eisenhower as Director of War Relocation Authority offers a hint of the possibility that was envisioned of relocating evacuees on underdeveloped land and employing them at agricultural pursuits, for Eisenhower was Coordinator of Land Use in the Department of Agriculture immediately prior to his appointment.

The Tule Lake relocation area was the first site selected by the WRA, for though, it was preceded in construction by the Manzanar and Colorado River projects, the latter two projects were originally undertaken by the Army as "reception center" (assembly centers) for the evacuees and were only later transferred to the WRA. The Tule Lake Division of the Klamath Reclamation Project, where the site was located, had long been maintained under the U S Bureau of Reclamation.

Almost as soon as Eisenhower was chosen Director of WRA, he cast his eyes upon the Klamath Reclamation Project as a prospective area for the construction of a relocation center. From the standpoint of the site selection criteria, Tule Lake was one of the most suitable for the project of the WRA. A considerable tract of very fertile land , for farming use, highway and railway, as well as power lines were available, water could be obtained by wells and climatic conditions were relatively mild compared to some of the other proposed sites. Generally speaking from regional planning criteria, the Tule Lake area was of the best sites for a relocation center.

One major disadvantage was its location within the boundary of California, and therefore within the zones restricted to people of Japanese ancestry, for this inevitably placed the project under the closest supervision of the Western Defense Command, and subjected the center to the scrutiny of hostile political and news media elements within the state.

On April 1, 1942 the site was chosen and Memorandum of Understanding was drawn by the Bureau of Reclamation on April 24, 1942.

Construction of the Tule Lake Center begun on April 23, 1942; within a month the basic physical structures of the center was virtually completed. Facilities to house 10,000 evacuees were all completed during this brief period by private contractors under the supervision of the US Army Corps of Engineers.

It was decided at the last minute to expand the capacity of the center from 10,000 evacuees , for which it was originally planned to 15,000. Again later when the segregation program began the center was expanded to hold 20,000 segregates.

## GENERAL DESCRIPTION AND SETTING

The Tule Lake Project is situated in the northeastern corner of California, 35 miles from the Oregon border. The nearest town is Tulelake, about 6 1/2 miles north on State Highway 139. There are several other towns between the project and Klamath Falls, Oregon, but none if them have a population of over 1,200. Klamath Falls is a city of 15,000 (1940) people and has a fairly good shopping district.

The Modoc County seat which the project is located is at Alturas, California, 68 miles southeast of the project. The Office of Price Administration (OPA) gas ration board is located there. The OPA ration board for shoes is at Tulelake, and at present there is on the project a panel for obtaining shoes for the colonist (internees).

Merrill, Oregon is 14 miles northwest of Tule Lake Center, at this location was an abandoned Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camp which was used to house protesters of the draft registration and loyalty oath. This camp became a holding camp for dissidents and Pro-Japan leaders.

The project center is approximately 800 acres square. The farm, some four miles up the State Highway and on the left handside comprises 3,800 acres, 2,800 of which are under cultivation with crops mainly of root vegetables, potatoes being the largest crop. The hog and poultry farms are about a mile and one half from the project and are situated south of the farm. These two units occupy about forty acres.

The Tule Lake Project is located on lake bed, part of a long-time government reclamation project for draining Tule Lake, only a small part of which remain. Soil varies; in the project area, it is a combination of sand and silt judging by the lack of vegetation. On the other hand, the farm is covered with rich dark loam several feet thick.

The temperature varies from zero in winter to 95 F in summer. There are no protracted spells of hot or cold weather. There are frequent dust storms in the spring and summer months.

The elevation is 4,035 feet.

Visually, the project is not remarkable. Just across the state highway on the left is the 'peninsula' which the colonist have named "Castle Rock Mountain" . Facing this, and just outside of the project center bounds on the other side of the project is 'Horse Collar Mountain', known to the colonist as "Abalone Mountain". Except for beautiful clouds and sunset effect, there is little beauty in this district except for Mount Shasta which looms up toward the left of the project, sixty miles away. There are no trees on the project. Colonist, however have planted vegetables, or flowers gardens around most of the barracks.

In the center of the village (camp) there are 893 barracks for evacuees. These are army like structures divided into apartments measuring 20' x 25', which there are 1,920; 1464 apartments measuring 16 1/2' x 20'; 845 units measuring 20' x 20' , or a total of 4,2667 units.

There are 61 double structures mess halls for evacuees. There is a formula mess hall supplying babies and other formula solution; two mess halls for public schools, one mess hall for the hospital, one mess hall for the WRA personnel, or a total of 66 mess halls.

There are 63 recreation halls for evacuees, one for WRA personnel. There are 40 separate ironing and laundry buildings, all of which are placed between the double rows of barracks. There are in addition 24 combined ironing and laundry building which service some of the blocks.

Bath houses are centrally located between each of two rows of barracks (apartments). There are 24 combined bath houses and toilets for men and women ; in addition there are 40 separated bath houses for men and women.

The project has three well equipped fire stations. There is a siren on number one fire station which is situated directly behind the hospital unit.

The hospital accommodates up to 250 patients on twelve wards running out from the main corridor which is 550 feet long.

There are 77 general warehouse; divided as follows: general warehouse, 65; four refrigeration warehouse, two hospital warehouses, six railway warehouse.

There are four garages; two for trucks, and two for private cars owned by the personnel. There is a filling station with two pumps.

The project has it own post office, the address is Newell, California.

In addition, a building houses the provost marshal; two railway shed ,a sentry house at the gate, a motor pool, and a vegetable packing shed alongside the railway siding.

There are five Cooperative stores located strategically in the project center and there is a barber shop, a beauty salon, and shoe repair shop, a radio repair shop, a fresh fish store, two machine shop, and three implement sheds.

The administrative areas is situated a few yard within the front gate and is composed of one unit of three buildings and the Leave Building on the opposite side.

The high school is on the main firebreak between the hospital and the first row of barracks. The gym - auditorium is used for showing motion pictures, dances, athletic events and other social gatherings.

The grade schools are located in remodeled barracks in three sections of the project. .

## THE MOVEMENT TO TULE LAKE CENTER

The first group of evacuee arrived at Tule Lake Center on May 27, 1942. A special train with 250 evacuees arrive at Tule Lake Center from the northwest. These evacuees were all members of the Work Corps and had enlisted as such and agreed to serve for the duration of the war and fourteen days thereafter and to accept such tasks as were assigned and to accept in payments such as cash advances and other allowances as were allowed by the Authority. This was part of the bargain by which the Authority agreed to furnish evacuees and their unemployable dependents housing, food, health, services, and educational facility in the center.

The volunteer evacuees comprised a group that had been selected on the basis of qualifications, to work as a skeleton crew in assisting the opening of the center.

This group included 447 volunteers who came from Puyallup and Portland Assembly Centers. This vanguard was followed by 287 evacuees who arrived on June 1 and 2 directly from evacuated area in rural Oregon. In the two succeeding days similar contingents arrived from rural areas in western Washington; these evacuees aggregating 647 individuals, came to the Tule Lake Center directly from their homes in the Northwest. The early arrivals along with almost 500 evacuees from the Clarksburg area in California, were assigned living quarters in Ward I. The general pattern of settlement in Ward I may be roughly described in the following manner. The evacuees from the Portland and Puyallup Assembly Centers were placed in blocks 4,5,6 and 14. The next group to arrive on the project, the evacuee from rural areas in Oregon were assigned quarters largely in blocks 15 and 16.

The people from rural Washington were given apartment in block 13,17, and 18.

The evacuees who arrived from the Clarksburg area along the Sacramento River were distributed to every block in Ward I Thus California people were scattered throughout the ward settled largely by evacuees from the northwest.

Between June 6 and 15, the tempo of settlement slowed considerably. Small groups of evacuees entered Tule Lake Center from Tulare, Sacramento. Marysville, Puyallup and Tanforan Assembly Centers These were the advanced party preparing for the arrival of their groups. The numbers were insignificant for not more than 50 peoples were included in each group.

By the 15 of June 1942, there were 1.911 evacuees in Tule Lake Center. The majority of these people had entered Tule Lake Center during the first week in June.




## NUMBERING OF BLOCKS AND WARDS*

*WARDS 6 & 8 HAD 10 BLOCKS, REST HAD 9 BLOCKS

NO SCALE

THE BLOCKS 56 TO 74 WERE ADDED FROM THE ORIGINAL PLAN; THEN BLOCKS 75 TO 80 WERE ADDED DURING THE SEGREGATION PERIOD.

In the two weeks that followed, the flow of in-migration swelled. Each day brought large numbers of new arrivals into Tule Lake Center, principally from Sacramento and Marysville Assembly Center.

The evacuees who arrived from Sacramento Assembly Center on June 16 were assigned apartment largely in blocks 4,5, 11 and 18 of Ward I and then were spilled into block 25 of Ward II. The large contingent which arrived from the same Assembly Center in the succeeding day from June 17 to 20, were assigned to various blocks in Ward II until the ward was filled.

During the four days that followed June 20 the evacuees continued to arrive from Sacramento Assembly Center in large numbers.

Ward III like Ward II was filled with these people from the Central Valley of California. These two wards then are composed predominately of evacuees from the Sacramento Assembly Center.

Evacuees now began to arrive in large numbers from Marysville Assembly Center. Those who arrived from that assembly center on June 25 were assigned to blocks 10 and 21 of Ward IV. The following day 500 more evacuees arrived from the same assembly center and were given quarters in the rest of Ward IV. The ward was largely assigned to people from Marysville Assembly Center, with the exception of blocks 7,8, and 9 which was reserved for hospital workers. The groups from Marysville Assembly Center which arrived on June 28 and 29 were given apartments in Ward V. Ward I lies between Ward IV and V and thus between the two group of Marysville evacuees.

With these arrivals the period of heaviest increase came to a close and a period of comparative quiet set in. On the first of July 1942, the population of Tule Lake Center was 9,036, a gain of 7,100 individuals within a period of two weeks.

There was only a slight increase in population during the first week and a half in July 1942. The first group of any size to arrive in July were those from Military Area 2 of northern California. These people came largely from the Auburn, Lincoln and Newcastle area and from the vicinity of Chico and Gridley. They were evacuated from their homes directly to Tule Lake Center. The first contingent of 319 arrived on June 20; the second and slightly larger contingent arrived on June 13. Ward V was assigned to them, that is, that portion of it not already assigned to people from Marysville, who came from the same general region in the Sacramento valley. As Ward V filled some of the evacuees from Military Area 2 overflowed into block 51 of Ward VI.

During the first half of July 1942 the population of Tule Lake Center increased from 9,038 to 10,947 an increase of less than one thousand. This was far below the growth experienced in preceding fortnight.

In the latter half of July, the 4,011 evacuees from Pinedale Assembly Center were sent to Tule Lake Center. These evacuees were assigned living quarter in Ward VI.

With the coming of Pinedale Assembly Center, the boom days of Tule Lake Center came to an end. By the first of August the camp had experienced the major part of its population growth, and the days of rapid expansion were now over. There were 15,021 individuals now living in what had been an uninhabited portion of a dry lake bed a few month before .In a few days over two months these thousands of individual were poured into the hastily constructed barracks, row after row of them, until almost all of them were filled. The largest city in the northern portion of California was created with unprecedented speed.

It was on September 4, 1942,that the maximum population (15,276) of Tule Lake Center was recorded prior to the conversion to the Segregation Center, which held a maximum of 18,355 on May, 1944.

After September 4, 1942 a gradual decline in the number of evacuees living at Tule Lake Center manifested itself. A number of people left for private employment outside the evacuated areas to the sugar

beet fields of Idaho, Oregon, and Montana. This work is somewhat seasonal and many returned from such employment.

There were a number of evacuees who left for schools in the middle-west and the east coast. Others left for the Military and Naval Intelligence schools to become students or teachers of the Japanese languages. Some young wives left camp to join their husbands in the various army camps.

Other evacuees left for various types of private employment. The War Relocation Authority adopted a policy of giving encouragement to evacuees, both issei and nisei, who wish to relocate to middle west and east.

## ELMER SHIRRELL

Mr. Elmer Shirrell, Project Manager, had made the statement that he expected only those without a shred of ambition will remain in relocation centers. He does not want to make Tule Lake Center too attractive for its inhabitants; he does not want the project life to become so attractive that it will deter evacuees from leaving.

Mr. Shirrell was later appointed by WRA Director Dillon S. Myer to head the relocation project for the entire WRA. In a farewell address to the assembly of evacuees, Mr. Shirrell described his new job and his feeling toward the program of relocation. Mrs. Shirrell and himself were like the proverbial rats who are first to leave the sinking ship. He warned the evacuees to follow him. "Tule Lake Center is going to pot, and you had better follow us", he concluded. *How true his prediction came to fruition.*

The people of Tule Lake Center came from various widespread areas. They are mostly rural. But they have come from rural area in California Central Valley, from farms and small towns of Oregon and Washington.

Most of the people who were evacuated to Marysville , Pinedale and Sacramento Assembly Centers were sent to Tule Lake Center. From the Sacramento Assembly Center came the largest contingent of evacuees over 4,000 of them. The people evacuated under Civilian Exclusion Orders #52,75 and parts of 70 and 93 were sent to Sacramento Assembly Center and from there to Tule Lake 3,800 of these people were evacuated from City of Sacramento. This does not represent the normal population of Japanese of Sacramento. Approximately a thousand evacuees crowded into the city's Japan town district from surrounding rural areas before the evacuation occurred. The Japanese population of Sacramento (1940) census was 2,879; over 3,800 were evacuated.

## SACRAMENTO (WALERGA/CAMP KOHLER) ASSEMBLY CENTER

Another urban group came from Stockton, part of Civilian Exclusion Order #70, which included City of Stockton, was sent to the Sacramento Assembly Center. *The Sacramento AC was originally called Walerga/Camp Kohler.*

The remaining people who were evacuated to the Sacramento Assembly Center came largely from the rural areas in Sacramento river valley. From the delta region around Isleton came 575 evacuees. A part of the 920 evacuees from Florin area below the City of Sacramento were also sent to the Sacramento Assembly Center and remainder went to Marysville Assembly Center.

## MARYSVILLE (ARBOGA) ASSEMBLY CENTER

Almost the entire Marysville Assembly Center was emptied into Tule Lake Center. This Assembly Center much smaller than the Sacramento Assembly Center contributed 2,431 evacuees to Tule Lake Center. Evacuees from Civilian Exclusion Order # 47,48 and part of 93 were sent to the *Arboga Center at Marysville, California.*

The first two Civilian Exclusion Orders included 1,487 persons evacuated from that part of Placer County which lies within Military Area 1. Within this area there was included the heavily concentrated enclave around Auburn , Loomis, Penryn, and Newcastle. That part of Placer County lying in Military Area 2 was evacuated directly to Tule Lake. The part of the people evacuated under Civilian Exclusion Order 93, that didn't go to Sacramento Assembly Center, were sent to Marysville . They were of course , joined together again at Tule Lake Center.

Almost the total population of Pinedale Assembly Center was transferred to Tule Lake Center. Next to Sacramento Assembly Center, Pinedale made the largest contingent to the population of Tule Lake Center.

## PINEDALE ASSEMBLY CENTER

Most of the people evacuated to Pinedale Assembly Center came from the rural regions of western Washington. When the plans for making Toppenish Fairgrounds an assembly center were abandoned, it became necessary to send part of the evacuees from the Northwest to the assembly center in California until the relocation centers materialized. Pinedale center was located 10 miles northeast of Fresno, Ca.

The evacuees sent to Pinedale were predominately rural. From the Hood River area in northern Oregon 555 were evacuated to Pinedale Assembly Center. There were evacuees from the region around Auburn, Washington in Pindedale. Part of northern Sacramento County north of city of Sacramento, also was transported to Pinedale Assembly Center so that this assembly center had representative from rural areas in the three Pacific states.

There were urban evacuees in Pinedale Assembly Center however, for 865 evacuees from Tacoma were sent to Pinedale. Although evacuees came to Pinedale from the three coast states, the majority of its population 2,464 came from the State of Washington.

## ORIGIN OF EVACUEES AT TULE LAKE CENTER

| ORIGIN | | NUMBER | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| PINEDALE ASSEMBLY CENTER | | 4,011 | 25 |
| PORTLAND AC | | 340 | 3 |
| PUYALLUP A C | | 250 | 2 |
| MARYSVILLE A C | | 2,431 | 15 |
| SACRAMENTO A C | | 4,655 | 29 |
| SALINAS | | 105 | 1 |
| DIRECT EVACUATION | | 4,126 | 26 |
| MILITARY AREA 1 | 1,337 | | |
| MILITARY AREA 2 | 2,789 | | |
| TOTAL | | 15,918 | 100% |

A considerable number of evacuees came to Tule Lake Center directly from Military Area 1 and 2 and without first going through assembly centers. In such cases people were transported from their communities to Tule Lake Center. Wherever this proved possible the Wartime Civil Control Administration (WCCA) considered highly advantageous to eliminate the assembly center stage of the evacuation and transported evacuees directly to the various relocation centers. This was possible only in the event that the relocation center, which was ultimately to receive a given population, was prepared to take that population when the evacuation occurred. Only Manzanar, Colorado River (Poston I, II ,& III), Gila River and Tule Lake Centers were completed in time to receive direct assignments.

Evacuees were sent to Tule Lake directly from areas in California, Oregon and Washington; these areas were rural. Evacuation from Military Area 2 in northern half of California contributed many more evacuees. They came principally from areas east of Chico and Marysville and north of Lincoln, Auburn, and Newcastle. The Japanese population of these areas had been considerably augmented by a heavy in-migration during the month directly preceding the evacuation.

A large number of people had moved to Military Area 2 in order to avoid being evacuated or to postpone the evacuation at least. Another evidence of this migration is the fact that many people were evacuated from counties split by the military line than could be anticipated on the basis of 1940 census figures.

## RURAL - URBAN DICHOTOMY

Those who were responsible for planning the movement of evacuees into relocation center felt it desirable to keep communities intact and to keep rural people together. These have been two cardinal principle of the relocation programs. Not that these principles weren't challenged by other members of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. There were those who felt that assembly center and relocation centers should not be either predominately urban nor predominately rural but rather balanced in part rural and in part urban.

It was decided, however,that adjustment to evacuation and to the conditions of camp life would be enhance from the city and regional planning goals if two conditions were observed:

1. That communities be transported in as intact a unit as possible;
2. That the urban people be kept together and rural evacuees be kept by themselves.

For that reason the urban population of the northwest, including evacuees from Portland and Seattle were kept together at Puyallup AC and then transferred to Minidoka, Idaho or Heart Mountain , Wyoming Relocation Centers.. Most of rural Washington and Oregon was evacuated to Tule Lake.

Not always was it possible in the process of relocation to carry out the desire of movement. There were practical consideration of time, space and condition. The physical condition of certain assembly centers made it necessary for them to be emptied before the time designated; the evacuees had to be sent to the relocation center which could find necessary space for them regardless of the plan. The fact that the various center had limited capacities made it impossible to keep communities intact in all cases. that is true in evacuation to assembly centers and as true in its application to relocation centers.

## ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURE FROM TULE LAKE RELOCATION CENTER

| FROM | DATE | ARRIVAL | RUNNING TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|
| PUYALLUP AC | MAY 27. 1942 | 197 | 197 |
| PORTLAND AC | MAY 27 | 250 | 447 |
| MEDFORD, OR | JUNE 1 | 38 | 485 |
| SALEM,OR | JUNE 2 | 249 | 734 |
| VAN COUVER,WA | JUNE 3 | 339 | 1,073 |
| " | JUNE 3 | 309 | 1,380 |
| CLARKSBURG, CA | JUNE 6 | 482 | 1,861 |
| " | JUNE 15 | 50 | 1,911 |
| WALERGA( SACRAMENTO)AC | JUNE 16 | 498 | 2,409 |
| " | JUNE 17 | 504 | |
| " | JUNE 18 | 512 | |
| | JUNE 19 | 494 | |
| | JUNE 20 | 477 | |
| | JUNE 21 | 499 | |
| | JUNE 22 | 509 | |
| | JUNE 23 | 512 | |
| | JUNE 24 | 545 | 6,540 |
| | JUNE 27 | 85 | |
| ARBOGA (MARYSVILLE)AC | JUNE 25 | 520 | |
| " | JUNE 26 | 499 | |
| " | JUNE 27 | 488 | |
| | JUNE 28 | 490 | |
| | JUNE 29 | 377 | 9,039 |
| | JULY 1 | | 9,038 |
| SALINAS AC | JULY 4 | 105 | |
| CHICO | JULY 10 | 319 | |
| LINCOLN | JULY 11 | 440 | |
| MARYSVILLE | JULY 12 | 580 | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| LINCOLN | JULY 13 | 387 | |
| | JULY 15 | | 10,947 |
| PINEDALE AC | JULY 16 | 499 | |
| " | JULY 17 | 503 | |
| " | JULY 18 | 508 | |
| | JULY19 | 515 | |
| | JULY 20 | 513 | |
| | JULY 21 | 515 | |
| | JULY23 | 510 | |
| | JULY 24 | 446 | |
| | JULY 31 | 37 | 15,020 |
| PINEDALE AC | AUGUST 15 | 60 | 15,080 |
| PINEDALE AC | AUGUST 30 | 90 | 15,170 |
| NORTH PORTLAND | SEPTEMBER 4 | 75 | |
| NORTH PORTLAND | SEPTEMBER 10 | 31 | 15,276 (PEAK) |

## DEPARTURES

| TO | DATE | DEPARTURES | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|
| UTAH | SEPTEMBER 11, 1942 | 50 | |
| IDAHO | SEPTEMBER14 | 48 | |
| MONTANA | SEPTEMBER 15 | 50 | |
| IDAHO | SEPTEMBER 16 | 48 | |
| MONTANA | SEPTEMBER 16 | 41 | |
| IDAHO | SEPTEMBER 18 | 42 | |
| MONTANA | SEPTEMBER 18 | 48 | |
| IDAHO | SEPTEMBER 20 | 45 | |
| IDAHO | SEPTEMBER 22 | 52 | |
| MONTANA | SEPTEMBER 22 | 26 | |
| IDAHO, OREGON | SEPTEMBER 24 | 48 | |
| MONTANA | SEPTEMBER24 | 28 | |
| KLAMATH | OCTOBER 2 | 20 | |
| TOTAL IN CAMP ON | OCTOBER 3. 1942 | | 14,628 |

## PROBLEMS OF THE EARLY ARRIVALS

The first arrivals enjoyed the advantages of easy access to preferred jobs and of an abundance of such resources for home improvements; such as scraps lumbers; but the later arrivals, while not completely shut out from jobs and other opportunity, encountered poverty of opportunities.

If the transfer movement had been voluntary, no issue could have been made about this inequity, but since the evacuees could not choose either the time of movement or whether they should move at all, resentment was aroused over the fact that certain groups were arbitrary chosen to be moved last and thus to suffer the disadvantage of their late arrival at the Tule Lake Center.

## PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES

From the assembly center experience at Puyallup and Portland; it was easy to obtain the volunteers for the advanced party. These evacuees were a group of volunteers who had been recruited at the assembly centers for the following purpose.

A small advance detachment of about 200 persons was sent at least six days in advance of the main movement. This advance party consisted of the key evacuee personnel necessary to receive, feed, house and provide medical service for the evacuees of the main body as they arrived.

The selection to the group was based on the ability of the individual to service in certain capacities, but since the group was recruited from volunteers, another form of selection resulted from the type of individuals interested in leaving with the earliest detachment.

The participants in the advance party were two types of evacuees who were most dissatisfied with the conditions at the assembly centers. felt themselves squeezed out of desirable position in the early political maneuvering, and anticipated special advantage in arriving early at the relocation center.

From the outset at the Puyallup Assembly Center, there existed a general resentment of the control over the center exercised by the leader of the Japanese American Citizen League (JACL), particularly as it was thought that this group had "sold out" to the Caucasian authorities in order to gain personal favors. Before the evacuation of the Seattle Japanese Americans to Puyallup Assembly Center, the local Army authorities chose the Seattle Chapter of the JACL to act as the liaison agency in carrying out the evacuation, and by virtue of their favorable position, the JACL was also able to gain supervisory control at the Assembly Center. A Japanese American headquarters staff was established whose personnel was selected by the JACL leaders. All directives to the evacuees in the center were processed through the Japanese American headquarters, and most of the business of the evacuees with the Caucasian authorities had to be relayed first to the Japanese American authorities (JACL).

A widespread discontent developed against the "self-assumed and arbitrary"" leadership of the JACL as well as against the policy of cooperation with the evacuation announced by the National JACL.

"Hell, the JACL gang are nothing but puppets of the Army and the WCCA. They ought to do something about the conditions in this center, but they're too damned scared to protest to the authorities. All they know is how to bootlick the Army guys."

"It makes me sick to see those JACL people strutting around looking so important . Back in Seattle not one of them was anything but now that they've been given a little power, it's gone completely to their head. If they really have authority, why don't they do something about the conditions here. Why, this place isn't fit for animals to live in."

Conditions at the Puyallup center were poor, especially in Area D, the largest of the four section, composing the center. There were no bathing facilities during the first week, mess accommodation were so limited that the evacuees sometimes stood in line from one to two hours before they were fed, and the quality of the food was a source of constant compliant.

The conditions at the Portland Assembly Center were superior to those at Puyallup Center and there was apparently a less acute consciousness of the unsavory aspect of the former center.

Early in July, in the Sacramento area much resentment was developed against two professional men ,an attorney and a doctor. Both were older nisei who had dealt with issei before and had built up reputation in Sacramento. Because of their age and reputation and because of their JACL connection, the two men were given considerable authority in Walerga Assembly Center. They were in many ways the liaison men between the administration and the evacuees there. The conditions in Walerga were apparently none too good, food being terrible for one thing and no one paid or receiving clothing allowance for another. Since the two men were on such good terms with the Caucasian , many concluded that the administration with the cooperation with two men had "chiseled in" on the government allowances to better their own personal ends.

One lesson learned from the experience was that the first ones to arrive at the center and established contact with the authorities had advantage both in acquiring facilities and in the struggle for power. It was not surprising then that widespread interest developed when the request for volunteers for an advance party to Tule Lake was announced.

The advance party was far from being composed entirely of dissident elements. For one thing, if a single family member volunteered, it was necessary that all the remaining family member join the advance party in order to prevent the split of families.

However, the chief motives to volunteer were those rising out of discontent with the conditions and achievable status at the assembly centers and hope of gaining advantages by transferring early to the relocation center.

## THE FIRST IMPRESSION OF TULE LAKE

The first impression of Tule Lake after much rumored beauty of the Northern California countryside, the treeless dry lake bed on which the center was located, was quite disappointment. The barbed wire fence and the armed guard, the two bitterest symbols of the relocation centers were the most obvious features of the center.

Once the evacuees were transported to the processing point within the center, they passed into an isolated distinct world of their own.

Processing included the tasks of registering each new arrivals, giving brief preliminary instructions, and information about the center, giving a cursory medical examination, and assigning apartment to family groups. They generally expressed satisfaction about their new homes. Viewed under different circumstances, the small unfurnished rooms offered little to elicit pleasure from home makers, but these apartment were superior to the flimsy structures that had constituted their living quarters at the assembly centers. Moreover, each block had a mess hall, a laundry room, a ironing room, a recreation hall, shower and toilets, which constrained the limitations suffered at the assembly centers seemed a definite improvement.

There were also conditions that drew forth irritation and dissatisfaction. The evacuee were herded into lines and required to wait at the processing center; some families found themselves crowded into small apartment unit for the size of their group.

## DIRECT EVACUATION

Those who were transferred directly from their homes to the relocation centers without the experience of the assembly centers were somewhat demoralized that where the others by their initial experience with the previous center .Most evacuees tended to see the relocation center as an improvement over the assembly center, but the latter group compared the relocation center unfavorably with their homes which they had just left.

The immediate concern of the freshly arrived evacuees was to create a home, and find employment. The elemental life needs such as housing . employment. meals. transportation service and medical care were provided by the WRA, but the provision was only minimum substance level and it was left to the evacuees to provide themselves with anything beyond that standard.

On the second day after arrival of the advance group. the employment office was opened and enlistment to the War Relocation Work Corps was begun. At the employment office, evacuees were immediately confronted with the request to sigh an agreement by which they were enlisted into the Work Corps; a prerequisite to employment at the project. The signing this agreement was the first controversial issue that appeared at the Tule Lake Center.

The WRA Work Corps was established by Executive Order 9102, the same order authorizing the establishment of the WRA. It was conceived as a means of mobilizing the evacuee workers within a government agency.

The issue of the Work Corps agreement was removed before it became an serious controversies. The Washington office of the WRA decided against the policy of enlisting for the Work Corps and the question was permanently dropped at the Tule Lake Center as well as at all the other centers.

When Work Corps agreement was laid aside. the major barrier to employment was removed. and there was generally a rush of workers to get paying jobs.

The motive to seek immediate employment resolved around the fear of losing out in the competition for preferred position. also because of the strongly felt need in some families to replenish depleted savings. For the early arrivals there was no dearth of all types of position and most individuals were able to get

work that corresponded with their training and experience. For some evacuees, the relocation center offered employment opportunities such as they had never enjoyed before. In the pre-evacuation communities, nisei men and women although university educated, frequently had no opportunity to apply their knowledge in professional employment.

For those people, the relocation center offered the first opportunity of gaining practical experience in their field of training, and their enthusiasm for work tended to be correspondingly high.

On the other hand, the bulk of the issei whose independent farming, and small city shops had very little opportunity of finding similar work at the center, and they were mostly relegated to the less desirable positions of boiler firemen, janitors, farm hands, and mess hall helpers.

In the competition for preferred position, the emphasis was definitely an American training skills, including the ability to speak and write English, which excluded most of the issei and kibei from acquiring the better jobs.

Most of the work of the first week at Tule Lake were directed towards organizing the functions of the community and towards the preparation for the arrival of later group,. Emphasis was placed upon organizing procedures in the housing, employment, and transportation system.

In line with the WRA conception of the relocation center as a war duration office, the hope was to have industrial and agricultural program that would not only make the center self sufficient but offer some profits to the evacuees.

Most evacuee workers found their time fully occupied by the work assigned to them and worker morale was high and there were few complaints about the conditions.

One point of dissatisfaction the wage scale on the basis of which the workers would be paid. In short the evacuees were accepting employment without any knowledge of the amount of compensation they would receive for their work.

Equally as important was their concern to provided themselves with satisfactory home improvements. The housing provided by the WRA only an unpartitioned room (called an apartment) in which the sum of furnishing was a stove, and cots, mattresses and blankets for each individual. In evacuating, the evacuees had not been permitted to take with them any household appliances larger than folding chairs and bridge tables.

Not only were the evacuee without household furnishings in their arrival but the WRA provided no new lumber with which to make these furniture. What was available were piles of scraps lumber dumped in the fire breaks by the construction contractors who had built the center .Little resentment appeared among the early arrivals for there was no shortage of scrap lumbers in the first few weeks and the evacuees were glad enough to accept what was provided them.

Like a flock of scavenger bird, men, women, and children flitted about the pile combing the surfaces of the pile for the more desirable long, smooth boards, and later digging underneath the surfaces.

Families with plenty of male help available were at an advantage, the task of transporting the pile to the residence were back breaking when mechanical means of transporting were not available.

So the first few weeks went by rapidly getting organized and making the apartments livable.

By July, there was no longer the feeling of thankfulness to the Caucasian staff. There was in its places growing distrust and fear.

Thus we see that by early in August, 1942 the life in Tule Lake Center had changed. There was one disagreeable incident after another making it extremely difficult to live happily. Attitude had changed considerably from cooperation to antagonism and distrust. Strife was plentiful. This was only the beginning.

## ADMISSION MAY 27, 1942 TO MARCH 20, 1946

| | |
|---|---|
| VOLUNTARY EVACUATION | 10 |
| DIRECT EVACUATION | 3,100 |
| SACRAMENTO AC | 4,672 |
| MARYSVILLE AC | 2,455 |
| PINEDALE AC | 4,011 |
| PUYALLUP AC | 285 |
| SALINAS AC | 109 |
| STOCKTON AC | 23 |
| PORTLAND AC | 351 |
| SANTA ANITA AC | 54 |
| FRESNO AC | 26 |
| TANFORAN AC | 46 |
| OTHER AC | 54 |
| SEASONAL AC PLUS ASSIGNMENTS | 69 |
| SEASONAL DIRECT EVACUATION | 25 |
| TRANSFER (DURING SEGEGRATION): | |
| CENTRAL UTAH | 1,485 |
| COLORADO RIVER | 1,443 |
| GILA RIVER | 2,012 |
| GRANADA | 231 |
| HEART MOUNTAIN | 995 |
| JEROME | 2,143 |
| MANZANAR | 2,208 |
| MINIDOKA | 357 |
| ROHWER | 1,429 |
| LEUPP | 39 |
| EXCLUDEE (HAWAII) | 73 |
| BIRTHS | 1,490 |
| PAROLEES | 182 |
| INSTITUTIONS | 51 |
| OTHER | 3 |
| TOTAL | 29,498 |

## DEPARTURES MAY 27, 1942 TO MARCH 20, 1946

| | |
|---|---|
| INDEFINITE - EDUCATION | 130 |
| ARMED FORCES | 61 |
| EMPLOYMENT | 1,471 |
| JOIN FAMILY | 409 |
| PENAL INSTITUTION | 6 |
| MENTAL INSTITUTION | 13 |
| INTERNMENT | 101 |
| VOLUNTARY INTERNMENT | 95 |
| REPATRIATION (8/,1943) | 17 |
| OTHER | 14 |
| TERMINAL: | |
| WITH GRANT (EXCLUDES HAWAII) | 12,321 |
| WITH GRANT (HAWAII) | 500 |
| WITHOUT GRANT | 33 |
| MENTAL INSTITUTION | 12 |
| REPATRIATION (1945) | 3,975 |
| REPATRIATION (1946) | 432 |
| INTERNMENT | 1,446 |
| VOLUNTARY INTERNMENT | 59 |
| TRANSFER (CRYSTAL CITY, TEXAS) | 408 |
| OTHER | 11 |
| TRANSFER (TO OTHER WRA CENTER SEGREGATION MOVEMENT): | |
| CENTRAL UTAH | 1,778 |
| COLORADO RIVER | 37 |
| GRANADA | 1,174 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | HEART MOUNTAIN | 1,498 |
| | JEROME | 969 |
| | MANZANAR | 32 |
| | MINIDOKA | 2,037 |
| | ROHWER | 50 |
| | LEUPP | 3 |
| | TRANSFER ASSEMBLY CAMP | 8 |
| DEATHS | | 331 |
| | TOTAL | 29,498 |

## AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION

The structure of the Japanese population in Tule Lake Center bears a close similarity to the general structure of the total Japanese population in the United States. In population of this center the same evidence of social forces which have operated in the past upon the total Japanese population in the United States are clearly manifested. The age and sex structure of a population reflects the conditions of net-migration and of birth and death within that population. That is true in Tule Lake Center.

The period of Japanese immigration into the United States is not long in point of time. Immigration began in the 1890's. In 1890 there only 2,039 Japanese living in this country. A decade later the number of those living here had increased to 24,326. The immigration reached its height in the years from 1900 to 1908. This period marked the high tide of Japanese migration; an increase of 42,831.

After the Gentleman's Agreement in 1908 Japanese immigration was limited to non-labor immigration. This served to greatly reduce the flow of immigration. From 1908 until Exclusion Act of 1924, a large portion of the immigration from Japan were women. Since the Exclusion Act immigration has almost ceased entirely.

AGE GROUP AND SEX OF PERSON AT TULE LAKE CENTER-SEPTEMBER 18, 1942

| AGE GROUP | MALE | FEMALE | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0-5 | 610 | 608 | 1,218 |
| 6-10 | 564 | 546 | 1,110 |
| 11-15 | 768 | 807 | 1,575 |
| 16-20 | 1365 | 1256 | 2,621 |
| 21-25 | 979 | 993 | 1,972 |
| 26-30 | 648 | 529 | 1,177 |
| 31-35 | 312 | 229 | 541 |
| 36-40 | 371 | 320 | 691 |
| 41-45 | 417 | 493 | 910 |
| 46-50 | 222 | 508 | 730 |
| 51-55 | 558 | 333 | 891 |
| 56-60 | 587 | 182 | 769 |
| 61-65 | 588 | 107 | 695 |
| 66-70 | 260 | 52 | 312 |
| 71-75 | 75 | 11 | 86 |
| 76-80 | 25 | 5 | 30 |
| 81-90 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| TOTAL | 8,349 | 6,979 | 15,330 |

## COMPOSITION OF OCCUPANTS:THE NISEI, ISSEI AND KIBEI

There were three distinct Japanese elements living at the Tule Lake relocation center. Each group had a distinct characteristic and affected their behavior during the period of internment.

It should be added that condition differed for the three major classes of evacuees, the nisei, issei and the kibei.

### NISEI

The nisei were fundamentally at loss as to how they should interpret the evacuation. For the most part those less than twenty one years of age possessed little independence of thought. They sense the injustice of the evacuation , but they held no clear conviction of why it had come about and of what should be done to remedy the condition.



**THE FINAL CAMP ARRANGEMENT IN 1946**

**NO SCALE**

Many of the younger nisei looked upon the evacuation as a adventure, in which new friends could be made and romance might occur. The immediate popularizes of sports and dances at the relocation centers is the indication of the channels into which their interest were directed.

The older nisei viewed the evacuation more seriously and their resentment was sharper, but there was considerable disagreement among them as to how the evacuation had come about. For one thing they inclined to be discriminatory in evaluation of the Caucasian group.

Among the early arrivals at the project, there were relatively few nisei leaders who could lead the others in a more clearly defining their position.

## KIBEI

The kibei were, of themselves too small a group to wield effective power in a Japanese community. The dual background and attachment of the kibei enabled him to shuttle back and forth between the two countries, and his career, by its circumstances, has been marked by an absence of commitment on either side. It should be suggested that the kibei were not merely afraid of serving in either army; they also lacked the incentive for giving up their lives to the cause of one nation or the other. If a choice between the two alternative were necessary, it seemed that a majority of kibei were inclined to fight for Japan, especially in the light of the evacuation.

But the fact that they returned to the United States for the opportunities it offered indicates the value which their citizenship had for them, and they were reluctant to give up their citizenship since it could not be retrieved once it was forsworn.

Most kibei encountered difficulty in making a clear-cut decision on the registration issue. They were revolted by the suggestion that they fight in the US Army, possibly against Japan.

Many of the recent arrivals from Japan were indoctrinated in the nationalistic jingo of modern Japan and most of them were sympathetic toward Japanese efforts in the Far East.

They were frequently more embittered about the evacuation than were the nisei, and constantly harped upon the discriminatory character of American life. But they were also reluctant to take the step of repatriation, for their citizenship, while it remained in their hands, was a key to American opportunities, much envied by people in Japan. They knew the hardship of a livelihood in Japan better than did the nisei, which they admitted when arguing the economic justification of the Japanese expansionist policy.

Finally, there was the possibility of being drafted in Japan if they were repatriated on an exchange ship.

## ISSEI

Political authority among the evacuees rested primarily with the issei group; this was true in the pre-evacuation communities, and this conditions had not been altered by the evacuation. The youthfulness of the nisei and the smallness of their politically articulate members , the greater homogeneity and the domination of issei opinion by contrast with the uncertainty and confusion among the nisei, and the traditional parental authority of the issei over the nisei, were sufficiently significant factor to insure issei control over the nisei.

Considered in this light, the initial willingness of the issei to accede superior employment and political opportunities to the nisei , which appears as contradiction of expected behavior, offer an understanding of the issei's position.

A more specific deterrent to issei activity was their fear of internment. Since the outbreak of the war, a number of issei has been removed from every Japanese community by the FBI, and considerable anxiety was aroused in all those families which had issei family head who might be subject to arrest.

A certain amount of mystery surrounded the charges on which the apprehension were based, through its was believed that issei who were officered in Japanese organization, who were leaders in their communities, or who possessed wealth, were the ones being picked up. The imminence of this threat to family solidarity and personal freedom was strong reason for the issei to exert caution against any action that might bring them under the suspicion of government authority.

The characteristic of the nisei, issei and kibei, given above fail to show the wide variation existing within each group. Particularly does it fail to show those in each group who favored and affirmative answer to question # 28 and those families which faced little conflict over the issue.

## THE CAUCASIAN STAFF AT TULE LAKE

At each relocation center there were about 350 Caucasian staff. At Tule Lake center there were 550 staff of Caucasian during the segregation phase.

The Caucasian staff may be roughly divided into three categories:

1. The sociologist or more negatively "them dammed sociologist ". This group includes those individual who were good evidence of the interest in the welfare of the4 Japanese Americans, issei and nisei and have developed a wide circles of friends and acquaintance among them.

2. The 'operators' , they are neither are 'for' or 'against'. This second group is composed of individuals who are not much concerned with the people of Japanese Americans as individuals , their main interest at Tule Lake Center lies in their work.

3. In the third category are included those Caucasians who have freely expressed deep prejudices against the evacuees or have displayed animosity toward them.

## THE INCIDENT OF NOVEMBER 4, 1943

At 9:50 PM, Thursday, November 4, 1943 Project Director Raymond R. Best phoned the Commanding Officer at the Military Post to take over the project to protect government property and to prevent physical violence to Caucasian appointee personnel. The Commanding Officer assumed command immediately. The soldiers entered the Center, some of whom manned the eight tanks and other cars began immediately to patrol the administrative center.

An estimated crowd of 500 evacuees had a few minutes before came from the wards.

On November 6, 1943 proclamation issued by Colonel Austin announcing the Army occupation of the center, prohibition of out-door gathering, and offer to meet with representative group of evacuees.

There had been a 'incident' at Tule Lake. By agreement, the Army took over complete control of the center on November 4, 1943 and did not withdraw until January 14, 1944.Immediately after the Incident of November 4, 1942, the Army , with the aid of WRA, constructed a fence, segregating the internees and the administration area. Four gates were constructed and Army sentries were assigned to examine the workers who passed through the gate. They built a stockade to incarcerate the agitator who had taken part in the disturbance and erected a 'manproof' fence between the evacuee colony and the administration area.

On November 9, the Spanish Consul visits the center to investigate the incident.

## THE RELOCATION PROGRAM

The relocation program, when announced to the center, did not create the reaction which normally would be expected. In reverse, it was often a bone of contention that the authority was trying to force evacuees to relocate, when on the other hand they had when coming to the center been promised they could and would remain until hostilities had ended. The infamous registration program designed to streamline leave

clearance, establish once and for all the loyalty question, naturally should have been accepted by anyone of the simplest intelligence as a terrific boom to the cause. Not so though with the evacuees. There arose several major criticisms:

1. The authority was again attempting a forced relocation program
2. The registration was not nation-wide, and therefore amounted in a sense a further persecution.
3. After having been declared unsatisfactory, Japanese youth was about to be trapped for military service.

The policy with respect to segregation as it affected the center further aggravated already bad relations and added more to bitterness so often demonstrated, while there must be sound reasoning in selecting the Tule Lake Center as the natural center to be converted to a segregation camp, an eleventh center or Jerome Center would unquestionably have lessened internal discord.

REMAINING POPULATION OF TULE LAKE - DECEMBER 27, 1943

| | REGISTRATION SEGREGATES | REPATRIATES EXPATRIATES | TOTAL | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MALE | 2,443 | 383 | 2,826 | 57 |
| FEMALE | 1,908 | 237 | 2,145 | 43 |
| TOTAL | 4,351 | 620 | 4,971 | 100 |
| | | COUNTRY OF BIRTH | | |
| USA | 2,732 | 382 | 3,114 | 63 |
| JAPAN | 1,531 | 227 | 1,758 | 35 |
| HAWAII | 86 | 11 | 97 | 2 |
| ALASKA | 2 | 0 | 2 | --- |
| TOTAL | 4,351 | 620 | 4,971 | 100 |

PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY SEGREGATED AT TULE LAKE CENTER -- MAY 1944

| | AMERICAN BORN | FOREIGN BORN | TOTAL | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MALE | 6,940 | 3,758 | 10,698 | 55 |
| FEMALE | 5,549 | 2,108 | 7,657 | 45 |
| TOTAL | 12,489 | 5,866 | 18,355 | 100 |

## REGISTRATION PROGRAM AND CRISIS AT TULE LAKE

In March 1942, shortly after the outbreak of war, the military conscription of Japanese American through selective service was suspended, and later months a 4-C (Alien) classification was given to them. The WRA looked upon the Army's evident skepticism of the loyalty of Japanese Americans as an unfortunate if not a dangerous precedent, and the agency worked to have them reinstated to their former selective service status. Late in January 1943, the War Department reconsidered the eligibility of Japanese Americans for the draft.

Secretary of War Stimson issued public statement announcing the re-opening of military service to Japanese American and a registration was proposed to determine the number of citizen evacuees eligible for the draft and for a volunteer nisei combat team that was to be formed.

At the same time, the WRA, which was concerned to expedite the relocation of evacuees in areas outside the center requested a *registration for leave clearance* of all evacuees 17 years of age or more -- through a mass processing of leave clearance application by the Leave Joint Board. It was hoped, the eligibility of individuals evacuees for relocation would be determined once and for all. In earlier relocation procedure,

the Joint Board had inspected evacuees docket only as individual application were made, but this practice had proved cumbersome and slow.

Registration for the twofold purpose of determining evacuee eligibility; (a) for military service and (b) for relocation, was begun on February 10, 1943 at the Tule Lake Center and all other WRA centers.

For the WRA, the War Department's acceptance of this registration program was a great triumph; it was considered the most significant step to date toward fulfilling the fundamental WRA policy of relocation and toward regaining for the evacuees rights which were lost in the evacuation. For the evacuees, on the other hand, the program was neither as simple nor as felicitous as the WRA viewed it.

The bulk of evacuees did not share the WRA the opinion that military conscription and relocation, the proposed aims of the registration, were significant steps toward restoring rights lost by the evacuation.

As events transpired, the registration called upon the evacuees to make some of the most difficult decisions of their center experience, stimulated a considerable emotional disturbance in the evacuee mass, presented innumerable personal and community problems not anticipated by the WRA, and led to strong resistance to the program.

The registration period, which at Tule Lake extended over a two month span during February and March 1943, was a time of extreme confusion, indecision and tension, of wide spread dissension and open conflict and terror.

Only a small minority composed of JACL members, of individuals interested in "proving" their loyalty by volunteering and of young adventurer looking for any means of escaping the confinement of the center actively sought military services.

On the whole, it seems that WRA considered the question of Japanese American participation in the Armed Forces primarily from the standpoint of its influence upon the public relations. From the improved public relations it was anticipated that two important consequences would follow:

1. That evacuee morale would be bettered.
2. That the relocation of evacuees to outside communities would be expedited by their greater acceptability to the American people.

Whatever the wisdom of WRA point of view, the evacuees outlook on the same question was based upon quite different premises. There was no disagreement from the evacuees that "normalcy" should be restored to them, but there was disagreement that military service should be the first step toward those rights.

As early as October 1942, several month before the registration, the center people expressed their hostility toward military service for evacuees, when a JACL leader, at the request of the JACL, asked the Camp Council to inquire of the male citizen in their blocks whether they would volunteer for military service or would prefer induction through normal selective service channels. Not only was preference for the latter generally indicated, but at block meetings where the question was discussed, a strong objections were raised to the JACL meddling in the problems of military service.

The same sentiment again appeared when a recruiting team, composed largely of nisei soldier, arrived from the Army language school at Camp Savage in late November 1942 to recruit volunteers for the Military Intelligence School.

In the center this reluctance was reinforced by the other circumstances:

1.The evacuation and confinement behind barbed-wire fences were considered a wanton disregard of the right of a citizen evacuees and strong feeling existed that these rights should first be restored before further demands were made upon them. From the standpoint of the parents generation, it seemed that the Government, having stripped them of all except their

individual lives and family solidarity, were now threatening the latter with military services. As for the younger generation who would be subject to conscription, they demanded to know what they would be fighting for.

2. There was a question of who would look after the parents in the event the sons were inducted. The WRA emphasis on relocation heightened this problem, for there was possibility that families might be forced out of the center while the sons were away at war.

3. The issei had a differnet concept than the nisei on conscription of their sons. In Japan when a son was drafted into the Military the parents had given the sone to the State (Emperor) and did not expect to see thir son returned alive.. It was demaned that the sons would die in the battle rather than face shame from defeat or a surrender. Many issei had left Japan to avoid the conscription and did not want to their sons lives wasted.

4 There was much skepticism that a record of military services would improve the status of the evacuees. The west coast newspapers were full of accounts of hostility to the evacuees, of legislation being proposed to further impair the rights of the Japanese minority.

Opposition to the relocation program was almost as intense as the antagonism to the plan of military services. Having been recently uprooted from their homes, the evacuees, particularly the older people, balked at undergoing the trouble and uncertainty of further migration; they desired to stay as close as possible to the Pacific Coast and return there ; to which was their main objection; they feared separation of family members and they suspected that further movement could only result in further worsening of their situation.

The administration's unrelenting emphasis upon relocation aroused both fear and resentment of the policy for it threatened to disrupt the main source of security which many evacuees felt remained for their continued residence at the Tule Lake Center; the stability of family relationship and assurance of food and shelter.

The registration of citizen males for military service and all adults for application of leave clearance was thus launched under circumstances definitely unfavorable for its success.

The registration program was completely difficult at the Tule Lake Center for various reasons. The registration of all American born Japanese nisei and kibei - 17 years and older except those who have applied for repatriation or expatriation to Japan. The WRA representative from various relocation projects were acquainted with the plan to allow volunteer enlistment of the nisei and were then informed that a program of general drafting would be initiated. Combined with the program of registering the male citizen, or rather re-registering them , for selective service, was a registration of female citizens and all

issei as a part of a program to tap the manpower of the citizen and alien Japanese. This part of the program was wholly a WRA concern .It was assumed that the selective Service authorities were ordering the re-registration under the authority of that agency. (There was no such order issued by the Selective Service)

At the Washington conference, project representative spoke with the Army team which were to direct the military registration at the various centers in order to acquaint them with the general conditions of the camps to which they were assigned. The WRA representative J.O. Hayes, assistant project director, from Tule Lake painted a glowing picture of Tule Lake, it was reported by one of the individual present. J.O. Hayes stated that there would be no difficulty encountered in effecting the registration program at Tule Lake.

The announcement was made on January 30, 1943, Saturday in the *Tulean Dispatch,* the camp newspaper. The paper reported; Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson issued the following press release: The War Department announced today that plans have been completed for the admission of a substantial number of American citizen of Japanese ancestry to the Army of the United States.

"This action was taken following study by the War Department of many earnest request by loyal American citizen of Japanese extraction for the organization of a special unit of the Army in which they could have their share in the fight against the nation's enemies."

The JACL was keenly interested in the new policy of registration. Since JACL had continually promoted the policy of re-opening the military services to Japanese Americans, thus the JACL no doubt felt they deserved to know more than the administration had revealed.

The JACL organization was already under attack in the community as having brought about the volunteering policy.

It is clear that JACL did not request a program of voluntary induction or a separate nisei combat unit, but their request for the reopening of selective service to the citizen evacuees was equally damning to the community.

What made the community mad was; at one point a member of the JACL and representative to the conference at Salt Lake City) made a passing remark " JACL members should feel a little better than other nisei who are not members, because they have helped to bring this about," which was to become enlarged to assert that "He is bragging that the JACL brought about the nisei's induction program." The firestorm was just beginning.

The registration program was held in project schools on Tuesday, February 9, 1943. Teachers , (some refused to participate) were to act as registrars and they had been carefully instructed in their duties.

Evacuees were instructed to report to their block managers offices. Registration would be block by block. Citizens males of military age were to fill in their questionnaires at the block manager's offices and execute the last question (#27 & 28) in the presence of a member of the Army team, each of whom were available daily at three centrally registration points.

Registration was slow. Many of the blocks refused to register. Enemies of the selective service and leave clearance programs were busy, apparently , because threat on the lives of a number of evacuees had already been made, particularly person prominently identified with the JACL. Of these, one member of the JACL was given a special leave permit for Chicago on February 10, 1943.

Another member (of Placer County) also active JACL member was given a special leave permit a few days later An attempt to beat this personnel, of the Legal Aid Department, was also made on Monday night February 22, but quick action by his wife frustrated the plans of the attackers. The project director sent that person to Klamath Falls enroute to Idaho to forestall any further attempt at beating him.

The first two days registration was viewed by internees with extreme skepticism. Pivotal point of dissension and misunderstanding was question # 28 on WRA form 126- revised which has to do with allegiance, asking aliens to forswear allegiance to Japan in favor of allegiance to this country when, through no fault of their own, they were unable to obtain American citizenship. The wording of this question was later amended but in doing so the Government lost face to some extent. This made the internees extremely suspicious of the whole registration program. There was a deep conviction that the questions were vague and that they implied more than was readily apparent - - that all internees would be required to leave the project for work on the outside, except citizen males of military age who would be drafted.

Registration continued at a very slow pace and the first indication that some internees were being intimidated became know. It was apparent that there was a group operating behind the scenes. intimidating the internees and urging non-cooperation with the selective services and leave clearance program. It was also apparent that a great many internees felt that the whole registration program was

perpetrated on them without due warning: that the meetings conducted by the Army team were hastily and ill prepared and tactless.

The fourth day of registration was like the preceding day, characterized by non-cooperation. At the close of registration Friday, February 12, 1943, there were about 800 people had submitted their forms. It was apparent by this time that the registration program were clarifying the thinking of the internees. Heretofore, they had been drifting without any definite policy of either cooperation or non-cooperation. There was no incentive to take a positive stand one way or another.

The registration program also identified people as belonging to one of three groups: loyal, disloyal and those who hated the United States Government because of the so - called discriminatory evacuation. Needless to say, this group is not necessarily sympathetic to Japan, although some of the member are willing to cooperate with the subversive group out of spite for the wrong done them.

A great many, especially those of dual citizenship, were waiting to see which course the war took; a great many were still doubtful of an allied victory. Even many loyal citizen festered a growing doubt and hesitancy about the wisdom of registration due to a number of causes:

1. Suspicious of Government policies due to frequent changes of WRA policies.
2. Evacuation psychosis.
3. Subversive activities in the project.
4. Attempts to disenfranchise Japanese Americans citizens.

A plan of reasoning was first adopted and this was carried out in a series of meeting to which the team participated for the purpose of explaining the registration program by answering questions and by endeavoring to allay the suspicion and doubts.

Supplementing this program was continued campaign to educate the evacuee through the pages of the *Tulean Dispatch*. Special articles explaining the purpose of the registration programs were published daily.

Offensive to the internees was the fact the Army was called upon to help in arresting obstructionist. Attempts at punishing offenders were heretofore under the jurisdiction of the Department of Internal Security. Internees were therefore, totally unprepared for the stern and more unequivocally expeditious method of the Army.

In any event, launching of the registration program would produced dissension and turmoil; aiding and abetting this resistance were the administrative sins of omissions and commission of the entire administrative regime when internees were justifiably led to believe that no punishment of any kind would be melted out to the offenders no matter how grave.

Vision of evacuation hardships welled betore the internees and the cry of 'persecution' echoed throughout the project. Even many of the loyal ones began to quaver before these arguments and it was only after propaganda threats and unreason gave way to common sense that true perspective of the registration programs and their aims were fully understood and appreciated. The discrimination continued into the concentration camps; while the nisei were dismissed from the military after Pearl Harbor; they were again asked to register for selective service and while issei are denied citizenship in this country.

## TRIALS FOR PROTESTERS

WRA did not want to hold trials for those pleading not guilty. They were not sure about their procedure and in any case, evidence against those pleading not guilty would be difficult if not impossible to obtain

from the community. The administration were afraid that Civil Liberty Union might become interested in the cases.

The administration had good reason to worry about the ACLU. Nothing more violates American principles of legal and government theory than this procedure when WRA, an administrative body, does its own legislation (order registration), its own policing (removes recalcitrant to the CCC camp at Merrill, Oregon) and stands as its own court --- the said court being presided over by the chief administrator, the only lawyer present being one of those who participated in the policing, and the defendant having neither an attorney of his own nor one appointed by the court.

The project director presided at the trials or in his absence he appointed Paul Fleming to take his place. The penalties which the project director could mete out were far different from those that many of the men had expected. When the prisoners had been apprehended they were told that in refusing to register they were violating selective service regulations and therefore were subject to long term in federal court. Instead of a prison sentence they could receive was three month in a WRA camp.

The fact that WRA not the Army, held trials for the offenders made people aware of the fact that registration of male citizens, though on a selective service forms, was wholly a WRA affair as far as punishment for non-registration is concerned. Basically, WRA did not check and see if the selective service wanted to re-register the male citizen. To the Selective Service only a re-classification were necessary.

When no federal regulations were violated; the only punishment was those in the WRA regulations with maximum punishment of three month and dismissal from paid employment. This error by the WRA later became an embarrassment to the project director.

## THE ISOLATION CAMP - MERRILL, OREGON

Those arrested in the project of refusing to register or conspiring to obstruct registration, were sent to the temporary isolation camp 13 miles north west of the project. There were close to 130 male resident at the center. The latter had formerly been occupied by the CCC, and the structures, and area were in fairly good condition. A camp manger, Mr. Powell and an assistant Mr. Kirkman, directed the camp., while and assistant steward was assigned to direct the feeding.

For the first several days of operation, it seemed that the camp was under the direction of the Army, and the camp was supervised as Army prison camp. Under Army supervision, the isolation camp was operated as an Army guardhouse and all the usual disciplinary methods of the Army were immediately transferred to the control of this camp.

## TULE LAKE AS THE SEGREGATION CENTER

### CHRONOLOGY OF SEGREGATION PLANNING

In May, 1943 all the project directors gathered in Washington D C to plan for the segregation camp.

It was announced that a segregation would be put into effect. It was also decided at that time that Tule Lake Center would be chosen as the segregation center. Harvey Coverly the project director of Tule Lake himself is said to have favored the choice of Tule Lake, because of its capacity and the large number of segregates ( at least 5,000) that would be involved.

The project directors, were committed to secrecy until full plans for the segregation program could be published.

After the conference the whole Washington WRA staff put its full energy into making plans for the segregation program which were embodied in Administration Instruction No. 100.

In some of the centers, the project director announced the segregation program to the staff and evacuee leaders and made plans to cope with it.

At Tule Lake, however, the project director maintained a strict silence both as to the possibility of the segregation program and as to Tule Lake being selected already as the segregation center. Dillon Myer, the WRA Director, told the Dies Congressional Committee on July 7, 1943 that a segregation program had already been decided upon. IN Tule Lake it was announced on July 12, 1943.

On July 20, 1943, it was announce in the *Dispatch* that Tule Lake had been chosen as the segregation center. No particular reasons were given for this choice, although to many people it was not surprising because Tule Lake had the largest number of possible segregates and it was situated in a military zone.

Many officials of the WRA, felt that segregation program would not have taken place had it not been for pressure from such group as the Dies Committee. Many of the delegates to the Denver conference from Tule Lake held this point of view.

Some WRA officials chose to believe in line with this explanation that segregation program was being carried out for the good of the evacuees. Still others, however, still believed that it was a program force on the WRA by reactionary elements and that it meant unnecessary suffering for the Japanese people.

Four reasons were given for having chosen Tule Lake . rather than any other center:

1. With capacity of over 15,000 persons it is expected to be able to accommodate all those who will be segregated.

2. The farm is well developed and will provide food and employment on a large scale.

3. The Tule Lake has more residents who will be designated for segregation , thus reducing the total number of persons to be moved.

4. The center is located in the evacuation area where escort requirement have increased the cost and difficulty of outside relocation.

The future of the segregation center rested to large extent on the new project director replacing Coverly, since the project director was given a great deal of leeway in the way he chose to run his center. Raymond R Best was appointed project director of Tule Lake Center on August 1, 1943. He had been successful in administering the isolation center at Leupp. Arizona, where he won the confidence of the resident there. Before that he spent six month at the Minidoka Center.

## SCOPE OF THE SEGREGATION PROGRAM

The scope of the segregation program in Tule Lake was much greater than the registration program carried out earlier in the year. Every evacuee was involved in the program.

If he were to segregated, he would have to face the stigma of being branded as 'disloyal' , the inability to leave the center, the possibility of being deported after the war. If he were not to be segregated, he would have all the trouble of packing and getting ready to move, the need to face the uncertainty of going to a strange center, the possibility of not being able to stay in a center for long.

## "NO -NO -- YES - YES'

The distinction was based on the negative or affirmative answers given to question number 27 and 28 and in the popular stereotype presumed it show whether an individual were anti- or pro- administration.

The distinction between "yes-yes and no-no" groups was taken even more seriously by the administration personnel, who , very early in the registration, began to promote the idea of segregating the one group from the other. The segregation plan received its initial impetus when it seemed that the community was being coerced against registration and declaration of loyalty to the USA by a vocal, agitating "pro-Japan" extremist group. Their thinking was based upon three assumption:

1. The large majority of evacuees population, particularly the quieter, more cooperative element were loyal to the USA.

2. The registration issue was primarily a loyalty issue with the pro-Japanese pitted against the pro-American .

3. The segregation of pro-Japanese minority would make the latter group to make their 'natural' choice (for America) free from the dangerous influence of extremist minority.

The plan of segregation rapidly increased in favor immediately after the first beatings.

Nisei who identified themselves with America parted company with those who identified themselves with Japan, while those on the borderline were force to make up their mind one way or the other, often by circumstances outside their control.

COMPARISON OF REMAINING AND DEPARTING TULE LAKE RESIDENTS BY SIX FACTOR

| TOTAL | REMAINING | DEPARTING |
|---|---|---|
| BUDDHIST | 39.4 | 60.9 |
| CHRISTIAN | 48.4 | 51.6 |
| NONE | 33.4 | 66.6 |
| CALIFORNIA | 48.1 | 51.9 |
| NORTHWEST | 24.3 | 75.7 |
| KIBEI | 58.3 | 41.7 |
| ISSEI | 46.1 | 53.9 |
| NISEI | 26.5 | 73.5 |
| AGRICULTURE | 45.5 | 54.5 |
| NON-AGRIC | 34.0 | 66.0 |
| MALE | 41.5 | 58.5 |
| FEMALE | 36.7 | 63.3 |
| MARRIED | 41.6 | 58.4 |
| OTHERS | 37.0 | 67.0 |

The WRA set Tule Lake center for the segregation of those sympathies lay with Japan or against the United States. Camp Tule Lake was a segregation camp from July 1943 to the end, March 20, 1946. The camp housed people who were considered as disloyal and wanting to be repatriated to Japan. Many of the citizen had renounced their citizenship for variety of reasons and by intimidation.

## THE PRO-JAPAN SOCIETIES

Among the thing which made the Tule Lake different after segregation were the Pro-Japan or "Japanese Patriot" societies, which were a product of segregation and the labeling of Tule Lake as a little piece of Japan on American soil; but the beginning of which were foreign entirely to the culture, which gained their later truly anti-American characteristic and strength almost wholly and directly from the Congressional enactment of 1944 providing for voluntary renunciation of citizenship by persons residing on American soil and the interpretation and administration of this enactment by the Department of Justice.

The societies within which the Department of Justice found itself unable effectively to cope in Tule Lake Center were *Sokuji Kikoku Hoshi Dan (* Return Immediately to Serve the Emperor Society), which was the parent group; and *Hokoku Seinen Dan* (Young men's Patriotic Society) and *Hokoku Joshi Seinen Dan* (Young Women's Patriotic Society) which were its satellites.

There immediately forebears were a loosely connected organization aimed at re-segregation within Tule Lake itself (people who thought they wanted to return to Japan) had become irked upon discovery that they were residing , still, with people who did not. Neither of these organization was basically or necessarily anti- American.

The turning point in the character of these group was during the Army occupation of Tule Lake Colony subsequent to the Incident of November 4, 1943 and during which times Japanese language schools had usurped (while WRA's administration control was absent) quarter which had been set aside for recreation. The Japanese language schools put down their roots firmly while WRA's schools were inoperative. They became in effect schools of Japanese nationalism as well as languages, as the adopted names of some of them were frank to indicate.

This combination offered a fertile field for leaders who had remained here or who had come in with segregation and whose ambition were not being satisfied by the relatively restricted problem of re-segregation. The so-called language schools blossomed with the theories and the practices of *Nippon Danshi* (Sons of Japan or Flower of the Yamato Race), with dawn calisthenics and worship of the rising sun. They still had no specific anti-American hook to hang themselves upon, but with the coming of the Department of Justice to conduct hearings for renunciation of American Citizenship, an active program was seen and seized upon.

WRA's function at Tule Lake was to keep house for these people who had said they wanted to go to Japan but who, because of the War still in progress, could not yet go there- to furnish them with the necessities of life at least in full accord with the Geneva Convention. Its responsibility to those who could relocate was greater; but most of those in Tule Lake during the hey day of the Pro Japan societies could not relocate for reasons beyond WRA's control.

WRA, including the administration of Tule Lake Center, was neither a detaining, nor a punitive agent. It had not been contemplated that it be even an investigative one.

The Department of Justice, in its own right and among its various units, was all of these things. So, with the arrival from Washington of Mr.John L. Burling and his staff, with authority to hold renunciation hearing and also with authority to investigate trouble makers and remove them if need be, the situation with regard to Pro-Japan societies seemed on the way to being solved.

But it was not , Mr. Burling told the Japan society that their activity were those of irresponsible children and that they will not be tolerated. Mr. Burling shortly thereafter returned to Washington from where eventually he sent word that it was his considered opinion that WRA should do something about it.

It was a moot question whether the Administration of Tule Lake Center had authority to or otherwise could do anything about it, but it became apparent it would have to if anybody did. At this time Tule Lake Center had a population of 18, 500.

On the night of February 12, 1945, the night following the Department of Justice apprehending and removal of 650 men to Bismark, North Dakota, the administration raided the combined headquarters of *Sokuji Kikoku Hoshi Dan* and *Hokoku Seinen Dan* , stripped it and padlocked it.

That was the finish of the Pro-Japan organization in Tule Lake Center, but they had, with the unwitting or unheeding co-operation of both the Army and the Department of Justice, bilked and tragically altered the lives of nearly a third (5,500) of Tule Lake's population.

## THE VICTIMS

People in all degree of life, from youngster still in high school to mature men and women with American born children of their own, were caught and tossed by the unreasoning sweep of the renunciation fever which hit Tule Lake with establishment by the Department of Justice of its visible, on-the-premise, streamlined renunciation mill.

Action of the Army ,like the Nazi concentration camps, fed fumes into the asphyxiation funnel.

After the rescinding of the mass West Coast exclusion order, where the Army served individual exclusion orders, which in a large number of instance also were detaining orders but were not so identified; the Army process servers invariably asked "***have you applied for renunciation of citizenship***".

Some 600 former soldiers of the US Army were residence of the Tule Lake Center. They had been discharged "for the convenience of the government" at the outbreak of the War on a plan which never satisfactory was explained by the Army. These men who had worn the uniform and had it taken from them with no other explanation than "convenience" were embittered.

By no means all of the individual who renounced citizenship did so because of direct pressure of the Pro-Japan groups, although this pressure made a highly important contribution to the total. There were personal feeling of insult and degradation growing from the circumstances of the evacuation its results; there were family unity pressure from parents, or other relatives who still played a leading role

It must be considered that life in Tule Lake Center differed materially from that in other centers and certainly had little in common with life outside. The psychological atmosphere of Tule Lake life was more akin to the Nazi concentration camp, particularly after the Army occupation of the Center, the effect of which never were erased fully.

The fact that older people in this atmosphere, including men who had shouldered guns in wars, succumbed to renunciation , highlights the more tragic problems of the youngsters , who had not only to battle their own personal fears and battered prides, but to cope with Japan minded parents and grandparents as well.

They took the plunge, many of them , with eyes tightly closed and it was a rude awakening, abandonment in detention in many instances after Japan-born relatives had been freed (to relocate) and realization that the sacrifice which had been made on the altar of family unity had been not only futile but unappreciated.

Some of those who made the decision struck to it and went to Japan in the voluntarily "repatriation" begun by the Department of Justice as soon as shipping was available after the war was over. In Japan many of those and perhaps not strangely -- were working for the US Army as indigenous workers.

The bulk, when light of reasoning returned, sought means of regaining the discarded citizenship, or at least of remaining in the United States. Suits were filed, aimed at prevention of deportation and at court review of the constitutionality of the Congressional enactment providing for renunciation of citizenship on American soil and its administration by the Department of Justice. One of the key figure in perpetrating this tragedy was Abe Fortas , who years later became the (liberal element) an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court nominated by President Lyndon Johnson.

## RENUNCIATION

Around January 1944 the pro-Japanese societies at Tule Lake began advocating mass renunciation of American Citizenship.

## RENUNCIATION UNDER PUBLIC LAW 405

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| NOVEMBER | 1944 | 107 |
| DECEMBER | 1944 | 1,106 |
| JANUARY | 1945 | 3,400 |
| FEBRUARY | 1945 | 1.011 |
| MARCH | 1945 | 168 |
| APRIL | 1945 | 18 |
| MAY | 1945 | 7 |
| JUNE | 1945 | 14 |
| JULY | 1945 | 6 |
| TOTAL | | 5,837 |

There were more than 18,300 people at Tule Lake and a good many of them were American. Some of the young people, with traditional loyalty to parents, had simply come here rather than split the family. A small number of Tuleans were fanatical kibei, embittered Terminal Islanders were well represented; some of the young men admitted that they were dodging the draft - selective service had been reopened to the nisei .Others were frankly opportunist who, believing Japan would win, wanted to be on the right side. There were old issei who had always intended to return to their homeland to die, and who could not now face relocation in a strange place.

V-J Day came. Arrangement were made for repatriates and expatriates to go to Japan.

When the time to close Tule Lake came there were a lot of confusion as the residence realized that going to defeated and starving Japan was not in their interest.

The Department of Justice also made it difficult to leave the camp, even though the camp administration had written to the Justice Department of letting all remaining internees go home since the war was over for six month. The only way to leave the camp was by individual petition and this cumbersome process took up a long period. When March of 1946 rolled around many internees still had not heard from the Justice Department and in the last few weeks before closure, the families were in panic.

On the last day , March 19, 1945, the remaining personnel (550) were put on a train going to Crystal City, Texas and later to be shipped to Japan. There were over 6407 who were sent to Japan and of these over 4,400 were Japanese American. These people suffered great hardship in the war torn country and from their lack of speaking the Japanese language.

## CRYSTAL CITY DETENTION CENTER, TEXAS

This center was the last stop for the internees from Tule Lake Center before departing for Japan and also for several different classification of personnel. See notes on the site plan. This camp was operated by the Justice Department and held several different classification of Japanese American personnel. The records are not clear as to the site layouts, the distribution of population, and disposition of these personnel. Several groups have laid claim to being at the camp and then returning to the west coast and others have been sent to Japan. This center was the last to close relating to the Japanese American internment. The last occupants were the Japanese Peruvians who were not deported to Japan but stayed until closure which was on October 30, 1946.

After closure the center was disposed to Crystal City for use as a low income housing and to shelter the migratory farm workers. There was a riot over the poor housing conditions by the Mexican Americans and Crystal City ,the owner, demolished the housing project.

Since the center was operated under the Justice Department, both the UCLA and Bancroft libraries have scant records of the Japanese Americans in their files. The original records could be in the National Archives in Washington D. C.

## WHAT HAPPENED TO THE NISEI IN THE IMMEDIATE POST WAR YEARS

### CONTINENTAL USA

Those that relocated to the midwest, or eastern seaboard states and inter-mountain states were accepted by the public without the discrimination of the West Coast and prospered in their jobs and housing. As the years went by it was around 1955 to 1963 when the parents suddenly realized that their children had come of age and was approaching the period in which their children should be meeting eligible mates. But in isolated areas of the midwest there were few to be met. Suddenly they almost in mass uprooted again and returned to the west coast, especially to southern California.

The return to the west coast had cost the nisei or issei another ten or fifteen years of their productive lives. If the progressive directors had left them in the centers until the end and let them return to the west coast they would have lost only four years. The Japanese were similar to other people, always seeking a hospitable environment for their children.

Even today, fifty years later, the long exodus is continuing as the nisei retire from their jobs in the midwest and the east coast. Many professionals are coming back to the west coast to retire and be buried in their old haunting grounds similar to a salmon swimming to their place of birth to gasp the last breath of air.

### JAPANESE HAWAIIANS

There were two groups of Japanese people from the Hawaiian Island. Those who migrated to the west coast prior to December 1941 but were always referred as Hawaiians; these people evacuated with the other Japanese Americans to the relocation camps and then returned to their homes on the west coast. Many mainland nisei mistakenly thought that this group had evacuated from Hawaii.

Another group considered as 'high risk' from Hawaii were first detained on Sand Island (an Assembly Center), located in the Honolulu harbor and then sent to the mainland in early 1943. The personnel were generally people who lived and worked along the shores such as fisherman, longshoreman and waterfront labor leaders. There were 1,700 personnel who were sent to two WRA internment camps; Jerome, Arkansas and Poston, Arizona. After the war these personnel were sent to Los Angeles and awaited for transportation to their homes in Hawaii.

A significant number of Japanese Hawaiians after a taste of the west coast remained in California. These personnel settled in two areas; in northern California in San Jose - Sunnyvale area and in the southern California many settled in the Long Beach - Torrance - Gardena area.

### JAPAN

After the cessation of the Pacific War; several distinctly different groups of Japanese Americans and nationals were delivered to Japan. Some were repatriates but for others it was their first encounter with Japan:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | Tule Lake Segregation Camp | 4,407 |
| 2. | Japanese Peruvians from Crystal City, Texas | 1,700 |
| 3 | Other detention centers | 300 |
| | Total sent to Japan | 6,407 |

### PARTIAL SAILING LIST TO JAPAN

| DATES | NUMBERS |
|---|---|
| June 4, 1942 | 4 |
| September 2, 1943 | 314 |
| November 25, 1945 | 423 |

| | |
|---|---|
| December 29,1945 | 3,551 |
| February 23, 1946 | 423 |
| Remaining 1946 | 1,692 |
| Total sent to Japan | 6,407 |

The Japanese from North , Central and South America including issei, nisei and kibei were transported through the port of New Orleans starting in September 1945 and at regular monthly intervals into 1946. They left Long Beach, California directly to Japan and also from New Orleans, Louisiana and took over a month traveling through the Panama Canal and arriving in Yokohama and Kobe , Japan. They departed by trains arranged by the occupation army to their destinations which were located near their family prefectures.

During the winter of 1945 - 46, the living and supply of food were near starvation level. It was especially hard for the younger nisei who needed to attend the Japanese schools as many did not know the rudimentary of the language. Many were treated by their relatives as outcasts and were branded by the classmates as neither a fish nor a fowl.

As the Korean War started in 1950 and American forces still occupied Japan, many expatriate Japanese Americans because of their skill in English language worked for the US Armed Forces facilities throughput Japan. Ironically, these personnel were treated as indigenous (native) and some worked under the nisei of the occupation forces.

During 1948-1953, the Justice Department began to authorize these citizen-less personnel to individually petition to regain their lost American citizenship. This was a tedious and costly process and without help from the mainland lawyers and relatives most gave up the effort and remained in Japan. Those that returned to the USA faced the dilemma of reeducation in the English language. As years had gone by and the difficult task of catching up were too formidable, they settled to be forgotten citizens..

Those that remained in Japan are clustered in several areas:

Tokyo - Yokohama, Hiroshima. Wakayama. Shimonseki,
Fukuoka, Kumamoto, Kagoshima and Okinawa

Their children and their successors are well educated. The exodus to Japan did not seem to hurt the future generations and the rapid economic gains made in the 1970s to 1990s made the Japanese descendants prosperous.

### *Epilogue*

During the camp era a Caucasian staff member from Heart Mountain Center took a vacation at Denver, Colorado and reported the following about how the four nisei reported their situations:

The first nisei was a permanent resident of Colorado who had been here long before the outbreak of the war and did not have to relocate; but he was extremely curious about the centers conditions. Having not gone through the whole evacuation process, he simply can not grasp the complexity of a center life but apparently he considered that his present lot is lots better then that of the evacuees in the center. He was concerned about the fellow nisei who were interned, how they were treated and worried about their future.

The second nisei was considered lucky as he voluntarily evacuated out of military zone one to Denver before the trap was closed. When he settled in Denver the housing market was extremely tight and he did not obtain adequate housing nor did he obtain a well paying job. When he heard about those that were interned and the free meals and housing; he was extremely envious since his position in life was no better

than those that were interned. Fifty years later he went berserk when he found out that those interned were to receive a reparation check for $20,000, while he received a goose egg.

The third nisei had relocated to Denver from the Heart Mountain Center and found the opportunities which Denver provided even better than he imagined even though he had to start from the bottom of the ladder. He patronized the movie houses and small eating places and sent letters back to the camps telling his friends to relocate as soon as possible. He later climbed to the top of his profession and was noted as a famous nisei.

The fourth nisei still resided in the Concentration Camp and received the letters from the other nisei and pondered about the outside world. Being an artist with lot of free time to hone his skill he procrastinated about leaving the Center but was afraid of the future. Eventually the time to leave the camp was forced upon him because of the closing deadline. He was put on a train with twenty five dollars and a ticket to the west coast; years later, being poverty stricken he rejoiced when he received the reparation check and immediately spent the money for the two daughters law school tuitions and quietly muttered to himself ' ***never again***'.

.....Average people of Denver and elsewhere.....either the people did not know of the evacuation or if they did; they have forgotten it long time ago. Out of courtesy the adult would listen to the story but that's about all. The moral is that we are too conscious of the ***injustice of the evacuation.*** To us evacuation loomed and still loom to many of us, the biggest thing that ever happened, whereas in cold reality it is nothing but a small incident in a rapidly changing world. Sooner we overcome this evacuation consciousness , it is better all of us must outlive this terrible nightmare.

***So onto each nisei's life some rain fell .....Why did it happen; which group will be next?***

## *POSTSCRIPT*

Question constantly asked: ***Can internment happen again?*** There is always a possibility; but hardly probable for several reasons:

1. The changes in population composition which has taken place since 1940. Today there are coalition of minority in California which comprises the majority of 55%. In central urban areas the minorities are 65%.For a politician to win any race he needs the support of the minority voters.

2. The rapid urbanization of the west coast; in 1940 the west coast was rural and by 1990 these states are highly urbanized. It is much easier for a racist to operate in rural environment than in multi-cultural urban settings. In urban areas there are many civil rights organizations with strong leaders.

3. The education of the people have improved since 1940s. Today most people in urban area has some college education and in metropolitan area some 60-70% are attending colleges. Back in 1940, even a high school education was considered adequate. It is much easier for politicians and certain types of news media to propagandize the uneducated than the college graduates.

4. Most importantly, the Japanese Americans now have produced their own lawyers. In 1940s and 50s, they were dependent on the Caucasian lawyers to look after their interest, but records indicate that the lawyers did not adequately nor intelligently pursue our interest. In each of the four famous test cases involving the nisei, the Caucasian lawyers put up a weak defense because they were either inept or coddling with the government or both. If the Japanese Americans only had their own lawyers then, they could have deterred the unconstitutional activities of the US Government.

In the last ten years, the newest generation have graduated from top law schools, such as Harvard, Stanford, Boalt, Yale, UCLA and Tulane and many have graduated in the top ten percent. ***These graduates are articulate, aggressive and brilliant when compared to the nisei of 50 years ago. Without any doubt they could hold their own against any oppositions.***

In ten to fifteen years only these maps will the witness; --- the ***issei*** are gone and each passing day the ***nisei*** era is rapidly coming to a close, and the entire dual generation movement can be summed up by the Japanese nautical term '*maru*' meaning what goes around, comes around seems to have happened in the intervening

## REFERENCE NOTE

*The entire text and maps are derived from notes obtained from the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, California. For personal assessment of the relocation movement, review the original source documents. The library is open to the public; hours M-F 9-5, Sat 1 -5.Please check the schedule during holidays and summer sessions. The main document catalog is obtained at the check-out desk; ask for the Japanese American Internment Files. This is a black manila folder which lists all the documents. The main files are under 67/14C -((X-0.00). If you are planning extensive research bring a laptop computer as all the materials must be read in the library and photostat and xerox copies are expensive to order . In order to review all the main files, allow one week, two weeks if you can allow the time. The original data and dairies are fascinating to read, especially the trials of Min Yasui, the closing of the camps, the reasoning of General DeWitt and John McCloy and the letters supporting the internment..*

AN APOLOGY LETTER WHICH ACCOMPANIED THE $20,000 REPARATION CHECK

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

A monetary sum and words alone cannot restore lost years or erase painful memories; neither can they fully convey our Nation's resolve to rectify injustice and to uphold the rights of individuals. We can never fully right the wrongs of the past. But we can take a clear stand for justice and recognize that serious injustices were done to Japanese Americans during World War II.

In enacting a law calling for restitution and offering a sincere apology, your fellow Americans have, in a very real sense, renewed their traditional commitment to the ideals of freedom, equality, and justice. You and your family have our best wishes for the future.

Sincerely,

GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 1990